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Preface
Research in the premodern history of Southeast Asia hasbeen limited by a paucity of sources, a fact that has dis-
couraged many from undertaking further study of the pre-1500
era. There is, for instance, a total absence of a local chronicle
tradition until after the eleventh century. The bulk of the
available local sources for Southeast Asia’s early history are the
inscribed stones and metal plates through which religious insti-
tutions and political elites presented their idealized view of
early Southeast Asian society. When historical events or indi-
viduals are mentioned at all, it is to illustrate that the proper
order of the universe is maintained by the subordination of
those in the secular realm to those who are concerned with the
universe’s harmony. To overcome the ambiguities, distortions,
and voids in these sources, historians have looked to external
references that reflect the visits of foreigners to Southeast Asia,
for example, the accounts of Western travelers (including
Arabs) and Chinese pilgrims, and to the records of diplomatic
contact between Southeast Asian states and the great civiliza-
tions of India and China. Among the latter the Chinese dynastic
chronicles have been the most useful.
Early scholarship on Southeast Asian history in the West
was the product of well-trained Dutch, French, and British his-
torians whose research was an extension of their countries’
colonial experience. They tended to focus on external forces
that shaped Southeast Asia. Furthermore, these historians con-
centrated on the religious and political aspects of the epi-
graphic and literary sources and thus were especially con-
cerned with the reconstruction of dynastic chronologies.
Working from this base, modern historians have begun to re-
examine the sources critically in order to filter out information
useful for the reconstruction of social and economic history.
They have also attempted to balance the picture of outside
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forces by focusing equally on indigenous responses. And in the
past fifteen years archaeological research in Southeast Asia has
become sufficiently sophisticated to begin to supply these histo-
rians with new data.
To appreciate these advances and new orientations, one
might make a comparison of George Coedès’ impressive works
The Making of South east Asia or The Indianized States of
Southeast Asia with O. W. Wolters’ Early Indonesian Commerce
and The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History. Coedès was syn-
thesizing early twentieth-century Western history of Southeast
Asia, much of it done by Coedès himself, and work that was con-
cerned with Indian culture as the basis for state development.
Wolters, on the other hand, focused on the activities of those
Southeast Asians who responded to the presence of traders
and other foreigners—on their own initiative—by optimizing
their opportunities. Unlike Coedès, however, Wolters and other
recent scholars have normally examined specific areas within
the region without coming to terms with the general regional
patterns that characterize Southeast Asia’s early history.
But in his extended essay History, Culture, and Region in
Southeast Asian Perspectives, Wolters summarizes his percep-
tions of features common to the various early Southeast Asian
societies he has researched. To demonstrate the validity of
studying Southeast Asia as a regional unit, Wolters stresses the
linkages and cultural dialogue among Southeast Asian peoples
who shared a “common ocean.” Like Coedès, Wolters is con-
cerned with the role foreign culture (Indian or, in the case of
Vietnam, Chinese) assumed in the process of societal devel-
opment; but in contrast to Coedès, Wolters is more sensitive
to the indigenous elements that shaped the “localization” of
foreign forms.
This study also puts Southeast Asia on a large canvas and
treats areas not previously brought together for treatment
along comparative lines. By bringing together new theoretical
constructs and recent archaeological finds and interpretations
it attempts two things: to ask new questions of old sources and
to integrate the histories of individual civilizations to demon-
strate general regional patterns. It is intended to stimulate and
encourage further study of Southeast Asia’s premodern era.
Chapter 1 introduces Bennet Bronson’s model of riverine
exchange and statecraft and postulates a hierarchical and in-
tegrated marketing system that reflects the pattern of trade
and state relations characteristic of the wet-rice civilizations of
mainland Southeast Asia and Java. Chapter 2 describes trade
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during the era of the Roman Empire. It integrates archae-
ological evidence with Roman and Chinese texts to examine
the expansion of the international maritime trade in the first
century of the Christian era. It looks at why the Funan state
grew and the increasing volume of trade from India to the
Isthmus of Kra, from the isthmus to Funan’s coastal realm on
the lower Vietnam coast, and from there to China.
Chapter 3 emphasizes the dual nature of Funan’s success
as both a maritime depot and wet-rice producer and begins to
demonstrate the descriptive value of the models of statecraft
introduced in chapter 1. Reevaluating the evidence concerning
Funan, a realm whose authority by the third century A.D. had
spread from lower Vietnam across modern Thailand and Cam-
bodia’s coasts to the upper Malay Peninsula, the demise of
Funan is explained by the development of a route around the
Malay Peninsula and the subsequent emergence of new trade
depots in Sumatra and Java around the fifth century. The
sources for Funan’s history include archaeological, epigraphic,
and Chinese dynastic records, and a new look at them estab-
lishes that although Funan was not the well-integrated political
system the Chinese believed it to be, it was nevertheless im-
portant because of the cultural forms it evolved, forms that
anticipate later riverine and wet-rice plain political systems.
Chapter 4 analyzes the rise of Śrīvijaya and its rule over the
Strait of Malacca from the sixth through the eleventh centuries
and argues that Śrīvijaya was essentially a Sumatran state. By
examining in detail the earliest epigraphy of the Śrīvijaya state,
one finds that Śrīvijaya’s coastal depots had elaborate systems
of statecraft that integrated the depots with their hinterland
and also separated international traders from those hinterland
people who actually produced the commodities that the depot-
based rulers collected and sold. Their success depended not
simply on outside traders but more importantly on their ability
to see the value of and to use selected items of Indian statecraft
to consolidate their rule locally and thus control the hinterland
as well.
Chapter 5 argues that pre-tenth-century Javanese polities,
contemporaries of Śrīvijaya, were ritually based and were
evolving market systems but were not the centralized states de-
scribed by many historians. The chapter reevaluates the epi-
graphic and archaeological remains of pre-tenth-century Java
and the studies of this evidence by Dutch and Indonesian
scholars and explains why the regionally based Javanese elites
Preface
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were unable to develop a higher form of political integration
until the Javanese court was established in eastern Java during
the late tenth and early eleventh centuries.
Chapters 6 and 7 describe the development of systems of
socioeconomic integration in the mainland civilizations of
Angkor and Champa. Surveying Khmer (Cambodian) and San-
skrit epigraphy from the Angkor realm, chapter 6 examines the
development of Khmer temple networks and their role in the
evolution of the Angkor-based polity. Discussion of Khmer wet-
rice plain statecraft in the Angkor era from the ninth through
the early thirteenth centuries is continued in the following
chapter, where it is compared to the statecraft practiced in the
Cham realm of the southern Vietnam coast. The chapter surveys
Cham historical records but concentrates on two Arab inscrip-
tions that provide the only concrete references to merchant
activity in this area. It also draws upon Vietnamese chronicle
references to enhance understanding of the impact of the mari-
time community upon the Cham state.
Chapter 8 studies archaeological remains; Burmese, south
Indian, and Khmer epigraphy; and early Thai and Malay chron-
icles to analyze transitions in early Southeast Asian statecraft.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the mainland states of
Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia withdrew from the main in-
ternational route into their own regional commercial networks.
Their withdrawal was accompanied by a Theravāda Buddhist
revival and helps to explain why these areas were not on the
routes that Islam traveled—and why Islam’s later importance in
Southeast Asia was confined to the peninsula and the islands. It
also notes the new Java-dominated trade in the archipelago and
the emergence in the thirteenth century of new riverine states
on the north Sumatra coast.
Chapter 9 examines epigraphic and literary records of the
east Java-based Majapahit state that rose to prominence in
the late thirteenth century. Since the kings of Majapahit were
among the first to transform a pre-1300 classical tributary
system into a more highly integrated, centralizing state, its
history serves to demonstrate regional trends that persisted
into the sixteenth century.
In romanizing Southeast Asian languages, I have employed
the practice currently favored in the Southeast Asian country
under study. Chinese words and names appear according to the
Wade-Giles system rather than the currently fashionable Pinyin
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system; Sanskrit and Tamil words and names appear with dia-
critics appropriate to each and are written in the form currently
used by most Indologists.
Acknowledgment is extended to the University of Michigan
Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, Elmira College,
Tufts University, the American Institute of Indian Studies, the
National Endowment for the Humanities, and the American
Council of Learned Societies, who in various periods financed
my research and the preparation of this book. Southeast Asia’s
history was introduced to me by Robina Quale at Albion College,
Constance Wilson at Northern Illinois University, and John K.
Whitmore at the University of Michigan, who has continued to
be an invaluable critic. I studied Indonesian languages under
David H. deQueljoe at Northern Illinois University; Madhav
Deshpande introduced me to Sanskrit at the University of
Michigan; and William Gedney provided suggestions on the
translation of early Khmer.
My interpretation of Southeast Asia’s early history has been
shaped by my contact with numerous colleagues in the United
States and in Southeast Asia. While teaching in New York, I ben-
efited from O. W. Wolters’ comments. I have tested my ideas
on the members of the faculty and student body at Elmira
College, the State University of New York at Binghamton, Tufts
University, and North Adams State College. David K. Wyatt of
Cornell University, Robert Van Niel of the University of Hawaii,
George W. Spencer of Northern Illinois University, Lynda Shaf-
fer of Tufts University, and John Villiers, director of the British
Institute in South-East Asia (Singapore) generously provided
criticism of the preliminary manuscript. Damaris A. Kirchhofer
of the University of Hawaii Press patiently guided the prepa-
ration and publication of the final draft. My wife Lynne has
endured the various ups and downs over five years as the man-
uscript took shape and finally went to press. To all these as well
as many others too numerous to individually name I extend my
thanks.
I stress that my view of Southeast Asia’s early history is still
evolving and in no way does this study represent a final de-
piction of early Southeast Asian history. I acknowledge that the
noted paucity of sources makes my translations of Southeast
Asian epigraphy and interpretations of other currently available
sources subject to instant revision when new archaeological dis-
coveries are made. Until such new information allows a de-
finitive analysis, other historians’ translations and interpreta-
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tions that disagree with mine are equally plausible. I have pur-
posely structured the text to make the modern historiography
of Southeast Asia’s past accessible to a wider audience. The
chapters that follow are intended to solicit discussion, and I en-
courage others to test my hypotheses in their own studies of
Southeast Asia’s early history.
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Trade and Statecraft in
Early Southeast Asia
TradeandStatecraftinEarlySoutheastAsia
The subject of this book is the interaction between SoutheastAsian peoples and foreign cultures that was the conse-
quence of the strategic position of the Southeast Asian archi-
pelago along the major premodern maritime route connecting
East and West. Under examination are the classical centers of
power that emerged between the first and early fourteenth cen-
turies A.D. and the problems their leaders encountered in ruling
their domains. Two forms of classical states are examined: the
riverine coastal states of the Indonesian archipelago, the Malay
Peninsula, and the Philippines and the lowland wet-rice states of
the mainland (Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam)
and of Java.
The book approaches the sources of Southeast Asia’s clas-
sical era with the tools of modern economic history and high-
lights the role that international trade in Southeast Asia played
in the evolution of classical civilizations. The view taken here
is that Southeast Asia’s response to international trade was a
reflection of preexisting patterns of exchange. Well-developed
internal socioeconomic and political networks existed in
Southeast Asia before significant foreign economic penetration
took place; with the growth of interest in Southeast Asian com-
modities and the refocusing of the major East-West commercial
routes on the region during the early centuries of the Christian
era, internal conditions within Southeast Asian states changed
to accommodate the increased external contacts. The juncture
of the trade routes and the existing or developing forms of ex-
change and state polity in Southeast Asia suggests the way this
adjustment was made.
An early type of exchange involved highland hunters and
gatherers who exchanged their goods and services with lowland
cultivators; for example, trade between groups that practiced
swidden (slash and burn) and sawah (wet-rice) cultivation. 1
1
Another type of early exchange network was characterized by
trade between hinterland populations and coastal peoples; the
hinterland people supplied local agricultural or forest products
that were in turn dispensed to international traders. Coastal-
based traders returned goods of foreign origin or specialized
services (for example, “moneylending”) to the hinterland pro-
ducers. In a third variant, foreign merchants established a
coastal base and then worked from this base to organize the
necessary trade mechanisms that allowed them to extract local
products from the hinterlands. In contrast to some views that
identify this last pattern of interaction as most characteristic
of Southeast Asia’s premodern age, 2 this study contends that
direct contact was unusual and that Southeast Asia’s interaction
with foreign merchants was the result of indigenous initiative
and response to opportunities that already existed.
In this book, as in other studies by Western historians, there
is a tendency to impose Western values on ideas of what con-
stituted advanced civilizations in early Southeast Asia. Urban-
ization and the development of state systems are considered
signs of advancement. The great urban centers of Angkor (Cam-
bodia) and Java with their massive stone edifices thus become
standards for comparison. But were the nonurban yet focused
classical societies less valid as being “advanced” or “civilized,”
and was it necessary for an advanced civilization to leave im-
pressive temple complexes? 3
In partial response to this dichotomy, the focus here is on
political integration rather than on political centralization. The
evolution of Southeast Asian societies needs to be understood
on their terms. An approach to this understanding can be made
by looking at instances of cultural transition and continuity that
took place whether or not there was outside stimulation or
the development of a highly centralized polity—that is, a state
in which a bureaucratic center dominated and effectively inte-
grated its subordinate population centers under its elaborate
system of administration, justice, and protection. The states of
Southeast Asia’s classical age are not depicted as highly bu-
reaucratic polities, even in the case of the prosperous Cam-
bodian and Javanese wet-rice realms. Rather this study analyzes
why a higher degree of political centralization was not possible,
despite the opportunities for economic development and conse-
quent political innovation afforded by participation in interna-
tional trade.
Trade and Statecraft in Early Southeast Asia
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STATECRAFT IN INDIANIZED SOUTHEAST ASIA
An examination of Southeast Asia’s geography reveals two dom-
inant patterns. The island world is characterized by numerous
river systems that flow from interior highlands to the ocean, a
feature that has had significant impact upon the island world’s
social and economic evolution. Over time people settled among
these various river systems, populations becoming concen-
trated only in the broad delta regions at river mouths. This
diffusion of the population had important implications for the
island realm’s political systems, as those who attempted to
govern the island world found it necessary to bring multiple
river systems under their authority in order to implement their
political hegemony. Because it was impractical to control an
entire river system, a pattern more common than complete
political subjugation emerged—the establishment of partial
hegemony through direct rule of only coastal plains and river
mouths. By controlling the river mouth it was possible to in-
fluence movement up and down a river system. A river-mouth
ruler was able to utilize his control over the riverine communi-
cations network to forge various alliances with upriver groups.
In contrast to the geographical inaccessibility of the island
world caused by the multiple river system pattern, Southeast
Asia’s mainland along with a small number of island locales
is dominated by major river systems with corresponding broad
river plains, which are relatively flat, fertile, and extremely
productive agriculturally. These river plains were conducive to
the development of population centers by those seeking to cul-
tivate rice in the rich soil of the plains. Rice plain population
centers also proved easier to dominate politically than the more
diffused population centers of the multiple river system geog-
raphy. Southeast Asia’s great political systems of the past all
had a geographical base in a fertile rice plain: for example,
Pagan in the Irrawaddy River plain of Burma, Angkor near the
Tonle Sap in Cambodia, and the Vietnamese state in the Red
River basin of Vietnam.
In the island world this great plain geographical pattern
is found in central Java and again in the Brantas River basin
of eastern Java. As on the mainland, population centers and
great states developed in both regions. While the majority of
the island world shared a multiple river system geography and
thus what may be characterized as a riverine political system,
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
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the rich-soiled rice plains of central and eastern Java allowed
the development of a higher degree of social and political inte-
gration than was possible elsewhere in the island world.
The problem of defining what constituted a classical
Southeast Asian “state” may be approached by a careful de-
scription of the statecraft—the management of state affairs—of
the riverine and wet-rice plain systems. Based on Western and
Chinese prejudices that equate advancement with the evolution
of elaborate state systems, successful Southeast Asian wet-rice
civilizations of the mainland and Java are assumed to have
become centralized polities. 4 Historians have also minimized
the level of integration between the coast and hinterland of the
riverine states. 5 The wet-rice states were not as centralized
as most Western historians have believed, however, and the
riverine states were not as isolated from their hinterlands as
previously thought. Indeed, the two systems were not totally un-
related, as the mainland states had both a wet-rice aspect and
a coastal international trade sector that enhanced the economy
of the hinterland. Thus, the two were not at opposite poles but
were part of a continuum. In both, local statecraft was orga-
nized to control people not boundaries. Indeed, manpower was
the basis of political power.
Classical Southeast Asia was generally underpopulated.
Would-be rulers competed among themselves to attract the
manpower necessary for them to assume power. The continued
existence of a state and its management polity—that is, a state
in which a bureaucratic center dominated and effectively inte-
grated its subordinate population centers under its elaborate
system of administration, justice, and protection—depended on
the ruling elite’s ability to control population centers. The
control a state claimed and its actual control over people,
however, were quite different. 6 The “core” of the domain was
that area of land, usually near the capital, that was adminis-
tered directly by the state’s central administration. The king
was usually a major landholder in this core, but the landholding
rights of others—normally rights to a share of the produce from
the land under their authority rather than ownership in the
modern sense—were also protected. 7 “Peripheral areas,” those
areas bordering the core, were in a tributary relationship to
the state. Although the state might claim to have administra-
tively annexed these areas, its real control was minimal, as local
elites remained in power while paying homage to the center.
Although the records of monarchs might be widely distributed,
the wording employed in engraved inscriptions found in areas
Trade and Statecraft in Early Southeast Asia
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outside the state’s core domain, where the ruler’s power was
not direct, honored the authority of the strong local elite. It was
through the support of such leaders of local populations that
the ruler could command the loyalty of population centers pe-
ripheral to the state’s core.
Classical states showed little capacity to absorb the popu-
lations of regions beyond their core. People of various regions
could be brought under the state’s control, yet, although a re-
gional population might be engulfed by a state even for several
centuries, with the decline of that state, this same group of
people was capable of reemerging with its local traditions
intact—a pattern not unique to Southeast Asia. The key to a
center’s control over manpower was its ability to form political
alliances with the locally based elite. A ruler, acting from a
center of authority, fragmented his potential enemies by
reaching agreements with the leaders of local population
centers, and these potential opponents became subordinate
allies of the state. In return for their patronage of the state’s
monarch, the local elites enjoyed enhanced status in the eyes
of their followers, and the allied population received the pro-
tection afforded by the state’s armies and shared in a successful
state’s prosperity.
Early historiography of the classical period depicted the cap-
itals of Southeast Asian states as a social pyramid, with the
monarch and his elite on top having little personal contact with
the people below. In this view local populations were subju-
gated, continually exploited, and generally in awe of the elite
who resided in the state’s capital. 8 A more intense interaction
and interdependency existed between state centers and their
subordinate populations, however. In some cases the rulers of
classical states even appointed their own clan members to ad-
minister key “provinces.” In Java, for instance, classical states
were divided into numerous regional provinces (watĕk), each
governed by provincial chiefs (rakrayān) who were often the
sons of the states’ monarchs. 9 In the Sumatra-based state of
Śrīvijaya certain areas of the realm in the Strait of Malacca
were ruled by chiefs (dātu), some of whom were relatives of the
king, while others were ruled by dātu of nonroyal background.
The distinction between the powers of the two is not entirely
clear, although it appears that the Śrīvijaya monarch was quite
willing to accept strong local leaders as his subordinate d ātu.
Śrīvijaya, Java, and other classical Southeast Asian states
merged traditional indigenous symbols of divinity and power
with Indian cosmological symbolism and religious theory to
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
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form an ideological basis for their kingship. The blending of
indigenous and Indic traditions is seen, for instance, in the
universal significance of the mountain in the three mainland
wet-rice states. In Cambodia, “Mount Mahendra” became the
home of the devarāja in the cult of Jayavarman II in the early
ninth century—a cult that extensively subordinated worship of
local deities to the king’s worship of Śiva (see chap. 6). As the
traditional abode of ancestor spirits, the mountain was already
considered sacred by indigenous tradition. By incorporating the
external god Śiva, who was known in Indian philosophy as the
“Lord of the Mountain” and for his association with fertility, the
king’s position was reinforced. It remained for Cambodian kings
to associate themselves with this mountain and thereby sym-
bolize their ability to guarantee the flow of life-power from the
realm of the ancestors to their subjects. In Burma, the various
nat spirits were integrated into a similar cult that also came
to be focused on a “Lord of the Mountain,” the Mahagīri spirit
of “Mount Popa.” In Vietnam, kings were regarded as descen-
dants from the union of the nāga (water) spirit and a maiden
who resided on the mountain inhabited by the mountain spirit.
The necessity of this process of incorporating indigenous folk
belief is well shown in the case of Vietnam, where one reason
for the failure of the early Sino-oriented elite of the upper Red
River Delta to form a lasting state was their unwillingness to in-
tegrate local folk traditions into their Confucian ideology. 10
The early Southeast Asian monarch’s powers were bestowed
through ceremony. The royal court, its activities, and its style
recreated a world of the gods—in theory, a heaven on earth.
Here all greatness and glory were concentrated. By successfully
fulfilling his role as the hypothetical focus of all sanctity and
power, the king maintained the orderliness of the world. The
king’s court attempted to develop ritual links to its subordinate
centers of power by integrating local religious cults into a state
religious system, whereby the subordinate centers imitated the
ritual style of the royal center. 11 Local deities and, of most con-
sequence, local ancestor worship were blended into the state’s
religious ceremony. The state made great use of Indian (or, in
the case of Vietnam, Chinese) ceremony, performed by religious
specialists or elites who assumed the role of priests. These state
ceremonies, however, were built on traditional beliefs of how
spirits and ancestors were to be manipulated to guarantee the
prosperity of the living. Indic or Sinic patterns were thus uti-
Trade and Statecraft in Early Southeast Asia
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lized to enhance local religious views to the advantage of the
elite, whose ritual magic was presented to their subjects as
being greater than that of earlier practice.
The state elite’s patronage of the Hindu and Buddhist tradi-
tions from India brought them into a wider universe of symbols
and attachments and provided an Indian framework for their
statecraft. Southeast Asian kings utilized Sanskrit vocabulary,
described the world in the idiom of Hindu and Buddhist thought,
and sponsored art and architecture that expressed the Hindu
and Buddhist world views. 12 Royal monuments were cosmo-
logical symbols redefining the boundaries of time and space to
the advantage of the state’s elite. A vast and orderly cosmos was
substantiated by the most advanced mathematical astronomy
of the time and was the foundation for Hindu and Buddhist
thought. 13 States were patterned on the order of the cosmos
and linked the sacred and secular orders. A ruler and his capital
were at the center of the universe; cosmological and magical
symbols expressed royal power. In the Hindu and Buddhist con-
cepts of state the ruler facilitated the establishment of a sec-
ular society that was more nearly in harmony with the natural
cosmic order (dharma). In a successful state, society was har-
monious as well as prosperous. The most effective ruler did not
force conformity by use of physical might (daṇḍa) but achieved
success due to his righteous victory (dhammavijaya/dharmav-
ijaya) and continued peaceful leadership. The just ruler was
the cakravartin (“universal monarch”), whose illustrious moral
force uplifted his subjects and established the secular condi-
tions necessary for the attainment of their salvation. 14
Summarizing their perceptions of the Hindu and Buddhist
traditions, early Southeast Asian rulers fused these cosmo-
logical principles with Indic topographical formulas
(maṇḍala—a “contained core”) that provided a design for the
integration of clan or lineage-based groups into more complex
centralized polities. In the Indian philosophical tradition a
maṇḍala was a sacred diagram of the cosmos that was normally
depicted in art as a geometric construct of encompassed circles
and rectangles. The worldly maṇḍala (state) in early Southeast
Asia was defined by its center, not its perimeter, as there was no
notion of a firm frontier. 15 Subordinate population centers sur-
rounding the center were variably drawn to participate in the
ceremony of the state system. To encourage their participation,
the personal and regional cults practiced in the state’s regions
were assembled at the center. One theoretically moved from
the mundane world toward the spiritual one by approaching the
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sacred axis from one of the four quarters (defined by the points
of the compass). The devotee/subject was to become caught up
in a psychological state that grew in intensity as he was drawn
to this sacred core of the universe and its “world mountain”
(normally a central temple complex) that joined the celestial
powers with the fertile soils of the earth.
While in a theoretical sense the king’s only duty was thus
to maintain the world order—to promote prosperity and to fa-
cilitate passage to the realm of the ancestors—in practice his
duties sometimes involved the application of customary law re-
garding land and labor. In an inscription from central Java dated
860, for example, state administrators were asked to intervene
in a local dispute when the village elders and a certain indi-
vidual, who represented a religious foundation (temple), could
not resolve the method of repaying a considerable debt owed to
the local community. In this case the state administrators ruled
in favor of the local community. 16 However, since Southeast
Asian epigraphy does not contain many references to the adjudi-
cation of local disputes, one may assume that the state normally
remained above such conflicts during the classical age, discour-
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aging all but major disputes from clogging the state’s admin-
istrative system. This policy encouraged the continuity of local
custom, which the state generally left untouched as long as it
was not disruptive to state harmony.
The effective ruler also took an interest in his state’s eco-
nomic activity. In addition to being the ideological center of
the state, the royal capital was the economic center of the
monarch’s domain. The economic resources of the state’s core
were very important to its ability to maintain power. Rulers of
wet-rice states therefore attempted to increase the agricultural
output of their core. Under state supervision the construction
of water tanks and irrigation systems were undertaken, and
economic development in general was encouraged. In Java,
for example, to develop economically peripheral lands, reward
loyal followers, and extend the control of the throne, royal
land grants known as sīma (“freehold”) were given. 17 Although
such land was considered to be outside the administrative au-
thority of the king—freeing it from royal demands for taxes and
service—a ceremony dedicating the sīma land grant emphasized
that the grantee was expected to remain loyal to the Javanese
state. This ceremony involved an oath in which the grantee
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
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pledged his loyalty, and it culminated with the pronouncement
of a curse by a religious official threatening those present who
were not loyal to their monarch. 18
Although different in nature, the economic center of the
Śrīvijaya maritime state was functionally similar to those of the
wet-rice producing states. It served as a locus for economic
redistribution, fulfilling roles both as a trade entrepôt and as
the central treasury for a series of ports. A downriver port
on the edge of the Sumatra hinterland, the Śrīvijaya capital
was more vulnerable to attacks from outsiders as well as to
the rebellions of its hinterland inhabitants than the land-based
states that were established inland well away from the coast.
Yet the capital’s economic control over its disparate subject
population—upriver tribesmen and coastal sea nomads—was
similar to that of the land-based states. Because it was difficult
to control directly tribal producers who were distant from the
capital, the Śrīvijaya state relied on either physical force or
alliance relationships, symbolized by an oath administered to
state subordinates, to establish and maintain its economic
hegemony in peripheral areas. While a royal navy of sea nomads
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maintained the capital’s position as the dominant port on the
Sumatra coast, a network of alliances with its hinterland
tribesmen allowed a flow of goods from the interior to the
ports—giving Śrīvijaya its economic and thus its political
strength.
The classical political systems, whether wet-rice or riverine,
attempted to draw the resources of their realms—in the form
of tribute, talent, men, and goods—to their centers. Central Ja-
vanese states, for instance, expected both taxes in kind and
labor service from their subjects (see chap. 5). Inscriptions
report that rulers of eastern Java’s states received specified
shares of local products such as rice and cloth, as well as goods
supplied regularly by traders such as spices, ceramics, and
cloth of foreign origin. Resources acquired from a state’s own
core, when added to tribute extracted from politically subor-
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dinate peripheral areas, supplied the centers with large quan-
tities of wealth. This wealth was in turn redistributed to
maintain loyalty to the state. One type of investment was the
regional construction of large temple complexes that empha-
sized the state’s theoretical powers. Often such construction
was financed by the transfer of the royal right to a share of
local products and labor to a community, and the community
applied this designated income to finance local temple con-
struction and the temple’s maintenance. In such instances the
royal investment also provided for economic development in the
vicinity of the temple, and the construction of elaborate temple
complexes promoted the growth of an indigenous artisan class.
19
Payments to various state armies and administrators were
important revenue outlays of the state. Military power was es-
sential in the process of concentrating as many resources as
possible at the center. Military strength allowed the state to
“protect” its subordinate territories—whether in theory or in
fact—which in turn facilitated the establishment of the state’s
economic base, the administration of oaths, and the formulation
of the various royal cults. To insure the flow of revenues that
supported the classical state, a system of record keeping was
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initiated and in the more developed wet-rice states a council
was formed to handle it. This royal administrative council, con-
centrated at the center, was composed of a small group of ad-
ministrators who were generally literate and capable of dealing
with a variety of matters. 20 Periodically they were sent out indi-
vidually or as members of a mobile royal retinue traveling from
place to place within the realm to act on disputes that could
not be solved locally or on affairs that were considered to be
in the state’s interest. 21 These state administrators also partici-
pated in the various state ceremonies. In a system of statecraft
in which ritual links were a vital tool of integration, it was es-
sential that the ritual at the center be performed by an elite who
knew how to conduct the required ceremonies properly. 22
To achieve political integration, the leaders of a classical
Southeast Asian state had to diversify the state’s economy as
well as manipulate a set of symbols that would distinguish them
from other elites in the state. Therefore, the ruling elite of a
coastal-based state who had ambitions of political grandeur, for
example, had to make their state a leader in the externally fo-
cused international trade sector. To accomplish this, they had
to establish their economic and political authority over upriver
populations as well as over the maritime-oriented inhabitants of
the coastal enclave. To depend only on the redistributions—the
allocation of rewards and resources that served to help inte-
grate the society—derived from facilitating trade in a coastal
enclave with limited upriver ties made a coastal-based riverine
political system vulnerable to the fluctuations of international
trade. If revenues derived from international trade diminished,
political and economic alliances that depended on the
redistribution of trade goods could no longer be sustained.
As the maritime trade diminished, the state’s maritime allies
might turn to open piracy to maintain their personal livelihood,
thereby further destroying the coastal center’s viability by dis-
couraging international traders from navigating the state’s
waters.
Likewise a state too dependent on income derived from
its wet-rice plain base was also limited in its development po-
tential. The rice plain state elites of both Java and Angkor
shared land control with rival landed elites and institutions.
Some of the competing institutions had been created by the
state’s elite to reinforce the state’s legitimacy. For example,
temples and temple networks were heavily endowed with eco-
nomic resources by various classical-era rulers. Initially this pa-
tronage returned merit and bestowed superior status on the
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state elite, but over time the continued endowment of temples
could have left the temples with income rights exceeding those
of the state. A network of temples could—and in the case of
the Burmese state of Pagan did 23 —use their wealth and their
control over large segments of the state’s land and labor to in-
fluence state policy.
Since income derived from the land was the major source
of a rice plain-based elite’s ability to exercise political sover-
eignty, providing the would-be ruler with material as well as
“symbolic” capital with which to construct alliance networks,
a successful sovereign had to have either immense personal
prowess or greater economic resources at his personal disposal
than did potential sovereigns from other elites within the realm.
It was only when those claiming sovereignty in a rice plain state
became more actively involved in external commercial affairs
that the authority of the state leaders and their court relative to
competing regionally based elites and institutions became more
secure. Economic leadership in the commercial sector provided
a new source of income for wet-rice plain monarchs and in
turn enhanced their political accomplishments. Development of
an international trade sector also promoted the prosperity of
the wet-rice sector, providing new markets for local rice pro-
duction and facilitating the expansion of wet-rice agriculture,
which then stimulated the development of a more integrated po-
litical and economic order.
STRUCTURES OF TRADE IN THE CLASSICAL
SOUTHEAST ASIAN WORLD
Two models may be used to explain the ways that external
trade came into contact with existing and developing internal
forms of exchange. One reflects the riverine political system,
in which upriver exchange networks connected with foreign
trade at coastal centers through the agency of river mouth
rulers who shared trade-derived prosperity with the interior.
The second model attempts to show how trade was conducted
in the river plain realms of the Southeast Asian mainland and
Java. Contact with foreign merchants was similar to that in the
riverine states. Trade gravitated toward the coastal centers,
and the trade’s profits were redistributed to emphasize the
ruler’s hegemony. But the geography of a rice plain economy
held greater potential for the evolution of an integrated and hi-
erarchical system of market exchange, which was capable of
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facilitating political and social integration. In both economic
systems the potential for conflict with foreigners was minimized
because trading activities were confined to the coastal ports,
where business was transacted by indigenous merchants who
supplied the rice, pepper, and other products the foreign sea-
farers desired. 24
Riverine and Rice Plain Exchange Networks
Figure 1 gives a diagram of exchange in decentralized
Southeast Asian riverine political systems. 25 In this model, an
economic system’s trade “center” (A) is a coastal base located
at a river mouth. Points B and C are secondary and third order
centers located at upstream primary and secondary river junc-
tions. Point D identifies distant upstream centers, the initial
concentration point for products originating in more remote
parts of the river watershed. Points E and F are the ultimate
producers—the nonmarket-oriented population centers of the
hinterland and upland or upriver villages whose loyalty to the
marketing system dominated by A is minimal. A 1 represents
a rival river-mouth center and its marketing system. A 1 can
compete for the loyalty of E and F as well as for trade with X, an
overseas center that consumes the exports and supplies imports
for A and A 1.
This riverine marketing system is integrated by coercion,
where practical, or can be directly administered or colonized
by A. A holds the loyalty of its marketing system by exacting
oaths and/or tribute or through exercising its ability to select
or confirm local leadership. A must also compete with B to es-
tablish and maintain dominance over the hinterland network. A
relates to B and the other upriver centers via emphasis on tra-
ditional mechanisms of alliance but also depends on X as a con-
sumer of local products or as a supplier of foreign luxury goods
and as the source of the entire network’s prosperity. X, though,
can likely acquire goods from each of several As, concentrating
upon a coastal center where foreign merchants can acquire the
best quality or the best deal, or ideally both. X can shift its trade
to a rival A without regard for the acute economic or political
hardships suffered by a center temporarily deprived of trade, or
X can even attempt to deal directly with the interior centers of
supply. Points A and A 1 are thus natural enemies, and it is in the
interest of one or the other to establish political hegemony over
the other. In this instance A’s control of A 1’s entire marketing
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Figure 1
Riverine System Exchange
Adapted from Bennet Bronson, “Exchange at the Upstream and Down-
stream Ends: Notes Toward a Functional Model of the Coastal State in
Southeast Asia,” 42.
network is not even necessary. 26 As long as A controls A 1, A will
dominate the flow of trade goods to and from A 1’s river mouth.
A’s dominance over B 1 could also conceivably accomplish this
same objective.
This riverine system model can be applied to the Śrīvijaya
maritime state as documented in the early seventh-century in-
scriptions discussed in chapter 4 (see map 4). 27 Initially
Śrīvijaya’s center was in the Palembang area of Sumatra, a
point at the intersection of several river systems upriver from
the coast, a strategic position that allowed Śrīvijaya’s rulers
to dominate commerce flowing upriver and downriver from its
harbor. Palembang’s control over its hinterland was based on
its own physical might, but was especially dependent on an
oath of allegiance that was administered to the state’s sub-
ordinate elites, inculcations, the systematic redistribution of
wealth from the royal treasury, alliances with local chieftains
(dātu), and even the assignment of royal princes to leadership
positions in the hinterland. Śrīvijaya’s marketing network was
based more upon alliances and the common sharing of the
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wealth derived from foreign trade than on direct coercion. The
Śrīvijaya monarch was recognized as the source of the system’s
prosperity.
Palembang’s natural enemy was Jambi, a rival coastal center
dominating the Batang Hari River system. Consequently, one of
the Śrīvijaya ruler’s first expeditions of conquest was against
Jambi in A.D. 682. Śrīvijaya’s victory over the rival river-system
center and subsequent victories over other river-mouth centers
on the Sumatran, Malayan, and western Javanese coasts guar-
anteed Śrīvijaya’s control over the flow of goods within the
Strait of Malacca and as well from the region into the interna-
tional trade route.
The riverine system model implies that the riverine system
was by nature impermanent, and indeed some historians believe
that Śrīvijaya as a political entity was characterized by a
shifting center. The Śrīvijayan “capital” may have initially been
on the Musi River system but in the eleventh century was at
Jambi and was likely focused on other riverine centers in the
Strait of Malacca region at times in between. 28
Chinese dynastic records document this internal compe-
tition among the various Malay river systems. Numerous river-
mouth centers sent tribute missions to the Chinese court in
hopes of receiving recognition as a “preferred” trade partner
of the Chinese. 29 Such recognition would seemingly have re-
inforced a riverine center’s ability to trade not only with the
Chinese but also to assume a special position in trade with West-
ern merchants who would stop in the Southeast Asian archi-
pelago on their way to China.
While the riverine system diagram provides a model for the
understanding of trade relationships within the island world,
the geography and historical records of the river-plain realms of
the mainland and Java do not lend themselves to this analysis.
The second model (see fig. 2) better characterizes the com-
mercial networks in the rice plain economies of Java and the
Southeast Asian mainland. Although discussion of the model in
this chapter is specific to Java, the model is intended to illus-
trate the rice plain states’ trade structure in general, and it will
be applied to the rice plain states of the mainland in subsequent
chapters.
Contemporary Javanese inscriptions portray networks of
clustered villages called wanua as the most important units of
local integration in the pre-Islamic Javanese hinterland. These
village networks are generally viewed as units of social and po-
litical integration; what is not understood is how the indigenous
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Figure 2
Marketing in Pre-European Java
village networks provided for the flow of goods from coastal
ports to village cluster markets. Merchants who had external
ties and who were encouraged by Javanese monarchs had a role
in providing this commercial linkage. 30 Such encouragement
may be seen, for example, in the royal grants to merchants that
freed them from royal tax assessments on their transactions
within specified village cluster markets. 31 However, the village
clusters may be equally understood as local marketing networks
whose nucleus was in every instance a periodic market, iden-
tified as pkĕn in Javanese inscriptions.
In pre-Islamic Java, pkĕn village markets operated on a five-
day weekly cycle; itinerant merchants circulated among groups
of tightly knit village clusters within this cycle. Figure 2 shows
the resulting hypothetical marketing hierarchy. At the base of
the marketing system were the wanua, local village clusters
(“communities of exchange”) that converged at a market center
(pkĕn) where the village cluster’s inhabitants gathered once
every five days. The pkĕn markets were centers of local ex-
change. Market participants included farmers and artisans who
Trade and Statecraft in Early Southeast Asia
18
sold their products and who purchased local goods or those
commodities transported to the market by itinerant peddlers.
32 To facilitate easy access for the population, a pkĕn market-
place would have to have been located within walking distance
of the homes of the village cluster’s inhabitants, thus dictating
the pkĕn market’s position near the geographical center of the
village cluster. A local official controlled access to the market-
place, collected taxes on goods offered for sale, and in general
represented the village cluster’s interest in dealings with the
itinerant peddlers. 33
These itinerant peddlers, identified in the inscriptions by
the titles adwal and apikul, linked village clusters horizontally
into marketing networks composed of multiple wanua commu-
nities of exchange. Peddlers circulated among pkĕn markets
and made their travels conform to the indigenous marketing
cycle—or the local marketing cycle conformed to the travels of
the peddlers. In either case the various village-cluster commu-
nities of exchange were integrated into market cycles, which
allowed one wanua community’s pkĕn market to hold its trans-
actions on a certain day of the week and others one each on
the other four. A band of roving peddlers could thus have po-
tentially served five wanua communities, participating in a dif-
ferent pkĕn market every day and trading in each village cluster
once every five days.
The peddlers and their pkĕn market networks, in turn, were
integrated by intermediate full-time market centers. Unlike the
pkĕn markets, the intermediate centers of exchange had per-
manent shops or at the minimum a market that met every day.
Such centers were inhabited by ada gang, “large-scale traders,”
who conducted both a retail and wholesale trade, as well as
groups of artisans. 34 Also based in the intermediate center
were abakul, “market-based middlemen,” who were the key to
the natural flow of commodities between village clusters and
the intermediate market center. Both serviced the needs of
the pkĕn-focused itinerant peddlers, supplying goods of various
sorts in exchange for local products acquired by the peddlers
on their circuit. Abakul were wholesale specialists who traded
in bulk for local production, especially for the rice, salt, beans,
and dyes that figure so prominently in lists of Java’s major ex-
ports. 35
Goods acquired by abakul intermediate traders were trans-
mitted to adagang, the large-scale traders, who in turn trans-
ferred goods to “higher order” merchants, identified by the title
banyāga bantal, who connected the intermediate marketing
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centers to higher order markets that were inhabited by
banyāga, “large-scale and seafaring traders”—“those who en-
circle the sea, those who travel throughout the sea.” 36 These
higher markets were major commercial centers integrating the
various networks of exchange below them and were normally
located during this age at coastal ports rather than at a royal
center or a major pilgrimage center—the negotiation of major
commercial transactions would have been inappropriate to such
sanctified urban centers. 37 It is noteworthy that banyāga do
not appear in lists of those participating in pkĕn market ex-
change, implying that there was a hierarchy of merchant and
marketing activity within the early Javanese economy. Banyāga
were clearly functioning only at the topmost levels of the mar-
keting system, integrating the intermediate and local levels of
commercial exchange to the “foreign” realm of trade. In the Ja-
vanese plains, free of physical constraints on the movement of
goods from the hinterland, a number of small, periodic market
centers connected to intermediate and higher order centers of
exchange by a hierarchy of specialized and large-scale traders
thus expedited the natural flow of goods destined to be sold to
seafarers.
Javanese kings, especially in the post-tenth-century era of
eastern Javanese dominance, played a key role in facilitating
trade. 38 They encouraged and legitimized the incursions of
port-based traders (ban yāga) into the Javanese hinterland to
collect specified amounts of produce. The royal stance in re-
lation to the trade is reflected in an inscription that elaborates
five royal instructions on the conduct of trade, quality control,
and the use of standards and approved weights and measures
at warehouses and rice granaries. 39 In the tenth century, ac-
cording to one inscription, a Javanese ruler removed royal taxes
from twenty vessels and the shippers of goods of twelve dif-
ferent classes—a total of 135 vessels were operating from one
north coast port, reflecting a sizeable trade. 40 Another tenth-
century inscription records a royal grant to encourage set-
tlement along the river and roads leading to an eastern Java
port to lessen the danger to merchants and coastal people from
banditry. 41 Development of a port in eastern Java under royal
patronage is also shown in an eleventh-century royal project
that dammed the Brantas River to “reduce the threat of flooding
to benefit shiphandlers, pilots, and gatherers of goods at
Hujung Galah, including ships’ captains, and merchants
(banyāga) originating from other islands and countries.” 42
Royal charters were granted to port-based merchants, and late
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in the era of eastern Javanese hegemony port-based merchants
were even employed as royal tax collectors in areas near their
port. This was a further means of facilitating the movement
of goods from the hinterland, or it may also be viewed as an
attempt by the Javanese monarch to penetrate local political
autonomy. The use of foreign tax collectors may also indicate in-
ternal political instability, revealing the political system’s need
to depend on foreigners to support the king’s authority.
It is important to remember that the centralization of trade
constituted not only a convenience for all participants but also
served as a mechanism for minimizing the penetration of the
hinterland by outsiders. Control of the activities of higher order
merchants strengthened the social cohesion of the local village
cluster communities of exchange by protecting the interests of
indigenous merchants and producers. For a river plain state de-
siring to participate in the international commercial networks,
the aid of foreign merchants and seafarers was a necessary
source of extended economic contacts with China and India.
Indeed, eastern Javanese inscriptions reflect considerable inter-
action with a south India-based international trade consortium.
43 The use of seafarers as maritime allies was a double-edged
sword, however. These allies could be a source of support or a
serious threat to the political system’s stability if they chose to
act independently of the ruler’s authority. There was always the
potential for a port community to initiate a successful challenge
to the state’s authority. The port could do this by establishing
its autonomy from royal control or by undermining royal au-
thority by supporting one royal faction against another. Further,
successful trade made the coastline vulnerable to naval attack.
Southeast Asia’s early history is full of references to maritime
raids, one of the most famous being the 1292 maritime expe-
dition of the Mongols against Java. Most Javanese ports there-
fore had fortified enclosures that were under the charge of the
port’s merchant community.
Thus foreign merchants and seamen who were beneficial
to a ruler’s ambitions could also destroy his state. Merchants
and seafarers of foreign origin are described in Cham epigraphy
from the southern Vietnam coast as “demonic” and “vicious,”
and are justifiably seen as “a threat to established order” (see
chap. 7). To protect itself, and to remain consistent with the es-
sentially inner focus of the Javanese state, the Javanese royal
capital was situated well within the Javanese hinterland. Mer-
chants and seafarers of foreign origin were confined to coastal
ports where the potential danger of their commercial activities
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could be isolated. Local marketing networks and merchants pro-
vided the intermediary links to supply their needs and demands
for goods. Ultimately, with the coming of more powerful foreign
traders in the sixteenth century, penetration beyond these ports
became possible, with disastrous consequence to the traditional
Javanese way of life.
MARITIME TRADE IN EARLY SOUTHEAST ASIA:
ZONES AND ERAS
Premodern maritime exchange in Southeast Asia was trans-
acted in five commercial zones (see map 1). The first zone
encompassed the northern Malay Peninsula and the southern
coast of Vietnam and was the first to openly solicit and facilitate
East-West trade during the last millennium B.C. In this age
Southeast Asia was regarded by foreign seamen as an interme-
diate and virtually unknown region lying between the riches of
India and those of China. The initial agents of foreign contact
were Malayo-Polynesian sailors who made voyages to as far
west as the African coast and to China in the east. 44 Passage
through Southeast Asia by international traders became im-
portant in the second century A.D. as the central Asian caravan
routes, the previously preferred connecting link between East
and West commercial networks, were disrupted by internal
strife. During the second and third centuries the transport of
goods shifted to the sea, and shipping flowed along a maritime
route between the southeastern coast of China to the Bay of
Bengal via a land portage across the upper Isthmus of Kra. Mer-
chants’ transit through Southeast Asia followed ports on the
western edge of the Mekong Delta, said by the Chinese to have
been under the authority of the early Southeast Asian state of
Funan.
It is unlikely that the same group of sailors made the com-
plete journey from the Middle East to China or vice versa, in
part due to the seasonal nature of the monsoon winds, which
were critical to navigation. Westerly winds from the southern
Indian Ocean begin in April and peak in July. In January the wind
flow reverses direction as the northeastern monsoons bring
easterly winds. This means that voyagers had to wait at certain
points until the next season’s winds could take them to their
destinations. Because the complete transit from one end of
the route to the other was not possible within a single year,
sailors found it expedient to travel only one sector of the route.
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One group would make the trip between Middle Eastern ports
and India, and another made the Bay of Bengal voyage to the
Isthmus of Kra, where their goods were transported across the
isthmus and shipped from the Gulf of Thailand to the lower
Vietnam coast. There commodities from the West were ex-
changed for those of the East. Another group of sailors then
made the voyage from Funan to south China. 45 By the time
fleets arrived in Funan ports, those ships traveling the China
leg of the route had already gotten underway. Initially no local
Southeast Asian products were exported from Funan’s ports.
During this second-and third-century era a second com-
mercial zone emerged in the Java Sea region. This Java Sea
network was chiefly involved with the flow of gharuwood, san-
dalwood, and spices such as cloves among the Lesser Sunda Is-
lands, the Moluccas, the eastern coast of Borneo, Java, and the
southern coast of Sumatra. The development of a commercial
center, known in Chinese records as Ko-ying, on the northern
edge of the Sunda Strait region, was critical in connecting the
riches of the Java Sea region with the international route. 46 The
Sunda Strait location was ideal as a point at the end of the Java
Sea where the flow of commerce within the Java Sea and beyond
Java could be concentrated. Likewise a Sunda Strait entrepôt
offered easy access to Funan and its international clientele.
Malay sailors initiated the transport of spices from Ko-ying to
Funan. They also began to supplement Eastern and Western
products with products from the forests of the Indonesian arch-
ipelago. Ko-ying well represents the indigenous response to the
potential for trade provided by the new maritime activities.
By the early fifth century the southern Sumatra coast as-
sumed an additional importance, due in part to Java Sea spices.
The principal East-West maritime route shifted from its upper
Malay Peninsula portage to a nautical passage through the
Strait of Malacca, making direct contact with the northwestern
edge of the Java Sea. 47 The Strait of Malacca thus became the
third zone of Southeast Asian commerce, and its center on the
southeastern Sumatra coast soon became the focal point for
Malay trade in western Borneo, Java, and the eastern islands, as
well as the upper Malay Peninsula and its hinterland, the Chao
Phraya and Irrawaddy river systems. 48 O. W. Wolters described
southeastern Sumatra as a “favored coast” that aided the flow
of commerce, marketing its own Sumatra forest products and
Java Sea goods and utilizing Malay ships and crews to connect
indigenous exchange networks with the international route. 49
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Under the Śrīvijayan maritime state, which dominated strait
commerce until the early eleventh century, a pattern of riverine
statecraft emerged built on alliances with Malay coastal pop-
ulations and balanced by an expanding inland power base. 50
In the eyes of the Chinese, Śrīvijaya was the perfect trade
partner. It was able to keep goods moving into south China
ports by servicing vessels voyaging through the Southeast Asian
archipelago. Śrīvijaya’s ports were utilized as centers of ex-
change for those ships traveling over but one segment of the
maritime route or as ports of call for ships awaiting the ap-
propriate monsoon winds to take them to their destination.
Śrīvijaya also successfully protected the Southeast Asian zone
of the international commercial route from piracy. In recog-
nition of Śrīvijaya’s power the Chinese granted the maritime
state preferred trade status, suggesting that those who utilized
Śrīvijaya’s ports were given preferential treatment when en-
tering Chinese ports. Wolters argued that this Chinese con-
nection was critical to Śrīvijaya’s prosperity and that Śrīvijaya’s
power was dependent upon the fluctuations of the Chinese
economy. 51 When trade with China’s ports was prosperous,
Śrīvijaya thrived. But when China’s ports periodically closed,
the economic repercussions were disastrous to Śrīvijaya’s po-
litical authority. With declining trade revenues Śrīvijaya was
unable to maintain the loyalty of its seafarers, who shifted their
energies to open piracy.
The Śrīvijayan era of economic hegemony came to an abrupt
close in 1025, when the south Indian Cō la̤ dynasty successfully
attacked the Malacca region’s ports and shattered Śrīvijaya’s
authority over the strait. This raid began a two-century restruc-
turing of the patterns of Southeast Asian maritime trade. In this
era not only Indian but also Chinese and Arab traders began
more openly to penetrate Southeast Asia’s markets, moving
more directly to the sources of commercial goods. Foreign mer-
chants began to regularly travel into the Java Sea region to ac-
quire spices, a movement that encouraged the development of
Javanese ports on the northern and eastern Java coasts as trade
intermediaries and as ports of call for foreign merchants from
the West. The destruction of Śrīvijaya’s hegemony also allowed
the reemergence of the southern Vietnam coast as a commercial
power, as coastal centers in the Cham domain became more
prominent ports of call on the way to China.
The relationship of the plain-based and internally focused Ja-
vanese state to the outside world changed radically during the
eleventh and twelfth centuries. During the eighth and ninth cen-
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turies the Javanese capital and the territory under its control
had been situated in and around the Kedu Plain of central Java,
to the south of the Merapi-Perahu mountain range. After the
removal of the Javanese state’s political center to the lower
Brantas basin of eastern Java in the tenth century, and the
subsequent consolidation of the eastern and central Javanese
plains under one authority, Javanese rulers began to take a
more active interest in overseas trade. This change was in part
due to the shift of the royal center to the Brantas River basin
and in part to the increasing economic potential that direct in-
teraction with the maritime traders provided. 52
Not only was this the era of Śrīvijaya’s demise, it also co-
incided with a significant increase in the volume and economic
importance of trade with China during the reign of China’s Sung
dynasty. At the same time that the Java Sea zone flowered as
a commercial power during the eleventh and twelfth centuries,
the penetration of Chinese seamen from the north through the
Sulu Sea to acquire the products of the Spice Islands brought
the development of the Philippines and northern Borneo as the
fourth Southeast Asian commercial zone. Chinese traders es-
tablished trade bases in the Philippines during this era. To dis-
tribute imports and to gather the forest products the Chinese
traders desired, an intensive and extensive network of native
trade evolved in this age, and it stimulated major changes in
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
25
Philippine society. 53 The archaeological remains of early
Laguna, Mindoro, and Cebu society especially document the
rapid growth of trade centers, as people from the interior and
other islands congregated around ports fortified with brass ar-
tillery—to protect against the piracy rampant in this region’s
sea channels—in response to the opportunities and demands af-
forded by foreign trade. 54
The growing interest among the mainland powers at Angkor
and Pagan in directly participating in international trade activ-
ities resulted in the development of a fifth Southeast Asian trade
region, in the Bay of Bengal, during the post-Śrīvijayan age. Bay
of Bengal regional trade encompassed the mainland political
systems and the former Śrīvijayan domains on the upper Malay
Peninsula and the northern and western coasts of Sumatra and
made contact with the international route in southern India and
Sri Lanka. Meanwhile, southern Sumatra and the lower Malay
Peninsula remained the principal Southeast Asian landfall for
the international traders. Arab traders focused their contact
on the Kedah coast of the lower Malay Peninsula and shifted
their activity from Palembang to Jambi on the southern Sumatra
coast in the late eleventh century.
By the thirteenth century Southeast Asia’s internal trade
was back in the hands of Southeast Asians, as foreign mer-
chants found it once again more expedient to deal with
Southeast Asia-based intermediaries at major international en-
trepôts rather than attempting to deal directly with the people
who controlled the sources of supplies. This was due in part
to the growing efficiency exhibited by Southeast Asians in ca-
pably providing goods for the foreigners at selected ports. As
opposed to the Śrīvijaya era, when trade was dominated by a
single Malay state and its ports, by the thirteenth century all
five Southeast Asian maritime zones had become prosperous
and independent economic networks, not as competitors for
maritime dominance but representing an overall commercial
prosperity within Southeast Asia. The strongest of the island
realm’s political systems, Majapahit, was centered in east Java.
Javanese rulers facilitated the Java Sea spice trade but found
no need to dominate the ports of the Strait of Malacca as
Śrīvijaya had in the earlier age. 55 The Javanese established a
loose hegemony that saw the emergence of new ports; among
them were northern Sumatra ports that depended heavily upon
commercial interaction with Arab and Indian seamen. 56
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Java’s limited control over the strait region is also linked to
the rise of strait piracy. The eventual establishment of Malacca
at the end of the fourteenth century was a result of initiatives
given out by the Chinese Ming dynasty to fill what they per-
ceived to be the absence of a major political power in the area
that could be depended on to contain piracy, which was jeop-
ardizing the steady flow of commerce into Chinese ports. 57
By the 1430s, however, Malacca’s prosperity depended less on
Chinese support and more on interaction with Javanese mer-
chants and Javanese commercial networks. The Javanese con-
trolled the island traffic to and from the strait and used Malacca
as a trade intermediary through which to market Javanese rice
and Java Sea spices.
A new era of Southeast Asian commerce unfolded after Por-
tuguese entry into the strait region in 1511. Not only did the
Europeans take over Malacca, but they also penetrated the Ja-
vanese sphere in the eastern archipelago, attempting to break
Java’s hold on the spice trade. Over the next four hundred years
the Portuguese and other Europeans who followed attempted
to impose their direct control over the sources of products and
to eliminate the indigenous intermediaries who had controlled
trade in Southeast Asia since its inception. Although the Eu-
ropeans’ attempts to monopolize Southeast Asia’s trade failed,
they did successfully open the archipelago to a variety of com-
peting groups, both Eastern and Western. By the seventeenth
century ports on Java’s north coast, which had emerged as
independent economic centers during the decline of the Ma-
japahit state, were destroyed by the emerging inland power at
Mataram in central Java. This victory effectively internalized Ja-
vanese commerce and ended the remaining control of Javanese
merchants over the Java Sea trade. Henceforth control over
the international trade was assumed by others. In the Strait of
Malacca, in Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra, and in Johor
on the southern Malay Peninsula, there emerged successors to
Malacca and the Javanese; and in the eastern archipelago Malay
seamen in Brunei and Sulu assumed control over the regional
and Chinese trade with the Spice Islands.
The waxing and waning of states in various parts of
Southeast Asia were directly tied to shifting international trade
routes, just as trade routes shifted in response to local power
configurations and local initiatives. The following chapters
discuss this pattern of growth and decline in detail.
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2
The Development of
Maritime Trade in Asia
TheDevelopmentofMaritimeTradeinAsia
International maritime trade in Asia developed in stages. Itfirst became prosperous along the Middle East-to-india route,
expanding after Rome established its Pax Romana in the first
century of the Christian era and corresponding to a diffusion of
knowledge among sailors of Greece and the Roman Orient on
the use of the monsoon winds for navigation. When Westerners
reached India in the first century they found that a regular mar-
itime route connected India to the Malay Peninsula. Malay
seamen and Indian and Arab traders routinely made the voyage
from India’s eastern coast or Sri Lanka to Southeast Asian
ports, which provided access to China’s rich markets. In the ear-
liest era of maritime trade, ships from Indian ports touched land
on the upper western coast of the Malay Peninsula, their trade
goods were portaged across the Isthmus of Kra to the Gulf of
Thailand, reloaded on ships, and transported along the coast to
ports on the western edge of the Mekong Delta, most notably to
one identified by archaeologists as Oc-èo in the Funan realm.
The Funan state, based on the lower Vietnam coast, dominated
trade in this sector of the commercial route until the fifth
century. From Funan ports goods were transported to ports in
south China.
Traders of the Roman Empire eventually joined the ships
on this route, and Western maritime contacts were extended
beyond India and Sri Lanka to Sumatra and other commercial
centers at the western end of the Java Sea, which in the post-
Funan age came to replace the Malay Peninsula and mainland
as the locus of international trade in Southeast Asia. The full de-
velopment of the maritime route by international traders mak-
ing regular use of the Strait of Malacca and the South China
Sea came in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. By the
fifth century commercial intercourse between East and West
was concentrated in the maritime route.
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As a consequence, during the first five centuries of the
Christian era international trade in Southeast Asia became well
defined, regular, and prosperous as trade relationships were ex-
tended to include new members and products. This expansion
of trade in turn stimulated significant transitions in Southeast
Asian economic and political organization. Once the route was
established through the region interaction between Southeast
Asian peoples and foreign merchants was inevitable; the
peoples of the region were also exposed to foreign cultures and
ideas. Initially, the role of Southeast Asia’s ports in the inter-
national trade was simply to provide facilities for foreign mer-
chants who were passing through on their way to China or
India or laying over until the next season’s winds allowed a
return voyage. Coastal states on the edges of settled hinter-
lands served as commercial entrepôts, providing suitable ac-
commodations for sailors and traders, food, water, and shelter,
and storage facilities and marketplaces, thus facilitating the ex-
change of Eastern and Western goods.
Soon, however, Southeast Asian merchants began to market
their own spices and aromatics as substitutes for foreign com-
modities and then built upon this substitution to market other
indigenous products. Demand for Southeast Asian products was
quickly established when spices from Indonesia’s eastern archi-
pelago began to flow out of the Java Sea region to international
markets in the fourth and fifth centuries. The new marketing
opportunities required more formal political and economic re-
lationships between hinterland populations and coastal com-
mercial communities than had hitherto been necessary,
however. The international trade thus acted as an impetus to
state-building efforts in the region.
THE EXPANSION OF ROMAN TRADE IN THE
INDIAN OCEAN
In the seventh century B.C. goods from India were imported into
Babylon along two well-traveled commercial routes. 1 The pre-
ferred overland route crossed the mountains of Central Asia.
By the fourth century B.C., however, Aramaic inscriptions from
the Middle East begin to record an active maritime trade along
the coast, with goods being carried by sea from India’s north-
western coast to Saleucia in Mesopotamia via the Persian Gulf
and the Tigris River. Alexander the Great’s admiral, Nearchus,
after employing local pilots to explore the Indus River and
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commissioning a fleet of thirty oared galleys, used the same
coastal route to transport Alexander’s troops from India to
Mesopotamia in 321 B.C.
Very early maritime contact between Middle Eastern and
Asian ports was characterized by coastal shipping rather than
by transocean voyages. There was apparently little knowledge
or use of the seasonal monsoon winds until the first century
A.D., except by Malay seamen who were sailing between the In-
donesian archipelago and Madagascar. Early Middle Eastern lit-
erary references speak colorfully of six-month voyages during
which “trained birds” were used to guide ships to land; sailors
navigated by the stars and by watching the flight of birds.
The small-oared galleys that made these voyages tried to stay
within sight of land as they hopped from port to port between
Mesopotamia and India.
Western markets for goods transported along this coastal
route were at first limited because of political fragmentation
in the West; the real blossoming of maritime trade between
East and West awaited a stable Western market. This peaceful
setting was provided after the consolidation of Roman rule.
Rome’s political growth heralded a demand for luxury goods,
among them spices, scented woods, resins, and cloth from the
East, which substantially encouraged the expansion of Indian
Ocean shipping. Technical advances soon followed as innova-
tions in Western ship construction provided sailing rigs capable
of undertaking voyages with larger loads and ultimately
promised a means of using the ocean monsoon wind currents,
thus enabling navigators to make transoceanic voyages.
The discovery and excavation of the Arikamedu site near
Pondicherry on the southeastern coast of India in the late 1940s
and early 1950s gave dated proof of the existence of an ex-
panding maritime trade network connecting East and West. 2
Arikamedu was a trade station, an emporium or entrepôt, com-
plete with harbor, warehouses, and merchant residences, which
served as a center for the exchange of goods coming from East
Asia and the West. Reaching its zenith between A.D. 23–96,
Arikamedu was a port of call for convoys of oceangoing mer-
chants during the trading seasons. In the early months of the
year merchants would arrive from the West via the northeast
monsoon and would depart for home on the southwest monsoon
by early summer; seamen would arrive from Southeast Asia
shortly thereafter and would leave on the northeast monsoon
around the first of the year. Arikamedu was also the permanent
residence of the Western merchants known in Indian literature
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as yavana. Archaeological excavations at Arikamedu have
shown that its exports to the West included pepper, pearls,
gems, muslins, tortoise shell, ivory, and silk. Imports from the
West were coral, lead, copper, tin, glass, vases, lamps, wine, and
coined money.
Unfortunately, Arikamedu and one or two other south Indian
sites stand alone as the major sources of archaeological evi-
dence of this first-century trade. Literary sources are ample,
however, particularly those from Rome itself. The earliest of
these sources, the Geography of Strabo (63 B.C.–A.D. 21),
records the growth of the Asian trade, contrasting the smallness
of the trade in earlier times to the significant expansion experi-
enced during the reign of the emperor Augustus (27 B.C.–A.D.
14). While formerly only twenty ships passed annually through
the Strait of Bab el Mandeb from the Red Sea into the Indian
Ocean, now ships were departing for Asia in convoys of 120
from the upper Red Sea port of Myos Hormos alone. 3
Perhaps the richest of the classical sources is the Periplus
of the Ery threan Sea, written between A.D. 40 and 75, the
work of an anonymous sailor who had actually made the voyage
from Rome to the ports of western India. 4 The Periplus sailor’s
handbook lists commodities worth exporting to and bringing
back from India and is also a definitive guide for sailing to and
from India’s western or Malabar Coast, with extensive descrip-
tions of the harbors and ports encountered on the way. The Natu
ral History of Pliny the Elder (A.D. 23–79), primarily a scientific
treatise, provides useful details on Indian ports and most no-
tably makes an exaggerated claim that there was a serious drain
of Rome’s precious metals to India to pay for the luxury trade.
5 Works by the Egyptian Claudius Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy, A.D.
100–170) offer a comprehensive list of ports and inland centers
of second-century India. 6 Of particular interest is his reference
to one emporium and one royal residence per Indian maritime
district. When compared to first-century works, Ptolemy’s com-
pilation shows a growing knowledge of the trade routes and
documents the expansion of trade into new regions. Especially
noteworthy is his knowledge of the Coromandel or eastern coast
of India, of which nothing is said in the Periplus.
Roman trade interest focused on two commodities that India
offered: Malabar pepper and cloth, both Indian and Chinese.
Pliny eloquently described Roman demand for Indian pepper:
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
31
It is quite surprising that the use of pepper has come so much in
fashion, seeing that, in other substances which we use, it is some-
times their sweetness and sometimes their appearance that has
attracted our notice; whereas, pepper has nothing in it that can
plead as a recommendation to either fruit or berry, its only de-
sirable quality being a certain pungency; and yet it is for this that
we import it all the way from India! Who was the first to make
trial of it as an article of food? And who, I wonder, was the man
that was not content to prepare himself by hunger only for the
satisfaction of a greedy appetite? 7
Prior to the first century, the coast-hopping trade made
northern Indian ports the most expedient destination for
Western vessels. Spices from Malabar were carried north by
Indian coastal fleets where they were exchanged for com-
modities from the West. According to the Periplus, Barygaza
in present-day Gujarat was the most important destination of
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the coastal galleys. The overland caravan route between India
and China also terminated in Barygaza in that period, further
heightening this port’s significance as an international center
of trade. Finished Chinese silk cloth carried overland through
Central Asia was transported down from Taxila in the north,
partly via a highway built several centuries before, where it was
exchanged for Arabian frankincense, “a product always more
highly valued in China than India.” 8 Another route was used for
the transport of Chinese silk threads from Taxila south to Bar-
baricum at the mouth of the Indus River. From there the yarn
was carried by sea to Arabia, where it was used in the manu-
facture of embroidered and silk-shot fabrics. This route down
the Indus is described in the Peri plus as less important “owing
to the character of the tribes living on the lower reaches [of the
river],” reminding readers that political instability in a port area
was a serious impediment to commercial development. 9
Pliny detailed the change in this pattern. Of primary impor-
tance was the discovery of the monsoons, known in Rome as
the Hippalos winds, which made possible direct travel first be-
tween Arabia and the Indus River ports; later a shorter route
in both distance and time from Arabia to Kalligeris, south of
present-day Bombay, was developed. In the first century A.D. yet
shorter direct voyages were made to the Malabar ports them-
selves. It is believed that the monsoon winds were known in
the West before Roman expansion but that they were a well-
kept secret of Arab (Parthian) commercial middlemen and their
Indian trade agents. 10 For this reason, the profitable spice trade
was until then exclusively in the hands of Arab merchants.
The Periplus attributes the discovery of the monsoons to the
Roman sailor Hippalos, thus the common Roman reference to
the Hippalos winds, and informs us that in the time of the Peri
plus’ author Roman ships began crossing from North Africa to
southern Malabar Coast ports. With knowledge of the monsoon
winds there came a change in ship construction. Multi-oared
galleys were replaced by sailing ships, and a new rigging
system, perhaps a Persian innovation, allowed ships to sail
closer to the wind.
The Western termini of Roman ships were the Red Sea ports
of Myos Hormos and Berenice, from which Indian goods were
transported overland by caravan to the Nile and then by boat
to Alexandria (see map 2). 11 Apparently to break the Arab mo-
nopoly on the India trade and ensure its control of ports with
access to the Indian Ocean, Rome began to exert its authority
over the Red Sea region during the first century. The Periplus
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reports that a Roman military garrison was established at Leuke
Kome, a small-vessel port at the mouth of the Red Sea popu-
lated by Arab seamen, to collect a duty of 25 percent of all im-
ports. Meanwhile trade at the “official” Roman ports in the Red
Sea was being charged only a 3 percent duty. 12 It may be log-
ically concluded from this account that the Roman government
was forcing the India trade merchants to patronize Rome’s “pre-
ferred” ports and not those of the Arab merchants. This action
was quite similar to practices the Romans had observed in India
during the same period.
There appear to have been treaty relationships between
Roman merchants and the Indian ports. The Periplus uses the
phrase nomimom emporium (“lawful market”) with respect to
Kalligeris. 13 Ptolemy singles out sixteen coastal towns as em-
poria from the Indus to the Ganges (e.g., Muziris emporium,
Podouke emporium), which apparently were the principal com-
mercial centers of each maritime district, each having been as-
signed special legal provisions for trading. The Periplus states
that local markets on the west coast between Barygaza and
Malabar could be visited only under the supervision of the
rulers of the area. 14 At Kalligeris, the rulers had cancelled, or
at least obstructed, rights conferred on traders by their prede-
cessors to the extent of seizing Greek ships upon arrival. Guards
were placed on board an offending ship, which was then taken
to the “official” port at Barygaza.
Various Western literary sources imply that an international
port in order to be successful in these times had to offer a
neutral meeting ground for a cosmopolitan population. It was
not enough for a port to offer goods from its own hinterland or
from regions farther afield. The international merchant groups
active in the port region had to feel a sense of security, but
the “protection” provided had to be carefully regulated so that
the visiting merchants did not feel threatened or abused. If
an inland-based political power put too many restraints on the
traders they would have shifted their operations to another port
that allowed them more freedom to transact their business.
The Arthaśāstra, the classical north Indian treatise on state-
craft, describes in general terms the trade transacted in the in-
ternational markets found on the coasts during these times and
makes a distinction between commerce conducted in the for-
tified cities of the interior and that taking place in those des-
ignated centers for international exchange known as pattana.
15 Pattana markets were administered by three royal officials.
Market exchange was coordinated by a “supervisor of markets,”
The Development of Maritime Trade in Asia
34
whose chief function, according to the Arthaśāstra, was to keep
merchants and artisans from cheating their customers. When
commodities of distant origin came into the marketplace the su-
pervisor of markets called in the “director of trade,” an expert
in determining prices, who then fixed a price on the foreign
commodities after calculating the investment, production, duty,
interest, rent, and other expenses that contributed to the fair
price of such items. This director of trade was normally sub-
ordinate to a “commissioner of ports,” whose duty it was to
set regulations for the port town. In the terminology of the
Arthaśāstra, a pat tana was an emporium, a place officially des-
ignated by local rulers as a legal center for the exchange of
goods that arrived by boat or caravan.
The formal international trade agreements concerning em-
poria were subject to continuous negotiation. Access to Indian
markets by foreign merchants had to be arranged with local au-
thorities before the merchants were allowed to participate in
local commerce. The reverse might also be true, that is, that
ports sought out the merchants for trade, since embassies nego-
tiating such treaties were to be found moving from East to West.
Two Indian delegations to Augustus Caesar were recorded in
25 B.C. and 21 B.C., which coincides with the entry of Roman
traders into the Indian markets and the circumvention of Arab
sailors and other intermediaries who had monopolized the India
traffic prior to that time. 16
We know from the Periplus that Barygaza was India’s
greatest port during the first century chiefly because of its cloth
trade and as a result had become the principal point of contact
between the Western and Eastern commercial realms. Most
of Barygaza’s exports were sent there from other commercial
centers and included onyx-stones, porcelain, cottons, silk cloth,
and peppers. Barygaza’s imports from Roman ports were wines
from the Italian peninsula, brass, copper, tin, lead, coral, cloth
goods, white glass from Arabia, gold and silver specie (“which
brings a profit when exchanged for native specie”), 17 perfumes,
and a steady supply of luxuries for the local king. The com-
mercial dominance of Barygaza over other hinterland and
coastal centers on the subcontinent is emphasized in the
Periplus. Local ports such as Suppara (Sopara) and Kalligeris
were said to be subservient to Barygaza. But the Periplus also
notes the emergence of Nelkunda and Muziris (Cochin) on the
Malabar Coast as ports of trade outside Barygaza’s sphere of
influence. These were the ports where Roman vessels could ac-
quire pepper without dealing through Barygaza middlemen.
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Rome’s discovery of the monsoons was critical to the emer-
gence of south Indian ports as independent centers of trade,
free from Barygaza’s economic dominance. The Malabar Coast
pepper supply was sufficient to attract Western ships, and once
direct trade with the West was established these ports became
dominant over their own commercial network. Chinese silk and
goods that had been transported overland to the Malabar Coast
from the southeastern regions of the subcontinent—pearls,
ivory, cloth goods, and jewels—were also available to Roman
ships anchoring in south Indian ports. In exchange Roman ships
traded great quantities of specie, cloth, white glass, copper,
brass, tin, lead, and wine—essentially the same commodities
that they traded at Barygaza. 18
The author of the Periplus had nothing to say of India’s
eastern coast and beyond. Ptolemy was the first knowledgeable
authority in the Roman realm on the geography of India’s Coro-
mandel Coast, and it appears that his information was largely
new to his readers. 19 Classical Tamil literature from south India
describes the emporium of Kaverippumppattinam, an east coast
terminus for both overland and coastal trade in the first cen-
turies of the Christian era. Kaverippumppattinam had a huge
warehouse to which were taken large quantities of articles ob-
tained from numerous places. 20 The excavations at Arikamedu
substantiate this literary reference. The distribution and con-
centration of Roman coin hoards across the southern part of
the subcontinent indicate that an overland route was preferred
during the first century, with caravans of merchants crossing
from the Malabar Coast to the Kaveri River. The traders of
the Roman Orient left circumnavigation of the subcontinent to
Indian merchants and their smaller vessels. 21 Whether these
commercial centers were reached by land or by sea, however, it
is clear that they were part of the developing India-Rome trade
network by the mid-first century.
The study of Roman coin hoards found in India further sub-
stantiates these contacts. Of sixty-eight coinage finds
throughout the entire subcontinent, no fewer than fifty-seven
were discovered in the south, and of these fifty-seven all but a
few stray Roman coins were found in hoards located inland be-
tween the western and eastern coasts. These are invariably of
gold or silver content; coins of Augustus (27 B.C.–A.D. 14) and
Tiberius (A.D. 14–37) predominate. 22
According to the Periplus, first in importance among first-
century imports carried by Western merchants to the Malabar
Coast ports were gold and silver coins. Pliny noted that India
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absorbed some 55 million gold coins (sesterces) annually, and
further stated that 100 million ses terces were taken to India,
China, and Arabia combined. 23 It is interesting that most re-
covered Roman coins have been either pierced for suspension
or mutilated by a cut across their obverse, which implies that
Indians used this coinage as bullion rather than as currency.
Roman coins, it seems, were weighed out in exchange for goods,
a fact that explains the existence of the south Indian hoards.
As subdivided and stamped subunits of precious metal, coins
undoubtedly facilitated the Indian trader’s accounting and also
benefited him in his dealings with his customers; that they were
widely recognized units of value no doubt made it easier for the
trader to negotiate his various transactions with numerous pop-
ulation centers that would have had no other common unit of
exchange.
The flowering of Roman trade in the Indian Ocean during
the first century A.D. not only had important implications for
Rome but was also of significance to the development of po-
litical and economic centers in southern India. Recent schol-
arship views this commercial growth as a critical stimulus to
the evolution of south Indian statecraft. Former tribal chiefs
are seen seizing the opportunities offered by the growing trade
to organize the flow of trade goods out of the hinterland and
into the coastal ports, expanding their political hegemony in the
process. 24 This thesis may well be valid, for it is during this
era that the earliest south Indian states begin to appear. Cor-
responding to this political development and in response to the
demand for local commodities, new hinterland commercial and
political centers evolved. It is no coincidence that the most illus-
trious hinterland urban center of that time, the Pāṇḍya capital
of Madurai, was strategically located at the center of a major
cotton producing and weaving region and was as well directly
linked to the major caravan route between the western and
eastern coasts of southern India. 25
INITIAL MARITIME CONTACTS WITH SOUTHEAST
ASIA
Early references to trade with Southeast Asia are rather am-
biguous. Indian literature from the first centuries A.D. refers to
Southeast Asia in general as Yāvadvīpa or Suvarṇadvīpa, the
“Golden Island” or “Golden Peninsula.” The Rāmāyaṇa, India’s
great classical-era epic poem about Rama’s attempts to rescue
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his wife, who had been abducted by the king of Sri Lanka,
records seven kingdoms on the “Gold and Silver Islands”
beyond Sri Lanka. The Buddhist Jātaka fables from popular lit-
erature mention Indian merchants who went to Southeast Asia
in search of wealth. Ptolemy, writing in the mid-second century,
uses Yāvadvīpa, “the Golden Peninsula,” in describing the lands
beyond India. He makes it quite clear that few Roman sailors
were making the passage to Yāvadvīpa, and indeed Indian evi-
dence indicates that not many Indian sailors were making the
passage either.
Chinese records provide a more satisfactory yet still incom-
plete view of the burgeoning Southeast Asian commerce. Sub-
stantial references to Western trade began to appear in official
Han sources in the last decade of the first century. By 111 B.C.,
the Han dynasty had extended its control into southern China,
and Han emperors, following the lead of the illustrious emperor
Han Wu-ti (140–87 B.C.), who is believed to have encouraged
the development of the Central Asian caravan route, came into
control of Canton, a coastal city with strong commercial in-
terests. During a break in Han rule in A.D. 9–25, the southern
part of China had become a haven for refugees escaping from
the turmoil in the north, among them northern aristocrats, who
further encouraged the development of Canton as a commercial
center. These aristocrats, now resident in the south, constituted
a growing market for Western goods.
The term Ta-ch’in was used by the Chinese to refer to the
Roman provinces in the Middle East stretching from Syria to
Egypt. From these western regions “precious and rare objects
of all foreign countries” were said to come. 26 A Han history
text dating from A.D. 125 vaguely describes Ta-ch’in’s trade
with the northwestern coast of India. Profit to Ta-ch’in’s traders
from this trade was said to be tenfold, but “honest.” 27 Ta-ch’in
products reaching China included glass, carpets, rugs, embroi-
deries, piece goods, and precious stones. Among these, man-
ufactured goods—notably glassware in the form of imitation
jewelry and ornaments of colored glass—were especially
valued. 28
There are several reasons for the growth of maritime trade
during the first century. First, historians have theorized that
gold became difficult to acquire during this time. 29 Due to in-
ternal disturbances in the Central Asian steppe region, caravan
routes from Central Asia no longer provided gold from Siberian
deposits, one of the major sources of the precious metal in
the Asian world in earliest times. Since gold was the medium
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of Asian trade, enabling commercial exchanges between mer-
chants of disparate cultures, new sources had to be found to
cover trade imbalances. The demand for Roman gold coinage
increased accordingly until the emperor Nero (A.D. 54–68) re-
sponded to inflation by debasing the gold content in Roman
coinage, which quickly brought decreasing interest among
Eastern traders in accepting Rome’s coins in commercial trans-
actions. 30 The emperor Vespasian (A.D. 69–79) made an official
attempt to stop the unfavorable flow of gold coins away from
Rome. 31 As a consequence, Indian merchants began looking
toward the mythical wealth of the “Islands of Gold” with keen
interest and embarked on a major effort to secure these riches.
Second, the quest for gold coincided with the revolution
in boat construction and navigation techniques. By the first
century Western ships were being built with fore and aft rigging
that greatly increased sailing efficiency. Ships of considerable
size came into use, some with the capacity to carry six to seven
hundred tons of cargo. Pliny wrote of a 75-ton ship making the
ocean crossing.
Third, the first century marked a great age of Buddhism in
South Asia. Buddhism did not view commercial activity as nega-
tively as did the Hindu tradition. Its spread during this time was
tied to the evolution of the new Mahāyāna Buddhist school in
northern India. Under the patronage of rich Indian merchants,
Buddhist monks who instructed the lay community split with the
monks of the Theravāda school, who observed the more elitist
“Way of the Fathers.” The popular worship of the Mahāyāna
sect was practiced in great public shrines rather than in the
seclusion of monasteries. Less scholastic and not as concerned
with self-attainment, Mahāyāna developed the concept of com-
passion and of assisting others to salvation as symbolized by
the Bodhisattva, the “Buddha-to-Be” who postponed his own ul-
timate salvation to remain among mortals as a spiritual guide.
The Mahāyāna school can be viewed as a response to a dynamic
and expanding world, a world intimately connected to com-
merce. Buddhist tales (Jātakas) thus came to deal extensively
with the activities of common men, including their economic ac-
tivities, normally ignored in Hindu literature. In these tales the
pursuit of wealth, as long as it was not accomplished at the ex-
pense of others, was not seen as evil but was considered natural
to man. Indian Ocean seamen were particularly devoted to the
Buddha Dīpamkara, the “Calmer of the Waters.” 32 Significantly,
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
39
a number of outstanding Dīpamkara statues associated with this
era are distributed throughout the Southeast Asian archipelago.
33
By the sixth century Buddhism would become especially im-
portant to the Chinese, and Southeast Asia played a key inter-
mediary role between South Asia, the source of Buddhism, and
China. Buddhist monks passed along the international sea route
and by a land route through Burma; Chinese monks traveled
to India to acquire deeper understanding of their faith; and
Indian monks journeyed to China to share their knowledge with
Chinese patrons. As early as the third century an urban com-
munity on the edge of the Red River Delta in Vietnam had
become a center of Buddhism, with at least twenty temples and
over five hundred monks in residence. By the seventh-century
voyage of the Chinese pilgrim I-ching, it was viewed as an im-
portant stopping point prior to one’s entry into China, not only
because it was a commercial entrepôt but also because it had
become an important religious center for Buddhist pilgrims. 34
The Sumatran state of Śrīvijaya was also in that age con-
sidered a “must” stop for pilgrims. Śrīvijaya, like Vietnam,
seems to have been able to fit into the more egalitarian Bud-
dhist world order. I-ching reported that an international com-
munity of a thousand monks studied at the capital of the
Śrīvijaya monarch in 671. Those who traded with the Chinese
and Indian markets in the name of the Śrīvijaya ruler could
claim prestige appropriate to those who came into contact with
this great patron of the Mahāyāna Buddhist school. Mahāyāna
Buddhism thereby allowed Southeast Asian realms that fol-
lowed the Vietnam and Śrīvijaya examples prestige in the
channels of religious communication, raising their status above
the “barbarian” image normally held by the Chinese of
Southeast Asians and providing the basis for intellectual as well
as commercial interaction among the states that participated in
the international maritime route.
A fourth reason for the growth of maritime trade through
Southeast Asia was Chinese interest, which broadened after the
disintegration of the Han dynasty between A.D. 190 and 225.
With trouble in Central Asia along the old caravan route and po-
litical strife in northern China, there was an increasing need for
a southern maritime link between East and West.
Western diplomatic missions to China traveled overland
until A.D. 160, when suddenly missions from northern India
began to arrive by sea reflecting Central Asian upheaval that
must have effectively closed the overland route. The south
The Development of Maritime Trade in Asia
40
China based Wu dynasty (A.D. 220–264) encouraged the import
of Western textiles (mainly Indian cotton), tree resins, coral,
pearls, amber, glassware, jewelry, and other manufactures. A
group of traders appeared on the south China coast in A.D.
166 claiming to be envoys from the Roman emperor Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus; in 226, Ta-ch’in merchants from the West
visited the Wu court. They were questioned extensively by the
emperor Sun Ch’uan himself, who sent an official to accompany
them on their return voyage. 35 Lu Tai, Wu governor of a Chinese
province in northern Vietnam, was assigned a special role in
advertising south China’s interest in this trade, sending envoys
“to the South.” When envoys from the lower Vietnam coastal
states of Funan and Lin-yi paid official visits in 226 and 231,
respectively, Lu Tai was congratulated by the emperor for his
“meritorious performance.” In 240, Wu envoys were dispatched
to Funan’s ports to view firsthand the nature of trade with
the West—and seemingly as well to evaluate whether conquest
down the coast beyond the Red River Delta would be worth-
while. 36 These envoys’ reports not only provided important in-
formation on Funan but also on Ta-ch’in and northern Indian
commercial centers.
K’ang T’ai, one of the envoys, informed his emperor that the
kingdom of Funan was a prosperous realm from which great
merchant ships departed for China and India. Funan’s authority
stretched beyond the lower Mekong Delta to the upper Malay
Peninsula. After a major naval expedition in the early third
century, Funan had assumed authority over many of the trade
centers on the Malay coast, thereby consolidating its dominance
over the flow of commerce through Southeast Asia. By the early
fourth century, however, significant changes were taking place
on the international route that resulted in the demise of Funan
and other northern peninsula commercial centers.
THE FIFTH-CENTURY TRANSITION
In the second half of the fourth century the Chin dynasty in
China lost access to the Central Asian caravan routes. While
in the third century the south China-based Wu elite had de-
pended totally on the maritime route for luxury goods from the
West, the Chin elite had been able to balance their needs, re-
ceiving goods from both the maritime and overland networks.
However, with the loss of access to the caravan route they
too began to encourage the further development of the sea
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passage. Of greatest consequence to Funan was the reaction of
would-be Southeast Asian entrepôts south and east of the Malay
Peninsula to the new commercial initiatives by the Chinese.
Chinese efforts to expand the volume of trade along the sea
route had met with an immediate response from a number of
Sunda Strait coastal centers that had already been trading di-
rectly with India but indirectly with China via Funan’s ports.
These commercial rivals quickly seized the opportunity to trade
directly with China.
Records of direct commercial and maritime contact between
the Java Sea region and China show that by the fifth century
Funan’s role as the principal commercial power in the
Southeast Asian world was being seriously eroded. In 430, the
ruler of the western Java kingdom known to the Chinese as Ho-
lo-tan/t’o petitioned the Chinese court seeking protection for his
ships that sailed on a regular basis to China. 37 The significance
of this embassy is that it documents the fact that direct voyages
were being made from the Sunda Strait region to China across
the South China Sea, bypassing Funan.
The Sunda Strait state known to the Chinese as Ko-ying
was described in sixth-century Chinese records as having been
previously cut off from China. “For generations” Ko-ying had
traded with China via Funan. Nevertheless, Ko-ying had evolved
during the Funan era as a terminus for shipping using the
Strait of Malacca, a point of departure for trade between India
and the Spice Islands of the eastern archipelago. 38 At Koying’s
trade depots Indian merchants acquired the forest products and
spices of the archipelago in exchange for pearls, gold, jade,
areca nuts, glassware, and horses. In the fifth century, however,
Ko-ying’s economic position was challenged by the western Java
commercial center of Ho-lo-tan/t’o, and ultimately both were re-
placed by a new southeast Sumatra commercial center, Kan-
t’o-li, and its successor, the Śrīvijaya state, as the dominant
maritime power in the western Java Sea realm.
Evidence that Funan was being bypassed in favor of a Strait
of Malacca and South China Sea passage comes first from the
Buddhist pilgrim Fa Hsien. Fa Hsien had traveled from China
to India overland but returned by sea from Sri Lanka in A.D.
413–414. His description of the return voyage provides a vivid
picture of the sea passage from Sri Lanka to Southeast Asia:
[I] took passage on board a large merchant vessel, on which there
were over two hundred souls, and astern of which there was a
smaller vessel in tow in case of accidents at sea and destruction of
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the big vessel. Catching a fair wind [i.e., the monsoon], [we] sailed
eastwards for two days; then [we] encountered a heavy gale, and
the vessel sprang a leak. The merchants wished to get aboard the
smaller vessel; but the men on the latter, fearing that they would
be swamped by numbers, quickly cut the tow-rope in two. The
merchants were terrified, for death was close at hand; and fearing
that the vessel would fill, they promptly took what bulky goods
there were and threw them into the sea…. The gale blew on for
thirteen days and nights, when [we] arrived alongside an island,
and then, at ebb-tide, they saw the place where the vessel leaked
and forthwith stopped it up, after which [we] again proceeded on
[our] way. This sea is infested with pirates, to meet whom is death.
The expanse is boundless…. 39
After sailing through the Strait of Malacca, Fa Hsien landed
at a trade depot known to the Chinese as Yeh-p’o-t’i, believed
to have been located on the west coast of Borneo. From there
he might have been expected to go to Funan, for archaeological
evidence from the presumed site of Yeh-p’o-t’i, notably carved
sacrificial posts known as yūpas, substantiate a Borneo cultural
link to Funan, indicating as with other archipelago coastal
centers that early interactions between these depots and the
Chinese and Indian commercial markets had been funneled
through Funan’s ports. 40 Yet Fa Hsien went directly from Yeh-
p’o-t’i to Canton, a voyage of fifty days under normal conditions.
An Indian prince and Buddhist monk, Guṇavarman, also
sailed from India to Southeast Asia in the early fifth century,
landing at the Javanese trade depot of She-p’o. He departed
from there with the intention of making an intermediate stop in
a Lin-yi (Cham) port on the lower Vietnam coast before entering
China. The winds were unfavorable, however, and the merchant
ship on which he had taken passage sailed nonstop for China. 41
Indigenous elites in early Southeast Asian coastal centers
found that the increased volume of international trade during
this era afforded them with other opportunities as well. Local
leaders came to recognize that facilitating trade could be useful
in reinforcing their sovereignty vis-à-vis potential rivals and
subordinates. Successful rulers could organize the flow of local
products from their hinterlands to their courts, sell the products
themselves or receive a share of the profits from others’ sales,
and assess fees on international merchants who came to trade
for the products in their ports. Income from this trade amounted
to a significant supplement to the income a landed or tribal
elite already received from lands they held. Exotic goods and
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additional income from trade also enhanced an elite’s capacity
to implement their gift-giving “ritual sovereignty” (discussed
later in this chapter), thereby increasing their alliance capital.
Southeast Asian rulers thus found it in their personal interest to
control local contact with the international trade routes. Rulers
consequently took great interest in the collection and redistri-
bution of wealth derived from trade. This wealth, as well as
foreign luxury goods acquired on the coast, was shared with
supporters to reinforce the status of the monarch and his sub-
ordinate elite. The development of new state systems was thus
in part due to an elite’s successful manipulation of external and
indigenous commercial networks to expand their authority vis-
à-vis competing elites.
As noted in chapter 1, by the fifth century the southern coast
of Sumatra had become a “favored coast,” serving the archi-
pelago as well as hinterland systems that had formerly been
within the Funan sphere of influence. The new importance of
this favored coast was partially due to the expanding Chinese
market for Southeast Asian products. Chinese overtures en-
couraged river-mouth centers in the Java Sea region to send
their products directly to Chinese ports. Chinese initiatives also
stimulated competition among the emerging trade depots for
dominance over neighboring river-mouth centers.
Commercial centers on the Sumatran coast near the Sunda
Strait enjoyed a strategic location between the riches of the
Java Sea region and China. Their coastal and hinterland net-
works were easily mobilized to provide manpower and goods for
the China trade. Malay ships and crews transported Sumatran
products and Java Sea spices to China and brought back
Chinese goods. Soon coastal rulers began to use these same
seamen to police the Strait of Malacca, for piracy was a plague
to shipping in this area. Once it was brought under control,
maritime contacts between Sumatran ports and India expanded.
Ships from India began sailing south through the strait instead
of landing on the upper Malay Peninsula and sending their
goods by land across the Isthmus of Kra. Trade depots vied for
political supremacy over rival river-mouth centers on the coasts
of southeastern Sumatra, northwestern Java, and southwestern
Borneo, all the while maintaining and facilitating the movement
of goods between Chinese, Indian, and other Southeast Asian
markets.
With this transition to the sea passage through the Strait of
Malacca, Funan’s ports became peripheral to the mainstream
of international commerce. To participate in international trade,
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Funan’s traders had to travel to other trade depots, just as pre-
viously Southeast Asian seafarers had to come to Funan to carry
on their exchanges.
THE CHINA TRADE
Who provided passage from Southeast Asia’s ports to China and
India in the first centuries of the Christian era? Early Chinese
records make it clear that Malay ships and seamen based in
Southeast Asia, identified by the term K’un-lun, sailed the route
between Southeast Asia and China. 42 Until the eleventh century
no Chinese ships made the voyage on a regular basis, and until
the sixth century Persian ships went no farther east than Sri
Lanka. There is disagreement, however, on who provided the
passage from South Asia to Southeast Asia.
Many Western historians initially thought that Indian
seamen in Indian-made ships developed the route. In reiterating
this view, one has recently argued that Southeast Asian seamen
were not capable of building the great ships making the voyage.
43 Indians duplicated in shipyards along the Indian coast the
more advanced Persian ships, and Indian sailors, most of them
Buddhists, then sailed the vessels with their international pas-
sengers and cargoes to the “Land of Gold.” Opposing this posi-
tion, other historians now believe that it was not Indians but
Southeast Asians piloting K’un-lun ships from the Southeast
Asian archipelago to India and back who provided this early
linkage for international merchants, 44 which would make
Southeast Asian seamen responsible for opening the entire sea
route from India to China. They point to Western accounts from
this age that record voyages by Malay seafarers as far west as
the African coast and draw the conclusion that if Malay ships
could reach Africa, they could reach India.
When the need for a maritime route increased, these
seamen were able to turn their maritime skills to financial gain.
Because Western traders at this time were primarily interested
in exchanging Western goods for Chinese products, access to
the ports of south China was a critical factor that allowed Malay
seamen to expand their Western trade. By securing Chinese
commodities and transporting them to Southeast Asian and
South Asian trade depots, Southeast Asian seamen eliminated
the need for Western ships to venture beyond South Asia.
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Malay seamen, however, were not only facilitators of inter-
national trade; they could be a serious obstacle as well. They
had the potential to be shippers or pirates. Chinese records
report that “merchant ships of the barbarians” (K’un-lun) were
used to transfer Chinese envoys to their destinations in the
archipelago, and that these seamen profited equally from the
trade and from plundering and killing people. 45 Herein the
Malay seamen’s duality is fully recognized. The Chinese con-
sidered Southeast Asia to be generally unstable politically and
a potential threat to the efficient flow of commercial goods into
China. The Chinese government in its dealings with Southeast
Asian states was not as much interested in having its political
legitimacy and dominance recognized—there was no need to
annex the southern regions since the Chinese ruling elite was
sure that the southern barbarians would eventually become
part of the Chinese cultural realm—as it was in establishing
commercial goals as the basis of relationships. The Chinese thus
looked for a strong, dominant state in the area that would be
able to maintain trade and prevent plundering by the sea pi-
rates based in Southeast Asian waters.
The Chinese apparently favored consistency, preferring not
to shift alliances from one state to another. They would rec-
ognize one state and attempt to maintain a tributary rela-
tionship with it. If the state stopped sending envoys to the
Chinese court the Chinese would try to reestablish contact
with the state before granting official recognition to another.
Southeast Asian states in a tributary relationship with China
received nothing from the Chinese but recognition of their le-
gitimacy and trading status. Appeals for direct military aid or
patronage were generally ignored. 46 Southeast Asian states did
capitalize on Chinese recognition, however, to attract trade to
their ports. Chinese support bestowed on them a legitimacy that
contributed to their rise. Traders who frequented a “legitimate”
coastal trading center seem to have been given preferential
treatment in their trade with China, The Malay seamen who pro-
vided shipping for goods and merchants saw the potential for
acquiring great wealth in the China trade and joined forces with
the legitimized states. They turned to policing rather than pi-
rating the sea channels and in return for their loyalty shared in
the trade-derived prosperity.
So critical was Chinese recognition that any coastal trade
depot wishing to prosper sent a tribute mission to the Chinese
court. According to one historian’s analysis of these political
missions, which were dutifully recorded by Chinese scribes,
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when they were few it meant stability in the area, that is,
when one trade depot’s authority over the sea lanes was unchal-
lenged. 47 Periods of internal dissension and political turmoil
are reflected, on the other hand, by numerous tribute missions,
as various coastal commercial centers competed for the pre-
ferred status the Chinese could bestow. For example, in the era
of Funan’s supremacy, Funan ports were officially recognized
by the Chinese court and sent few tribute missions. But by the
fifth century, when the pattern of trade was shifting from Funan
to the Sunda Strait region, numerous tribute missions from
the former economic subordinates of Funan appeared at the
Chinese court soliciting favorable trade relationships. Funan at-
tempted to regain Chinese favor, sending both tributary mis-
sions and trade envoys to the Chinese court, but the Chinese,
fully aware of the transition taking place in trading patterns,
chose to ignore the Funan initiative and to give official recog-
nition instead to the ports of a southeastern Sumatra state as
well as to those of Funan’s neighbor, former vassal, and mortal
enemy, the Cham state of Lin-yi.
THE IMPACT OF TRADE ON STATE
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH INDIA AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Over the years historians have examined the possible roles
of Brahman priests, Kṣatriya warrior-adventurers, or Vaiśya
traders from India in spreading Indian civilization along the
emerging maritime routes to developing Southeast Asian states.
While some have postulated wholesale colonization by Indian
exiles, 48 others have maintained that “Indianization” was wholly
created by Southeast Asians themselves, by summoning
Brahmans to their courts and creating a thin veneer of In-
dianized customs. 49 Indeed, the historical records provide no
evidence of Indian colonies, Indian conquest, or direct Indian
control. The adoption of Indic culture appears to have been vol-
untary on the part of the Southeast Asians, although some seg-
ments of a Southeast Asian society may well have had Indian
cultural forms imposed upon them by an indigenous elite. Since
the process did not merely occur once or twice but on numerous
occasions between the third and fourteenth centuries A.D., in
riverine coastal centers as well as in hinterland wet-rice plains,
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questions of who brought the Indian civilization are better refo-
cused to ask how and why Southeast Asians chose to adopt the
Indic culture. 50
In response to these questions of how and why, a compar-
ative examination of expanding international commercial con-
tacts in southern India and Southeast Asia may provide a basis
for understanding transitions in Indian Ocean commercial pat-
terns and also contribute to an understanding of early south
Indian and Southeast Asian political organization. South India is
different from northern India historically and ethnically: the re-
lationship of south India to northern India is in some ways par-
allel to the relationship of Southeast Asia to northern India—the
differences are differences of degree. The historical issues con-
fronting the scholar of early Southeast Asian civilization are
similar to those raised by southern Indian civilization. Both
areas developed state systems by integrating north Indian San-
skritic ideology with existing cultural forms. Thus by coming
to terms with the process of state formation in southern India,
whose history is far better documented than that of early
Southeast Asia, one may acquire a conceptual perspective that
can be tested and applied on a comparative basis to Southeast
Asia; that is, the understanding of one in many ways facilitates
the better understanding of the other.
The study of south Indian history suggests that while early
south Indian monarchs were in general introspective, their in-
terest in promoting trade and in the development of institutions
and organizations to enable the efficient flow of products into
and out of their ports was stimulated by the potential revenue to
be gained from cesses on luxury goods brought in by seafaring
merchants. Between the sixth and fourteenth centuries—the
height of classical Southeast Asian civilization and also the
golden age of early south Indian civilization—the Coromandel
Coast was under the rule of the Pallava and Cōla̤ dynasties.
Their royal style required the conspicuous display of grandeur;
seeing the benefits to be derived from a positive attitude toward
commerce, these rulers structured their relationships accord-
ingly with those who participated in the trade. 51
In Pallava and Cōla̤ times agricultural settlements were
spreading inland from the coast along river valleys. 52 Clusters
of villages inhabited by a settled agrarian population were sur-
rounded by various nonagrarian areas occupied by tribal
peoples. The village clusters were dominated by a local land-
holding elite. In this multicentered system of power, direct
control by a royal house extended only to the village clusters
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located near the base of royal power. Beyond the royal centers
dynastic rulers were limited in their ability to mobilize material
and human resources.
A village cluster tried to preserve local resources for its own
use, which created tensions between local and higher levels of
political authority on the issue of who was to receive what share
of the local agricultural surplus. A strong community was able
to retard the flow of goods to a political center. The dynastic
rulers sometimes found it necessary to undertake military cam-
paigns, not to conquer territory but to take plunder to offset
the villagers’ unwillingness to share their surplus. 53 Often a
ruler’s desire for personal glory was at odds with the amount of
revenue he could peacefully extract from his own domain. As a
result royal armies were frequently turned loose into the field
where they sustained themselves on the resources of conquered
territories.
As an alternative to the use of force, south Indian kings
attempted to institutionalize and regularize their relationships
with landholding elites. Particular emphasis was placed on the
peaceful consolidation of the population through the royal be-
stowal of legitimacy on certain local rulers, a theory of legit-
imacy that drew heavily on Brahmanical Hindu thought. The
network of alliances that south Indian kings constructed was
acted out in ceremonies of “ritual sovereignty.” 54
Ritual sovereignty stressed the consolidation of the society
under the royal ideology of legitimacy. The integration of semi-
autonomous agrarian units into a state system centered upon
the king, who functioned as the ritual center—a political, cul-
tural, and social reference rather than an all-powerful authority.
By endowing temples, temple ceremonies, and settlements of
Brahman-dominated villages in strategic locations, 55 a king
could be viewed as expressing his concern for social morality
and the spiritual welfare of the realm. It added merit to the
royal house when the state endowed a temple with land and
funded ceremonies to the perpetual memory of the king. The
record of such endowments was inscribed for eternity in the
stone of the temple walls. Each inscription reflected the kingly
style: long Sanskrit and Tamil eulogies composed at the court
were included in the prologue of royal inscriptions throughout
the realm. Brahmanical terminology, an important element in
the claim of royal legitimacy, was grafted onto existing institu-
tions. Local deities were incorporated into “respectable” pan-
theons. Local temples and pilgrimage centers were patronized
by royalty and gained added luster through the association. Re-
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ligious patronage was intended to raise the king’s status in the
eyes of the subject population. Royal inscriptions encouraged
this recognition, noting the prosperity the king had brought to
his domain. Royal eulogies undoubtedly represented an attempt
to diminish the visibility of local elites while increasing that of
the king, but there was no similar effort by kings to eliminate or
disperse the local centers of power.
Locally entrenched agrarian elites had to be willing to rec-
ognize royal suzerainty, however. On the one hand, the king with
his superior might could physically eliminate or replace local
rulers; on the other hand, the king could defend them against
local or outside threats. Aside from the threat of force, the most
important legitimizing factor in gaining their cooperation was
that south Indian kings were patrons of Sanskritic tradition,
which provided an ideological justification for the landed elites’
claim to hold superior status vis-à-vis other members of the
agrarian order. They also allied themselves with south Indian
kings in order to draw upon the dynastic rulers’ religious net-
works and symbols, normally concentrated in temples, thereby
enhancing their status by being seen as certified patrons of the
royal cults.
In return the king received the fealty of the elites and their
subordinates. Sometimes this relationship was formalized by
the flow of local cesses into the king’s treasury. Such cesses
were often immediately returned in the form of royal patronage
of local temples. In other instances, locally raised troops might
fight as loyal followers of a king in a military campaign and in
return share in the spoils of victory. The king’s spiritual prowess
was also enhanced by local support for royal temples. Notables
made gifts to the temples, financed holy ritual in the king’s
name, or subordinated local temples and their cults, which
were supervised by the local elite, to those of the central royal
temples. 56
The political synthesis of Sanskritic culture in south India
provides a meaningful parallel to that which took place in
Southeast Asia. Notably, Hindu and Buddhist Sanskritic culture
provided the basis for south Indian as well as Southeast Asian
ritual sovereignty. The adoption of Sanskritic culture was en-
couraged by leaders in both areas because of its potential as a
source of political and social cohesion. Sanskritic culture was
not imposed through the conquest of south India or Southeast
Asia by northern Indians nor was it due to the mass migration of
north Indian elites to the south. Sanskritic ideology was adopted
because of the advantages it offered to an emerging indigenous
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agrarian-based elite, who emulated the Hindu model of kingship
and order in which in theory the monarch relied on virtue rather
than force to extend his sovereignty. South Indian as well as
Southeast Asian monarchs who sought alternatives to violence
by which to force the landholding elites into submission de-
pended instead upon ritual kingship to integrate their realm.
They promoted alliances rather than relying on the threat of
physical retribution.
Revenues generated from maritime commerce reinforced al-
liance networks. They supplemented local revenue collections
and were redistributed by successful monarchs to reinforce the
ties formed through their ritual sovereignty. The sea trade de-
scribed earlier was thus a stimulus to state development. Local
chiefs in southern India and Southeast Asia developed their
coastal ports to serve the needs of the international trading
community. In exchange they garnered income from various
port cesses. This revenue in turn increased their wealth such
that they were able to transform material benefits into political
advantage. For instance, a local leader with an income suffi-
ciently higher than that of his fellow chiefs and tribesmen could
expand his manpower base by soliciting the support of rival
chiefs and/or their followers. This base of support could then be
used to protect or provision the port—for example, to police the
sea channels against piracy, stabilize the hinterland, guarantee
the flow of food for visiting merchants, or assure the delivery of
the local products desired by traders. Followers shared in their
chief’s success as a facilitator of international trade through
direct redistributions of profits. Rulers also cultivated their fol-
lowers’ loyalty by subscribing to north Indian Sanskritic reli-
gious tradition, which reinforced the chief’s spiritual prowess,
putting his magic above that of his followers.
Indic cultural forms were indeed important to evolving
Southeast Asian states as an ideological base for their ex-
panding sovereignty. In the chapters to come we shall look at
how these cultural forms were introduced into and influenced
the development of specific states.
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3
The “Indianization” of
Funan, Southeast Asia’s
First State
The“Indianization”ofFunan,SoutheastAsia’sFirstState
We have seen that the growing importance of the maritimeroute through Southeast Asia had a significant impact on
the political and economic systems of the region. Just what that
impact entailed can perhaps better be observed by examining in
detail the earliest known Southeast Asian political entity, Funan.
As noted in chapter 2, when in the 240s the first Chinese
envoys on record traveled to Southeast Asia to explore the
nature of the sea passage at the behest of the Wu dynasty, it
was to Funan on the southern Vietnam coast that they went.
From the reports filed by K’ang T’ai and Chu Ying, the origins of
Funan become intelligible. 1 K’ang T’ai’s report provides a con-
temporary glimpse of the prosperous state, informing his em-
peror that the people of Funan
live in walled cities, palaces, and houses…. They devote them-
selves to agriculture. They sow one year and harvest for three….
Taxes are paid in gold, silver, pearls, and perfumes…. There are
books and depositories of archives and other things. Their char-
acters for writing resemble those of the Hu [a people of Central
Asia who used a script of Indian origin]. 2
Among the coastal centers in the vicinity of the upper Malay
Peninsula that quickly developed to service the growing
numbers of merchants traveling the sea and overland Isthmus
of Kra route were ports on the lower Vietnam coast said by
the Chinese to have been under Funan’s authority. Archae-
ological remains at Oc-èo, the site of one such Funan port,
show that the coast was occupied in the early first century
A.D. by Malay fishing and hunting groups. 3 Already building
their own ships, these seamen recognized that the location of
their coast in relation to the new international route across
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the Isthmus of Kra would enable them to provide passage for
Indian and Chinese goods. Soon Oc-èo was booming. Port fa-
cilities were constructed, including buildings for storing goods
and hostelries for merchants laying over until the next season’s
monsoon winds would allow their return voyage. 4
The archaeological data from Oc-èo also indicate that the
evolution of the Funan port as a commercial center for maritime
trade was ultimately connected to a parallel or previous devel-
opment of Funan’s agricultural base. A vast water management
system that at some point included elaborate hydraulic projects
allowed the Funan land-based population to produce multiple
rice harvests annually—supplying sufficient surplus to easily
feed foreign merchants resident in Funan ports and to provision
their ships. 5 It is unclear, however, whether this water man-
agement system required either a new level of technological
competence and/or a central leadership for its construction. 6
It would seem that the hydraulic projects (discussed later in
this chapter) did not appear until later and that Funan’s early
agricultural development was based on flood-rice cultivation,
for which the Funan region (unlike others) was most suited.
Thus Funan’s rise had two sources: the development of an
advanced agrarian system (possibly including the drainage of
coastal swamps) and its strategic location opposite the Isthmus
of Kra. To determine whether Funan’s emergence was the con-
sequence of indigenous development or the result of a signif-
icant input of foreign expertise, especially Indian, it is necessary
to examine Funan’s earliest history.
THE ORIGIN OF FUNAN
According to Chinese sources the founding of the Funan state
took place in the first century A.D., and its origin is suggested
by a local legend. In that age a female ruler is said to have
led a raid on a merchant ship, whose passengers succeeded in
fending off the raiding party and landing. One of the travelers
was a man from a country “beyond the seas.” This man drank
water from the land and then married the local ruler, thereby
becoming “king” over her domain. At the time of their marriage
Funan consisted of several settlements, principally along the
Mekong, each of which was under the authority of its own local
chief. The first “king” of Funan and his wife not only assumed
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the right to rule but assigned their son the right to rule over
seven of these population centers; the remainder of the domain
they retained under their own authority. 7
The basic elements of this legend are reiterated elsewhere
in Indian and Southeast Asian folklore—the marriage between
the foreigner, bearing the Indian name “Kauṇḍinya,”—a great
Brahman, and a local nāga princess, daughter of the ruler of
the water realm. 8 This legend is broadly used to symbolize
the union of Indian and indigenous cultures, Kauṇḍinya repre-
senting elements of Indian culture and religions and the nāga
princess symbolic of local ways and indigenous fertility cults.
The marriage myth may be an attempt to explain not only
the penetration of Indian culture into Southeast Asia, but also
the origin of Southeast Asian kingship. Historians have not,
however, been in agreement on its interpretation.
One classic account of the process symbolized in the
Kauṇḍinya myth is provided in this early twentieth-century his-
torical reconstruction:
The true picture must have been something like this: two or three
Indian vessels sailing together eventually arrived [there]. The
newcomers established relations with the chiefs of the country,
earning favor with them by means of presents, treatment of ill-
nesses, and amulets…. No one could use such procedures better
than an Indian. He would undoubtedly pass himself off as of royal
or princely extraction, and his host could not help but be fa-
vorably impressed. 9
These Indians are then seen uniting in marriage with the
daughters of the local chiefs as the basis for converting the
rulers and their population to Indian ways. Because the local
population had no equivalent vocabulary or understanding to
deal with the social, moral, and religious innovations the for-
eigners wished to undertake to uplift the native population, it
was necessary for the Indians to use their own terminology.
Indian culture soon engulfed the more primitive local civi-
lization, as the local population became subjects of an Indi-
anized state.
This theme of Indians traveling to Southeast Asia and pre-
siding over a cultural transformation is carried to the extreme
by several Indian historians who have argued that large
numbers of South Asians not only migrated to but also colonized
Funan and other early centers of civilization in Southeast Asia.
10 In opposing the colonization theories, while not denying the
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role of Indians in stimulating the formation of early Southeast
Asian states, Justin van Leur was the first among modern his-
torians to stress the active role of Southeast Asia’s indigenous
rulers in forging the initial linkage. 11 Many historians hold that
Indian traders were the precursors and agents of the cultural
transformation. 12 Van Leur, however, reasoned that traders
would have been incapable of transmitting most of the more
subtle concepts of Indian thought. Rather, local rulers, having
learned of Indian culture through their interaction with Indians
on the maritime route, recognized the advantages to them of
certain elements of Indian civilization and drew from the Indian
tradition for their own benefit by encouraging the migration of
Brahman clerks to help them administer their realms.
George Coedès denied a Southeast Asian initiative and
argued that Indian Brahmans, or other Indians claiming to
belong to the Indian upper caste, were behind much of this in-
teraction. 13 He suggested that in some instances Indians im-
posed their authority over a local population, in others they
strengthened the power of the local chief, and in yet others they
intermarried with members of the local elite to legitimize the
new high-caste status of the “Hinduized” rulers.
Arguing against Coedès’ emphasis on the role Indians may
have played in the change, O. W. Wolters stressed the idea of a
mutual sharing process in the evolution of Indianized statecraft
in Southeast Asia. 14 The initial contact with and knowledge of
Indian cultural traditions came through Southeast Asian sailors.
Southeast Asian rulers, recognizing that Indian culture pro-
vided certain opportunities for administrative and technological
advantages vis-à-vis their rivals, followed up on these contacts.
The Indianizing of their realms was not due, then, to com-
mercial pressures (i.e., a desire to convert in order to facilitate
trade with Indian merchants). The early era of trade contact
was one of adaptation and learning—an “appren-
ticeship”—when rulers of states like Funan were curious about
Indian and other foreign cultural traditions and were in the
habit of looking overseas to their own benefit. The initiative was
Southeast Asian, not Indian; and it was a slow process of cul-
tural synthesis, not one of rapid imposition of Hinduism made
possible by a massive influx of Brahmans, that was responsible
for the Indianization of Southeast Asia. 15
Wolters has further proposed that a significant obstacle in
understanding the Indianization process is that historians have
tried to depict Funan and other early Southeast Asian political
entities as unified kingdoms. He argues that the difficulty in
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dealing with the “Hinduization” of early Southeast Asian states
is that they cannot be assumed to be “states” in the modern
sense but must be viewed as tribal societies that from time to
time produced certain chiefs who were able to mobilize suf-
ficient military power, family networks of relatives and their
allies, and marriage alliances to other chiefs’ groups to impose
their hegemony over neighboring chiefs. 16 Such overlordship
was of temporary duration and was made possible by the for-
mation of a coalition of those who supported the adventurer
seeking hegemony. To the successful candidate and his coali-
tion went the rewards of victory. Those who wished their local
authority to remain undisturbed would hasten to have it con-
firmed by the new overlord. Only the Chinese viewed early
Southeast Asian states as unified kingdoms with continuous dy-
nastic lines holding “thrones,” which was consistent with their
knowledge of their own historical experience of kingship and
dynastic succession. There was, however, no indigenous sense
of kingdom and its supraterritorial demands on loyalty among
the Southeast Asians themselves. Kingship derived from per-
sonal abilities and meritorious acts, not because of a claim
of descent from a royal lineage. Although an overlord might
speak of his descendance from ancestors who were remem-
bered for their accomplishments, kinship was not critical to
the promotion of authority. Political reality was that of tempo-
rary overlordships shifting from this to that group. One group’s
leader replaced another, not by a usurpation of the throne,
but by demonstration of leadership, often through a renewal of
tribal warfare that would then produce another era of short-
lived unity. A kingdom was no more than a territorial mea-
surement of those people allied to and acknowledging a leader’s
authority.
In Wolters’ view, statecraft in early Southeast Asia was char-
acterized by personal achievement. Local belief supported the
idea that some people (chiefs) could be superior to others, that
there was an uneven distribution of both secular and spiritual
prowess. An individual’s heroic secular accomplishments con-
firmed his spiritual superiority. Wolters documents strong con-
cerns over death in early Southeast Asia. 17 Through worship
of the dead, ancestors who had achieved eminence in life were
recognized; personal achievements in an individual’s lifetime
earned him ancestor status. Just as one sought alliances with
those of superior prowess in life, so too one desired a personal
bond to “ancestors of prowess,” who it was believed could
bestow material and spiritual substance on devotees. Those
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who achieved greatness in life thereby demonstrated that their
contact with the ancestors was greater than that of others of
their generation.
When an individual established a relationship with a suc-
cessful leader he confirmed his own bond with the ancestors.
Homage to one’s leader was thus a gesture of obedience to
the ancestors. A subject validated his own potential to become
an ancestor of prowess by sharing in his leader’s continuous
achievement. One important role of an overlord was thus to
support his followers’ hopes for a superior death status. The
successful chief carefully recognized his followers’ achieve-
ments and meritorious deeds by bestowing material (e.g., titles
and wealth) and spiritual (e.g., ritual and death status) gifts
on those whose secular performances on his behalf were note-
worthy. He was thereby able to influence his supporters’ stature
in this life as well as their hopes for recognition after death.
Wolters’ thesis is that the Indic religious tradition had
certain teachings that were supportive of the efforts of chiefs
to distinguish themselves as secular and spiritual superiors.
As noted, heroic accomplishments demonstrated an individual’s
superior prowess, which in turn was the ideal of ascetic
achievement. After consolidating his position by force, the suc-
cessful Southeast Asian chief began to practice Hindu as-
ceticism, further demonstrating spiritual superiority.
Achievement exemplified one’s close relationship not only with
the ancestors but also with Hindu gods. Specifically, Wolters
notes early patronage of the god Śiva. In early mainland inscrip-
tions Śiva was depicted as a patron of asceticism and as the
lord of the universe. Men of achievement became recognized as
Śiva’s spiritual authorities on earth, and since Śiva’s authority
over all that exists was absolute, their powers on earth had no
limit. The accomplished leader thus partook of divinity. Rela-
tionships with such a leader thus not only linked followers to the
society’s ancestors but also established a relationship with an
Indian divinity who reigned over the universe. 18
Wolters concluded that Southeast Asia’s early rulers did not
try to develop state institutions but instead initiated religious
cults that allowed their followers to draw from a leader’s spir-
itual relationship with both the ancestors and a universal deity.
Early Southeast Asian society thus rallied behind spiritually en-
dowed leaders who were supported by a blend of local and
Indian cultural symbols and values. Such leaders were able to
use these symbols and values to mobilize local populations for
various intraregional adventures.
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If these different interpretations are synthesized for the
purpose of undertaking an analysis of Funan’s political devel-
opment, it may be concluded that the entrepreneurial activities
of traders of various cultures stimulated the local rulers to
selectively adopt Indianized patterns for their own purposes.
Funan chieftains oversaw the initial commercial transactions
with foreign traders as the instigators and organizers of
Funan’s ports and served as mediators between the traders and
the local Malay population. As the international trade through
ports such as Oc-èo developed and increased in volume,
Funan’s rulers were subjected to a range of experiences beyond
those of their land-based subordinate populations. They were
exposed to new perceptions of the world, new life goals, and
became especially aware of new organizational possibilities.
The local ruler became a cultural broker, as well as the principal
beneficiary of profits directly derived from the commercial
route. The rewards included ceremonial regalia, beads, textiles,
wealth (precious metals/“cash”) that could be shared with
clients, and other items useful to a chief attempting to stress
his superiority over other similar indigenous rulers. The chief
thus had a vested interest in the continuation and expansion of
the system that was evolving. Since his own society’s norms re-
stricted his ambition, he was forced to rise above the indigenous
system in order to assume a more illustrious personal status,
one closely associated with the Indian model of divine kingship.
This synthesis may also be applied to the Funan origin myth.
In this age the volume of international maritime commercial
traffic between India and China was increasing and various
coastal rulers in Southeast Asia were competing to attract mer-
chant ships to their ports. The transformation of a coastal
center into an international port depended on a local ruler’s
initiative in organizing his supporters to facilitate this trade.
First a port facility had to be built. Second, a center had to es-
tablish itself as a purveyor of the goods desired by international
traders. In the case of Funan this was initially done by providing
superior facilities or, if necessary, by using force to build up a
supply of both Chinese and Western goods in its ports. Funan
chiefs formed working alliances with the Malay seagoing popu-
lation, who could facilitate the flow of trade by serving as trans-
porters of goods and policemen over the sea channels or could
plunder merchant ships, if that proved more profitable.
In the Funan origin myth, a local chief (a female, denoting
the importance of women in Funan society prior to Funan’s
adoption of “Indianized” statecraft, in which males normally
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assumed leadership roles) led a band of Malay seamen from
the Funan coast against a passing merchant ship. This is sym-
bolic of initial efforts to bring shipping to Funan’s ports by
force or it demonstrates an early pirate stage in Funan’s devel-
opment. Interestingly, the attack was said to have been beaten
off by the ship’s travelers, explaining why the use of force was
not always successful. Piracy rejected, only with the marriage
of the local ruler and the ship’s traveler was the prosperity
of Funan guaranteed. The marriage of the local princess and
the foreigner therefore represented a pact, a promise that in
the future Funan would be willing to deal more positively with
foreign merchants—in other words, a better way for Funan to
become prosperous had been found.
Thus the Funan origin myth may not in any way document
an actual marriage between a native princess and a foreign
traveler, as it is usually interpreted. Instead of symbolizing the
“Indianization” of Funan, the legend more validly symbolizes a
marriage of interests—the establishment of Funan as a major
Southeast Asian trade center, its ports serving international
shipping—and reflects the actual evolution of Funan’s power.
In order to develop into a thriving entrepôt in this age, a port
had to present a cosmopolitan character. The Kauṇḍinya myth
suggests that Funan’s ports became such a neutral meeting
ground, where foreign merchandise could be peaceably ex-
changed. Funan rulers offered international merchant groups
active in their ports a sense of security, but protective measures
were carefully regulated so that visiting merchants did not feel
threatened. 19 If too many restraints were placed on the traders
they would have shifted their operations to other ports that al-
lowed them more freedom to transact their business.
Funan’s origin myth as it appears in Chinese sources spec-
ifies that the foreign traveler drank the water of the land before
his marriage to the local princess. This is possibly an allusion
to the construction of the Funan hydraulic system, described by
archaeologists, by which Funan drained saltwater from the land
near the coast to increase its agricultural productivity. Since
the establishment of a system of water management is asso-
ciated with the founding of the Funan state and appears to
be specifically attributed to the foreign traveler, many histo-
rians have concluded that the application of foreign technology,
the presence of foreign supervisors, or the corresponding de-
velopment of a foreign component within Funan statecraft was
critical to the expansion of Funan’s agrarian base.
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The history of Funan’s hydraulic projects is subject to con-
troversy. Air surveys of the Funan region show a network of
skillfully laid out channels between the Bassac estuary and the
Gulf of Thailand—hundreds of canals, estimated to cover 200
kilometers, connecting at least a dozen urban centers whose
populations lived in houses built on stilts within great earthen
ramparts. The Funan realm was criss-crossed by canals that
could have provided an internal transport system as well as
water control. Although Louis Malleret believed that the canal
network was constructed to drain salt out of the land, pre-
venting the waters of the sea from flowing back into the Bassac
estuary, his detailed presentation and analysis of archaeological
remains were inconclusive as to whether its purpose was ir-
rigation or land drainage. Further, Malleret dated the con-
struction of the works to the fifth or sixth centuries, a period
corresponding—as will be shown in this chapter—to the demise
rather than to the origin of the Funan state. 20
Based on K’ang T’ai’s description of Funan residents sowing
seed one year and harvesting the next three years, I. W. Mabbett
argued that Funan agriculture was characterized by rain-fed
cultivation. Mabbett holds that K’ang T’ai’s report does not
provide evidence that an intensive irrigation system existed in
the third century and that even if such a system existed, it does
not necessarily mean that Funan had developed into a densely
populated and highly integrated state system. 21
This view is in part substantiated by a Cham inscription
that records the Funan origin myth and stresses that wet-rice
agriculture was an indigenous development. Contrary to the
Chinese account of the myth noted above in which a foreigner
(Kauṇḍinya) is credited with the draining of Funan’s swamp-
lands, in the Cham version the father of the local princess—a
chief who enjoyed the protection of the nāgas—gave his
daughter and Kauṇḍinya a dowry at their wedding, making the
Funan area suitable for habitation by “drinking up the water
that covered it” and thus allowing the local population to farm
the lands of the Mekong Delta. 22
A 1980 study of the development of irrigation systems in
the Mekong Delta region by W. J. van Liere also supports the
indigenous development thesis, finding that the area around
Funan’s archaeological remains was ideally suited for early
flood-rice cultivation. 23 The study shows that cultivators
avoided the lower Vietnam coast because of its dense man-
grove vegetation and because in numerous areas of the Mekong
Delta region dense evergreen and mixed deciduous forests re-
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quired too much labor to clear. However, the zone associated
with Funan at the delta’s edge was a floodplain covered by sa-
vanna vegetation, which was more readily farmed. 24 Further,
in this area of the upper delta backswamps kept out saltwater
and retained the fresh water run-off of the monsoonal rains,
making usable water available year round. The gentle flood pat-
terns of the area—a rapid rise of water, but not too deep, and
a gradual water drain-off—were ideal for simple wet-rice cul-
tivation. Local broadcast rice cultivation, as opposed to more
elaborate irrigated wet-rice cultivation, required no leveling or
bunding of fields nor, due to the area’s natural flood regulators,
was there need to dig canals for irrigation or drainage. Simple
water management and broadcast cultivation systems were ca-
pable of producing a substantial rice surplus that could have
supported a rapid population increase. Interestingly, van Liere
has demonstrated that the area that extended inland from the
Oc-èo region on the coast to the hinterland surrounding Funan’s
capital city of Vyādhapura was ideal for broadcast rice culti-
vation. But his study further notes that as the early broadcast
rice civilizations of the Mekong Delta region matured, it was
not unusual for them to construct water reservoirs to store
large quantities of water for the dry season, which when circu-
lated through a new network of irrigation canals produced more
substantial multiple rice crops—adding credence to Malleret’s
thesis that Funan’s wet-rice irrigation projects were con-
structed in the fifth and sixth centuries. 25
The various versions of the Funan origin myth and K’ang
T’ai’s report all emphasize a developed agrarian sector as a key
factor in Funan’s general prosperity. While the Funan origin
myth first deals with sea contacts, its secondary focus on the
land reflects the dual nature of the Funan domain. Not only was
Funan’s success the result of its interaction with the sea, but
its wealth was equally due to its agrarian base. The impetus for
initial or further agrarian development came from the maritime
sector, when merchants and seamen putting in at Funan’s ports
demanded food during their layover periods. This demand for
rice created a need for a rice surplus that had to be supplied
by Funan’s agrarian population—given the undesirability or im-
probability of importing rice, which would have required mer-
chants to devote an inordinate part of their ship cargo space
to food. 26 While the construction of an irrigation or drainage
system would have facilitated greater productivity, Funan’s
terrain initially allowed the land-based population to produce
sufficient rice to supply seamen stopping at its ports. A portion
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of the trade revenues were in turn reinvested in the devel-
opment of hydraulic projects that expanded Funan wet-rice
cultivation. Regardless of where the technology came
from—whether it was local or foreign—the evolution of Funan’s
water management system was stimulated by foreign demand.
Agrarian development or the agricultural potential in Funan
thus contributed to Funan’s growth as an international en-
trepôt.
The Funan origin myth describes the early Funan domain
as being comprised of several settlements, each ruled by its
own chief. This reinforces Wolters’ thesis that early Southeast
Asian states, including Funan, derived their power from control
over manpower. 27 According to the myth, the first Funan king
assumed direct rule over a specific sector of land, assigning
his son seven “centers,” or subordinate chiefdoms to supervise.
The seven subordinate population centers were thus ruled in-
directly, their loyalty questionable beyond their personal ties to
the Funan ruler/chief. The Funan ruler drew income from two
sources to use in establishing his supremacy over his fellow
chiefs. Revenues collected in Funan ports—usage fees collected
from those taking advantage of port facilities—flowed directly
into the royal treasury. These revenues were used to expand
the Funan economic base not only in the commercial
sector—upgrading ports—but in the agrarian sector as well.
More sophisticated hydraulic projects could be undertaken,
thus making more land fit for cultivation and expanding the
economic potential of the agrarian core. This added potential
in turn allowed the Funan ruler to support a larger manpower
base. Initially, then, Funan’s might was derived from local
tribesmen who both cultivated and went to war on behalf of
their chiefs, and who shared in the Funan ruler’s prosperity.
THE RISE OF FUNAN AS A “STATE”
The process of economic transformation that was taking place
in Southeast Asia at the time Funan was expanding its
hegemony was marked by a transition in mechanisms of ex-
change. 28 In a less complicated tribal existence, reciprocity—a
sharing process among family, community, and religious
groups—maintained the social unit. According to geographer
Paul Wheatley, Southeast Asia prior to the expansion of the mar-
itime route in the first century was “occupied exclusively by
societies whose most advanced level of political organization
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was the chiefdom and among whom the instrumental exchanges
characteristic of a reciprocative mode of integration domi-
nated.” 29 Except for the Red River Delta region of northern
Vietnam, which came under Chinese political authority and was
thus subjected to the sudden imposition of an external tribute
system, the exchange mechanisms of most of Southeast Asia
were only gradually transformed. Entrepreneurial advances as-
sociated with international commerce created social imbalances
within societies like that of Funan, with the result that the in-
digenous economy was transformed and political entities based
on redistributive exchange emerged. Redistribution is here de-
fined as the allocation of rewards and facilities by an individual
(a tribal chief) or a small group (a tribal, merchant, or religious
elite) for the purpose of integrating that society. In the case of
Funan, the initial efforts of the ruler to subordinate other chiefs
and thus to integrate the society under his authority included
ritualized redistributions of the wealth derived from foreign
trade. 30
Wheatley holds that several Southeast Asian societies (he
does not consider Funan to be one of these) went beyond this
level of integration, developing strong “mobilizative sectors”
in their economies. Such “mobilization-oriented economies” he
views as having developed organizational mechanisms for the
acquisition, control, and disposal of resources in pursuit of col-
lective goals, most of which were political. While in the “re-
distributive economy” the resources of the realm “naturally”
flow to a center to be redistributed for the benefit of all, in
the “mobilizative economy” impersonalism takes hold. Tribal
gifts are transposed into tribute and agricultural surplus is
taxed by state administrators to support a court. Tribesmen
are not only replaced as warriors by a royal army paid from
a central treasury but are also demoted from cultivators to
peasant status, becoming less personally involved in the affairs
of their former chief. 31 Their chief is transformed into a divine
king, his legitimacy defined no longer by tribal tradition but
by elaborate Sanskrit ritual—his hut has become a palace, the
tribal spirit house a temple, the local spirit stone a powerful
liṅga (the symbol of Lord Śiva’s powers of fertility), and the
tribe’s village the center of the king’s rule over the villages
of other tribes, as these villages and their tribesmen are inte-
grated into a state. 32 With the development of the institutional
structures necessary to administer this expanded political
realm, Wheatley maintains, a society’s old reciprocity networks
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were overlaid with redistribution and mobilization systems, as
in some way all sectors of the state inevitably interacted with
the new order.
That Wheatley does not believe this process occurred in
Funan raises the question as to whether Funan can be cate-
gorized as a “state.” Wolters holds that it cannot be. Recent
studies concur but see the Funan region as an important early
Southeast Asian cultural center. Some even argue that ref-
erence to “Funan” should be avoided until historians reach
a better understanding of what Funan was. Nevertheless, ar-
chaeological evidence does suggest that Wheatley’s economic
transformation process, which he considers critical to early
Southeast Asian state development, can be discerned in Funan’s
history as well.
The degree of integration that occurred in the Funan realm
can best be measured by a comparison of Funan’s archaeo-
logical remains with those from the Chansen region of central
Thailand. 33 Chansen’s archaeological remains provide a con-
trast between cultural developments in early central Thailand
and those in the Funan realm and also demonstrate the impact
of Funan on early central Thailand civilization. While the Oc-
èo area’s sites show a high degree of uniformity and economic
integration in the Funan age, those of contemporary central
Thailand do not. Archaeological remains there make it difficult
to speak of extensive regional economies or political devel-
opment until the seventh century (although there is previous
evidence of subregional integration and development), but the
similarity of the evidence from the Funan sites is indicative of
a higher level of regional, economic, cultural, and political inte-
gration.
The canal network connecting Funan’s population centers,
surrounded by earthworks and moats, which has been seen in
archaeological air surveys, is considered to have been critical
both to Funan’s irrigation agriculture and to riverine communi-
cation within the Funan realm. 34 Archaeological remains from
Oc-èo include an abundance of items that reflect its commercial
prominence: ceramics, jewels, gold rings, merchant seals, and
tin amulets with symbols of Viṣṇu and Śiva. Roman materials
that date to the second through fourth centuries are highlighted
by glassware fragments, a gold coin minted in the reign of
Marcus Aurelius, A.D. 161–180 (see page 8), and a gold medal
of Antoninus Pius dating from A.D. 152. Imports from China in-
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clude a bronze mirror dating from the Later Han dynasty (first
to third centuries) and several Buddhist statuettes from the Wei
period (A.D. 386–534). 35
In addition to these objects of Western and Eastern origin,
there is ample evidence of local craft production. Glass beads,
possibly a local application of Western glass technology, are
abundant in the Oc-èo excavations. More impressive, however,
are numerous molded and engraved tin plaques (a craft not
known to have been practiced elsewhere in that time).
Local adaptation of Indian religious art is evident in the
sculpture and stone architecture found in Funan’s core area.
While Indian stonecarvers in this early era normally sculpted
statues that were part of wall reliefs or were backed or enclosed
by a stele or a wall, Funan sculptors developed their own free-
standing style that is first evinced in two wooden standing
Buddhas, believed to date to the fifth century, that were mirac-
ulously preserved in the mud near Binh-hoa (see page 8). This
sculptural expression reached its height in the early sixth
century when several stone Viṣṇu and Buddhist statues dis-
covered at Phnom Da were produced, which have impressed
one art historian with their “delicate and graceful [bodies], soft
and smoothly rounded, with muscles indicated only slightly, but
yet with astonishing sensitivity, so that one feels the swing of
a body in motion, or the balance of a gently bending body at
rest.” 36 The sexless style of this statuary is characteristic of
later Southeast Asian Buddhist sculpture, which was seemingly
modeled on that of Funan’s craftsmen.
Also demonstrative of local initiative is a building (“K”)
among those excavated at Oc-èo where local architects con-
structed a temple that was modeled on the rock sanctuaries that
were popular in south and central India during the late Gupta
period (fifth and sixth centuries). The crafting of this brick and
granite temple in an area with no rock or cliffs demonstrates
the power of local technology; the skill by which the granite
slabs were held together especially shows the local control of
technique. Such artistic initiative impressed the Chinese court,
which received several stone Buddhist statues that the Indian
monk Nāgasena brought from Funan in the late fifth century. In
503 a Funan monarch sent the Chinese emperor a coral statue
of the Buddha and an ivory stupa. 37
In central Thailand the principal evidence for an early in-
digenous consolidation is not only the distribution of various
local pottery types, of which each has its own character, but
also the number of trade goods from external sources, espe-
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cially those from Funan, which have their own distinctive and
consistent markings. These archaeological data imply that the
growth of Funan civilization spurred the state-building process
in central Thailand, as the flow of trade goods into the region
supplied the demand of an emerging foreign-oriented elite class
who came to emulate Funan. 38
The archaeological evidence substantiates Wheatley’s thesis
that there was a pattern of simultaneous economic and political
integration. Furthermore, it shows that Funan was not an ex-
ception to it. External trade was a likely stimulus to local trade,
and the growth of domestic commerce promoted the need and
the desire for a higher degree of economic integration. The
need for economic integration in turn necessitated the exercise
of authoritative control over areas of potential conflict, the man-
agement of the economic resources of the domain, and the
ability to support an increased population in the area.
Wolters considers that one of the key factors that constitute
a state is continuity from ruler to son. It was suggested earlier
that the seven chiefs initially allied with the Funan ruler under
the authority of his son were in part drawn to the Funan ruler
by their desire to participate in his rapidly expanding economic
base and prosperous redistribution network. The threat of con-
quest was another likely pressure, however, since the Funan
ruler’s wealth could be used to mobilize more troops for his
band of armed supporters. In this sense the first Funan ruler,
in appointing his son overlord of the seven subordinate chiefs,
made an attempt more sophisticated than the use of force to in-
tegrate these centers into Funan and as well to provide a foun-
dation—a manpower base—for his son when it came time, after
his death, for the son to assume the throne. Chinese sources are
vague on this succession, but in their view there was continuity
among early Funan rulers through the second half of the second
century. 39
Through an analysis of other early developing centers of
mainland civilization (to allow reconsideration of the limited
sources for Funan’s history), it was found that the Kauṇḍinya-
nāga myth was commonly used by later Khmer rulers of Cam-
bodia as the basis for the construction of their royal ge-
nealogies. 40 The Khmer domain was ruled by a “royal family”
whose members were descended authentically, whether by fact
or by law, from “Funan” rulers, who were themselves descended
from the original Kauṇḍinya. This demonstration of the impor-
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tance of the Funan legacy to Khmer kingship adds credence to
the proposition that the Funan region manifested a level of cul-
tural if not political integration beyond the tribal level.
Other studies have found that Funan was a cultural axis as
well as a commercial center connecting three early Southeast
Asian cultural realms. One cultural zone extended from lower
Burma (Chin-lin) to Funan and was inhabited by developing
Mon-Khmer and Pyu civilizations. 41 A second zone extended
from Funan north up the Vietnam coast and comprised what
was to become the domain of the Cham and Vietnamese civ-
ilizations. Funan also had contacts with a third zone, extend-
ing from Funan into the Java Sea cultural realm with its Malay
populations. 42 Ideas from Funan were introduced into the three
zones via the principal networks of communication, the trade
routes that connected the developing population centers of the
mainland and the Indonesian archipelago.
Evidence from archaeological, linguistic, and literary
sources, then, support the conclusion that Funan may best be
understood as the first Southeast Asian “state.” Clearly, the
Funan region was an economic center, with an economic base
that supported a more sophisticated level of political integration
than was indicated previously in the area. This integration was
achieved through the attempts of Funan’s first ruler to build
a continuous manpower base, subordinating local chiefs to his
authority as well as to that of his chosen successors. The re-
sulting “royal family” that appears in later Khmer genealogies,
said to be descended from the original Kauṇḍinya, is evidence
of a continuity associated with higher levels of political in-
tegration. More elaborate cultural forms evolved within the
Funan realm; over a period of time preexisting indigenous cul-
tural and ethnic diversity were synthesized with external ide-
ology to create a new syncretic higher-order cultural base. 43
The Funan region also served as the locus of contact between
various regional and local marketing systems and the higher-
order international marketing network. It was in Funan’s ports
that attempts were first made to substitute the exchange of
Southeast Asian goods for those of foreign origin. 44 Through
these economic ties Funan’s political, economic, and cultural
advancements spread into other areas of Southeast Asia.
Let us examine the early history of Funan to explore the
character of this first state and the process of economic, cul-
tural, and political diffusion as it relates to the Indianization of
Southeast Asia.
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THE EXTENSION OF FUNAN’S HEGEMONY
In the Chinese account of Funan’s early history, during the
second half of the second century a ruler known to the Chinese
as Hun P’an-huang, a descendant of the original Kauṇḍinya,
was said to have enjoyed a long reign, further consolidating his
state’s hold over local chiefs by sowing dissension among them.
Having thus fragmented their unity, he attacked and conquered
these chiefs. He then sent his sons and grandsons to rule di-
rectly over their political centers. 45
By the late second-century reign of Hun P’an-huang the
original seven subordinate tribal centers and others as well
were being incorporated into the area directly ruled by the
Funan monarch, as the pattern of Funan statecraft began to
emerge. The origin myth stipulates that these victories were the
consequence of dissension among the ruler’s enemies, the use
of his ever-increasing wealth either to bribe or at least to create
envy among his rival chiefs’ followers, and his exploitation of
weaknesses in the local political systems. With the potential for
united resistance among his opponents weakened, the Funan
ruler was able to extend his hegemony over them. His sons and
grandsons, his direct kin—those whose personal loyalty he de-
pended upon—were sent to rule over the former rivals, who
were then integrated under Funan’s direct control.
K’ang T’ai’s third-century report to the Chinese emperor
also supplies information on Hun P’an-huang’s conquests. It re-
lates that Hun P’an-huang captured large elephants while on
hunting expeditions into the jungle and, while domesticating the
elephants, brought about the submission of many “countries”
whose lands he hunted upon. This tale of the hunting king re-
lates to the origin of Funan’s capital of Vyādhapura, “the city
of the hunter king.” 46 The Funan name is itself a derivative of
the Khmer phnom (bnam) or “mountain”; Funan’s rulers were
known as kurung bnam, “kings of the mountain.” 47 According
to Chinese records the sacred mountain of Funan was located
inland 500 li (200 kilometers) from the sea, which is almost ex-
actly the distance from the Ba Phnom mountain to the site of
Oc-èo’s remains, adding authenticity to the Chinese accounts.
48 Vyādhapura was constructed adjacent to the sacred mountain
Ba Phnom. Because the Funan state and its rulers derived their
name from this mountain, it is therefore reasonable to date the
origin of a Funan state to the conquests of Hun P’an-huang
and the establishment of his capital city Vyādhapura, named in
his honor. Vyādhapura was strategically placed to establish the
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cosmological and supernatural base that substantiated the le-
gitimacy of future Funan rulers. By localized Indian tradition,
the mountain was the repository of supernatural powers that
were dispensed by Funan monarchs to benefit their subjects. 49
The mountain symbolized the ruler’s authority, and from it, as
from the monarch himself, came the domain’s prosperity. This
contact with the supernatural enhanced the superior status of
Funan rulers and further encouraged adjacent populations to
submit to the Funan monarch. 50
During the early third century the rulership of Funan passed
to a great general, known to the Chinese as Fan Shih-man,
who was selected to rule by the people of Funan after the
death of Hun P’an-huang’s son. In dealing with records of Fan
Shih-man’s reign, one first notes that the legend of Fan Shih-
man’s succession to the throne stressed that he was selected
by Funan’s subjects. The shift of leadership to someone who
was not a direct relative of Hun P’an-huang would seemingly
have raised questions of legitimacy. Such a problem was ap-
parently alleviated by taking the issue “to the people,” in a
process whereby Fan Shih-man was nominated to rule princi-
pally because he had sufficient military power to impose his
hegemony over Funan’s tribal chiefs. Fan Shih-man’s legitimacy
was thus based on his past success as a leader and his position
as the head of a sizable body of troops. Likely Fan Shih-man
could have easily seized power with or without the validation
of a council of chiefs or tribal elders representing the people of
Funan. Whatever the circumstances of his succession, Fan Shih-
man assumed power with the approval of Funan’s population.
Building upon this “vote of confidence,” Fan Shih-man soon
embarked on a campaign to extend Funan’s authority. He first
consolidated Funan’s hold over the Mekong Delta, annexing ter-
ritory northward up to the mouth of the Tonle Sap and then sub-
jugating the Cham domain to the south on the north edge of the
delta. 51 Having thus secured his mainland base, Fan Shih-man
next took a naval expedition against the upper Malay coast, uti-
lizing the Malay seamen of his ports. This campaign was clearly
an attempt to assume direct authority over the trade centers on
both sides of the peninsula, from the Isthmus of Kra region to
Burma, thereby solidifying Funan’s dominance over the flow of
commerce through Southeast Asia. His conquest of the Malay
coast is described by the Chinese envoys:
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[Fan Shih-man] attacked and conquered the neighboring
kingdoms. All recognized themselves [as] his vassals. [As a result]
he took the title of “Great King of Funan.” Then he had great ships
built and crossing the immense sea he attacked more than ten
kingdoms, [including] … Tun-sun. He extended his territory 5,000
or 6,000 li [2,000 miles]. Then he wished to subdue the country of
Chin-lin [lower Burma]. But he fell ill [and died]. 52
Fan Shih-man’s key conquest on the Malay Peninsula was an
entrepôt known to the Chinese as Tun-sun. K’ang T’ai reported
that Tun-sun was a “state” where:
There are five kings [who rule Tun-sun] who all acknowledge
themselves vassals of Fu-nan. The eastern frontier of Fu-nan is in
communication with Tong-king [the Red River Delta of Vietnam],
the western with India and Persia [i.e., Tun-sun’s domain en-
compassed both sides of the Malay Peninsula]. All the countries
beyond the frontier [beyond the Chinese frontier, i.e., Southeast
Asia] come and go in pursuit of trade because Tun-sun curves
around and projects into the sea for more than 1,000 li [roughly
333 miles]. The Gulf of Siam is of great extent and ocean-going
junks have not yet crossed it direct [i.e., ships were navigating
from Malay Peninsula ports to Funan’s ports on the lower Vietnam
coast sailing close to the coast rather than directly crossing the
Gulf of Thailand]…. At this mart East and West meet together
so that every day great crowds gather there. Precious goods and
rare merchandise—they are all there…. 53
The Tun-sun polity was concentrated in a city some ten li
from the sea. Among the “five kings” (chiefs) who shared the
rule over the northern peninsula, the ruler of Tun-sun was dom-
inant. After Fan Shih-man’s conquest all the chiefs transferred
their loyalty to Funan. Resident in Tun-sun were a thousand
“Indian Brahmans,” who were receiving the daughters of the
local population in marriage, which encouraged the Indians to
stay. There were also some five hundred families of “Persian”
origin—likely Western merchant families. 54
At the time that Fan Shih-man embarked on his sea ex-
pedition, sailors voyaging from the Malay Peninsula to China
via the South China Sea hugged the coastline. K’ang T’ai re-
ported that the passage from Tun-sun to Funan took thirty days,
and this was the reason it did. Ships navigated close to the
coast rather than sailing directly across the Gulf of Thailand to
Funan’s ports. Ships seldom ventured into the open sea before
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the fifth century. Funan already dominated the coastal route
between the Malay Peninsula and China at this time. For it
to totally dominate Southeast Asian trade, including the Malay
Peninsula transit—which was Fan Shih-man’s ambition—Funan
needed to acquire a base on the Malay Peninsula. Tun-sun, al-
ready established as a cosmopolitan center of commerce on the
peninsula’s upper east coast and a terminus for the Isthmus of
Kra portage, was a well-chosen victim for Fan Shih-man’s su-
perior naval power. 55
Described by the Chinese envoys as a loose confederation of
five chiefs whose territories stretched from coast to coast, Tun-
sun was representative of other settlements on the northern
Malay Peninsula that had developed because of and depended
upon the transpeninsular portage of commercial goods. In ad-
dition to Tun-sun, there were Langkasuka in the Pattani region,
Tāmbraliṅga in the area south of Chaiya on the east coast, and
Takuapa on the west coast, all believed to have been major
Malay entrepôts during this early age of commercial devel-
opment (see map 3). 56 Fan Shih-man’s conquest of Tun-sun not
only gave Funan a solid position on both sides of the Gulf of
Thailand, it also allowed the Funan monarch to extend his domi-
nance over these other entrepôts, which were river valley-based
political entities that, like Tun-sun, were no more than loose
tribal confederacies. A more broadly based polity had evolved
in Funan by this time with an agrarian system that stabilized
the revenue flow of its rulers. Funan’s political and economic
potential far exceeded that of the more simple tribal societies
of the isthmus, which depended almost entirely on trade rev-
enues to finance their statecraft. Funan thus had a distinct ad-
vantage in attracting the loyalty of the Malay sea populations
of the gulf. Funan’s rulers were able to supply a steady income
and the promise of prosperity to Malay seamen. They provided
Funan with a naval force like that which Fan Shih-man used on
the peninsula and protected the sea lanes between the Malay
Peninsula and southern China. 57
The conquest of Tun-sun and the acquisition of a peninsula
base had other than purely economic significance for Funan,
however, for it was after Fan Shih-man’s reign that Funan state-
craft began to exhibit signs of stronger Sanskritic influence.
Chinese sources imply that the likely source of Funan’s new
Indian mannerisms were the conquered peninsula entrepôts,
which had a substantial Indian character prior to their takeover
by Funan. Tun-sun was not the only peninsula center having an
Indian element in its population. P’an P’an, an entrepôt indi-
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cated by Chinese sources as being south of Tun-sun that was
also conquered by Fan Shih-man, was said to have been in-
habited by “numerous Brahmans [who] have come from India to
seek wealth by serving the [local] king, with whom they are in
high favor.” 58 The most dramatic consequence of the presence
of these Indians as far as Funan was concerned appears to have
been the growing use of Sanskrit in Funan; the first known San-
skrit inscription in Funan was issued shortly after Fan Shih-
man’s death in the third century. 59
Although Indian vocabulary came to be used in the conduct
of state affairs, Indian cosmology and statecraft had little sig-
nificance at the time in the actual workings of Funan’s political
system, as evinced in the transfer of power to Fan Shih-man’s
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successor. When Fan Shih-man’s son attempted to assume the
Funan throne after his father died he was put to death by a ruler
the Chinese sources knew as Fan Ch’an, son of Fan Shih-man’s
sister, whose claim to the throne was based upon his recognition
as a war chief by two thousand men. 60 As with Fan Shih-man’s
succession to the throne, control over manpower was still the
most important variable in determining legitimate succession in
Funan.
One of the most important incidents of Fan Ch’an’s reign
according to K’ang T’ai occurred when the envoy called Chia
Hsiang-li came from India buying and selling and told the Funan
monarch all about India, of which Fan Ch’an was said to have
been ignorant. 61 It is remarkable that the Funan ruler could be
ignorant about India when Indian traders should have been fol-
lowing the route to China via Funan for a century. Fan Ch’an’s
limited knowledge of the trade route west of the Isthmus of
Kra, however, is testimony to the local character of Funan’s
early statecraft and the absence of a true Indian presence that
might have stimulated Indianization in a significant way. The ac-
count gives credence to the belief that Southeast Asian seamen,
not Indians, dominated the ocean east of the Malay Peninsula
during the early Funan era. It was during Fan Ch’an’s reign
that regular diplomatic contact between Funan and both India
and China was said to have been established. More because of
commercial interests than political ambition, Fan Ch’an sent a
relative to India to gather information and to solicit trade. Em-
barking from Takuapa, Fan Ch’an’s envoy sailed to the mouth
of the Ganges on the Bengal coast. From there he traveled
inland some 7,000 li (roughly 2,333 miles) up the Ganges until
he reached the court of a Kushāna prince. This prince was so
impressed with the visit that he sent back a present of four
horses to Fan Ch’an. Later in his reign Fan Ch’an also dis-
patched Funan’s first official embassy to China.
The politics of Funan were still dominated by warring fac-
tions in the mid-third century when Fan Ch’an was killed by
another of Fan Shih-man’s sons (an infant at the time of his
father’s death), who had assembled a band of supporters. This
son had taken refuge—“living among the people”—during Fan
Ch’an’s reign and “was able to collect good soldiers of the
country” from among them. 62 These soldiers were the kinsmen
of his mother who, when the opportunity arose, had mobilized
their own allies to support a new bid for hegemony. This son was
in turn assassinated by a man the Chinese sources identify as
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Fan Ch’an’s “general” Fan Hsun, yet another chief with his own
manpower resources, who assumed the Funan throne around
A.D. 240.
It was during Fan Hsun’s long reign in the middle of the
third century that Funan commercial prosperity reached its
zenith. The Wu envoys K’ang T’ai and Chu Ying visited Funan
around 240 and made their extensive reports on Fan Hsun’s
domain and its history, depicting Funan as a wealthy political
domain whose rulers supplemented their income from the land
with the taxes paid by foreign merchants—“gold, silver, pearls,
and perfumes….” 63 An Indian vocabulary was in use and there
is evidence of Indian technological influence, but political
theory and religious philosophy in Funan were still strongly in-
digenous in character. Not for another two hundred years, until
the mid-fifth century, do Chinese and indigenous sources denote
any significant Indianization. Then a sudden departure from in-
digenous patterns occurred that was in some way related to the
takeover of the Funan throne by a new line of monarchs.
POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN FIFTH-CENTURY
FUNAN
The dynastic line that came to ascendancy in Funan in the fifth
century may have originated in the more Indianized peninsular
center known to the Chinese as P’an P’an, which came under
Funan’s authority during Fan Shih-man’s reign. The Chinese
record of Fan Shih-man’s conquests stressed that P’an P’an’s
rulers were patrons of Indian Brahmans, as if this were quite
different from the practice of Funan’s rulers. The succession to
the Funan throne of this new line was reported by the Chinese:
The people of Funan heard of him [the ruler of P’an P’an]. The
whole kingdom rose with joy. They came to him and chose him
king. He changed all the rules according to the custom of India.
64
Was this “second Kauṇḍinya,” as this ruler is known by some
historians, from P’an P’an, or was he actually of Indian origin?
65 The strongly Indian character of Funan’s fifth-century state-
craft has been thought to have been the work of an Indian
Brahman or a ruler who patronized Brahmans and gave them
a significant role in the creation of a new ideological base for
Funan’s political system. 66 The only definite evidence of Indian
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Brahmans resident in Southeast Asian courts, however, is post-
eighth century in date. 67 Although Brahmans may well have in-
fluenced the new Funan polity, it is not necessary to trace the
origin of this transition all the way to India; rather, the changes
that occurred reflect an internal evolution in Funan’s dynastic
system and are best understood within an indigenous context.
The Chinese report of the fifth-century Kauṇḍinya suggests
that the people of Funan had become embroiled in another suc-
cession dispute or some other internal disharmony between re-
gional armed factions. As a consequence a chief having his base
in P’an P’an was either invited by Funan’s clan elders to restore
internal order or a P’an P’an-based chief and his supporters
seized power directly. The report makes it clear that the new
ruler felt it was necessary to establish the legitimacy of his line
by imposing substantially new patterns of state administration
upon Funan—changing all the rules according to the custom of
India. If there was indeed a succession of P’an P’an’s ruling line
to the Funan throne, then the administrative style introduced
would likely have been synthesized with earlier Funan practice,
producing a more Indian character to Funan’s state. It was
from this era onward that Sanskrit came into widespread of-
ficial usage. An Indian dating system became standard. Worship
of Indian deities, especially official worship of the Śiva-liṅga
Maheśvara and icons of the Mahāyāna Bodhisattva Lokeśvara
and the Lord Viṣṇu, was systematized and extended. The San-
skrit honorific title -varman was added to the names of rulers.
There was also an attempt to consolidate and construct an of-
ficial genealogy for Funan’s royal line elaborately tracing the
origin of Funan monarchs to the marriage of the first Kauṇḍinya
and the nāga princess. All of these changes reflect a significant
attempt to redefine the basis of legitimacy and especially to ele-
vate more distinctly the prestige of the Funan ruler above that
of his subordinate chiefs. As shown in Chinese records, pre-
fifth-century succession to Funan’s throne was dependent on
the candidate having royal blood, designated by the Fan clan
prefix before his name, and on having enough armed supporters
to guarantee “election” by a group of clan elders (chiefs). 68
P’an P’an was more extensively Indianized than Funan be-
cause of its intense direct interaction with Indian merchants.
The story of Fan Ch’an and the Indian merchant who visited
Funan and informed him about India, related above, implies
that there was little opportunity for Funan monarchs to acquire
firsthand information about India; that is, that few India-based
merchants were visiting Funan ports but were instead concen-
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trating their activities in the maritime zone between India and
the Malay Peninsula entrepôts. This is further evidence that
Malay seamen from Funan were shipping goods between the
Malay Peninsula and the southern Vietnam coast, and likely be-
tween southern Vietnam and China ports as well. In P’an P’an
as well as in other Malay Peninsula entrepôts that facilitated
the international trade, Indianization was a means of elevating
the status of the indigenous rulers both in the eyes of their own
people and with the visiting Indian merchants whose presence
was essential to continuing prosperity. Funan’s reasons for In-
dianization were quite different. Funan began to refocus its
statecraft in the fifth century because it needed to develop
an agrarian base as the principal source of royal revenue col-
lections. Indianized statecraft became extremely useful in the
transition from the earlier maritime focus to one in which the
prosperity of the agrarian sector was the most essential contrib-
uting factor to the state’s continuation.
The thesis that there was a fifth-century dynastic crisis and
resulting transition is substantiated in other sources. First,
Chinese court records report Funan embassies to China in 268,
286, and 287, a period marking the fall of the Wu dynasty
and its replacement by the Chin. 69 Applying O. W. Wolters’
thesis that embassies to the Chinese court were sent only in
times of upheaval, these three embassies in the third century
guaranteed continued commercial interaction between Funan
and southern China under the new Chin rulers. 70 Apparently
the effort was successful, for Funan did not send another em-
bassy until 357. Fifth-century embassies reached China in 434
and again in 484, dates corresponding to the era of political
transition in Funan. Since the succession to the Funan throne
by the P’an P’an ruler would have taken place around the
date of Funan’s 434 embassy, it may be viewed as being sent
by Funan’s new rulers to renew the Chinese commercial rela-
tionship. 71
Second, an inscription dated 478 issued by a Funan prince
named Guṇavarman, who is believed to have been the second
Kauṇḍinya’s grandson, is even more telling: Guṇavarman’s
father, King Jayavarman (son of Kauṇḍinya) was said to have
ruled over a domain “conquered in the mud.” George Coedès
believed that this passage symbolized the recovery of land ac-
complished by the draining of Mekong Delta swamps. This asso-
ciation fits well with the fifth-and sixth-century dates assigned
to the Oc-èo area canals by Malleret. But Funan’s wet-rice
system clearly predated the fifth-and sixth-century dates
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Malleret (and Coedès) gave to the Funan irrigation system.
As noted earlier, a network of tanks and canals for irrigated
wet-rice cultivation was not necessary to support Funan’s ear-
liest agricultural needs—which were satisfied by broadcast cul-
tivation—and are best seen as a product of later Funan society.
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In light of evidence of a fifth-century dynastic crisis, the
“conquered in the mud” statement may better be understood
as reflecting an actual war that took place in Funan’s ricelands
in the Mekong Delta. Chinese reports support this interpre-
tation, further relating that during the mid-fifth century a Funan
prince fled to the Cham kingdom known as Lin-yi, based north
of the Mekong Delta on the Vietnam coast, where he ultimately
became the king of the Chams. This prince has been thought to
have been a second son of King Jayavarman who was forced to
flee after he failed in an attempt to usurp his father’s throne. 73
Chinese accounts record this second son’s name as Fan Tang,
employing their name for the old Funan royal clan, when the
Chinese officially recognized his rule over Lin-yi in 491. 74 If
Fan Tang was the son of King Jayavarman, as Coedès has pro-
posed, the use of the Fan prefix in his name would suggest
that Jayavarman and his son Guṇavarman, as well as the second
Kauṇḍinya, although all taking Indian titles, were in fact re-
garded by the Chinese as being members of the indigenous
Funan royal line.
It should be remembered that Fan Shih-man and other
Funan kings had traditionally sent direct relatives to rule over
conquered territories or had intermarried with the families of
these territories. Thus P’an P’an in the early fifth century was
likely under the rule of a kin group of the Funan royal family.
P’an P’an’s fifth-century rulers would therefore not have been
“foreigners,” but blood relatives of the line holding the Funan
throne. If one accepts that there was a dynastic crisis at this
time, then it is not unreasonable to believe that the P’an P’an
line became the dominant lineage group in Funan’s political
system.
Once on the throne, the P’an P’an rulers would have begun
to change the character of Funan’s statecraft, as discussed
above. These innovations—the use of Indian vocabulary,
worship of Indian deities, and presence of “Brahman bureau-
crats”—more clearly distinguished the Funan monarch from
other Funan elites in the state polity. This new organization was
intended to avert the factional competition for the throne that
was characteristic of the earlier era. It is likely that Funan’s
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old elites were not entirely pleased with their diminished status,
however. Thus a civil war between Funan’s new rulers and those
of the old order could well have taken place, and Fan Tang may
well have taken part. Although the new Funan line was able to
retain its authority and continue to Indianize the state, under
Fan Tang’s leadership a rival faction might have left Funan
to take refuge in Lin-yi, where they waged war “in the mud”
to establish their independence from Funan. 75 In Lin-yi this
rival Funan faction would have posed a continuing threat to the
new rulers of Funan. The imposition of an Indianized style of
rule may also have been a necessary step in distinguishing the
Funan rulers from their rivals, now operating from self-imposed
exile in Lin-yi.
Third, by the fourth century significant changes were taking
place in the international trade route that had profound impact
on Funan. As was seen in chapter 2, by the second half of
the fourth century the Chin dynasty no longer had access to
the central Asian caravan routes and was forced to turn its at-
tention to the maritime route. Southeast Asian trade centers
beyond the Malay Peninsula responded to Chinese initiatives,
significantly Ho-lo-tan/t’o in western Java and Ko-ying in the
Sunda Strait. 76 From Chinese records it is clear that both these
centers were trading directly with China, rather than through
Funan’s intermediary ports, by the fifth century. The Isthmus
of Kra portage had fallen into disuse, and ships leaving Sri
Lanka and India were sailing via the Strait of Malacca directly
to ports on the western edge of the Java Sea, which were closer
to the source of the Indonesian archipelago spices that were be-
ginning to find an international market. 77 One of Funan’s early
advantages as a commercial center was its ability—without wet-
rice irrigation technology—to produce surplus rice to provision
passing seamen and traders. By the time the route began to
change, other Southeast Asian population centers—notably in
Java—employed wet-rice drainage and irrigation techniques
that allowed them to produce multiple wet-rice crops and pro-
vision the increasing numbers of passing traders. 78
The Buddhist pilgrim Fa Hsien and the Indian prince
Guṇavarman provide the first evidence that the Isthmus of Kra
passage had been abandoned and Funan was being bypassed
in the fifth century. Fa Hsien sailed directly from Yeh-p’o-t’i on
the Borneo coast to Canton without stopping at any Funan port.
79 Guṇavarman likewise went nonstop to China from She-p’o, a
trading center on the north Java coast.
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Both the accounts of Fa Hsien and Guṇavarman and cor-
responding Chinese evidence substantiate a fifth-century tran-
sition in the maritime patterns of Asian trade. Whether this
refocusing of the international trade was directly responsible
for Funan’s dynastic crisis is not certain, but it had profound
consequences for Funan in the future. The shifting of the com-
mercial shipping route to the Strait of Malacca and the subse-
quent omission of stops at Funan’s ports denied the Funan
rulers important revenues. Deprived of this major source of
royal income, the ruler as well as his followers, including subor-
dinate chiefs and their supporters, found their prosperity dimin-
ished. Such a decline in royal income could well have touched
off a dynastic crisis as rival claimants, promoting their ability
to restore Funan’s prosperity, attempted to gather enough sup-
porters to seize the throne.
Because of the shift in the trade route, diplomatic inter-
action between Funan and China declined. Apart from the 434
embassy, Funan’s only other recorded contact with China in the
fifth century took place around 484, when King Jayavarman sent
a group of merchants to Canton to solicit Chinese trade. The
Indian Buddhist monk Nāgasena accompanied them on their
return, and then was sent back to the Chinese court to plead
for Chinese aid against the Chams. Nāgasena’s comments to the
Chinese emperor do not reflect the existence of regular inter-
action between Funan and China and hint at growing instability
in Funan politics. Nāgasena reported that Funan was “cease-
lessly invaded by Lin-yi and has [therefore] not entered into
relations with [the Red River Delta region]. That is why their
embassies so seldom come.” 80
Embassies from the Chinese emperor were sent to three In-
donesian coastal centers in 449 to confer titles on the rulers
of these “states,” but significantly, no similar action was taken
by the Chinese to recognize the ruler of Funan, their old trade
partner. Under normal conditions the Chinese tried to maintain
established commercial relations with Southeast Asian states
and did not actively seek out new ones. 81 The lack of attention
to Funan implies that the Chinese fully recognized by 449 that
Funan’s ports were no longer the most important source of in-
ternational trade but had been replaced as the dominant force
in Southeast Asian commerce by Java Sea entrepôts.
In 491, the Chinese court bestowed an important title upon
Fan Tang, ruler of Lin-yi, proclaiming him “General Pacifier
of the South, Commander-in-Chief of the Military Affairs of
the Seashore, and King of Lin-yi.” 82 This, coming after Nā-
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gasena’s 484 appeal on Funan’s behalf for Chinese aid against
the Chams, reflects the low opinion the Chinese had of Funan
at that time, and when considered in light of the 449 initiatives
indicates that, to China, Lin-yi had become the more important
trade ally by the late fifth century. It should be remembered
that when Guṇavarman traveled from the Javanese entrepôt of
She-p’o to China in the mid-fifth century his ship was originally
to have made an intermediate stop on the Cham coast, not at
Funan (see chap. 2). This may mean that calling in a Cham port
had become routine in the voyage between Java Sea centers and
China. The title bestowed upon Fan Tang put more emphasis
on Fan Tang’s role as protector of the Cham seacoast than on
his role as Lin-yi’s monarch. In his report to the Chinese em-
peror Nāgasena related that he had been shipwrecked on the
Cham coast, where his possessions had been stolen. The fact
of his reporting the theft to the Chinese court and the Chinese
investiture of Fan Tang as “Commander of the Seashore” show
that Fan Tang was now held responsible for curtailing acts of
piracy on the lower Vietnam coast.
The 430 petition of Ho-lo-tan/t’o to the Chinese court
seeking protection for its ships sailing from the western Ja-
vanese coast to China provides more evidence of Funan’s dimin-
ished status along the trade routes. Following a route similar
to that from She-p’o, voyagers from Java to China, to avoid the
navigational hazards associated with the Paracel reefs south
of Hainan Island, sailed within range of the Cham coast of
lower Vietnam. 83 Here, it would seem, fifth-century Javanese
shipping was threatened by piracy. This piracy was either the
result of Funan’s attempts to retain its control over the mar-
itime channels by forcing ships to utilize its ports as inter-
mediaries or because Funan’s decline as a major commercial
center had forced its Malay maritime colony to resort to piracy.
Perhaps Funan’s loss of revenue meant that it could no longer
pay enough to Malay sailors, for whom piracy proved more lu-
crative.
Fan Tang’s investiture by the Chinese court may be seen as a
response to the instabilities precipitated by Funan’s impending
commercial demise. 84 The Chinese interest in Southeast Asia
was clearly to keep the flow of goods moving into south China’s
ports. Despite the fact that throughout the third and fourth cen-
turies Lin-yi had, with Funan’s aid, continually harassed the
Chinese Ton-king (Chiao-chi) province in the Red River Delta
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to the north, the Chinese emperor in 491 found himself able
to overlook this past misbehavior and resulting inconvenience
when bestowing the “Commander” title upon Fan Tang. 85
It is thus apparent that by the mid-fifth century Funan was
no longer a major trade center. One further likely consequence
of Funan’s commercial demise was the shift of the seagoing
population in its ports to more prosperous Cham ports. By 431,
Lin-yi’s ruler was capable of pulling together a force of over
one hundred ships to pillage the northern Vietnam coast. 86
When Fan Tang and his faction from Funan took control of Lin-
yi, this relocation of population was given further impetus. Fan
Tang, by maintaining the old style of Funan statecraft in Lin-
yi, at least initially, established a certain amount of continuity
in the relationship of his state and the sea trade. Significantly,
Fan Tang’s move to the Cham domain and the growth of Lin-yi’s
maritime prominence coincide in Chinese eyes, making this re-
construction plausible.
Thus, while Funan was more concerned with reorganizing
its internal administrative structure at this time, in part due
to the loss of its dominance over trade, Lin-yi’s ports were in
the meantime becoming more involved as intermediaries in the
trade. When in the latter half of the fifth century Funan’s ruler
was trying to reattract traders to his ports, Lin-yi’s ports had
already assumed a strong commercial position on the southern
Vietnam coast as a result of their more strategic geographical
proximity to the now restructured international maritime route
that went through the western part of the Java Sea before
turning northward toward China. This fact was acknowledged
by the Chinese in their 491 eulogy of Fan Tang.
THE DEMISE OF FUNAN
The failure of Funan’s attempt to reclaim a significant role in
the international trade—including the ill-fated 484 appeal to
the Chinese—marked the collapse of Funan as a major interna-
tional entrepôt. Funan’s vassals began to break away and es-
tablish their own independent identities as centers of trade. Not
only the Chams, but numerous river valley centers on the Malay
Peninsula coast began sending tribute missions to the Chinese
court in order to solicit favorable trade relationships with the
Chinese.
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Without the prosperity of the previous age, Funan rulers
withdrew their civilization inland, concentrating their rule in
the ricelands of the upper Mekong Delta. The virtual elimination
of trade-derived revenues forced them to internalize to better
maximize revenue collections from their agrarian economic
base. Concomitantly, Funan statecraft took on a more Indian
character. The Indian pattern of statecraft, with its focus on the
land, was more effective in dealing with the economic situation
Funan found itself in. 87 It may be that when the new Funan
rulers “changed all the rules according to the custom of India,”
it was in response to political and economic expediency.
Prior to the era of political transition in Funan, a ruler’s
capacity to extract revenues from rural clan and tribal subor-
dinates had been constrained by the basic premise of Funan
statecraft—reciprocal alliance—which was inherently unstable.
The court’s limited revenue demands on its agrarian sector
were also due to the fact that Funan ports produced sufficient
revenues to allow ample redistributions to loyal supporters as
well as to finance the royal court and its projects. In light of
the need in the fifth century to depend more on the agrarian
sector for revenues, it is significant that the archaeological ev-
idence of Funan’s hydraulic projects has been dated to exactly
this period, when expansion of the state’s agrarian base beyond
earlier wet-rice system development became critical. As noted
earlier, the hydraulic projects would have indeed made pos-
sible both the expansion of Funan’s agrarian sector and the
concentration of manpower on lands under the direct authority
of Funan’s rulers and thereby allowed the production of an even
greater rice surplus.
Indian celestial deities provided the sacro-religious legit-
imacy that Funan’s rulers required. Funan monarch worshiped
the Śiva-liṅga Maheśvara and stressed the liṅga as the source
of the land’s fertility, although this was in effect a synthesis with
existing fertility and ancestor cults, thus giving indigenous be-
liefs legitimacy and more clearly focusing the local fertility and
ancestor cults on the monarch. By this time, the Funan monarch
was known in inscriptions as the “king of Vyādhapura,” 88
who personally received benefits of the god Maheśvara’s power,
which he then bestowed on the entire population. The king, also
the patron of knowledge, promoted Indian intellectual discourse
as his court became the cultural and intellectual center of his
realm. The king was the personal benefactor of a number of
“Brahmans,” who conducted Indian rituals, and he called on “In-
dians,” those who had become students of Indian civilization, to
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assist him in the efficient administration of the royal court and
the ricelands that by the end of the fifth century provided most
of the court’s income. This intellectual elite’s prominence was
also due to their ability to read and write Sanskrit, which al-
lowed them to serve as an administrative elite in the ruler’s de-
veloping court bureaucracy. 89
By the sixth-century reign of Rudravarman (514–539), the
capital had been moved from Vyādhapura to Angkor Borei.
The nearby mountain of Phnom Da became the locus of
Rudravarman’s worship of Viṣṇu and seems to have replaced
the Śiva-focused Ba Phnom as the sacred center of the Funan
realm. This may have been the result of a succession dispute.
Chinese records describe Rudravarman as a usurper, born of a
concubine, who after the death of his father King Jayavarman
murdered the rightful heir, Guṇavarman, and seized the Funan
throne. 90 As a usurper, Rudravarman might well have refocused
the Funan cults of legitimacy on Viṣṇu. 91
Ultimately, the effort to reorganize the state did not succeed,
however. By the mid-sixth century Funan was severely
weakened by internal power struggles. Recognizing Funan’s
internal crisis, its neighbors applied increasing pressure. The
Chams moved to fill the power void in the lower Mekong Delta
and the peoples of the Khmer domain known to the Chinese as
Chen-la began to move against Funan from modern Thailand
and Cambodia to the north. 92 As a result in part of Lin-yi’s
preoccupation with petty wars against its northern Red River
Delta neighbors, the Funan domain was ultimately conquered
by Chen-la. The Khmers were thus responsible for the final
demise of Funan, either destroying or failing to maintain its
hydraulic networks. Funan’s lands were depopulated as culti-
vators shifted their labor to more productive and secure lands.
What remained of the agrarian population moved either by
choice or by force to the Khmer rulers’ developing economic
base in the Tonle Sap area to the north. Largely depopulated,
the hydraulic system laid to waste, and no longer subject to
administrative supervision and financial support from a central
authority, Funan’s ricelands quickly reverted to swamp and
jungle. 93 The former Funan Mekong Delta domain declined as
the centers of Cham and Khmer authority became the focal
points for civilization on the mainland, the Chams controlling
the southern Vietnam coast and the Khmers building a great
agrarian civilization at Angkor.
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Both these peoples traced their lineage to Funan and based
their evolving polity on the Indianized patterns of statecraft
developed by Funan rulers. While Funan rulers had begun to
bridge the gap between tribal politics and Indianized statecraft,
it remained for the Chams and especially the Khmers to develop
the mainland Southeast Asian classical state to its fullest.
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Trade and Statecraft in
Early Śrīvijaya
TradeandStatecraftinEarlyŚrīvijaya
With the decline of Funan, the Chinese sought to establishcommercial relationships with other Southeast Asian en-
trepôts capable of maintaining the flow of East-West trade. As
was noted previously, early Southeast Asian trade centers were
responsive to the fluctuations of the international markets, es-
pecially those of China. The opening and closing of Chinese
markets constituted a “rhythm of trade” that is reflected as well
in the pattern of tribute missions sent to the Chinese court from
Southeast Asia. 1 Frequent missions from many states repre-
sented times of political and economic competition during
which states solicited Chinese patronage. Few missions indi-
cated periods of relative stability—that is, the Chinese recog-
nized one state that dominated others. In times when China was
particularly interested in the trade—when Canton came under
the control of a new, stable imperial government—various
Southeast Asian centers attempted to become the dominant en-
trepôt of the region. One such state to emerge was Śrīvijaya.
The state of Śrīvijaya dominated maritime commerce
passing through Southeast Asia between A.D. 670 and 1025.
In the fifth century when the international trade route shifted
to a sea passage through the Strait of Malacca and Funan
lost its strategic position, a number of new commercial centers
had arisen on the southeastern Sumatra and northwestern Java
coasts to take advantage of the trade. Śrīvijaya was able to gain
control of the seas in the strait region, put down piracy and
competition, establish a cosmopolitan center on the southeast
coast of Sumatra, and attract the support and patronage of
China. Chinese trade with the Malay Peninsula and beyond
came to be focused on Śrīvijaya’s ports, and the principal
peninsula entrepôts of earlier East-West trade became sec-
ondary and were brought into the sphere of Śrīvijaya control.
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2 The ports of Śrīvijaya furnished supplies, local products,
Chinese and Western goods, storage facilities, and living accom-
modations for passing traders waiting out the monsoon season.
The name “Śrīvijaya” came to enjoy a certain prestige in
Chinese and Indian markets; to trade in China, a merchant
would wish to deal in the name of the Śrīvijaya ruler. Using this
prestige, Śrīvijaya was able to build an empire by blending the
naval power and commercial skill of coastal ports with the land-
force potential of the interior populations. As opposed to other
ancient ports of trade that were politically and economically pe-
ripheral to land-based empires, the Śrīvijaya state was equally
dependent on its ability to organize hinterland trade and local
contact with international traders. In return the local commu-
nities of this hinterland and coast reaped such benefits as sub-
sidized religious ceremonies, social pageantry, and wars (which
brought the promise of booty), as well as the underwriting of
the construction of public and religious edifices.
Śrīvijaya was once thought of as a “federation of trading
ports on the fringe of large areas of forest,… not a state with
territorial boundaries, but a series of interlocked human re-
lationships among harbor principalities and pirate lairs based
on patronage, loyalty, and power.” 3 According to this recon-
struction there were three zones of dependencies: the Malay
Peninsula, where Śrīvijaya’s dominance was not continuous; the
north and the northeast coasts of Sumatra, which supplied raw
materials for international trade; and the east coast and island
area near Palembang in southeastern Sumatra, which became
the heartland of the state’s power. This heartland was sup-
ported by a group of seminomadic Malay seamen whose power
was measured in the number of ships under their control. It was
believed that a Southeast Asian harbor area such as Palembang
could have—with the support of these Malay seamen—estab-
lished autonomy within its own domain and then spread its
influence outward along the seacoast to encompass other simi-
larly structured harbor ports. Surrounding the developing port
zones were tribal peoples of the interior who supplied the ports
with raw materials but were in general feared. For example, the
central Sumatran port of Jambi did not attempt to collect taxes
from the population outside its own town boundaries. 4 In this
analysis such ports had no need for an agrarian base. The local
ruler looked elsewhere for his revenues—essentially to the sea.
An emphasis on the maritime aspect of Śrīvijaya, while in
the main correct, tends to neglect the important relationship be-
tween the Śrīvijaya ports and their hinterland. For instance, the
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Kedukan Bukit inscription found near Palembang reports that
on 23 April, A.D. 683, the king of Śrīvijaya embarked in a boat to
go on a siddhayātrā (a quest for supernatural prowess), and that
on 19 May he conducted an army from one place and arrived at
another. This army consisted of about two hundred sailors and
two thousand foot soldiers and was said to have the potential
to reach twenty thousand in strength. 5 Since so large a force
of fighters must have been recruited from a land-based pop-
ulation rather than from port-based seamen (who contributed
two hundred sailors), this inscription does not indicate a lack of
interaction between the port city and its hinterland, but rather
the opposite.
Limited archaeological research conducted in the
Palembang area as well as in its river estuaries provides evi-
dence of a Śrīvijaya hinterland from which such troops could
have been recruited. 6 Remains from the Śrīvijaya period in-
dicate that Śrīvijaya’s culture penetrated deeply into the in-
terior not only along the rivers that flowed to its capital at
Palembang, a downriver rather than a seacoast port, but also
along those that flowed through other contemporary downriver
and seacoast commercial centers on the island of Sumatra, the
Malay Peninsula coast opposite it, and the numerous islands
that lay between. 7
Both Arab and Chinese documents record that Śrīvijaya was
the source of forest products and aromatics, yet its principal
ports on the southeastern Sumatra coast were not strategically
located to exercise direct control over the source of these rich
natural resources from north and central Sumatra. 8 These
products were important enough to the international com-
mercial community, however, that the center of trade would
have shifted to other ports in central and northern Sumatra
if Śrīvijaya had failed to supply the demand. By neglecting
to examine Śrīvijaya’s relationship to its hinterland, historians
have left the impression that there were no formal political al-
liances that generated the flow of products to Śrīvijaya’s ports.
Yet the nature of the trade required a regular, ongoing rela-
tionship with the hinterland to allow goods from the interior
to reach the ports. Foreign sources are generally ambiguous
when describing the Sumatra interior, suggesting that visiting
merchants did not make direct contact with this area. Thus
it may be assumed that goods flowed into Śrīvijaya’s ports
either as part of a tribute system in which subordinate chiefs
were required to supply the Śrīvijaya ports with marketable
commodities or that Śrīvijaya came to control an indigenous
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trade network in which people of the interior exchanged forest
products they had collected for the imported goods that were
available in coastal ports.
There are two primary sources for the study of early
Śrīvijaya statecraft. One is an extremely generalized Arab ac-
count of the redistribution of gold bars dredged from the
Palembang harbor at the death of a mahārāja. 9 The Arab geog-
raphers Ibn Khurdādhbih (writing in 846) and Abū Zaid (writing
in 916) both spoke of the custom of Śrīvijaya mahā rājas com-
municating with the sea. 10 Daily, the mah ār āja propitiated the
ocean by throwing a gold brick into the water, saying, “Look,
there lies my treasure,” and thereby demonstrating his debt to
the sea. The greatness of a deceased king was measured by
the number of gold bars retrieved from the water. These were
divided first among the royal family, then among the military
commanders, and what remained were given to the king’s other
subjects. While providing little elaboration of these “class” dis-
tinctions, the Arab account is consistent with the second of
the primary sources—the various epigraphic records left by
Śrīvijaya rulers.
The inscriptions left by the Śrīvijaya state, most of which
have come from the late seventh-century period, are the second
major source. Among these the majority have been recovered
from the Palembang area (see map 4). The earliest of the dated
Old Malay inscriptions, the Kedukan Bukit (683) and Talang
Tua (684) inscriptions, as well as two epigraphic fragments,
were discovered near Bukit Seguntang—the highest point in the
area—on the southern edge of the present-day city of Palem-
bang. 11 A second group of inscriptions was collected north of
the city at Sabokingking. These include the Telaga Batu in-
scription (ca. 686), the most detailed among the late seventh-
century Old Malay inscriptions, and three contemporary epi-
graphic fragments. 12 Edited versions of the Telaga Batu in-
scription have also been found at Kotakapur on the island of
Bangka, off the east coast of Sumatra, Karangbrahi on the
Batang Hari River system (upriver from modern Jambi), and
Palas Pasemah on the southeastern Sumatra coast adjacent
the Sunda Strait. 13 In addition to these late seventh-century
records, a Śrīvijaya inscription was found on the Karimum Besar
Island in the Riau Archipelago in the Strait of Malacca, and
there are two inscriptions from Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat on the
east coast of the Malay Peninsula, one dated 775 that records
the dedication of a Buddhist monastery by the Śrīvijaya
monarch. 14
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The Telaga Batu inscription has served as the main source
for the analysis of Śrīvijaya’s government. J. G. de Casparis pro-
vided a complete and accurate translation of the Telaga Batu
inscription but stopped short of using it to speculate on the
system of statecraft established by Śrīvijaya’s early rulers or
the similarities between this system and the indigenous pattern
of Sumatran culture. 15 The discussion of early Śrīvijaya history
that follows will explore the possibilities of such an analysis of
this and other Śrīvijaya inscriptions.
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THE ŚRĪVIJAYA MONARCH AS A TRADITIONAL
CHIEF
It is useful to approach the ruler of Śrīvijaya as a product of
his own culture, that is, as a Malay dātu or chief. In the ear-
liest period of Śrīvijaya’s history the ruler was an important
chief who was able to forge alliances with other Sumatra chiefs,
which allowed him to expand his state. On the everyday level, as
indicated in the Telaga Batu inscription, the Śrīvijaya monarch
fulfilled certain functions expected of a chief: he was a judge,
he collected revenues, and he received the services of those
subject to his authority. The traditional avenues to power and
legitimacy were thus available to him.
In the seventh century, Buddhism was grafted onto tradi-
tional Sumatran terminology. Traditional values such as ref-
erences to mountains, oaths, and a cult of dead chiefs were
integrated with Buddhist religious symbols and thought. The
adoption of Buddhism was useful in international relations, but
Buddhism also allowed the Śrīvijaya monarch to establish and
enhance his legitimacy within his own system. Syncretic royal
ideology was diffused to the various levels of society as the
king’s subjects were given a new blend of magical beliefs and
rites.
The inscriptions testify to the ability of the Śrīvijaya kings to
synthesize indigenous cultural symbols with new systems of le-
gitimacy derived from Indian and Buddhist sources. An example
of Buddhist piety is reflected in the seventh-century Talang Tua
inscription recording the dedication of a public park. In this
inscription the sovereign expressed his desire that the merit
gained by the deed and all his other good works should be
shared with all creatures and should bring them closer to en-
lightenment. The Ligor Plate inscription of 775, with its record
of the dedication of a monastery near Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat to
the Buddha and to the Bodhisattvas Padmapāni and Vajrapāni,
refers to the Śrīvijaya king as “the patron of the nāgas, their
heads halved by the streaks of the lustre of gems.” 16 A similar
association can be seen in the Telaga Batu inscription, which is
carved on a large Buddhist ceremonial stone, the upper edge
of which is canopied by the heads of seven serpents (nāgas).
Since the seven-headed nāga is a well-known symbol in Indian
iconography it could well be argued that in this instance a
wholesale borrowing of an Indic image had taken place and that
it had become an important part of the Śrīvijaya system of state-
craft. But surviving local oral tradition indicates that the seven-
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headed nāga of Indic tradition fit with indigenous patterns of
belief. 17 It can thus be taken as evidence that the Śrīvijaya king
was syncretizing local and foreign patterns in creating his own
royal style.
In the Kedukan Bukit inscription we see the Śrīvijaya ruler
consolidating his state and at the same time fulfilling the tra-
ditional Sumatran role of war chief. In the Śrīvijaya expedition
against the rival riverine center of Malāyu, for which he had
allied himself with surrounding chiefs to form a military force
with a potential of twenty thousand soldiers, the king led at
least two thousand into battle, establishing hegemony over the
manpower of the Batang Hari River network and forcing it into
submission. 18 Having proven his worth by ordeal by seeking
siddhayātr ā—a military quest for the mythical supernatural
prowess of the enlightened Buddhist ruler that is also men-
tioned in the Kedukan Bukit inscription—the Śrīvijaya monarch
was able to assume legitimately the traditional role of a
Sumatra war chief. This also allowed him to exercise consid-
erable influence over peacetime politics. The Malāyu expedition
may thus be seen as a quest for symbolic legitimacy as well as
a campaign undertaken out of the necessity to impose control
over a rival port.
A consistent theme of the Śrīvijaya inscriptions is that the
monarch was responsible for the common prosperity, or lack
of it, for all his subjects. The ruler was not only royal but also
rich. Continuing prosperity protected his right to rule. This
theme is projected in the Telaga Batu inscription as the notion
of ripening fruit. Acts against the king were tālu (tālu muah),
“subject to punishment.” 19 The sense implied is that if the
proper code of conduct were not observed the empire would
“not reach its perfect state.” 20 In the Kotakapur version the
king warns: “to them [who plan revolts] the fruits of the sins
contained in their wicked deeds will be turned.” 21 To those
who followed the king were promised prosperity for the future:
vṛddhi (“growth, prosperity”), subhikṣa (“prosperity”), siddha
(“arriving at a perfect state”), and sānti (“eternal quietude of
Nirvāṇa”). 22 The Telaga Batu inscription also promised the
secret Buddhist formula of final liberation from the cycle of re-
births, tantrā mala, to faithful subjects. 23
Another Palembang inscription announces a curse against
all those guilty of the Buddhist prohibitions against love of self,
anger, and greed—kāma, krodha, and lobha. 24 Those who dis-
turbed the system by indulging in these vices would be swal-
lowed by a big river that was controlled by the Śrīvijaya king.
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The inscription also speaks of a battle in which the blood of the
people ran red in the waters or soil near this river. The impli-
cation is that in the Śrīvijaya heartland the king held a magical
control over the waters of the Musi River or some other prin-
cipal river. A folktale from the Palembang region records that
the origin of local civilization occurred when the water of the
various rivers was weighed and a settlement was established
where the water was the heaviest. 25 The legend represents the
practical notion that the people searched for fertile lands where
the silt content of the water was right for wet-rice cultivation.
It is interesting that the legend’s emphasis is on the sanctity of
water; such sanctity is consistent with the use of a water oath
in the Telaga Batu inscription to pledge the loyalty of the king’s
subordinates.
The Kotakapur version of the Telaga Batu inscription in
Bangka invoked two gods: Ulu, Old Malay for “high” and
“mountain,” conveying the traditional Southeast Asian per-
ception of the holiness of mountains; and Tandru n Luah, “the
God of the Waters of the Sea,” to guarantee the loyalty of
Bangka’s population. 26 The Śrīvijaya king’s association with
these two indigenous gods may well be the basis of references
to the titles “Lord of the Mountain” and “Mahārāja of the Isles”
in Arab accounts of Śrīvijaya. The connection of the Śrīvijaya
monarch with the magical properties of water was also men-
tioned by Arab observers. They particularly noted that the
Śrīvijaya mahārāja had bewitched the crocodiles of his river to
allow safe navigation to his estuary. 27 The Arab geographers’
tale of the daily propitiation of the estuary with gold bricks
is part of this same association of magical power over the
water with the king. A similar tradition was preserved into the
nineteenth century among the people of Lampong in southern
Sumatra. As reported in an early nineteenth-century ethnog-
raphy, “The Island people of that country are said to pay a kind
of adoration to the sea, and make it offerings … deprecating its
power of doing them mischief.” 28
The Śrīvijaya king’s prowess was also considered respon-
sible for the agricultural prosperity of his domain. Abū Zaid
remarked in the tenth century that the “Mahārāja’s island is ex-
tremely fertile … things always grow there.” 29 Chao Ju-kua, an
early thirteenth-century south China port official, related that
the Śrīvijaya king could not eat grain on a specific day of the
year. If he did, the year would be dry and the grain dear. It is
also reported that the king could bathe only in rose-water; were
he to bathe in ordinary water a great flood would engulf the
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fields of his subjects. 30 In the Talang Tua inscription (684), the
king expressed his concern “that all the clearances and gardens
made by them [his subjects] should be full [of crops]. That the
cattle of all species raised by them and the slaves they possess
should prosper … that all their servants shall be faithful and
devoted to them … that, wherever they may find themselves,
there be in that place no thieves, no ruffians, no assassins and
no adulterers … that there arise among them the thought of
Bodhi and the love of the Three Jewels.” 31 Another Śrīvijaya in-
scription associates the king with the sun. 32 This inscription in-
dicates that the rays of the sun, so vital to crop growth, were
obscured when the king was away. 33
Śrīvijaya was clearly a center of economic redistribution.
One key to the successful operation of its economic network
was the king’s ability to acquire a share of customs duties and
trade profits collected at his subordinate ports. 34 A Cōla̤ in-
scription from Tañjāvūr in south India dated 1030–1031 de-
scribes thirteen Southeast Asian ports conquered by the
eleventh-century naval expedition of Rājēndra Cōla̤ I, all of
which are considered by historians to have been subordinate to
Śrīvijayan authority. 35 Of those thirteen, eight were mentioned
for their military strength, while only Śrīvijaya-Palembang was
noted for its “golden gates” and royal treasury filled with gold.
The Telaga Batu inscription makes specific reference to “a
treasury of gold and property” that was situated at the center
of the Śrīvijaya royal court (kraton). 36 The practical role of the
king as dispenser of material wealth as well as his role as the
source of moral and spiritual benefit was reinforced by the mys-
tical legend surrounding this central treasury, which was closely
guarded from outsiders. The inscription mentions the efforts
of the king’s enemies to secure information on the location of
the gold and jewels kept in the treasury. If the treasury were
robbed, the inscription warns, a curse would fall upon the dis-
trict governors (dātu). The implication is that if the treasure
were stolen the entire state would crumble; the stolen treasure
might be spent by the king’s enemies to recruit mercenaries and
to destroy the kraton. 37
According to the account of Abū Zaid, the treasury’s wealth
was normally shared by all the citizens of the king. Arab sources
identify the mahārāja as being responsible, through the pros-
perity of trade, for the welfare of his subjects. Commercial
revenues converged at the capital and were redistributed to
the loyal following, including local land-based chiefs as well as
Malay seamen allied with the king. Alliances with local chiefs
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formalized by charters guaranteed the safe passage of goods
in different segments of the trade network. In return the local
chiefs received a guaranteed income. The “privilege” of pro-
tecting trade was granted to a favored chief. The system de-
pended on a strong central ruler to enforce personal loyalties
as well as to prevent jealousy on the part of those chiefs not
favored. As the central government had a vested interest in
local markets, loyal subordinate chiefs had a vested interest in
preserving the central entrepôt as the source of their common
prosperity. The Śrīvijaya chief was their common banker. His
wealth was shared with his “family” of subjects. 38
As the holder of his subjects’ prosperity the Śrīvijaya chief
was the focus of a cult of veneration. Śrīvijaya statuary and re-
mains have been found bearing the sculpted images of the faces
of kings. The statues also bore inscriptions warning future gen-
erations not to deface them. 39 The Telaga Batu inscription indi-
cates that such a personality cult was an important part of the
king’s legitimacy and an attempt by the Śrīvijaya rulers to es-
tablish a sense of ancestral continuity, possibly utilizing the ex-
isting custom of venerating dead chiefs. Reference is made to
rūpi naṅku, “my picture,” meaning the material image of the
king or something attributable to the king that was used for
magical purposes. The same type of exclusive reference is made
earlier in the inscription when it is suggested that rebels placed
special emphasis on destroying the personal orders of the king,
thereby symbolically destroying the king’s magical powers and
replacing them with their own. “Making people crazy” was part
of this plot.
Despite his positive attributes—although the Śrīvijaya king
was a military hero, a traditional chief, and the upholder of
common prosperity—he still faced the problem of political frag-
mentation, which appears to have been prevalent in the area.
Chao Ju-kua’s thirteenth-century account provides a hint of the
divisive tendencies that plagued Śrīvijaya:
When they (the people of Śrīvijaya) are about to make war on an-
other state they assemble and send a force as the occasion de-
mands. They then appoint chiefs and leaders, and all provide their
own military equipment and the necessary provisions. 40
In Sumatra the elements of discord and division were contained
in the concept of chieftainship. There was traditional reliance
on alliances for political union, which caused an inherent in-
stability since alliances could and would be broken and de-
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Sanskrit rock inscription, Sumatra.
pended so much on a ruler’s personal prowess. If indeed po-
litical union, as Chao Ju-kua reports, normally took place only
in times of emergency, how then did the Śrīvijaya monarch
maintain control over his broad domain?
One means the Śrīvijaya monarch ritually employed was
the act of “oath taking.” The Telaga Batu inscription, as noted
earlier, is carved on a Buddhist ceremonial stone with a canopy
of seven nāga heads; the water oath is recorded on this stone
(page 87). A funnel below the text drained off the water that
was poured over the stone during ceremonies. One is told of the
sacred function of the oath in the first line of the inscription; a
traditional Malay magic formula and the magical Buddhist invo-
cation “Om” are given, followed by the oath itself. 41 The same
oath is given in the Kotakapur, Karangbrahi, and Palas Pasemah
inscriptions.
Taking the oath symbolized one’s allegiance to the Śrīvijaya
monarch. “If you embellish this curse on this stone, whether you
are of low, middle or high descent,” warned the text, you would
be struck down with calamity for being disloyal to the ruler.
It is implied that the water the oath-taker drank had magical
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The Telaga Batu inscribed stone
with seven-headed nāga canopy,
Sumatra.
properties that could visit some unnamed horror on the dis-
loyal, such as the rotting out of the insides of the offender or
eternal damnation in hell. While to the unfaithful was promised
more than death alone, the curse promised rewards, such as the
secret formula for final liberation (tantrā-mala), to faithful sub-
jects:
If you [execute these disloyal] actions, you will be killed by this
curse which is drunk by you. However, if you are submissive,
faithful (and) straight to me and do not commit these crimes, an
immaculate tantrā will be my recompense. You will not be swal-
lowed with your children and wives. 42
This reference to being swallowed may refer to the nāgas
sculpted on the head of the stone, which might devour those
who betrayed the oath. That this was one possible consequence
of disloyalty is indicated by the Arab geographer Ibn Khur-
dādhbih, who commented that in the mountains of the mahārāja
of Zābaj (Śrīvijaya) there were snakes that devoured men. 43
Being “swallowed by the water” in a Palembang inscription also
represented the threat of the death one could expect for being
unfaithful. 44 One scholar believes that the first two lines of the
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Avalokiteśvara, the Bodhi-sattva of
Compassion. Early Śrīvijaya era,
Palembang, Sumatra.
Telaga Batu inscription that are written in a so-far unidentified
Austronesian language seem to include an appeal to the “spirit
of the waters,” who was the guardian of the oath and whose
support was the ultimate source of the Śrīvijaya monarch’s le-
gitimacy. 45
The Telaga Batu oath is not alone in its use of magical
imprecations as a means of protection. Key words in the lo-
calized Buddhist tantric lexicon are revealed in the Talang Tua
inscription (684). In the view of O. W. Wolters, the tantric tra-
dition provided Śrīvijaya with “an armory of magical formulae”
that blended well with local tutelary spirits. 46 Wolters especially
notes numerous Chinese records reporting the importance in
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Śrīvijaya of a tantric text known as the “Peacock” sūtra. This
Indian text honors a powerful spiritual force that is represented
as a peacock and offers its devotees numerous formulas for pro-
tection against dangers. Interestingly in light of the Telaga Batu
inscription’s curse, the “Peacock” sūtra was commonly invoked
in India at oath-taking ceremonies and in courts of law to make
witnesses tell the truth. I-ching, the Chinese monk who visited
Śrīvijaya in the second half of the seventh century and recom-
mended that all Buddhist pilgrims from China ought to spend
time studying there prior to their departure for India, translated
from Sanskrit into Chinese a “Peacock” sūtra text that he had
acquired in Śrīvijaya. 47
Thus, the ultimate response to the divisive tendencies to be
found in the local concept of chieftainship was the appeal to the
Śrīvijaya blend of indigenous and Indic supernatural powers,
which culminated in the symbolic act of oath taking. This water
oath was taken by the state elite and other individuals who
were likely to have had personal contact with the monarch and
who are enumerated in the Telaga Batu inscription (and will
be discussed below): the king’s personal bondsmen, members
of the royal household, and those state personnel who adminis-
tered the realm and voluntarily took the oath prior to assuming
their posts to secure their obedience to the ruler; and various
subordinate chiefs of the hinterland, other coastal centers, and
former rivals conquered by force who were required to render
homage. 48
Śrīvijaya in its patronage of Buddhism imposed a new reli-
gious system that was primarily intended to impress upon the
hinterland populations that the royal ideology was superior to
traditional systems of belief. Buddhism, then, became a useful
means to awe the hinterland population into submission. In-
digenous symbols such as water, snakes, and mountains were
incorporated into the oath-taking ceremony, which ended with
the sharing of a Buddhist tantrā-mala, guaranteeing prosperity
and security as long as the participant adhered to the terms of
the oath. In effect this was an act of subjugation: by taking the
water oath a local elite accommodated its functional roles and
structural organization to the demands of the state. Threats of
dire magical consequences, when backed by the real threat of
military power, were sufficient to convince a local elite that the
new system was beneficial.
As such the military campaign against Malāyu, the strongest
of Śrīvijaya’s riverine system opponents, was the single most
important factor giving Śrīvijaya the authority to administer the
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water oath. Victory over Malāyu made good the Śrīvijaya king’s
claim to siddhayātrā and thereby focused attention on him as
the stabilizer of both the cosmic and mundane worlds. As he
had done previously in developing alliances with Malay seamen
and upriver tribes who formed the core of his military strength,
the Śrīvijaya ruler extended assurances of the great wealth and
glory to be had under his rule to the established elites of other
coastal centers in the Strait of Malacca region, offering them
a continuing although subordinate role in the developing mar-
itime state. 49
SRĪVIJAYA’S STATE STRUCTURE
Early Śrīvijaya statecraft reflected the Malay riverine culture
from which it arose, although it was not until the mid-seventh
century, when inscriptions record the rise of Śrīvijaya, that this
culture generated a classical Southeast Asian state. The major
reason was the tendency toward political fragmentation. The di-
visive nature of Malay society was recognized in ancient Malay
myth. One myth records, for example, that when a boatload of
Malays reached land they would almost immediately split into
factions. 50 Malays based in the Strait of Malacca region were
members of small socioeconomic units and needed some new
principle of organization to generate an entity as politically so-
phisticated as a state. The Telaga Batu inscription suggests how
this came to be in the case of the earliest Malay riverine state.
At the center of the Śrīvijaya state was the king, who per-
sonally addressed the Telaga Batu inscription to all those under
his command. It is significant that the text of this inscription is
directed in the first person to the king’s servants, as opposed
to the Kotakapur, Karangbrahi, and Palas Pasemah inscriptions,
which instead implore a divine force to carry out the necessary
punishments on those subordinates of the king who revolt
against the state. The differences in the texts of these inscrip-
tions indicate that near the center of the Śrīvijaya king’s domain
his power was unquestioned, while in the state’s upriver and
coastal hinterland the king was forced to emphasize the more
theoretical and mythical aspects of his kingship because his
power was less direct.
The Telaga Batu inscription first outlines the structure of au-
thority in the core of the Śrīvijayan state. Here the king was sur-
rounded by his kinsmen and his close associates. Immediately
below the king in importance was the crown prince, the yu-
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varāja; the prince next in the line of succession was the pratiyu-
varāja; then came the other princes of the royal family, the
rājakumāra. These three princely ranks were distinct from that
of the rājaputra, “sons of kings born of lower queens.” 51 In
establishing a state hierarchy, as this inscription seems to be
doing, the fact that the rājaputra were regarded as being of in-
ferior status in relation both to the king’s other sons and to the
royal family is very important. The stipulated hierarchy of the
inscription would have permitted succession to the throne by
the king’s legitimate sons but not by the rāja putra.
Surrounding the royal family and at the heart of the central
administration were the various royal officials named in the
text. Highest in status among this group were the dandanāyaka,
royal judges who exercised the king’s power of adjudication.
Next were the nāyaka and pratyaya, considered to have been
two categories of administrators. 52 Nāyaka were revenue col-
lectors, while pratyaya managed the landed property of the
royal family. It is interesting that pratyaya appears in compound
with hāji, “the king,” as hājipratyaya. This term distinguished a
confidant of the king, meaning that the pratyaya were in per-
sonal contact with the king and were very important members
of the king’s administrative staff. 53 If this assignment of their
function is correct, then the Śrīvijaya monarch derived a no-
table amount of his revenue from some landed base.
At the time of this inscription, when Śrīvijaya was consoli-
dating its power, it is unlikely that revenues derived from the
state’s control over the China trade could have sustained the
monarchy. The titles of administrative office listed in the Telaga
Batu inscription indicate that the Śrīvijaya king was initially
able to formulate his legitimacy by drawing upon the indigenous
resource base under his control, and then he added to this
material and symbolic resource pool as Śrīvijaya expanded its
hegemony over the rival centers of power on the Sumatra coast
and in the strait region. The Śrīvijaya ruler’s local economic
base was populated by the hulun hāji, personal bondsmen of the
king as defined by the inscription, who were controlled by their
own local chiefs, mūrdhaka. 54
The Telaga Batu inscription divided the king’s subjects into
two categories: nonelite were “slaves” (hulun) and the elite
were “lords” (tuhan). As chief of a regional unit, the Śrīvijaya
monarch would have expected the multiple services a Sumatran
subject was customarily obliged to give his local chief. Con-
sistent with traditional practice, in addition to providing labor
and revenues to their chief the chief’s followers also served as
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the nucleus of his army. Reference to the core of the Śrīvijaya
monarch’s nonelite supporters as hulun—slaves—implies that
there was a greater than normal expectation of commitment
than would have been the case in a more typical chief-subject
relationship. “Slavery” in this instance is better thought of as
a bondage of personal service owed to one’s lord, in this case
the Śrīvijaya monarch. In early Southeast Asia such bondage
normally resulted from debt foreclosure, purchase, alliance, or
capture in war. 55 That the expectations of loyalty from these
royal bondsmen was greater than that of nonbondsmen is re-
flected by the focus of the Telaga Batu inscription’s curse on
the king’s nonbondsmen elite, who needed to have a more ab-
stract threat held over them. While in times of peace these per-
sonal bondsmen of the king would have provided labor services
and shared their production with their “chief,” in times of war
hulun hāji troops would have fought beside various professional
and mercenary troops, all contributing to the success of the
Śrīvijaya monarch.
Other officials of the center included: kumārāmatya, “min-
isters not of royal blood”; kāyasatha, “clerks”; and sthāpaka,
the “priests” or technical supervisors for the erection of divine
images and the construction of buildings who directed rather
than actually worked on these projects. In contemporary Ja-
vanese epigraphy sthāpaka assumed important roles in royal in-
auguration ceremonies. One may therefore assume that these
were “Brahman” advisors, religious specialists who advised the
king in the Indian method of construction and in the proper
routine for performing religious ceremony—particularly that of
installation.
Indian ritual was important in the Śrīvijaya monarch’s at-
tempts to consolidate his rule; the systematic incorporation of
Indian cosmology promoted his legitimacy. By assigning San-
skritic titles to all those who were subordinates to the king, the
Telaga Batu inscription documents the Sanskritization process
taking place as the Indic culture provided a certain unity and
prestige to the new system of statecraft that was emerging
in Śrīvijaya. The educational backgrounds and training of the
“Brahman” religious specialists allowed them to assume useful
roles as clerks or technical advisors to the Śrīvijaya ruler, and
they helped to legitimize the rule of this superior “chief” in
his quest to distinguish himself from other traditional Sumatran
chiefs. 56
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The ascent of Śrīvijaya in the seventh century was in part
the consequence of a challenge by Malāyu (the Batang Hari
River system) to the earlier southeast Sumatra-based entrepôt
of Kan-t’o-li, which had been the dominant port in this part of
the strait region. 57 In order to reestablish the paramountcy of
the southeastern Sumatra coast vis-à-vis Malāyu the Śrīvijaya
ruler undertook to forge alliances with Malay seamen and
various hinterland chiefs until he had surrounded Malāyu with
Śrīvijaya allies. As we have already seen, the Kedukan Bukit
inscription makes a direct reference to such alliances when it
speaks of a potential force of twenty thousand troops under the
personal command of the ruler of Śrīvijaya. Only two thousand
troops were actually called upon for the battle against Malāyu,
however, and it is likely that only two thousand could have
been put in the field under the direct command of Śrīvijaya
at this time. The remainder of this Śrīvijayan “army” were the
tribesmen of subordinate chiefs who fulfilled their part of the
alliance with Śrīvijaya by remaining neutral or by terminating
their relations with Malāyu. This was the traditional Sumatran
way of conducting war.
Alliances that helped to establish the rule of the Śrīvijaya
monarch were thus an integral and important part of the state’s
development. While Kan-t’o-li had been a relatively isolated
port state that had encountered few challenges to its position
due to the traditional character of the remainder of the island
(i.e., ports in the area had not yet begun to vie for the in-
ternational trade), circumstances had changed by the seventh
century. The consolidation of T’ang rule in China in the late
sixth and early seventh centuries presented new opportunities
for trade to ports on the coast of Sumatra. 58 Śrīvijaya took
advantage of the Chinese preference for recognizing a single
power within the region and thereby cut off these ports’ as-
pirations to be granted “preferred” status in the trade by the
Chinese court. By threat of force, Śrīvijaya brought rival ports
under the dominance of its capital. The Śrīvijaya system ex-
panded from a limited core domain to include assorted “vassal”
relationships with a wide range of subordinates who were al-
lowed to retain varying degrees of autonomy in relation to the
capital.
In its quest to dominate, the burgeoning Śrīvijaya state
relied on military alliances with subordinates who were
willing—or were forced—to accept the superiority of the
Śrīvijaya monarch. Those who did not take this view were
stripped of official status and recognition. This is shown in a
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Śrīvijaya inscription fragment where the phrase bharu nirbhāra
appears, which may be translated “lords without a charge or
function,” indicating that those unfaithful to the king would be
isolated by having their functions and thus their power taken
away. 59 Only those faithful to the king were rewarded. In the
Telaga Batu inscription there also occurs the phrase samaryyā-
damāmu, “your realms [or] your newly acquired regions,” a ref-
erence to parcels of land or districts granted to loyal civil and
military servants. 60
As noted earlier, Malay seamen are believed to have initially
formed the nucleus of Śrīvijaya’s military might. In a traditional
island-based Malay chiefdom, the role of the chief was to
provide a land base and munitions of war to a group of followers
in return for a share of any booty returning from a war cam-
paign. 61 Prestige was defined in terms of service to one’s ruler.
In turn, the Malay sea peoples viewed a king as powerful and
to be feared. 62 The tenth-century geography of Ibn Rusta pro-
vides an example of such a body of Malay mercenaries in a tra-
ditional pattern of service to a local chief who had pledged his
followers to the Śrīvijaya king. It mentions an official known as
a harladj who had an island named for him and was “head of the
Mahārāja’s army.” 63 This island, situated in the Riau or Lingga
Archipelago, was famous for its camphor. From a cliff on the
island inhabitants gave protection to or harrassed ships passing
through the strait.
Relationships between the Malay sea peoples and the
mahārāja of Śrīvijaya were similar to those established between
the Śrīvijaya ruler and the military leaders and chiefs of the
Sumatra hinterland. The mahārāja was capable of investing
power, for example, naming the island Ibn Rusta referred to in
honor of his vassal. What attracted people to Śrīvijaya was its
prestige. The king was royal, rich, and known to promote the
general well-being of his people. For a group that sold its ser-
vices as mercenaries, participation in the division of the royal
treasury meant a regularization of income. That military leaders
shared in this wealth is clear from the Arab geographers’ ac-
count of the redistribution ceremony at the death of a mahārāja,
when gold from Palembang harbor was divided first among the
royal family and then among the military commanders.
In the list of people linked to the Śrīvijaya king there were
two major classes of military commanders at the top of the
hierarchy, well ahead of the priests (whose contributions to
Śrīvijaya’s statecraft were more theoretical; i.e., they were a
source of ideas and plans) and also above those who were
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regarded as members of the king’s administrative staff. First
in importance was the parvvāṇḍa, “a rather high official, in
command of troops or of a small district…,” 64 The fact that
parvvāṇḍa appears in association with the term nisaṃvarddhiku
(nisaṃvarddhiku parvvāṇḍa) is of particular interest. Nisaṃ-
varddhiku stands forth in the Telaga Batu inscriptions when the
responsibilities of royal princes are described. Those charged
with nisaṃvarddhiku were directly accountable to the king.
A Palembang inscription fragment, for instance, shows what
these commanders did: one nisaṃvarddhiku parvvāṇḍa was per-
sonally entrusted by the king to bring a rebellious area under
control. 65 Thus the word nisaṃvarddhiku designated personal
responsibilities to the Śrīvijaya monarch.
The Telaga Batu inscription also identifies the senāpati as
a second category of important military commanders. While
parvvāṇḍa commanded royal troops, senāpati were com-
manders in the private armies of the Śrīvijaya king’s subor-
dinate chiefs. This association is reflected in the inscription’s
text, where senāpati appears with bhūpati (“vassal chiefs”).
Senāpati were thus military commanders of “vassal troops.”
Another category of military commander appearing in the
state’s hierarchy was the pratisāra, whose position in the in-
scription indicates their subordination to the two higher ranks
of military commanders. Since pratis āra is followed immedi-
ately in the inscription by the term hulun h āji, “the king’s
personal bondsmen,” the two would appear to be connected.
As noted, hulun h āji would have participated in Śrīvijaya’s
army, and it is reasonable to expect that pratisāra were their
commanders. As coordinators of troops of royal bondsmen the
pratisāra would have been under the command of parvv āṇḍa
rather than sen āpati (see fig. 3).
Despite the seemingly foreign hierarchical order imposed
in the Śrīvijaya state by the assignment of Sanskritic titles
in the Telaga Batu inscription, implying that the indigenous
elite might not have been able to maintain their own power
bases except through some quality associated with these Indian
titles, it appears that indigenous elites continued to maintain
their own alliance networks. In coming to terms with local
chiefs—and to integrate them into his system of statecraft—the
Śrīvijaya monarch synthesized his new policy from the existing
system of political organization. The Telaga Batu inscription
lists “vassal chiefs” (bhūpati), to whom were assigned a high
district-level office in a ranking immediately following that of
the “sons of kings born of lesser queens” (rājaputra). 66 The
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Figure 3
Śrīvijaya’s State Hierarchy based on the Telaga Batu In-
scription
(Arrow indicate flow of authority in addition t o that implicit in the hi-
erarchical arrangement.)
vassal chief’s district-level office was that of dātu, the tradi-
tional Malay title for an important chief. A dātu, according to
the inscription, held a d ātu province (pardd ātuan), which was
distinguished from land belonging to the king personally (called
k ād ātuan). Royal princes were usually appointed to dātu posi-
tions as well, probably governing k ād ātuan, and were charged
with nisaṃvarddhiku, “personal responsibility to the monarch.”
Those of nonroyal status who filled dātu positions were charged
with nigalarku, “loyalty to the monarch.” 67 The distinction be-
tween the terms nisaṃvarddhiku and nigalarku related to the
danger to the king posed by members of the royal family. Royal
dātu were believed to be potentially more dangerous than non-
royal d ātu. Since he was of royal blood a royal d ātu was a
threat to the king’s rule because he was a legitimate heir to the
throne. Those d ātu charged with nisaṃvarddhiku were subject
to far more severe punishment for failure to carry out their re-
sponsibilities than those charged with nigalarku.
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The Telaga Batu inscription gives the impression that as
soon as the king received information about suspect actions by
one of the royal dātu “he would immediately take measures.
He would organize an expedition in order to have the culprit
brought to the capital, where he would be liable to punish-
ments: but, it is added, the expedition would hardly be nec-
essary; the culprits would already have been killed by the effect
of the imprecation,” the curse associated with this inscription.
68 Not only was the threat of a curse imposed upon royal d ātu,
but the king also promised to order the immediate execution of
anyone in such a position who challenged the throne. To the d
ātu charged with nigalarku there was no such threat of physical
retribution; only the threat of the curse was held against them.
Thus, in the Kotakapur, Karangbrahi, and Palas Pasemah ver-
sions of the Telaga Batu inscription, the Śrīvijaya monarch could
merely invoke the curse and could not or would not undertake
other measures to protect his position.
If we were able to map the geographical distribution of
those appointed and charged with one or the other of the dātu
positions, it would be extremely enlightening. For instance, the
Kotakapur inscription (line 4) states that the rulers of Bangka
were charged with nigalarku. As nonroyal elite, their position as
dātu in the Śrīvijaya system did not demand total subservience
to the capital but allowed them considerable autonomy. The
king did not hold out the threat of direct force against them,
submitting the threat of the curse as a warning against dis-
loyalty. The potential for disorder inherent within alliances with
subordinate local chiefs was fully recognized by Śrīvijaya’s
ruler. The Telaga Batu inscription expressed the king’s fear of
rebellion in the frontier regions of his state, where loyalties to
the capital were likely weakest. Here, too, emphasis was placed
on the curse exacting vengeance rather than on a specific mil-
itary response: “[If] you plot against me in the frontier regions
of my state, [then] you are not submissive and will be killed by
the curse.”
The proper function of a dātu was apparently to serve as
the king’s “eyes” (line 6) in the areas outside the capital. After
a warning that actions taken independently of the capital in
an attempt to build a base of power would be punished, the
inscription then promises that if those persons who have at-
tempted actions against the king are punished by the dātu, then
“I shall not take measures against you.” 69 Allied areas were
thus given a high degree of autonomy out of the necessity of for-
mulating a political and economic base for the state.
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When the Telaga Batu inscription speaks of nonroyal d ātu
there is reference to the clans and descendants of those d ātu
who would suffer under the curse if a revolt against Śrīvijaya
were supported. It mattered who your antecedents were. One
enjoyed status in accord with the position with which one’s
family had been endowed, as recognized in the inscription’s
elaboration of the royal family. Regional clans seem to have
dominated the subordinate localities of the Śrīvijaya empire.
Rather than remove a dominant group from power in an area
and then attempt to subjugate the remaining population, it was
important that Śrīvijaya incorporate this local elite. Emphasis
on the family membership of subordinates is made several times
in the inscription. Family ties are repeatedly mentioned. There
is a warning issued to those who “charge members of your
family to conspire” (line 6). The joint responsibility among
family members for one’s improper actions is stressed: “[you]
will be killed … with your wives and children … your posterity
will be punished by me … you will be killed by the curse. You
will be punished with your children, your wives, your posterity,
your clans, and your friends” (line 19). Finally, the inscription
notifies servants of the state that if they had any knowledge of
their relatives’ participation in a revolt they too would be pun-
ished, even though they themselves did not participate (line 21).
Among the last groups recognized in the Telaga Batu in-
scription were those people associated with commerce. First en-
countered are the royal officials known as tuhā an vatakvurah,
“supervisors of trade and crafts.” Next appear the puhāwang,
“shippers,” and vaṇiy āga, “merchants.” The former term is
given in the Malay form rather than in the formal Sanskrit em-
ployed for the other titles in the list in order to distinguish the
puhā wang as indigenous traders and shippers who used the
Śrīvijaya capital as their home port and who were supervised
by royal officials with a specific jurisdiction over their activ-
ities—officials such as the tuhā an vatakvurah. 70
This use of indigenous vocabulary to distinguish these
seamen as being Malay demonstrates that in the Śrīvijaya era
Malay seamen were still providing the ships and passage for
international merchants traveling between Southeast Asia and
China. An early Palembang inscription refers to merchants in
general as “migratory men,” comparing them with birds that
traveled over long distances. 71 In the Telaga Batu inscription
the shippers and merchants were included in the list of those
who were considered potentially dangerous to the
king—probably due to their contact with foreign powers. Mer-
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chants were regarded as likely spies for the king’s enemies.
Thus the movement of foreigners and their goods was un-
doubtedly regulated in conformity with the requirements of the
state. 72 In particular, foreign merchants would not have been al-
lowed to establish a direct commercial relationship with interior
sources of supply. A policy of suppressing the foreigner was im-
possible, however. The advantages to be derived from trade rev-
enues, which were a vital asset to the expanding Śrīvijaya state,
required that hospitality be extended.
Trade was conducted under royal control, taking place in
specific marketplaces under the supervision of royal officials, as
may be seen in the Telaga Batu inscription’s reference to tuhā
an vatakvurah, the “supervisors of trade and crafts.” Chao Ju-
kua provides a clue to the role of such royal officials in his de-
scription of trade in Śrīvijaya’s ports:
They calculate first the value of their articles according to their
equivalents in gold or silver, and then engage in (the) barter of
these articles at fixed rates. As for example, one tong of samshu
is equal to one tael of silver or two mace of gold, two tong of rice
are equal to one tael of silver, ten tong being equal to one tael of
gold…. 73
The key to trade in Chao Ju-kua’s account is the estab-
lishment of fixed rates of value for various commodities in gold
and silver equivalents prior to any exchange within Śrīvijaya’s
marketplaces. This indicates an administered market (as op-
posed to a modern “price-making” market): 74 Śrīvijaya’s super-
visors of trade were likely involved in setting standards and
“fair prices” for commodities, thereby maintaining the social
and economic harmony of the port of trade. Arab sources, for
instance, report that it was common knowledge that merchants
based in the ports of the western Malay Peninsula coast they
knew as “Kalāh” devalued pure tin by adding substances to it, a
factor important in establishing a fair rate of exchange, calling
into question the integrity of commercial transactions in Kalāh’s
ports. 75 Śrīvijaya ports, on the other hand, were considered
“fair.” In the fifteenth century Malacca merchants used weights
on hand-held scales that bore the Malacca ruler’s stamp certify-
ing that they were of proper weight standard. The indented
stamp was so placed that peeling off small layers of weight
was impossible—just as a modern coin has rims on its edges to
prevent the shaving of its metal. It has been suggested that this
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practice predated Malacca and originated in the Śrīvijaya age.
76 Śrīvijaya’s “supervisors of trade” would have taken responsi-
bility for such standards.
The nature of trade in Śrīvijaya is further documented in the
1118–1119 account of Chu Yü, son of the chief administrator of
the Canton port from 1099 to 1102.
Every country in the southern ocean has its chief. San-fo-ch’i
[Śrīvijaya] is invariably described as a great country…. The land
has a great deal of sandalwood [a product of Java and the eastern
archipelago] and frankincense, and these products are [Chinese]
trade goods. San-fo-ch’i ships send frankincense to China, and
the [Chinese] Trade Office treats the product as a [government]
monopoly and reserves a percentage to sell on its own account.
In recent years San-fo-ch’i has established [its own] monopoly in
sandalwood. The ruler orders merchants to sell it to him. The cost
of the product [therefore] increases several times. Foreign mer-
chants do not dare to purchase it privately. This is a clever sys-
tem…. 77
This description documents a thriving and peaceful trade
center, but implies that in earlier times Śrīvijaya promoted “free
trade” within its ports instead of imposing monopolies on
certain products.
In economic terms the Śrīvijaya king utilized his hinterland
political relationships to collect goods at designated river-
mouth centers of exchange where goods met and flowed
outward. This entire process was dependent on the network of
political control developed by Śrīvijaya kings in the mid-seventh
century, a system that was an extension of the structure, or
“code” of the indigenous society of the Strait of Malacca
region—that is, even though the hierarchical structure de-
scribed above employed Indic titles, the structure was in es-
sential ways still indigenous.
THE ŚRĪVIJAYA LEGACY
Śrīvijaya came into existence because of its ability to organize
the commercial exchange of Southeast Asian
products—products from the Java Sea realm as well as those
goods produced in its own hinterland—for those of China and
the West. Successfully facilitating this exchange provided the
Śrīvijaya monarch with income beyond that which he would
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normally have derived from his own immediate economic base:
the Musi River Delta between Palembang and the coast and
Palembang’s upriver hinterland. 78 Because he redistributed
revenues derived from this trade, the Śrīvijaya “chief rose above
his fellow Sumatra and Malay chiefs (dātu) in status, and the
ensuing prosperity of his burgeoning state attracted more fol-
lowers.
As an indigenous chief the Śrīvijaya monarch could draw
upon local beliefs that chiefs possessed magical qualities. Tra-
ditionally a chief’s use of magic influenced his followers’ pros-
perity in this lifetime as well as in the next. The Telaga Batu
inscription stresses this locally defined power but also asso-
ciates the Śrīvijaya monarch with a higher level of magic—that
derived from Buddhism—to further reinforce his stature. Not
only did Buddhism provide new magic, it also gave the king
international prestige. The royal capital of Śrīvijaya became a
major pilgrimage center and the Śrīvijaya ruler and his rep-
resentatives became participants in Buddhism’s international
intellectual dialogue of the seventh-through tenth-century era.
79 His prowess was well publicized (e.g., in the Śrīvijaya in-
scriptions discussed above) and was intended to impress his
followers—to awe them into submission. The emphasis on mag-
ically derived legitimacy was critical to insure that the king
could maintain his authority during periods marked by drops in
port activity due to regular fluctuations in the volume of inter-
national trade, often the consequence of disorders at either end
of the trade route.
The concern for legitimacy in the early Śrīvijaya inscriptions
reflects the inherent weakness of the Śrīvijaya state system.
Nonpersonal allies—that is, local chiefs (dātu)—and their client
networks were willing to enter into a confederation with the
Śrīvijaya ruler in order to share in the state’s wealth as well as
to draw upon the mahārāja’s special magic. Upriver land-based
allies, in exchange for their subordination and delivery of local
production to downriver ports, received a portion of the income
and goods from the trade routes. For Malay seamen, being party
to the redistribution of Śrīvijaya’s wealth was an alternative to
piracy; in return they became the Śrīvijaya navy, safeguarding
the maritime passage through the Strait of Malacca. If deprived
of a part of this wealth, however, none of these allies had reason
to facilitate the flow of goods to and from Palembang or to
maintain a political alliance with Śrīvijaya.
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The leaders of subordinate groups could have attempted
to replace the Palembang-based rulers, repeating the cycle of
state consolidation: assuming authority over Palembang or an-
other of the potential coastal entrepôts at the mouths of the
Strait of Malacca riverine networks, constructing a viable
system of polity, attracting and conducting international ex-
change at their principal port, and mobilizing the subsequent
wealth to extend their authority over rival coastal centers and
their upriver hinterlands. 80 While internally defined legitimacy
and networks of alliance were critical to the construction of this
system, the key variable was access to the external income that
provided the foundation for an otherwise unstable hegemony.
Kinship in Śrīvijaya was defined in traditional terms: the
monarch was a Sumatran chief, and he dealt with his sub-
ordinates within traditional structures of relationship. In the
Śrīvijaya state external trade was integrated with the internal
economic and political networks using systems of alliance: the
Śrīvijaya chief brought the various internal networks togeth-
er and connected them to the international trade network.
Śrīvijaya was able to define its relationship with foreign mer-
chants in much the same terms: the king was the “chief” of
one people dealing with the “chiefs” of others. The Śrīvijaya
state developed continuing “treaty” relationships with different
groups of people who would normally have owed each other
nothing. Trade transactions became social and political strat-
egy; reciprocity among representative chiefs of the various
peoples became the basis of a redistribution network, organized
by Śrīvijaya’s rulers, that guaranteed the network’s continuing
prosperity. Maintaining the harmony of the economic and social
relationships was the ultimate function of the Śrīvijaya state
and its ruler.
If Śrīvijaya defined its authority in traditional Sumatran
terms, as is being argued, then the “destruction of the center”
would have had a tremendous psychological impact. One can
thus postulate the effect of a raid on Śrīvijaya’s capital in 1025
by seamen based in the south Indian domain of the Cōla̤ mon-
archs. The Tañjāvūr inscription of Rājēndra Cōla̤ (1030/31) re-
ferred to the conquest of the Śrīvijaya capital and its treasury as
if it symbolized the desecration of the source of Śrīvijaya’s legit-
imacy and power. 81 Śrīvijaya never regained its old prosperity
and control after the Cōla̤ raid. By 1079–1082, its capital had
moved from Palembang to the central Sumatra port of Jambi.
82 Java had become a “dominant entrepôt” area and the ports
of northern Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula were beginning
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to function independently as alternative “centers.” 83 Yet the
seventeenth-century Sejarah Melayu, the court chronicle of
Malacca’s history, in its description of the rise of Malacca in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries purposely connected Malacca
genealogies to Śrīvijaya-Palembang and not to Śrīvijaya-Jambi.
84 This substantiates the legacy of Śrīvijaya in Malay
history—and the success of the Palembang monarch in estab-
lishing a political network within the context of Malay-Sumatran
culture. The Śrīvijaya state had achieved “kingdom” status,
in that it had sufficiently integrated its riverine and coastal
centers with its upriver hinterland. Despite its political demise,
Śrīvijaya-Palembang remained a viable symbol of Malay unity
and common prosperity and was the standard for all Malay
riverine states that followed.
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The Śailendra Era in
Javanese History
TheŚailendraErainJavaneseHistory
From earliest times the coasts of southeastern Sumatra andnortheastern Java have formed a single commercial and cul-
tural unit. While historians have had considerable interest in
the southeastern Sumatra-based Śrīvijaya state, early Javanese
history is perhaps the least understood and most controversial
among that of Southeast Asia’s classical civilizations, despite
epigraphic and archaeological records surpassed only in Cam-
bodia and Burma. 1 Yet most of Java’s written records are of
post-eleventh-century origin, and as a consequence there is
little agreement on Java’s pre-eleventh-century history. It is this
pre-eleventh-century age, however, that produced Java’s most
impressive monumental remains, notably the Borobudur and
Prambanan temple complexes of central Java. Historians cur-
rently debate whether these historical treasures were products
of a civilization governed by indigenous Javanese monarchs or
by rulers (a) culturally influenced by Śrīvijaya, (b) politically
allied and subordinate to Śrīvijaya, (c) intermarried with the
Śrīvijaya royal line, (d) based in Java but directly ruling both
Java and Śrīvijaya, or (e) based in Sumatra and directly ruling
both Śrīvijaya and Java. Further, there is heated discussion of
whether the civilization that produced the major central Ja-
vanese temple complexes previous to A.D. 1000 was governed by
strong, unifying central governments or is better understood as
being subject to a number of semiautonomous regional zones
governed by regional chiefs.
This chapter examines the evolution of a “Javanese state”
from the fifth through the eleventh centuries—an era corre-
sponding to the existence of the Śrīvijaya maritime state dis-
cussed in chapter 4. It especially considers the role of maritime
trade in this development process and whether or not the par-
ticular patterns of early Javanese wet-rice civilization came to
emerge because of opportunities afforded by maritime trade.
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To make this analysis it is necessary to examine the Śailendra
line of rulers who at various times throughout this pre-eleventh-
century era claimed authority as both Javanese and Śrīvijaya
monarchs.
THE EMERGENCE OF EARLY RIVERINE STATES IN
WESTERN JAVA
The earliest written reference to Java is found in Ptolemy (A.D.
100–170), who provides separate references to Yāvadvīpa
(Iabadiou) and Jawadvīpa (Sadadibai) (see chap. 2). Recent his-
toriography has associated Ptolemy’s Yāvadvīpa with the Jelai
River system of southwestern Borneo, an area known by the
Chinese as Yeh-p’o-t’i that was said to be located next to She-
p’o (Java). 2 By the fifth century, however, Yeh-p’o-t’i’s commerce
had been absorbed by emerging coastal centers on Java’s
northern coast; Chinese sources began to omit references to
Yeh-p’o-t’i and referred thereafter to the She-p’o (Java) realm
alone. There were two fifth-century Javanese centers with which
the Chinese interacted: Holing in central Java and Ho-lo-tan/t’o
on the northwestern Java coast. 3
The story of the north Indian Buddhist pilgrim Guṇavarman
records the emergence of Ho-ling as a political entity from what
was previously a tribal society. In 422, Guṇavarman stopped
at Ho-ling on his way to China. There he stayed for several
years, patronized by the queen mother and preaching Buddhist
theology with great success; the king of Ho-ling asked
Guṇavarman’s advice on whether to attack his enemies. 4 The
emergence of Ho-ling involved competition among several
groups and the assistance of an Indian advisor, which denotes
the use of Indic culture as the basis for the establishment of
the local “ruler’s” supremacy over other chiefs. Ho-ling sent
envoys to China in 430 and 440 but is not mentioned in sixth-
century Chinese records, suggesting that international contact
with central Java was limited until two centuries later when in
the 640s and 660s Ho-ling again sent embassies and was visited
around 640 by a Chinese monk who remained to study under a
Javanese Buddhist master. 5
Meanwhile Ho-lo-tan (or Ho-lo-t’o) sent seven missions to
the Chinese court between 430–452. Chinese records of Ho-lo-
tan also reflect the instability of that age. In the report of a
436 mission the king of Ho-lo-tan, who held the Indic royal title
Viśāṃvarman, was said to live in fear of his enemies both inside
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and outside his realm and thus requested diplomatic assistance
and weapons from the Chinese. Ho-lo-tan was once a peaceful
and prosperous land but at that time was being attacked from
all sides; its people (the king’s supporters) were fleeing the
country. When the king’s son usurped the throne Viśāṃvarman
was forced into exile. 6
Historians have connected the references to Ho-lo-tan with
four undated mid-to-late fifth-century inscriptions of the king
Pūrṇavarman who ruled the Tarum River basin just east of
present-day Jakarta, a land known as Tārumānāgara in the in-
scriptions. 7 These inscriptions are similar in style—that is, they
have Sanskrit verses in an early south Indian script—to the
yūpa inscriptions of Kutei on the southwestern Borneo coast,
epigraphy associated with the Yeh-p’o-t’i coastal center. One
of Pūrṇavarman’s inscriptions discovered near the shore of
Jakarta Bay notes that in the twenty-second year of his reign
Pūrṇavarman gave his attention to the drainage problems of the
coastal area, altering the course of the river to provide a new
outlet. 8 The other three inscriptions were found on a hillside
near Bogor, south of Jakarta, and are associated with foot-
prints carved in stone symbolizing “the three conquering and
victorious footprints of Viṣṇu.” These footprints denote a great
victory by Pūrṇavarman, who is described as being “ever effi-
cient in destroying hostile kraton [courts/states] and salutory
to princes who are devoted subjects.” 9 These inscriptions of
Pūrṇavarman demonstrate several aspects of the emergence of
political systems in early western Java.
Recent studies of the historical ecology of western Java
reveal that the region did not develop a wet-rice (sawah) agri-
cultural system until the seventeenth century, although dry-rice
(ladang) cultivation was practiced earlier. 10 While a wet-rice
society was by necessity more deeply committed and bound
to a specific agricultural area, as for instance was true of the
populations inhabiting the river plains of central and eastern
Java in a later age, western Java’s dry-rice agricultural popu-
lation was more mobile and was capable of escaping the grasp
of an oppressive court elite or an unsettled political envi-
ronment—situations similar to those reported in Chinese refer-
ences to Ho-lo-tan in Viśāṃvarman’s time when Viśāṃvarman’s
subjects fled the country because of constant disorder. The pos-
sibilities for the successful development of an agrarian-based
court (kraton) in western Java were thus limited; the alternative
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was to build a maritime-focused court/state requiring the estab-
lishment of a coastal port and the recruitment of Malay sea pop-
ulations.
This was Pūrṇavarman’s intent in the mid-fifth century as
he supervised the construction of a new river outlet—possibly
because of the silting up of the mouth of the Tarum River—to
make his port more accessible for trading vessels. 11 A further
benefit from this project was the alleviation of the potential
for upstream flooding, which increased the capacity for dry-
rice production in Pūrṇavarman’s upstream hinterland. Signifi-
cantly, Pūrṇavarman’s fifth-century coastal development project
corresponds to the southern shift of the international maritime
route from the Isthmus of Kra and Funan realm to the Strait of
Malacca region (see chap. 3). Development of the Tarum River
estuary as an economic center, with a coastal port supported
by upriver dry-rice cultivators, facilitated the Tārumānāgara
ruler’s rise and allowed him to claim kingly status. The de-
veloped river system provided surplus rice to feed foreign mer-
chants utilizing the port facilities. Pūrṇavarman’s Bogor inscrip-
tions show that his initial political consolidations were brought
about via wars “destroying hostile kraton,” the bases of rival
chiefs within the Tarum River system, and constructing alliance
networks by being “salutory to princes [i.e., subordinate chiefs]
who are devoted subjects.” Such victories and alliances guar-
anteed the security of the international traders visiting the new
port but also encouraged the flow of local production (rice) from
upriver population centers ruled by local chiefs to Pūrṇavar-
man’s would-be coastal entrepôt.
One further dimension of the Pūrṇavarman inscriptions
should be emphasized. An important aspect of Pūrṇavarman’s
quest for power—as documented by his inscriptions—was an as-
sociation with Indic religion. Consistent with other emerging
Southeast Asian centers, Pūrṇavarman relied on Indian reli-
gious tradition to reinforce his legitimacy and to elevate his
magical status above that of his fellow chiefs. Pūrṇavarman’s
victories were glorified in his inscriptions by the symbolic in-
tegration of Indic and Javanese traditions; for example, Viṣṇu’s
three footprints, taken from early South Asian tradition, corre-
sponded to Javanese conceptions of feet as the locus of power.
12 The economic development of the Tarum River estuary was
sanctified by the bestowal of a thousand cows upon
“Brahmans,” a priestly elite employing the “sacred language” of
the inscriptions to record the glory of Pūrṇavarman. The three
Bogor inscriptions stipulate that Pūrṇavarman was “tantamount
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to … Viṣṇu,” a semidivine being worthy of being followed. The
personal focus of this quest for legitimacy is clear but does
not appear to have been transferred to the western Java-based
rulers who followed him. It remained for the central Javanese
ruler Sañjaya to provide further definition of Javanese sover-
eignty in the early eighth century, drawing from these earlier
developments in western Java.
Pūrṇavarman’s efforts are thus comparable to those of the
early Śrīvijaya monarchs. Ports in the strategic coastal zone at
the end of the Strait of Malacca and at the western edge of
the Java Sea first emerged as important commercial centers
because of their roles as intermediaries for the exchange of
eastern Indonesia’s spices, contrary to Funan, which began as a
way station. These spices were transported to southern Suma-
tra and northwest Java coast ports by Malay seamen, and in
these commercial centers the spices were traded to merchants
traveling the East-West maritime route from India to China.
But these fifth-century Java and Sumatra coastal centers never
achieved “kingdom” status. Their power was localized, concen-
trated in the coastal centers at the mouths of riverine systems
rather than integrated with their upriver hinterlands. There
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was, as noted in the discussion of riverine exchange networks
in early Southeast Asia in chapter 1, an inherent potential for
conflict as one or another would-be coastal entrepôt attempted
to establish its dominance over the international trade, monop-
olizing contact with the international traders and access to In-
donesia’s spices and other desired products.
The western Java coastal centers failed to satisfactorily re-
cruit the Malay sea populations they needed to become suc-
cessful entrepôts, nor were they able to develop a rice culture
producing sufficient surplus rice to sustain the sovereignty of
their elites. In the end the western Java coastal realm fell
subject to Śrīvijaya’s authority in the seventh century. Unlike
them, Śrīvijaya’s port-based elite had constructed the crucial
alliances with the strait region’s Malay sea peoples, who
became the basis for Śrīvijaya’s evolution as the dominant en-
trepôt in the region. The Palembang-based Śrīvijaya ruler con-
solidated his state by first establishing his authority over the
competing entrepôts of Malāyu/Jambi in Sumatra and then,
according to the 686 Kotakapur inscription found on Bangka
Island, prepared to launch a naval expedition against rival ports
on the western Java coast. 13
The Sunda Strait region and western Java coast are con-
sidered by historians to have been commercially if not politically
subordinate to Śrīvijaya’s authority for most of the period from
the late seventh to the mid-tenth centuries. 14 There is a void
in the epigraphic evidence concerning western Java until an in-
scription dated A.D. 932, which makes reference to a “King of
the Sunda Straits” who was reinstalled to royal status. 15 This in-
scription appears to be related to three Javanese inscriptions of
similar date recovered on the southwest Sumatra coast side of
the Sunda Strait. 16 Together these four inscriptions point to the
reemergence of Javanese authority over the Sunda Strait realm.
SOURCES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF THE
ŚAILENDRA ERA’S HISTORY
A Nakhο̨m Si Thammarat inscription (“Side A”) from the Malay
Peninsula dated A.D. 775 makes reference to the Śrīvijaya
empire; on the reverse of the same stone is an undated in-
scription that speaks of the Śailendra family that is known to
have ruled in Java in that same eighth-century era. 17 Using the
Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat inscriptions as evidence that Śrīvijaya
was the dominant political entity in the Southeast Asian archi-
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pelago in that age, some historians have proposed a “Sumatran
period” in Javanese history: the ruler of Śrīvijaya is seen dom-
inating central Java’s statecraft and culture in the eighth and
ninth centuries A.D. in an age characterized by Śrīvijaya’s
Mahāyāna Buddhist influence and Java’s most impressive
temple architecture. But a mid-ninth-century Nālānda in-
scription (860) from the Mahāyāna Buddhist monastery in the
Bihar region of northeastern India honoring a Southeast Asian
mah ār āja who sponsored a religious foundation, notes that this
mah ār āja was descended from the Śailendra family of “Yav-
abhūmi” (Java) and ruled “Suvarṇadvīpa” (Śrīvijaya). 18 The Nā-
landā inscription suggests a quite different interpretation of the
Nakhο̨m Si Thammarat inscription: that Java-based rulers of the
Śailendra family held authority over the Śrīvijaya realm and that
during the eighth and ninth centuries it was Java, not south-
eastern Sumatra, that dominated the Southeast Asian archi-
pelago. 19
The Śailendras came to power around the mid-eighth
century. They introduced the Indic title mahār āja to distinguish
themselves from other regional chiefs and established their
base in central Java. Patrons of Buddhism, the Śailendras during
the height of their power in central Java constructed impressive
monuments and temple complexes, the best known of which is
the Borobudur on the Kedu Plain. Their court attracted Bud-
dhist scholars from afar and was acclaimed internationally as
a center of Buddhist learning. They were the precursors of a
new concept of statecraft in Java—the concentration of political
power in a single authority—which by the tenth century was
clearly being realized.
The most widely accepted reconstruction of Śailendra
history was done by J. G. de Casparis, who stressed the linear
succession of Javanese and Śrīvijaya rulers, intermarriage be-
tween the Java-based Śailendra and Sumatra-based Śrīvijaya
royal houses, and the consequent assumption of rule over
Śrīvijaya by Śailendra-related monarchs after rival Javanese
elites had superseded the authority of Śailendra monarchs in
Java; that is, Śailendra kings lost their seat in Java and ended
up ruling Sumatra. 20
Casparis’ reconstruction is based on his view that the two
Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat inscriptions are related. While the “Side
A” inscription dated 775 clearly refers to Śrīvijaya monarchs,
Casparis dated “Side B” in the early 780s, noting the reference
in “Side B” to a Śailendra monarch who was the “killer of his
enemies.” This Śailendra monarch, he argued, was not ruling
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Śrīvijaya but was related to the Śrīvijaya monarchs through an
alliance. The “killer of his enemies” in the Nakhο̨n Si Tham-
marat inscription was the same individual described as the
“heroic king Dharaṇīndra” in the 782 Kĕlurak inscription
recorded near Kalasan in central Java, the Śailendra ruler of
Java “whose valour was established by the conquest of rulers
in all directions … who was given to attacking great warriors
hostile to him.” 21 The Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat and Kĕlurak in-
scriptions thus honored the establishment of Śailendra polity in
Java following an era of upheaval.
Casparis theorized that between 732, when Sañjaya, a
patron of the Hindu god Śiva, issued a major inscription at
Caṅggal in central Java, and 778, when a regional chief con-
structed a temple at Kalasan in honor of the tantric Buddhist
goddess Tārā and his Śailendra monarch, a major political tran-
sition took place in Java. 22 The Kĕlurak inscription supports this
theory. This inscription employed a new script, a north Indian
Nāgarī script also utilized by contemporary Pāla rulers in north-
eastern India, the chief supporters of the Buddhist complex at
Nālandā, and especially stressed the patronage of Buddhism
by the Śailendra monarch. 23 This patronage of Buddhism is
best evinced in the sophisticated Śailendra monumental art
and architecture, with the Borobudur representing the cosmo-
logical center of Śailendra power and the spiritual center of the
Śailendra realm in the Javanese world. It was Buddhist patron-
age that the Śailendra monarchs had in common with the rulers
of Śrīvijaya, as well as with the Pāla monarchs of India.
After the inscription of the 780s, there is a gap of infor-
mation until 824, when an Old Javanese and Sanskrit inscription
reports the reign of the Śailendra monarch Samaratuṅga, who
Casparis argued was allied to the Sumatra-based Śrīvijaya
rulers via his marriage to a Śrīvijaya princess (see fig. 4). 24 But
an Old Malay inscription dated 832 from Gandasuli in central
Java recorded the “restoration of order” by a new line of kings,
led by the regional chief Patapān and symbolized by the
construction of four monasteries (aśrama) dedicated to the
Hindu god Brahma. Casparis postulated that when Sama-
ratuṅga died the sovereignty of the Śailendra line in Java was
challenged by this regional chief, who had a legitimate claim
to the throne because of his marriage to a Śailendra prin-
cess, Samaratuṅga’s daughter. The new line of kings united the
Hindu and Buddhist traditions as the basis of its legitimacy. 25
An 842 inscription reports that Śailendra temples were main-
tained by a Śailendra princess, wife of Pikatan, Patapān’s son.
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Figure 4
Early Javanese Rulers
26 This act seemed designed to justify Pikatan’s right to assume
the Śailendra mah ār āja title as Javanese sovereign. Thereafter
the Patapān line began the development of a Hindu temple
complex at Prambanan around 863, perhaps related to the cult
of the Hindu sage Agastya, and continued as well to maintain
the Śailendra Buddhist temples. 27
Casparis speculated that, in trying to assume authority over
Java, Pikatan came into conflict with Samaratuṅga’s Śailendra
heirs, specifically the “brother-in-law” Bālaputra, named in the
Nālandā inscription of 860 as the mahārāja of Śrīvijaya (Su-
varṇadvīpa). The Nālandā inscription traces Bālaputra’s an-
cestry, reporting that he was the younger son of the mahār
āja Samaratuṅga, who was in turn the son of the Śailendra
mahārāja of Java (Yavabhūmi), who bore the title “killer of his
enemies,” that is, the Śailendra ruler of the Kĕlurak and the
Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat inscriptions. 28 Noting the Nālandā in-
scription’s reference to conflict within the Śailendra realm, Cas-
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paris proposed that in 856 Bālaputra was defeated by Pikatan,
whereupon Bālaputra retreated to Śrīvi jaya, the country of his
mother, to become the first Śailendra ruler of Śrīvijaya. Thus
in the late ninth century Śrīvijaya was ruled by a Buddhist
Śailendra ruler, while Java was ruled by Pikatan and his suc-
cessors, who patronized Śiva. 29 While Casparis’ chronological
reconstruction has been criticized, no historian has yet substan-
tially refuted his view of Śailendra rule of Java and Śrīvijaya
as being distinct from each other, and that Śailendra sover-
eignty in Sumatra did not begin until the latter half of the ninth
century. 30
Of related interest are Arab and Chinese references to the
Javanese and Śrīvijaya realms during the Śailendra era. 31 Zābaj
was at first an Arab toponym for Java as a whole and may be
roughly equated to Chinese references to She-p’o (Java) and
Indian references to Jāvaka or Yāvadvīpa. As Arab perceptions
of the Indonesian archipelago became more precise by the late
ninth century, being for the first time based upon personal ex-
perience, Zābaj came to be attached to the mah ār ājas who
ruled Java in the toponym “Mah ār āja [of] Zābaj.” The end of
the Śailendra line in Java and the transfer of Śailendra rule to
southeastern Sumatra may well be reflected in tenth-century
geographies, which referred to the mahār āja’s base in Sribuza
(Palembang) rather than in the Zābaj of earlier works. These
references could be seen as documenting a transition in Java’s
political fortunes and thus giving credence to Casparis’ theory
that Śailendra rule over Java and Śrīvijaya did not overlap but
was instead separate. Sribuza’s capital in post-tenth-century
references was clearly a maritime center, “a city built on
wooden piles at the edge of a large tidal river/bay,” said by
Ibn Sā‘īd (1274) to be the largest of the Zābaj domain. 32
Here the ruler levied taxes on ships sailing to China according
to the ‘Ajā’ib al-Hind (ca. 1000). 33 Similarly, Chinese refer-
ences to Śrīvijaya (Shih-li-fo-shih) changed to San-fo-ch’i around
A.D. 900. 34 Śrīvijaya (Sribuza, San-fo-ch’i) from the mid-tenth
century onward was thus the realm of the king of Zābaj, the mah
ār āja, the Śailendra ruler of Śrīvijaya, whose authority encom-
passed the Strait of Malacca region, but not Java.
Although the southeastern Sumatra and northeastern Ja-
vanese coasts formed a single commercial and cultural unit,
histories of the Śrīvijaya and Javanese cultures have often ig-
nored the intense interactions between the Bangka Island and
Sunda Strait areas. 35 The early Arab geographers quite cor-
rectly referred to Zābaj as a single commercial unit—centered
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in southeastern Sumatra and encompasing Sumatra, Java, and
the lower Malay Peninsula—until the mid-tenth century, when
political transitions finally divided the old Zābaj realm into sep-
arate Śrīvijaya and Javanese commercial sectors. This transition
was marked not only by a new Arab focus on the Sumatra-
based Sribuza maritime state but also by new Chinese ref-
erences—dating from 960 when the Sung dynasty assumed
power—to San-fo-ch’i, the “three Vijayas” (“victories/cities of
victory”) of Palembang, Jambi, and Malāyu, none of which was
in Java. The toponym used earlier by the T’ang dynasty was
Shih-li-fo-shih (Śrīvijaya), which is less precise. 36
The Sung court records after 960 mention as well an era of
warfare between Śrīvijaya and the new rulers of the Javanese
state, by then based in eastern Java, which ended when the
south Indian Cōla̤s raided Śrīvijaya’s ports in 1024–1025, and
with the political consolidation of central and eastern Java
under the authority of the eastern Javanese monarch Airlangga
shortly thereafter. 37 In the ninth century eastern Javanese mer-
chants had begun to actively secure spices in the eastern In-
donesian archipelago, exchanging Javanese rice for spices and
sandalwood that were then transported to Śrīvijaya’s ports for
sale to foreign merchants. 38 By the tenth century, after the
demise of Śailendra authority in Java, eastern Java ports were
capable of acting independently of Śrīvijaya as commercial
centers and competently attracting international traders.
Śrīvijaya, envious and fearing that rulers in eastern Java would
establish a monopoly over the spice trade and that consequently
merchants would begin to bypass Śrīvijaya’s ports, launched an
attack on eastern Java’s new commercial centers around 925.
A Javanese inscription provides evidence of an attack by the
Malāyu-based army of Śrīvijaya in 928–929. This force landed in
eastern Java and advanced to the area near Ngañjuk, where it
was defeated by Pu Siṇḍok, the current Javanese mahā rāja. 39
The inscription depicted Pu Siṇḍok saving the Javanese realm
and laying the political foundation for future east Java-based
rulers. There then followed a century of conflict between Java
and Śrīvijaya, reported in Chinese sources, until the Cōla̤s elim-
inated Śrīvijaya’s economic competition. 40
The points of controversy within Casparis’ reconstruction
of Śailendra history are questions concerning his linear recon-
struction of Javanese history, whereby an unbroken succession
of monarchs ruled a singular and centralized Javanese state
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from Sañjaya’s 732 inscription onward. In a summary critique of
Casparis’ view of early Javanese history, one historian provided
the following insight:
I remain unconvinced that, in early Hindu Java, there was only
one sovereign at a time. The historical sources at our disposal
enable us to conclude that there were several independent rulers,
some of them enjoying the title of mahārāja and others without
that title. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the former
were supreme rulers because they were known as mahārājas. To
ascribe supreme authority to a ruler merely because the inscrip-
tions mention him as a mah ār āja and at the same time to deny
authority to others who may possibly also have had sovereignty
would be inconsistent with what is known of the social structure
of the Hindu-Javanese period at this early state of its history. 41
In support of this view, many historians now believe that
early Javanese history was marked by dynastic transitions and
various upheavals that promoted regional autonomy. In an at-
tempt to elevate their status above that of other regional chiefs
the Śailendra rulers introduced the mahār āja title to Java, a
foreign-sounding title to awe their subjects and one they hoped
could be transformed into power. Sacred ritual and especially
the encouragement of temple construction by Śailendra mon-
archs were also intended to maintain and enhance Śailendra
prestige and “reinforce the aura of divine majesty.” 42 Yet the
Śailendra and other Javanese monarchs were incapable of con-
solidating their authority over a significant portion of the Ja-
vanese political realm or transforming this realm into a wide-
spread state system dependent upon the political and economic
leadership of a monarch until at least the eleventh century,
when the center of Javanese authority was concentrated in
eastern Java. Rather, central Java-based monarchs of the
Śailendra era held hegemony over a limited area. 43
JAVANESE STATECRAFT IN THE ŚAILENDRA ERA
Early Javanese society was a self-sustaining socioeconomic
order characterized initially by village clusters called wanua,
which in reality were comprised of several hamlets that shared
a common market (pkĕn). Village clusters were inhabited by
“children of the wanua” (anak wanua) and ruled by a village
council of “elders” (tuha) or “fathers” (rāma) who were the
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greatest among equals. Significantly, central Javanese epig-
raphy suggests that the most important village cluster official
was the head of the local water board (hulair), denoting the im-
portance of wet-rice agriculture to the village economy. The de-
velopment of Javanese wet-rice agriculture in the central Java
plain required the cooperation of several communities that were
all dependent on the equitable sharing of water from the same
river or its tributaries. As a consequence supravillage units of
economic and social cooperation emerged, known as watĕk.
These were initially water management networks for the con-
struction, maintenance, and distribution of water within the re-
gional watĕk irrigation systems. 44
These regional irrigation networks serving several village
clusters were supervised by a regional chief (rakrayān). A watĕk
was thus a limited ecological region ruled by a chief who held
the power to dispose of the material (dĕrwaya haji) and labor
(bwat haji) resources of the watĕk in various types of redistri-
butions to his followers. The rakrayān ruled from the village
cluster from which he originated and normally emerged from
among the village cluster elders, initially functioning as an
“elder brother” among the regional (watĕk) population. 45 The
rakrayān’s potential for power, like that among other early
Southeast Asia political elites, depended on his personal ini-
tiative and his ability to generate prosperity from his regional
resource base and to gain the cooperation of his subordinate
village populations and their elders. A successful rakrayān
ruling a prosperous watĕk region might in turn bring other
rakrayān and their subordinate village cluster networks into a
confederation under his authority, which had the effect of ele-
vating such a rakrayān’s status to that of a “king” (rāja). His
own village cluster thereby became a royal court (k raton) from
which he ruled.
The central Java rice plain thus came to be composed of
village clusters and their peasant producers, who were gov-
erned by village elders, who themselves came under the au-
thority of rakrayān, who ruled watĕk, initially units of suprav-
illage water management. Rājas were regional chiefs who con-
solidated prosperous watĕk regional networks under their rule
and were essentially equal in status to other rakrayān who were
successfully constructing alliance networks in the Śailendra era
and who may or may not have claimed “mahārāja” status. What
seems to have distinguished the rāja from his fellow rakray ān
was the r āja’s ability to establish his elite status via his and
his subordinates’ patronage of religion. Court-based officiants
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who functioned as both record-keepers and priests sanctified
and legitimized a r āja’s rule by conducting elaborate rituals.
46 Through their efforts ritual leadership became critical to the
r āja’s high status. However, it was intertwined with a suc-
cessful economic and administrative policy that generated the
surplus production from a r āja’s ricelands necessary to finance
the maintenance of his staff of priests/clerks, the construction
of royal temples, the performance of elaborate and impressive
ritual on the r āja’s behalf, and to perpetuate the flow of tradi-
tional economic redistributions to the r āja’s alliance network.
Pre-eleventh-century epigraphy reflects the concentration of
political power at the regional level. Although a Javanese ruler
claimed mah ār āja status and may have had other regional
chiefs in various ways recognizing his overlordship, his powers
were still ultimately derived from his possession of watĕk re-
gional rights over a network of wanua village clusters. Thus a
central Java-based mahār āja is best understood simply as an
important rakray ān regional chief. A ruler claiming mah ār āja
status, along with other important regional chiefs who did not
claim this lofty title, exercised the rights and obligations of a
rakray ān and little more.
The inscription currently considered definitive on early Ja-
vanese statecraft is the charter of Balitung, dated 907 and dis-
covered at Kedu in central Java, which enumerates the eight
ancestors of the monarch Śri Mahārāja Rakai Watukura dyaḥ
Balitung. All eight ancestors bear the rakray ān title, and all
except the first, Sañjaya, are also designated “mah ār āja” an
assigned status confirmed in all but two cases in inscriptions in-
dividually issued. 47 But in a 732 inscription Sañjaya claims to
be the rakray ān of the Mataram region who also holds the title
of ratu, a Javanese equivalent of the Indie mah ār āja title intro-
duced by the Śailendras. 48
Six inscriptions, dated 872–880, inscribed on twelve plates
found at Polengan near present-day Yogyakarta, which were
issued by the Mahārāja Rakrayān of Kayuwangi or by a rakray
ān subordinate to him, document the regionalized nature of
central Javanese statecraft. 49 The six inscriptions deal with
the construction and maintenance of the sanctuary of Gunung
Hyang (“The Mountain of the Gods”), a local or regional temple
complex reflecting the same religious ideology as the Hindu
temple complex Sañjaya founded on the Diëng Plateau in north
central Java. In these inscriptions the Rakrayān of Sirikan, Pu
Rakap, was rewarded by the Mahārāja Rakrayān of Kayuwangi
in 872 with a land grant. Pu Rakap reciprocated by building
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a temple (prasada) and assigning to it tribute rights due from
a part of lands “under his jurisdiction” (watĕk) made tax free
(sīma) by act of the Mahārāja in 875. 50 In 876 another rakray
ān, Pagar Wĕsi, also assigned income from lands “subject to
his jurisdiction” (watĕk) to this temple. The Rakrayān of Sirikan
in turn presented gifts to Pagar Wĕsi and his family in
877—seemingly Pagar Wĕsi and Pu Rakap were allies, con-
firming their relationship via periodic gift exchanges. Pu Rakap
at the same time assigned to the temple part of the income from
the land granted to him in 872 by the Mahārāja, but only did
so after first asking the permission of the elders of the village
clusters involved.
The fact that Pu Rakap did not have to similarly consult
the elders of the lands in the 875 sīma grant whose income he
initially assigned elucidates the rights of a rakray ān regional
chief. Rights to lands held as a watĕk region could be assigned
at the will of the rakrayān regional chief holding those rights.
For lands that were not watĕk lands, that is, lands not yet
subject to a regional chief or uncultivated or “free” lands, the
regional chief held only those rights assigned to him by
agreement of the local village cluster’s elders. As a further ex-
ample of the Rakrayān of Sirikan’s authority vis-à-vis the village
cluster elders, in 878 Pu Rakap again endowed income to his
temple after first purchasing the right to this income from
the village cluster elders; in 880 he assigned more land rights
after purchasing them and obtaining the approval of the village
cluster inhabitants as a whole. 51 It would thus appear that an
individual claiming mah ār āja status could assign the privilege
to negotiate rights with unattached wanua village clusters not
previously incorporated into a watĕk region to favored rakray
ān regional chiefs, but in such instances, as is well illustrated
by these ninth-century inscriptions, the authority of the mahār
āja, who was not viewed as the representative of the affected
local population, was limited. In effect the Rakrayān of Sirikan’s
right to extend his authority over lands adjacent to his watĕk
lands was being recognized by the Mahārāja of Kayuwangi, who
termed this recognition of what would probably have transpired
anyway a “land grant.” The right of Pu Rakap to assume au-
thority over these “free” lands was subject to the approval of the
local residents, represented by their elders, who in this instance
held the absolute administrative right to the land, but who
were offered the opportunity to become subject to the Rakrayān
of Sirikan for whatever benefits this new arrangement might
provide.
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
127
These inscriptions as well as others demonstrate three im-
portant facts about early central Javanese statecraft. First, the
relationships among rakrayān regional chiefs, including those
between those claiming mah ā r āja status and those who did
not, was marked by a limited confederation based upon peri-
odocally renewed reciprocal interactions. Thus the Rakrayān of
Kayuwangi was seemingly politically superior to the Rakrayān
of Sirikan, and the Rakrayān Pagar Wĕsi was the Rakrayān of
Sirikan’s ally; each of these relationships was maintained via
reciprocal gift exchanges. Second, these ninth-century inscrip-
tions reflect the consolidation of landholding at the regional
level under a rakrayān, a member of an indigenous landed
elite who was expanding his authority through the confeder-
ation of previously autonomous wanua village clusters with his
watĕk territorial base. Third, a critical role in this confederation
process was played by the pretext of a donation to a temple.
Under the authority and patronage of this rakrayān a regional
temple became a center providing unity beyond the wanua level
of socioeconomic integration. The transfer of land rights to this
temple were negotiated by the rakray ān—the inhabitants of the
local village clusters and their elders did not initiate transfers
of rights to local production to the Rakrayān’s regional temple
in the 878 and 880 inscriptions. In return for their promise
to pay tribute directly to the rakray ān’s temple the village
cluster elders and inhabitants received gifts. In these instances
transfers of gold, silver, and clothing were made to the affected
village cluster’s population as payment for the land rights be-
stowed upon the temple by the Rakrayān of Sirikan. 52
This gift exchange involving the Rakrayān of Sirikan’s
temple reinforced the image of Pu Rakap, his temple, or ideally
both, as the symbolic source of local prosperity; it served notice
that he had good connections with the gods of ritual. The
temple, emphasizing Indic religious symbols and integrating
preexistent local beliefs (adat) with Indian cosmology to ideo-
logically support the interests of the rakray ān, might also have
become the center for the rakray ān’s management of the lands
under his authority. 53 Rakray ān in general who already enjoyed
economic power derived from their watĕk rights—demonstrated
by their lavish gifts as recorded in Javanese inscriptions—were
beginning to concentrate some of their capital in temples. 54
Gifts bestowed upon temples, such as those of the Rakrayān of
Sirikan, generated merit for the regional chief and raised his
status as well as others’, including his mah ār āja superior and
his allied rakrayān, who participated in his endowments; gifts
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to a rakray ān’s temple offered the opportunity for the rakray
ān’s network of allies to demonstrate their generosity as well as
their continuing loyalty. The economic return from such endow-
ments was perhaps secondary to the “symbolic capital”—the re-
ligious, social, and political status—derived from the gifts to the
temple patronized by the rakray ān. 55
Interestingly, from the eighth century on central Javanese
mah ār ājas who emerged from among the rakray ān ranks do
not appear to have had economic capital superior to that of the
rakray ān who assumed subordinate status to the mah ār āja.
Rather, the mah ār āja’s elite status depended on the symbolic
capital bestowed by his ritual leadership and successful devel-
opment of temple networks. The temples of subordinate rakray
ān claimed legitimacy by serving as local representatives of the
mah ār āja’s central temples—as for instance the Rakrayān of
Sirikan’s temple looked to the “royal” temple complex on the
Diëng Plateau as the source of its sanctity. Thereby early Ja-
vanese mah ār ājas more than political or economic authority
exercised a “ritual sovereignty,” 56 sanctifying their mah ār āja
status by constructing impressive temple complexes and by pa-
tronizing “Brahman” priests who performed elaborate rituals
that endowed them with sacred powers and reinforced their
“aura of divine majesty.” 57
A mah ār āja, as a rakray ān regional chief competing with
other regional chiefs, needed to constantly confirm his role as
the ultimate source of his subjects’ prosperity. The sacred ritual
at the mah ār āja’s kraton helped to create this impression
as the court became the ceremonial center of the realm, the
source of religion, ritual art, and ritual literature. 58 These cul-
tural promotions were paid for through “the lord’s [monarch’s]
due” (dĕrwaya haji): in return for capable rule a rakrayān/
monarch received a percentage of local production and labor
services by the region’s inhabitants to which the monarch was
entitled (gawai haji) or “work done for the lord” (bwat haji). The
monarch held the further right to “favor” (anugraha) or assign
his right to a share of local production or labor to another indi-
vidual or to a temple; in the latter instance these rights of the
monarch became the “possession of the god” (dewa dĕrwaya)
or “work done for the god” (bwat hyang). Such rights could
also be temporarily assigned to accomplish the construction of
public works such as dams and bridges. 59 Effective assignment
of the monarch’s rights to local production and labor service
could stimulate production and the distribution of goods, while
also maintaining the interdependent relationship between the
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royal kraton and the autochthonous wanua village clusters via
the emphasis of the “gift” or “favor” implicit in the anugraha as-
signment that was the consequence of the monarch’s actions.
Monarchs thus benefited from converting tribute to the lord
(bwat haji) into tribute to the god (bwat hyang), whether re-
ceiving in return direct or indirect economic benefit or symbolic
capital as the initiator of the gift and chief patron of the deity.
60
The sanctity of Hindu rulers in central Java was initially con-
centrated in the temple complex on the Diëng Plateau, which
was originally a sacred “mountain of the gods,” a center for
the worship of indigenous deities that by the sixth century had
become the locus of a Javanese Śaivite cult. 61 The reign of the
rakrayān Sañjaya in the early eighth century was critical in the
development of the central Javanese statecraft described above.
Sañjaya’s 732 Caṅggal inscription provides information about
the royal Śaivite cult on the Diëng Plateau. 62
In this 732 inscription, Sañjaya erected a liṅga that he asso-
ciated with a mountain, praising Śiva, Brahma, and Viṣṇu and
invoking the immortals residing in the cosmic universe “who
used to inhabit an island (dvīpa) [bhūmi, a land] of great pros-
perity known as Yava [i.e., Ptolemy’s Yāvadvīpa].” But according
to the inscription the Yāvadvīpa land had disappeared; Sañjaya
was invoking the spirits of this former Yāvadvīpa realm. Sañjaya
claimed to be the current and intimate representative of the an-
cestors of Yāvadvīpa, as well as the patron of the sacred “field of
Śiva,” the Diëng Plateau temple complex. 63 Sañjaya thus estab-
lished his legitimacy on the sacred ground of the Diëng Plateau
by bringing together several earlier cults into a new, syncretic
Śaivite cult. 64 The 732 inscription notes that after Sañjaya had
subdued neighboring rāja, elevating his feet above their heads
and symbolizing his sovereignty in a traditional Javanese way,
all goodness prevailed, there was peace and prosperity, and
there was no fear among men:
Then there came forth (one) who was rich in good qualities …
who had his feet high above other kings of good family who were
standing on the ground. This king was named Śri Sañjaya, son
of the [rulers of Yavadvīpa]; he was glorious, honored by learned
men as a scholar in the subtleties of the śastras [Indian legal
texts that focus on the maintenance of harmony among the social
order], a ruler who had courage … and had … subdued many
neighboring monarchs (rājas), and his fame like the splendor of
the sun spread in all quarters. When he ruled the Earth [Java] who
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has the waves of the ocean for her girdle and mountains for her
breasts, … [“all goodness prevailed, there was peace and prosper-
ity, and there was no fear among men”]. 65
Chinese references to Java also indicate a transition in Ja-
vanese statecraft corresponding to Sañjaya’s early eighth-
century rule, eighth-century records showing a very different
state from that which existed in Java during the seventh century.
The Revised Annals of the T’ang described the Javanese state
the Chinese knew as Ho-ling, which corresponds to Sañjaya’s
realm in time and place, as “exceedingly rich”:
The ruler lives in the [capital] city of She-p’o [Java]…. His an-
cestor Chi-yen moved eastward to the city of P’o-lu-chia-ssu…. On
the borders [of Ho-ling] are twenty-eight small countries, all of
which owe allegiance to Ho-ling…. On top of the mountain there
is the province of Lang-pi-ya. The ruler frequently ascends this
mountain to gaze at the sea. 66
This was a Ho-ling state superior to the modest political entity
in central Java depicted in earlier Chinese accounts. 67 A new
state had been created, a state with an inland base, a mountain,
and “twenty-eight small countries” (i.e., wanua or watĕk) allied
to it.
The Śailendra era, like that of Sañjaya immediately prior,
was characterized by multiple regionally based power
centers—at least three are documented as being contemporary
with Śailendra rule and more may have existed but have not
left inscriptions—as revealed in the various inscriptions issued
between the eighth and tenth centuries by those who claimed
mahārāja status. Balitung’s 907 inscription, for instance, recon-
structed a line of non-Śailendra rulers who were descended
from Sañjaya. 68 While in the so-called Śailendra era in the
eighth and ninth centuries central political authority was ten-
tative and the structure of rule was in a constant state of
flux, from the tenth-century inscription of Balitung on a dif-
ferent Javanese state began to appear that demonstrated a
higher degree of unity than had been achieved previously, with
power clearly concentrated in a single kraton. In this new era
mahārāja status was consolidated and elevated as three kraton
at Janggala/Singasari, Kaḍiri, and Majapahit emerged consecu-
tively as the loci of economic as well as symbolic capital.
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THE TENTH CENTURY: POST-ŚAILENDRA ERA
TRANSITIONS
Balitung, Rakrayān of Watukura, issued at least three copies
of his version of the royal genealogy of Java in 907: two in
central Java were inscribed on bronze plates, while a third, in
eastern Java, was inscribed on stone. Thereafter the center of
authority in Java moved to eastern Java. However, evidence of a
high order Indic civilization in eastern Java predates this shift.
A Sanskrit inscription dated 760 records the dedication of a
temple to the sanctified Indian sage Agastya by Gajayāna, son
of King (narapati) Devasingha, who ruled from the pura (kraton)
of Kañjuruhan, a realm in the upper reaches of the Brantas
River, a fertile mountain plateau surrounded by four volcanoes.
69 Historians have argued that Gajayāna, a Śaivite patron of
Agastya, was descended from Sañjaya and had fled to eastern
Java sometime after 732 to escape from the Buddhist Śailendra
dynasty. 70 This argument is based on references in the Revised
Annals of the T’ang, as quoted above, that the ancestor of Chi-
yen, the new ruler of Ho-ling in the eighth century, had moved
eastward to the city of P’o-lu-chia-ssu in a previous age. His-
torians believe that this relative of the earlier Ho-ling rulers
returned to the She-p’o (Java) kraton to replace the previous
Śailendra rulers, restoring Śaivite worship as the basis of royal
legitimacy. 71
Other historians stress the indigenous development of a
kraton on the upper Brantas Plateau, an area well suited for
wet-rice cultivation. The favorable topography made irrigation
uncomplicated; the Hariñjing canal system in this area dates
to 804. The village elders (bhagawānta) themselves—and not a
ruler (raka or rāja) claiming rights over their villages—claim to
have initiated the construction of the local irrigation network.
72 In 891, a locally based and independent Rakrayān of Kañjuru-
han ruled from a regional base at Singhasari in the midst of
the plateau. 73 Historians believe that Balitung conquered this
rakrayān and the remainder of eastern Java at the beginning of
the tenth century, but the fact that most of Balitung’s inscrip-
tions were issued in central Java demonstrates that central Java
was his base. 74 It remained for Pu Siṇḍok, who reigned around
928, to establish a royal kraton in eastern Java and begin in ear-
nest the integration of central and eastern Java into a single
polity.
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Pu Siṇḍok, in an inscription dated 937, had reported hos-
tilities between Śrīvijaya and the Javanese realm. 75 The in-
scription eulogized Pu Siṇḍok for saving the eastern Java realm
from a 928–929 Śrīvijaya attack. In Casparis’ reconstruction of
Śailendra history, kraton based in eastern Java had by this time
become active and direct participants in international trade,
which unsettled the Śailendra rulers who by then occupied
the Śrīvijaya throne. They were concerned that eastern Java
would increasingly come to control the eastern archipelago
spice trade, with the result that the trade would bypass
Śrīvijaya’s ports. Thus the Malāyu-based Śrīvijaya army
mounted an expedition against eastern Java. After making some
progress toward the hinterland, they were defeated by Pu
Siṇḍok. Central Java had been ignored, according to this recon-
struction, because of the new importance of the Brantas River
Delta as a source of Javanese royal power and as the base for
interinsular trade. 76
There is evidence, however, that central Java was not re-
moved from the Javanese commercial developments of the tenth
century. Archaeological surveys in the late 1970s and early
1980s have turned up an abundance of Chinese ceramics that
date from the tenth century widely distributed from the north
coast of Java to the Ratubaka Plateau to the south. 77 The
presence of these foreign goods is evidence that international
trade was taking place. The coastal centers Pemalang, Kendal,
and Japara participated in this trade but were not linked to
their hinterlands via river networks like other areas of the
Southeast Asian island realm, including eastern Java. 78 Rather,
a major road network connected the Kedu Plain to the north
coast commercial centers via Parakan, and a branch road ran
via Wonosobo to the Diëng Plateau, then northwest to the neigh-
borhood of Pekalongan (see map 5). 79 This means that a central
Java-based ruler could have become involved in the interna-
tional trade despite the seeming isolation of his kraton in the
interior rice plain. Furthermore, a central Java base was less
vulnerable to an attack from outside Java than was the Brantas
River system in eastern Java. Thus the 928 Malāyu attack
against east Java shows that the interior of the Brantas region
could be easily reached by an army from overseas, not that
central Java was any less important as a participant in the inter-
national maritime trade. 80
In another reconstruction, the transfer of the Javanese
state’s base from central to eastern Java is seen as the result
of the drain on the central Javanese economy resulting from
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Caṇḍi Kidal, pre-Majapahit era, eastern Java.
the burst of temple construction that took place from the early
eighth through the early tenth centuries, as Javanese monarchs
used all the resources at their disposal to build temples. 81
However, most of this temple construction was done by regional
chiefs (r akr ayān) rather than by those claiming mah ār āja
status. Aside from the Diëng Plateau complex there were only
four major state-level temple complexes constructed in the
name of a central Javanese mah ā r āja: Caṇḍi Sewu, Caṇḍi
Plaosan, and Caṇḍi Loro Jonggrang at Prambanan, and the
Borobudur. While the Borobudur was constructed under
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Upper terrace, Borobudur.
Śailendra patronage for the worship of the deified ancestors of
the Śailendra dynasty, Loro Jonggrang and Sewu were built with
the cooperation of various members of the realm, notably sub-
ordinate r akr ayān, and Plaosan was built by the mahār āja and
his state administrators with the cooperation of local rakray ān,
each of whom contributed one or more buildings. 82 The labor
(bwat hyang) necessary for this temple construction does not
appear to have been a burden, and indeed agriculturalists were
not actively needed for the temple construction. Royal bonds-
men and professional artisan groups provided the continuous
labor for this construction—Brahmans or other religious spe-
cialists laid out temples, sculptors carved the statues and re-
liefs, bondsmen carried stones and performed the preparatory
shaping and chipping of stone, while local rakray ān provided
the labor force for the construction of specific buildings by
temporarily assigning their normal rights to labor (bwat haji).
83 Work in central Java’s paddy fields could, as now, be done
largely by women, freeing men to work on the temples. 84 Fur-
thermore, temple construction could have been of a seasonal
nature, corresponding to the slack periods of the growing cycle,
as work schedules were arranged so that they would not di-
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Borobudur, central Java.
minish local agricultural productivity. 85 One historian finds that
this “picture of a despotic ruler, forcing his subjects to build
splendid edifices to his own glory, resulting in economic col-
lapse [is] rather improbable.” 86
The Java historical tradition treats the transfer of power to
eastern Java as one among numerous cyclical shifts of Javanese
kraton due to various crises, such as invasion by an enemy
who desecrated the kraton, necessitating the abandonment of
the old royal compound in favor of another, the new kraton be-
coming the ruler’s source of a new and more powerful prowess.
In Javanese literature a Javanese kraton was normally shifted
on the average of every fourth generation prior to the four-
teenth century. 87 The events responsible for these transfers
were either the fabrications of ancient historians with the cycle
concept in mind or the consequence of belief in a cycle of
kingship based on the actual history as it was passed on by
oral historians. In the eyes of Java’s own historians, Java’s early
history was a product of the cycle concept: it was believed
that a catastrophe would take place if every fourth monarch
did not establish a new kraton, which resulted in the periodic
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Śiva temple, Caṇḍi Loro Jonggrang, Prambanan, central
Java.
movement of a mah ār āja’s palace compound, even within
the immediate area. Such moves were elaborate, requiring the
ritual creation of a new world order (maṇḍala) in which the
center of the cosmos was transferred to the new royal center
and there was a corresponding establishment of a new cos-
mic mountain via the construction of a new state temple as the
replica of Mount Meru, the center of the universe (see chap. 1).
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Caṇḍi Plaosan, Prambanan, with Ratubaka Plateau in background.
Internal as well as external evidence suggest that a major
crisis did occur in the first quarter of the tenth century and this
crisis, viewed by early Javanese historians as an omen that the
current order had come to an end, was the major reason for the
transfer of the Javanese royal kra ton to eastern Java. The early
tenth century was marked by incessant wars among various
rakrayān, as documented in the contemporary epigraphy. This
disorder could well have been viewed as provoking the wrath
of the gods, who responded with the major earthquake or vol-
canic eruption that one historian argues took place around 925,
when the royal kraton moved from central to eastern Java. This
historian postulated, based on his study of Javanese and foreign
literature, that a cataclysmic explosion of Mount Merapi pro-
duced ash rains and landslides not unlike those produced by the
eruption of Mount St. Helens in the United States in 1980. This
made the fertile Kedu and Mataram rice plains temporarily un-
inhabitable, and thus central Java was abandoned in favor of
eastern Java. 88 The Śrīvijaya raids of the early tenth century
were therefore directed at the new Javanese population center
and locus of royal power in eastern Java’s Brantas River basin.
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Sanggariti mountain “bathing” temple, eastern Java.
The economic consequences of the transfer of royal au-
thority to eastern Java had an impact on the evolution of Ja-
vanese statecraft. We have already seen that the resource bases
of Javanese rulers, whether they were of mahār āja or rakray
ān status, were essentially equal in central Java. Differences
in status were the results of political alliances, reinforced by
the construction of temple networks and the establishment of a
superior spiritual prowess. In the late ninth century, however,
there was a new concern among central Javanese monarchs
for their economic base. The reign of the Mahārāja Rakrayān
of Kayuwangi was especially critical to the development of the
kraton’s economic leadership, although there was still signif-
icant regional political autonomy during his reign. 89 The pro-
motion of agricultural development was apparently central to
the Rakrayān of Kayuwangi’s attempt to extend his royal re-
source base—bringing new lands into production by converting
woodlands to wet-rice fields (882) and requiring in inscriptions
dated 879 and 881 that unirrigated farmlands (tĕgal) should be
converted to wet-rice fields. 90
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The movement of the royal kraton to eastern Java provided
the opportunity for Javanese rulers to follow up on the Rakrayān
of Kayuwangi’s earlier initiatives and to secure a more ample
economic base in the east than was possible in central Java.
First, eastern Java’s agricultural development potential was
greater, partially due to the fact that the area was less popu-
lated and free of previously existing claims to watĕk authority
by rakrayān and other elites. In the post-tenth-century epig-
raphy of eastern Java the authority of a mahārāja over land is
more direct, and mahār ājas held rakray ān rights over a more
extensive personal economic base. Second, there was greater
access to the sea from the eastern Java hinterland. Eastern
Java had a wide coastal plain that could be developed as a
center of wet-rice production and the Brantas and Solo rivers
that drain this plain were both navigable, allowing good in-
ternal communication among regions and especially the flow
of local production from the highlands of the Brantas Plateau
to the coast and, vice-versa, goods from the coast to the hin-
terland. A base in the coastal plain or even in the upper Brantas
region made it possible for Javanese monarchs to participate
in and supervise international trade more directly than central
Java monarchs, who had been more isolated in the interior.
Eastern Java monarchs thus had new opportunities for the ac-
quisition of wealth, which in turn meant more economic redistri-
butions and temple constructions to reinforce the ruler’s power
and prestige. Unlike central Java monarchs who had to share
the financing of such activities—often undertaken primarily by
the mah ār āja’s allied rakray ān—eastern Java monarchs had
greater economic resources at their personal disposal for such
enterprises.
By the time Airlangga came to power early in the eleventh
century, not only had the status of the mah ār āja been elevated
but the possibilities for economic achievement implicit in the
new eastern Java order had been consolidated as well. This is
clear from a 1037 inscription of Airlangga reporting that the
Brantas River had burst its dikes, flooding many local villages
and making it difficult for trading vessels to reach the Javanese
monarch’s port. 91 The mah ār āja’s income was greatly dimin-
ished. Although previous efforts by individual communities to
control the Brantas had proven fruitless, the mah ār āja inter-
vened and had two dams constructed. Through this effort and
his continuing leadership, prosperity returned. 92
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Airlangga’s reign was critical to the evolution of a Javanese
state system. A 1041 stone inscription reported that a “great
catastrophe” took place in 1016, when Airlangga’s father-in-
law and predecessor to the throne Dharmawangśa Teguḥ was
killed along with his kraton elite by an enemy (Śrīvijaya), who
destroyed the kraton. The Cōla̤ raid of 1024–1025 eliminated
Śrīvijaya’s hold over central and western Java—Śrīvijaya’s au-
thority in central Java at that time was supported by alliances
with regionally based rakrayān, who relied on Śrīvijaya’s as-
sistance to maintain their autonomy from eastern Java-based
mahār ājas. Thereafter Airlangga began to “reestablish order,”
consolidating his authority over all of Java and Bali. He pro-
ceeded to modify the style of Javanese statecraft by placing
emphasis upon a localized Javanese culture rather than patron-
izing unadulterated Indian cultural forms as had been the case
during the era of central Java sovereignty. 93 Airlangga ascended
the throne as the victorious Śrī Mahārāja Rakrayān Halu, es-
tablishing a kraton at the unidentified capital Kahuripan in the
northeastern corner of east Java.
While Airlangga’s maritime interests are confirmed in his
1035 inscription, the same inscription also demonstrates the
evolution of royal authority in eastern Java. More complex tech-
niques of water management were necessary to develop sawah
cultivation in the lower Solo and Brantas river plains than were
required in central Java or even in the upper Brantas Plateau.
In the coastal river plain the flow of water had to be regulated;
otherwise the land was subject to periodic flooding. This had to
be accomplished by a complex regionwide water management
network if these lands were to be regularly productive, a degree
of management significantly greater than that required for the
functioning of the less technically sophisticated irrigation net-
works of earlier Javanese civilization. In eastern Java’s epi-
graphic records Airlangga and other eastern Java monarchs
provided the expertise and management necessary to facilitate
this development and were rewarded with the opportunity to
assume reciprocal rights over this land. Their personal powers
vis-à-vis those of previous rakray ān who served as managers of
watĕk regional irrigation networks in earlier times were consid-
erably enhanced.
Except for the fifth-century western Java inscription that
records Pūrṇavarman’s diversion of a river near present-day
Jakarta—and although wet-rice cultivation was extensively prac-
ticed in central Java well before the shift of Java’s royal au-
thority to eastern Java in the tenth century—the remaining
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epigraphic records of the building of early Java’s hydraulic
systems were issued in eastern Java. 94 These inscriptions are
related to the construction of major water management systems
that would bring the Brantas River and its tributaries under
control. The Brantas was a turbulent river with a propensity to
cause major destruction of wet-rice fields when it periodically
overflowed its banks, explaining why local efforts to protect
the fields from regular inundation appear to have been insuf-
ficient. Indeed, in each of the early centers of wet-rice culti-
vation in the Brantas River system there is a corresponding
post-ninth-century inscription that records not only the building
of a major component (e.g., dam or canal) of a regional hy-
draulic system but also an eastern Java monarch’s involvement
in this construction or in the continuing direction of local elders
or regional political authorities to guarantee that the hydraulic
system would be properly maintained or managed. 95
Inscriptions from the Hariñjing River system provide a
unique five-century history of a hydraulic system in a region
northwest of Kaḍiri in the upper Brantas basin. In 804 a dam
was built and a canal excavated under the direction of the
village elders—not a ruler claiming rights over their village
cluster—to connect the Hariñjing River to the larger Kanto
River, which flows from the Kelud volcanic mountain into the
Brantas at present-day Kertosono. In 921 the descendents of the
“elders” who had constructed the water management network
had their authority over the region’s hydraulic system con-
firmed by the mah ārāja Tuloḍong (919–921). 96 Then in 1350
a stone inscription recorded the restoration of the 804 dam
under the Majapahit monarchs, and, suggesting that the origi-
nal dam had been inadequate to control seasonal floodwaters,
states that the dam “was now so solidly reinforced that it would
last forever, for all the inhabitants of the valley east of Daha
[Kaḍiri].” 97 The Hariñjing inscriptions also record “canal cere-
monies” that were held every third day of the realmwide fes-
tival celebrating the annual harvest. 98 As well, there appears to
have been a temple constructed at the origin of the Hariñjing
River’s waters on Mount Kelud to commemorate the comple-
tion of the Hariñjing hydraulic system. 99 This temple and the
“canal rituals” may be compared to those at assorted “bathing
places” that are distributed throughout central and eastern
Java. At such places water flowed from the top of a sacred
mountain through a temple to a system of channels and basins
that carried water to the land below. While historians have gen-
erally stressed that such mountain bathing places were centers
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for the worship of ancestors and of mountain spirits, these likely
also assumed roles as centers for irrigation network worship
rites. 100 Through ritual such as this the ruler established a sym-
bolic communication with his realm’s rivers, one that was im-
portant to the general prosperity of the state’s economy. 101
THE ŚAILENDRA ERA IN OVERVIEW
The thesis that the transfer of the Javanese royal court to
eastern Java provided increased opportunities for the devel-
opment of the ruler’s economic base—and consequently en-
hanced the state’s political powers—offers a new insight into
the history of the Śailendra era. The Śailendras first emerged as
rulers of one among several important socioeconomic regional
units (watĕk) in central Java during the early seventh century.
The initial Śailendras were rakrayān, rulers of watĕk that in-
tegrated village clusters (wanua) participating in a regional ir-
rigation network. As rakray ān, these earliest Śailendra rulers
provided the administrative expertise necessary to maintain the
local irrigation system and, through their patronage of Indie
religion, constructed sacred cults to legitimize their regional
integration of wanua into watĕk. By the early seventh cen-
tury central Javanese rakrayān began to construct supra-watĕk
networks, drawing together several rakrayān into alliance net-
works. The alliance leader, the economic equal of his subor-
dinate rakrayān, came to his leadership role principally through
his own initiative and patronage of a superior cult of legitimacy.
He enjoyed a superior magical prowess and thus could sym-
bolically guarantee the prosperity of those who subordinated
themselves to his leadership. Subordinate rakrayān built local
temples that mirrored the cult ritual of the leading rakrayān’s
central temple complex. Eighth-century Javanese monarchs
were thus important as the source of a cultural integration of
the central Javanese realm. Their power was, however, limited.
As economic equals to their subordinate rakrayān, and because
the central Javanese wet-rice economy functioned best at the
local and regional levels and required minimal centralized eco-
nomic leadership by a higher authority, leading rakrayān had
few opportunities to politically dominate central Java’s wet-rice
economy except through their “sacred sovereignty.”
Around 732 Sañjaya, claiming status as the Rakrayān of
Mataram as well as ratu, a Javanese equivalent of the mah
ār āja title, installed the leading central Java Hindu cult at
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the Diëng temple complex, drawing legitimacy from indigenous
cults previously associated with the Diëng Plateau and inte-
grating them with a localized Śiva cult in which Sañjaya was
Śiva’s semidivine worldly patron. By the mid-eighth century the
Śailendra rakrayān had replaced Sañjaya’s line as the dom-
inant rakrayān among central Java’s rulers of watĕk regions.
The Śailendras called themselves mahārājas and introduced a
Buddhist cult that was concentrated in a new sacred center
located at the Śailendra watĕk base in the Kedu Plain. Their
central temple, the Borobudur, symbolized the Śailendra world
order; other newly constructed Buddhist temples in the Śailen-
dra realm were in various ways preparatory to the higher order
Buddhist theology depicted on the terraces of the Borobudur
cosmic mountain. The Borobudur sanctified Śailendra rule; as-
sociation with this “cosmic mountain” brought prosperity to
their realm. 102
Central Java became an internationally recognized pil-
grimage center and an acclaimed center for Buddhist schol-
arship. The visits of Chinese and Indian pilgrims were no doubt
used by Śailendra monarchs and their clerical staffs to validate
the Śailendra mahārājas’ special patronage of Buddhism and
their claims to subsequent magical prowess. The patronage of
Buddhism was also the Śailendras’ link with the Śrīvijaya mari-
time state, which in the eighth century held sovereignty over
the previously autonomous river outlets on the western Java
coast. The importance of this patronage of Buddhism by both
Śrīvijaya and the Śailendras as the symbolic source of each
realm’s sovereignty made possible a peaceful intellectual and
cultural exchange between the two states. International pil-
grims and no doubt Śrīvijaya- and Java-based scholars as well
moved between Śrīvijaya and Javanese Buddhist centers with
ease. The ninth century was the high point of this religious
and cultural exchange and can be depicted as an “era of good
feeling.” The cultural dialogue between these two states is re-
flected in the inspired Buddhist art of the period distributed
among the sites of Śrīvijaya’s authority in Sumatra and the
Malay Peninsula, as well as in central Java. This art was neither
of Śrīvijaya nor Javanese origin alone but was a product of
the interaction of both. This eighth and ninth century “good
feeling” between the Śailendra and Śrīvijaya realms explains
the reference to the Śailendras in the Nakhǫn Si Thammarat
inscription and adds credence to Casparis’ thesis that a mar-
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riage alliance took place between the Śailendra and Śrīvijaya
mahārājas, formalizing a political relationship that went beyond
the cultural relationship.
One reason that this peaceful interaction was possible was
the essentially complementary nature of the pre-tenth-century
economies of Śrīvijaya and central Java. While the Śailendra
realm in central Java was a productive, regionally integrated
wet-rice economy with limited supralocal economic linkages or
ambitions, Śrīvijaya’s economy and sovereignty depended pri-
marily on international trade and strong state interest in stim-
ulating the flow of local production from upriver hinterlands to
coastal entrepôts. Central Java inscriptions do not show great
concern on the part of Javanese mahārājas for economic inte-
gration or development of their watĕk until the tenth century.
Except for Pūrṇavarman in the fifth century, who did not create
a lasting state, only in the eleventh century do Java-based rulers
assume a conspicuous role as facilitators of international com-
merce.
Pre-eleventh-century Javanese monarchs appear to have
been quite willing to recognize Śrīvijaya’s supremacy in the
international commercial arena. Their lack of interest in in-
ternational trade is partially explained by the fact that they de-
rived sufficient income and assistance as traditional rakrayān
regional chiefs ruling wat ĕ k regions to accomplish their de-
sired ends, which were chiefly concerned with the construction
of temples that enhanced their ritual sovereignty. Royal am-
bition in Java thus dictated a preference for symbolic rather
than material ends.
As we have seen, however, archaeological evidence does
not support the conclusion that the central Java heartland was
ever economically isolated during the Śailendra era. Central
Java epigraphy records a developing hierarchical marketing
network that began with local periodic markets known as pkĕn.
In chapter 1 it was argued that the pkĕn marketing network
corresponded to the wanua village cluster, and thus supported
the integration of local peasant populations. Since pkĕn mar-
keting units were imbedded within a watĕk region, wat ĕk have
thus been understood to have been self-contained irrigation
and marketing units supporting the social, economic, and po-
litical cohesion of the unit as well as its autonomy vis-à-vis the
centralizing ambitions of mahārājas. Yet at the same time the
pkĕn markets provided the forum for the watĕk’s external com-
mercial contacts, the place where “foreign” merchants were
allowed to trade, and thus facilitated the flow of local pro-
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duction upward to supralocal market centers as well as re-
ceiving in return the downward flow of foreign goods for local
consumption from the supralocal markets. These goods were
then redistributed within the pkĕn to participating wanua pro-
ducers.
Such supralocal marketing links provided the basis for other
types of integration beyond the watĕk level, interaction that was
not inherent within the autonomous watĕk irrigation systems
of central Java, and to some extent must have facilitated the
attempts of rakrayān to develop the supra-watĕk focused re-
ligious networks that were so critical to their claim of sover-
eignty as Javanese mahārājas. It may therefore be proposed
that previously established ties beyond the watĕk and pkĕn mar-
kets to supralocal market centers became the basis for wat
ĕk participation in hierarchical political and religious networks
that concentrated ultimately in a mahārāja’s kraton and his
central temple complex. 103 The religious centers (temples) and
political centers (kraton) built by those who claimed mahārāja
status would thereby have integrated wat ĕk with major urban
centers and centers of consumption, connected by the road net-
works of central Java. These urban centers not only drew the
production of the wat ĕk, via the pk ĕn markets, but also created
a demand for foreign goods that was supplied by itinerant mer-
chants who connected these hinterland centers and their in-
digenous exchange networks to ports on Java’s northern coast.
While in the Śailendra era in central Java there is no definitive
evidence that mahārājas or other land-based elites significantly
directed the development of this marketing system, interna-
tional merchants were present in royal centers of power and pa-
tronized royal temples. 104 Airlangga’s 1037 inscription as well
as later inscriptions of eastern Java-based monarchs reflect far
greater and more regular interaction between rulers and mer-
chants at various levels of the state system than was true in
central Java and reveal that there was an explosion in the po-
tentials for meaningful economic cooperation.
The tenth and eleventh centuries brought demands for mon-
archs in eastern Java to take a larger role as economic leaders.
The development of the lower Brantas River basin wet-rice agri-
cultural system required their involvement and also gave them
more direct access to the northern coast. This meant extending
their economic and political sovereignty, and in the process
they became more than “ritual sovereigns” ruling from semi-
autonomous regional irrigation networks. Airlangga provides
an example of this transformation. After consolidating his eco-
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nomic base in the Brantas basin, he instigated the construction
of an effective irrigation system in the coastal plain, at the same
time using the flood control system to develop an anchorage ca-
pable of accommodating foreign ships. As a result, the entire
realm prospered. The emphasis on shared prosperity reflected
in Airlangga’s 1037 inscription resulting from the inspired eco-
nomic leadership of a mahārāja is quite different from the em-
phasis on the mahārāja’s spiritual sovereignty as the source of
prosperity that is stressed in earlier central Javanese inscrip-
tions. It denotes different concerns as well as different expec-
tations of a mahā rāja. The commercial leadership that eastern
Java ports began to exercise from the time of Airlangga’s reign
lasted until the Dutch effectively assumed authority over the Ja-
vanese coast in the seventeenth century (see chap. 9).
By the early tenth century, then, Javanese statecraft had
taken on a different character. It was the Śailendra era,
however, that provided the foundations for the flowering of
the Javanese economy and statecraft. The Śailendra legacy to
Java included the concept of the mahārāja and a further defi-
nition of Indic-style rule. The Śailendras demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of patronage to temples as the source of legitimacy
and symbolic capital and through the establishment of temple
networks began the process of political integration by drawing
subordinate rakra yān and their temples into confederations.
This stimulated the development of an integrated economic in-
frastructure whereby local products began to make their way,
through supralocal markets, to Java’s coastal ports.
While the political order that the eastern Java rulers estab-
lished clearly did not achieve the centralized status they often
claimed, there was significantly more power concentrated in
the royal court from the tenth century on than there had been
previously. Of most significance for this study, the increased
interest in the world outside Java and the capacity for action
among eastern Javanese monarchs dictated that Java in the
future would have a more positive relationship with the sea.
While the introspective central Javanese “states” were limited
in their potential for economic development—as too for political
centralization—once the royal court was firmly entrenched in
eastern Java, mahārājas began the integration of wet-rice plain
and riverine economic systems that led to a higher level of po-
litical integration.
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6
Temples as Economic
Centers in Early Cambodia
TemplesasEconomicCentersinEarlyCambodia
In chapter 3 it was proposed that Southeast Asia’s earlyhistory can be understood as being characterized by a series
of economic and social transformations. In tribal societies, a
reciprocal sharing of economic resources among family, com-
munity, and religious groups maintained the social unit. The de-
velopment of entrepreneurial activities brought social
imbalances, resulting in the transformation of the indigenous
economy and the emergence of political entities based on redis-
tributive exchange. Several early Southeast Asian societies
went beyond these primary levels of integration, developing or-
ganizational mechanisms for the acquisition, control, and dis-
posal of resources in pursuit of collective goals, most of which
were political. 1
The Khmer state that came to be based in Angkor—at its
height from the ninth through the thirteenth cen-
turies—demonstrates this transformation thesis. Especially
noteworthy is the development of Khmer temples as centers of
redistribution and the “continuous and massive movement of
products” from villages toward temples. 2 Khmer temples col-
lected and ultimately returned to the countryside a portion of
the local output, goods that represented a significant share of
the society’s total economic production. These goods were re-
distributed according to the wealth, power, or prestige of the
recipients. With the temple network as its base, Khmer society
went beyond primary redistributive integration and reached a
higher level of centralized economic control. The massive public
works projects directed by Khmer monarchs—highlighted by
the construction of Angkor Wat by Sūryavarman II in the early
twelfth century and the even more impressive Angkor Thorn
by Jayavarman VII at the end of the same century—required
a degree of economic and social integration high enough to
provide the economic resources necessary to fund and carry out
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these projects. They could not be supplied by a simple redistrib-
utive economy. To achieve these ends, goods and services from
the Khmer agrarian system had to be channelled into the hands
of those representatives of the state who were responsible for
the achievement of broadly political goals. They created an in-
tegrated state political system.
Although separate mechanisms of administration were de-
veloped in each temple, Khmer temples were never autonomous
from Khmer society and its stratified political order. At the
primary level, Khmer temples were subject to the authority of
a landed elite and were an instrument by which this elite re-
inforced its economic and political control. Temple staffs were
often members of elite families, and the staff of a local tem-
ple was frequently supervised by members of the local land-
holding elite who had entered the clergy or by priests who owed
their positions and their prosperity to continued patronage by
that elite. Normally, the consolidation into an estate of an elite’s
land rights in regional agrarian communities was legitimized by
the construction of a temple, with income from specified estate
lands designated to support the temple’s activities. Collections,
gifts, and offerings flowed to the temple as part of a cycle of
economic redistribution. They flowed outward in the form of
support for the performances of rituals and construction and in
so doing reinforced the prowess of the elite as patrons of the
temple deity and as the source of prosperity in the eyes of the
local inhabitants.
By the height of the Angkor era, local temples and their
cults had been integrated into a statewide network of temples
that was ultimately tied to the king’s central temple at the royal
capital. The priests from local temples participated in rituals at
major royal temples that were constructed at strategic points
throughout the state. They as well as their aristocratic patrons
derived legitimacy from this participation. In return local tem-
ples helped to finance the activities of the central temples by
assigning to them a portion of the annual collections. Under the
guise of religion, Khmer monarchs, who dominated the central
temples and their staffs, could draw part of the wealth of their
realm to the royal capital without creating an elaborate secular
bureaucracy to collect revenues in the state’s name.
This chapter summarizes research on early Cambodian
history and through Khmer temple inscriptions examines the
political and economic transformation of the Khmer state. From
these inscriptions we know that temples consistently served as
centers for the collection of economic resources and that the de-
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velopment of the temple network paralleled the development of
the Khmer state. 3 Yet temples were not centers for the redistrib-
ution of economic capital alone; they were equally important as
centers for the redistribution of “symbolic capital.” The temple
network came to integrate the Khmer realm in two ways. On the
one hand, temples linked disparate agricultural regions horizon-
tally into an ever-expanding economic network whose wealth
fueled the Khmer state. On the other hand, temples were the
locus for the manipulation of cultural symbols to vertically inte-
grate the higher and lower levels of the Khmer socioeconomy.
As institutions imbedded within the traditional socioeconomy,
temples assumed the leading role of “limiting and disguising the
play of economic interests and calculations.” 4
KHMER RELIGION
In early Cambodia Hindu forms of religion were introduced
in temples and temple ceremony to provide the basis for le-
gitimizing political (and by implication economic) integration.
As noted in chapter 1, local elites used the Śaivite religion to
reinforce indigenous symbols of authority relationships. Since
Śiva was referred to in Indian philosophy as the “Lord of the
Mountain,” proprietors of early Khmer temples were able to
connect the worship of Śiva to indigenous beliefs in the sanctity
of mountains, which were believed to be the abode of ancestor
spirits responsible for the prosperity of the living. Equally re-
sponsible for the success or failure of the living were various
local spirits who bestowed fertility on the land. Such fertility
spirits were represented in early Cambodia by a liṅga, a stone
or metal phallus usually inserted upright in a circular “vulva”
(yoni). Since Indian tradition associated the liṅga with Śiva, the
god of fertility, it was possible to link Śiva with these traditional
spirits as well. Thus worship of Śiva “fit” with indigenous tra-
ditions in which worship of mountains and phallic symbols was
necessary for the society’s success.
Worship of Śiva in Cambodia became formalized in the de-
varāja (“god-king”) cult of Jayavarman II (770–834), which was
based on a mountaintop that became the site of his realm’s
principal temple at the center of the royal capital. 5 In the
Brahmanical concept of the universe, a circular central con-
tinent, Jambudvīpa, was surrounded by seven oceans and conti-
nents. In the center of this continent was Mount Meru, around
which the sun, the moon, and the stars revolved. On its summit
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was the city of the gods, where Indra, the “Lord of Heaven,”
reigned. 6 On the slopes of Mount Meru was the lowest of par-
adises (Lokapāla) where the “Guardians of the World” resided.
Jayavarman II accordingly centered the cult of the devarāja at
his capital city of Hariharālaya, south of Angkor on the edge of
the Great Lake (Tonle Sap) in central Cambodia, on the summit
of “Mount Mahendra,” the Khmer equivalent of Mount Meru.
While building a Khmer state through a combination of con-
quest and the formation of a network of personal alliances,
Jayavarman II also consolidated the worship of regional deities
in his royal devarāja cult. 7 He incorporated the veneration for
mountains, subordinated local ancestor spirits to the worship
of Śiva, and then proclaimed himself Śiva’s representative on
earth. By associating himself with Śiva and the royal mountain,
Mount Mahendra, he symbolized his ability to guarantee the
flow of life-power from the spirit realm to his subjects. The
establishment of the devarāja cult tied Jayavarman spiritually
to his supporters, and the cult became an emblem of the uni-
fication of the Khmer realm. Henceforth, although there were
struggles for power within the royal domain, struggles for local
independence were denied religious sanction. 8 The Khmer
monarch from Jayavarman II’s time on could monopolize tem-
poral power within the realm, power that was justified by a
royal cult in which he alone could represent Śiva or any other
Indian deity.
The royal capital and its realm were thus under the pro-
tection of the “Lord of the Heavens,” and the king, his represen-
tative on earth, was the “Lord of the Mountains,” the guardian
of law and order, the protector of religion, the defender of his
land against external foes, and the sum of all authority on earth.
From the summit of Mount Mahendra (Mount Meru, the center
of the universe), the devarāja entered into a relationship with
the divine world. The royal temple was dedicated to the living
monarch—the god-king—and it became his mausoleum when he
died.
The blending of the indigenous cult of ancestor worship
with the Indic religious forms gave the monarch magic prop-
erties that conferred immortality upon him. Statues and liṅgas
of gods placed in the central and subordinate temples of the
Khmer realm were portraits and symbols of kings, their names a
fusion of monarchs’ personal titles with the names of the gods.
Jayavarman’s successor, Indravarman I (877–889), constructed
a stone temple to shelter the royal Śiva-liṅga Indreśvara in
which the devarāja resided, and he thus became associated with
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Indreśvara. 9 Although early Khmer kings such as Jayavarman II
and Indravarman I were identified with Śiva, in the early twelfth
century Sūryavarman II assumed an intimate relationship with
Viṣṇu and built Angkor Wat to honor this union. He became
the Viṣṇurāja rather than the devarāja. At the end of the same
century, Jayavarman VII was the Bodhisattva Lokeśvara who
decorated the faces of Angkor Thom’s Bayon temple complex
(see page 144) and was honored in a new Buddharāja royal cult.
Whether the devarāja, Viṣṇurāja, or Buddharāja, the Khmer
king was the intermediary between man and the divine powers,
the upholder of the established order (dharma) handed down by
his ancestors, the intercessor with the spirit world for the fer-
tility and prosperity of his realm. His capital city, with his royal
temple at its center, was constructed in the image of the uni-
verse interpreted in terms of the Indic Mount Meru. 10
The key religious elite of the Khmer realm was not com-
posed of legalistic Brahmans but devotional (bhakti) as-
cetics—“wayward Brahmans” who were not interested in Vedic
ritual sacrifices and preferred to stress Śiva’s grace rather than
the laws of orthodox Hinduism. 11 Gifts to Śiva or to any other
“Hindu” or local deity linked to him brought one merit and thus
hope of a superior death status. 12 A political overlord—a landed
aristocrat—not a Brahman priest as in Vedic India, was viewed
as having the foremost spiritual influence on his followers’ lives
and their hopes for salvation. The secular landed elites per-
formed customary ritual roles, including providing those of
lesser spiritual prowess (śakti) opportunities for enhancing
their prospects after death. Political allegiance, expressed by
personal loyalty, was based on indigenous attitudes about death
and spiritual prowess. As acts of homage, and in theory to
secure the favor of their overlord, subordinates offered presents
to temples or erected statues or liṅgas in honor of the god-
king. 13 Landed elites saw subordination to an overlord as pro-
viding further means of earning merit and satisfying their death
wishes. 14 Gifts to ritual priests (Brahmans) were rare. Merit
was earned by personal achievement rather than by honoring
“Brahmans.” Temple priests were not honored because of the
rituals they performed; they benefited instead through their
superintending of temples.
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JAYAVARMAN II’S DEVARĀJA CULT
Jayavarman’s devarāja cult was a watershed in the history of
Khmer religion. Even though Khmer kings after Jayavarman II
began to formulate their own royal cults, they continued to
venerate his devar āja cult. Although his devar āja cult was
like other personal liṅga cults that promoted a chief’s prowess,
Jayavarman’s spectacular achievements guaranteed his status
as an ancestor of note among his Khmer “kin” who followed
him. Early Khmer epigraphy glorified rulers in terms of their
personal achievements and spiritual prowess, which rewarded
their subjects with prosperity in this life and the next.
Jayavarman’s reign established new criteria for accom-
plishment; his military victories were so impressive that simply
honoring his spiritual capabilities was insufficient to praise his
powers as king. Jayavarman’s religious rites not only consol-
idated Khmer ritual in a statewide cult, they also used a new
sacred vocabulary to proclaim the king’s glory and abilities. 15
After Jayavarman’s reign, succession disputes ended with the
victor reaffirming the ancestral claim to lead the Khmer people
in his generation in return for the loyalty of his subjects. 16
The most important aspect of Jayavarman’s devarāja cult
was his incorporation of local deities—and in particular the in-
digenous ancestor worship—into the state’s religious ceremony.
While earlier Khmer monarchs had to some extent brought to-
gether the local and “Hindu” gods, they had always been wor-
shiped separately, and indigenous deities were never placed
in “Hindu” temples. In the indigenous belief system of Cam-
bodia, death was held to represent the passage of the spirit
into the realm of the ancestors. Death rites ushered the spirit
into this world of the dead. In return for faithful worship of the
dead, the ancestors granted a certain life-power to the living.
Additionally, indigenous deities were traditionally important as
“protectors” of the local realm; a chief was the repository of
their prowess and could activate their powers on his subjects’
behalf. To proclaim their legitimacy, Jayavarman II and subse-
quent Khmer monarchs merged the worship of Indic deities
such as Śiva, Viṣṇu, and the Buddha with the indigenous deities
and ancestor spirits, and even installed the local deities in the
king’s “Hindu” temples to represent his control over the tra-
ditional protective forces of his realm. True to this tradition,
Angkor Thom’s Bayon focused on the central shrine, which was
dedicated to the Buddhist Bodhisattva Lokeśvara, but the Bod-
hisattva (i.e., Jayavarman VII) was surrounded by images or
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Śiva and Viṣṇu, as well as those of important indigenous pro-
tector deities. Beginning with the reign of Jayavarman II, Khmer
monarchs did not build temples or invoke the cults of past mon-
archs to honor their ancestors but to install the traditional pro-
tectors of their ancestors and past kings in their central temple
compound. 17 The devarāja cult and the Khmer royal cults that
were initiated in its image exalted but did not deify the reigning
monarch. At their deaths, however, Khmer monarchs were ele-
vated to divine status so that their superhuman powers might
be drawn upon by the living. Jayavarman II is the first example
of the deification of a Khmer monarch at his death. 18 He was
known posthumously as Parameśvara.
The significance of this synthesis is also shown in the oath of
loyalty that was sworn to Sūryavarman I in 1011 by his admin-
istrative corps (tamrvāc). 19 In this instance these subordinates
of the state requested that, in return for their faithful service,
the king first maintain their family ancestral cults and then,
secondly, that he perpetuate their families. Through proper ob-
servance of the rites calling forth the protective forces of the an-
cestors, their kin would be guaranteed the resources necessary
for a prosperious life. 20 The oath ends: “May we obtain the rec-
ompense of people devoted to our masters in this and the other
world.” The emphasis of this oath was not on Sūryavarman’s
genealogical legitimacy, nor his divinity, but on the concerns of
the present: that the monarch guarantee the prosperity of the
Khmer people and secure for them a superior death status.
This emphasis on the prosperity of the present is also the
theme of the bas relief of Angkor Wat, which shows the de-
parture from the “present” and deteriorating age—the kali yuga
in Indian cosmology—and a return to the first or golden age
(kṛta yuga) that was represented by Sūryavarman II’s reign
(1113–1150). 21 According to this depiction, the new age began
when Sūryavarman II seized the throne from two “kings” (one of
whom was an elderly uncle), put down a civil war, and went on
to regenerate a maṇḍala (i.e., he restored order in the world).
True to the literary battle scenes of the Kurukṣetra, the episode
of the Indian Mahābhārata epic on which the Angkor Wat relief
is based, the king’s dead enemies and their supporters de-
scended into the underworld to be judged by Sūryavarman, who
assumed the role of Yama (Viṣṇu), the judge of the dead. 22 After
the dust of the battle had settled, Viṣṇu churned the creative
ambrosia of the universe to sustain the golden age.
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Central tower, Angkor Wat. Photo by Charles Mark.
Indian symbols were used in this bas relief to make a Khmer
statement; the use of the “Hindu” conventions of Viṣṇu and the
“golden age” drew attention to Khmer tradition. Sūryavarman’s
identification with Yama, the judge of the dead, was consistent
with Khmer views of a sovereign’s powers, where obedience
or disobedience to one’s overlord had consequences in the af-
terlife. While in Indian tradition the Kuruk ṣetra battle initiated
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Angkor Wat, Cambodia. Photo by Charles Mark.
the last age of the world (the kali yuga age of the present), at
Angkor Wat the battle episode was used instead to introduce
the first, or golden age (the kṛta yuga), which was still said to
exist. The message of the Angkor Wat bas relief was that it was
a privilege to live in Sūryavarman’s generation when internal
peace was restored and the Khmer military marched to the edge
of the Southeast Asian mainland. 23 As in the oath of loyalty to
Sūryavarman I, the emphasis of Angkor Wat’s bas relief was
not on royal genealogy but on the present golden age that had
been initiated by Sūryavarman II’s personal accomplishments,
which had fulfilled the Khmer people’s expectations of one who
claimed to be their monarch.
The depiction of Viṣṇu churning the creative ambrosia also
supported the traditional conviction that the Khmer monarch
was the source of his subjects’ economic welfare. In the Angkor
era the king was the creator and director of public works that
were designed to ensure prosperity—in particular the Khmer
hydraulic system, a network of waterworks that irrigated some
twelve and a half million acres, constructed around the Khmer
capital at Angkor and in a number of regional domains under
Khmer authority. Without this hydraulic system, the water
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Ornamental apsara, divine dancers who lavish the joys of paradise
upon the elect. Angkor Wat; photo by Charles Mark.
supply was irregular and thus limited agricultural productivity.
The nāga, the water spirit, was widely portrayed in Khmer art,
and was a central figure of popular religion. 24 Chou Ta-kuan,
Mongol envoy to Angkor in 1296, reported that the Khmer
people believed that their ruler slept with a nāga princess, and
that the result of their union was the country’s prosperity. 25
This report implies that the Khmer monarch enjoyed a ritual re-
lationship with the spirit of the soil that released the fertility
that guaranteed the earth’s productivity. In this same tradition
Yaśovarman I constructed an artificial lake (baray), Yaśod-
harataṭāka, northeast of his new capital city of Yaśodharapura
(Angkor) at the end of the ninth century. According to the in-
scription reporting this event, the king wished to “facilitate
an outlet for his abundant glory in the direction of the un-
derworld.” 26 This underworld, also depicted as the place from
which Khmer monarchs judged the dead, was the abode of the
nāgas, the source of fertility. Another inscription notes that
Yaśovarman, “resplendent with glory,” made the lake “beautiful
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Angkor Thom, the Bayon. Photo by Charles Mark.
Relief of naval battle, Angkor Wat. Photo by Charles Mark.
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The Bayon, face of Lokeśvara. Photo by Charles Mark.
as the moon to refresh human beings.” 27 Yet another inscription
equates Yaśovarman’s lake with the moon, which in Indian tra-
dition provided life-sustaining ambrosia. 28
A 1980 examination of the Angkor era water management
system demonstrates that Yaśovarman’s lake was not a critical
source of water for the Angkor region’s agricultural production
in a technical sense, though as the focus of Khmer religion it
was important symbolically in the Khmer system of “theocratic
hydraulics.” 29 Archaeologists have assumed that water seeped
through the dike base of Yaśovarman’s lake (which measured
four miles long by one mile wide) into collector channels outside
the dike, which subsequently carried the water to surround-
ing fields. 30 But studies conducted in the late 1970s found
that Angkor-era agriculture was based instead on bunded-field
transplanted wet-rice cultivation that allowed the planting of
approximately fifty million fields. 31 In the Angkor region flood
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waters would slowly rise from the lake to its tributaries, but
would rapidly recede after the rainy season. A network of dams
and bunds diverted and retained the receding floodwaters of
the Great Lake, the Tonle Sap, after the rainy season. The
Khmer lacked the technology to build large-scale dams that
could have allowed an integrated regionwide hydraulic system;
instead they depended on a network of small, simple earthworks
on minor streams to retard and spread floodwaters into clay-
based ponds, which stored the water for later use. 32 Archae-
ological evidence demonstrates that Angkor itself was not a
major center of this water management network but rather the
hill Phnom Kulen, which was located upriver from Yaśovarman’s
lake some fifty kilometers northwest of Angkor. Phnom Kulen
was near the headwaters of the Siem Reap (river), which flowed
from that area through Angkor to the Tonle Sap. A network of
small earth dams regulated the flow of water downstream from
Phnom Kulen to Angkor.
One striking feature of the water management network at
Phnom Kulen is that its dams, in addition to their effectiveness
in managing water, all were constructed running east-west and
north-south. Similarly, throughout the Angkor region Khmer
temples were constructed at the intersection of east-west and
north-south oriented moats and roads, which was done pur-
posely to project the image of the heaven on earth (maṇḍala)
that had been initiated by Khmer monarchs. 33 In addition to
being consistent with Indian and Khmer cosmological focus on
east-west and north-south, the water management network was
consecrated by the traditional symbols of fertility. A number of
liṅgas were carved in the rocky riverbed between Phnom Kulen
and Angkor, suggesting the sanctity of the water that flowed
from this mountain region to Angkor. 34 It is significant that
Jayavarman II consecrated his devarāja cult at Phnom Kulen,
which became the original “Mount Mahendra,” prior to the es-
tablishment of his new capital downriver at Hariharālaya and
the consecration of a new Mount Mahendra there. 35 The
original Mount Mahendra at Phnom Kulen was thus not only a
source of legitimacy for later monarchs who drew upon the pro-
tective powers of Jayavarman’s deva rāja cult but it was also
seen quite correctly as the source of the Angkor region’s water
supply, a fact that enhanced the possibilities for success for the
monarch’s subjects.
In these examples and others, Khmer inscriptions and ar-
chaeological evidence well reflect the growing religious sophis-
tication of Khmer society in the Angkor era. The sacred lan-
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guage and symbols of “Hindu” religious philosophy proclaimed
the king’s glory and abilities. The king was filled with life-sus-
taining energy derived from “Hindu” and indigenous deities, as
divinity flowed from the heavens or from the earth and per-
meated him, endowing him with the power to dispense “pu-
rifying ambrosia” or other less abstract forms of prosperity
upon his subjects. 36 While local deities and spirits protected
the monarch and his subjects, “Hindu” gods suffused Khmer
monarchs with their superior creative and purifying energy, en-
hancing further the prospects for prosperity in this and other
worlds. Having now an overview of the Khmer religious sys-
tem, let us step back and examine the economic and political
implications of this system’s evolution from pre-Angkorian to
Angkorian times.
TEMPLES AND KHMER STATECRAFT IN
PRE-ANGKORIAN KHMER SOCIETY
The principal concern of the leaders of early Khmer society,
as reflected in their epigraphy, was the establishment and en-
dowment of local temples, for which they accrued religious
merit and economic return. Key figures in the foundation of
these early temples were the consentual leaders of local pop-
ulations, rather than persons claiming royal authority. Inscrip-
tions recording such activities emphasize the religious prowess
rather than the physical might of the local elites who were
establishing the temples. Regional leaders held official titles;
the power of the landed elites was seemingly recognized by
those claiming the authority to rule over the Khmer people by
the bestowal of titles on these preexisting leaders, giving them
“new” authority as district officers in the state administration.
In such a way the landholders, the regional economic, social,
and political leadership, were integrated into an emerging state
system.
The actions taken by landed elites reported in nonroyal in-
scriptions involved the worship of local and “state” divinities
to “acquire merit” and to “exhibit devotion.” 37 Inscriptions cel-
ebrated the presentation of gifts made to the temple by local
leaders as part of their worship, and the wealth of those making
the gifts was stressed and donations were carefully calculated.
The landed elites who were responsible for this epigraphy em-
phasized the giving of gifts to temples as the foremost means to
ensure the prosperity of society. The literacy of the temples’ pa-
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trons was also acclaimed in the inscriptions recording gifts, as
if this literacy, in addition to the merit they acquired as temple
benefactors, legitimized the donors’ status as the leaders of so-
ciety. Gifts were normally provided not by single “officials” but
by several “officials,” members of the landed elites, who made
endowments as a group rather than as individuals, denoting
the existence of kinship-type bonds among the Khmer aristoc-
racy who may or may not have been blood relatives. The landed
elites’ patronage of temples as a group, thus, may be seen as in
some way formalizing their political alliances. Maybe one man
could not afford to make a gift by himself and took up a col-
lection from those who would benefit by the gift.
The Khmer aristocracy concentrated economic resources
under a temple’s administration, whether to acquire the merit
associated with such donations, to allow for a more efficient
management of an elite’s resources, or to avoid the revenue de-
mands of those political elites claiming rights to a share of the
local landed elite’s possessions. The foremost method of accom-
plishing this goal was to donate land to temples. Boundaries of
donated lands were clearly defined in the inscriptions, usually
associated with place names—perhaps a village, an estate, a
pond, or the riceland of another landholder. Past and present
holders of the assigned lands were enumerated, along with the
mode of the property’s acquisition and its price if acquired by
purchase; 38 the land’s productivity (rice yield) was even es-
timated. Inscriptions reporting assignments of populated land
gave the parcel’s current occupants and spelled out what por-
tion of the occupants’ production was assigned to the temple.
If the land was unpopulated a labor force was assigned the
task of working the newly donated lands. These laborers were
counted—males, females, females with children—and their
ethnic identity (e.g., Mon or Khmer) was recorded. 39
It is not uncommon to discover that the relatives of the
donors of such land endowments were members of the
priesthood servicing the local temple, and who became man-
agers of the assigned property. 40 In many instances the donor
family rather than the temple staff managed family land as-
signed to a temple, the temple receiving only a designated share
of the income. What was transferred by donors was not “own-
ership” of land but the right to income from land. As explained
in chapter 1, control over manpower and production rather than
ownership of land was critical for early Southeast Asian state
development. To Khmer elites “landholding” meant rights to the
production and labor service of the inhabitants of a parcel of
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land rather than absolute possession of it. In land donations
to temples, only certain rights over the land were transferred;
while inhabitants of the assigned land normally continued to
farm the land, the recipient temple collected much or all of their
production. Donated property was usually subject to a combi-
nation of claims, those of the temple receiving the donation as
well as those of the donor’s family, who retained certain per-
sonal rights to the property—for example, the right to a share of
the land’s production as well as administrative or political rights
over the inhabitants.
The economic diversity of local temples is reflected in the
variety of donations “for the service of the property” assigned:
domesticated animals, goats, buffaloes, cattle, coconut palms,
fruit trees, areca nuts, betel leaves, clothing, a threshing floor,
plus numerous individual objects are examples. 41 The type and
size of gifts to temples not only indicate economic specialization
within early Khmer society in order to create such wealth but
also the developing institutional capacity to utilize and admin-
ister this production. An economic system was emerging cen-
tered in the temple. The assignments of land and its production
by Khmer aristocrats turned temples into local storage centers;
goods deposited in temple storehouses were a source of social
and economic power, reinforcing the prestige of the temples’
primary benefactors, the local landed elites, who influenced
the redistribution of the temples’ stores in support of their fol-
lowers (including those working for the temple). Income from
the temple was utilized by a local elite to maintain a variety of
subordinates and was redistributed to expand the family’s social
and political power.
The concentration in temples of the authority to manage
local resources had a significant impact on the process of local
political integration. The implication of such centralization for
the economic control system is reflected in epigraphic refer-
ences to the “joining together for the enjoyment of the gods,”
whereby a single or several landholders shifted a share of the
income (goods and services) destined to one god or temple
to that of another or amalgamated the administration of one
temple’s lands with that of another. 42 This joining together
or joint usufruct is termed saṃparibhoga or miśrabhoga. 43
Through these actions a pattern of subordination of one local
deity to another as well as one local temple to another began
to emerge in Khmer society. Regional temple networks came to
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be sustained and controlled by a secular, landed elite who trans-
ferred income from their lands or donated material goods and
services to temples in the network.
During the Angkor era miśrabhoga arrangements were nor-
mally not undertaken without the approval of the king himself,
but in pre-Angkor society private landholders and not a royal
authority dominated the concentration of economic resources
and the amalgamation of temple administration. Prior to the
ninth century Khmer monarchs were concerned only with re-
cruiting as their allies the local landed elites who had initiated
such transfers and consolidations, confirming the transactions
rather than challenging them. This is illustrated in the records
of the reign of Jayavarman I (657–681) who was based in
northern Cambodia and northeastern Thailand (a region the
Chinese knew as “Chen-la”). Jayavarman actively extended his
authority over local communities and an important aspect of
this process was his attempt to bestow legitimacy upon local
temples. 44 His recognition of land income transfers is the topic
of seven of his eight surviving royal edicts. 45 Five involve
coparticipation and the consolidation of land management
under the authority of regional temples. 46 However, during
the reign of Jayavarman’s predecessor Īśānavarman I (616–ca.
635), such shifts of income rights and land management con-
solidations had been undertaken with neither the monarch’s
involvement or his favor; Īśānavarman was merely mentioned
as having reigned at the time they took place. 47 Īśānavarman
and other early Khmer monarchs seem not to have had suffi-
cient authority to manipulate the temples controlled by dom-
inant regional political elites, which were growing into centers
of regional religious and economic power. On the other hand,
Jayavarman I’s inscriptions show an attempt by the monarch
to dominate lands and temples, even though he clearly did
not have authority in land transactions. His royal edicts, al-
though expressing his concern for land, never claim that the
monarchy’s authority over land superseded that of the local
landed elites.
An inscription of the Angkor-era ruler Jayavarman IV
(928–941) also speaks of a Khmer monarch’s concern for land,
forbidding the careless grazing of buffaloes that might destroy
good riceland. 48 But in expressing this concern Jayavarman IV
still had to take an indirect approach and respect the land-
holding rights of the local elites. In this instance Jayavarman
ordered a royal official to notify the region’s political leader (a
khloñ viṣaya—a district chief) of his wishes; the local leader
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in turn decided to acknowledge the edict by permitting it to
be published in his district. Clearly it was the regional chief’s
option to acknowledge Jayavarman IV’s concern for the local
lands; it would appear that the chief equally had the option of
ignoring this expression of royal interest. Thus while Angkor-
era kings had a greater involvement in land transfers and as-
signments, early Khmer rulers could only express interest in the
transfers of income and management rights of lands that were
part of a regional elite’s domain. Even in later times the non-
royal private sector, dominated by landed regional elites, was
still quite strong and functional.
Jayavarman II, whose reign (770–834) marked the transition
from pre-Angkorian kingship, was particularly adept at forging
alliances with powerful regional families and their networks of
supporters. 49 The “commander of the royal army,” Mratāñ Śrī
Pṛthivīnarendra, was a regional chief from the eastern Khmer
realm who was allied to Jayavarman by marriage. 50 This kinship
linkage was critical to Jayavarman’s establishment of a terri-
torial base along the Mekong and drew to Jayavarman’s cause
two brothers, members of the Mratāñ’s personal alliance
network, whose ancestral home was Angkor Borei near the
old Funan capital of Vyādhapura at the edge of the Mekong
Delta. 51 At the insistence of the Mratāñ these brothers and
their family were rewarded for their service; Jayavarman as-
signed the family significant land grants in territories in an
area west of the Tonle Sap following its conquest by Mratāñ
Śrī Pṛthivīnarendra, the two brothers, and their allies for Jaya-
varman. 52 Not only did Jayavarman bestow income rights to this
land, but seemingly to perpetuate his alliance with this family
Jayavarman married one of the brothers’ sisters. 53 Mratāñ Śrī
Pṛthivīnarendra made requests of Jayavarman for redistribu-
tions to other of his followers and their families, who were
given land assignments, titles of honor, and posts at court. 54
It was Mratāñ Śrī Pṛthivīnarendra, a commander of troops and
the leader of an extensive regionally based alliance network,
rather than a temple priest who performed the critical Mount
Mahendra ceremony consecrating Jayavarman’s rule and initi-
ating the royal deva rāja cult. 55
Within the Khmer realm religious foundations (i.e., temples)
of powerful local families, who also held official titles in the
Khmer state’s administration, became a means of integrating
the land and its production into the structure of the state.
56 Family temples and their properties were subordinated to
central temples placed strategically throughout the realm. A
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portion of the production collected by private temples was chan-
nelled to the state temples. In return the priests of local family
temples received validation through periodic participation in
the rituals of the central temples. Local family cults also became
legitimized via their worship by Khmer monarchs and their sub-
ordination to royal cults. In these times temples were not just
religious centers but were important links in the state’s eco-
nomic and political network. Religion supplied an ideology and
a structure that could organize the populace to produce, tap
this production, and secure a region’s political subordination,
without the aid of separate, secular economic or political insti-
tutions.
TEMPLES AND TEMPLE NETWORKS IN THE
ANGKOR ERA
A regular order of royal priorities becomes discernable in the
activities of four great Angkor kings: Indravarman I (877–889),
Yaśovarman I (889–900), Rājendravarman II (944–968), and
Jayavarman VII (1181–1220). They first built public works,
usually large water reservoirs, or rehabilitated the capital, in-
cluding the hydraulic works. They also built ancestral temples
honoring their immediate predecessors. However, similar pat-
terns were not followed in the period between the reigns of
Rājendravarman II and Jayavarman VII (968–1181), leading his-
torians to describe the reigns that occurred during this time as
a “zone of imprecision.” 57 Yet within this zone of imprecision
the reigns of Jayavarman V (968–1001) and Sūryavarman I
(1002–1050) left a great abundance of inscriptions and along
with the reigns of Udayādityavarman II (1050–1066) and
Sūryavarman II (1113–1150) were eras of great royal con-
struction. During these four reigns the seeming “imprecision”
may well reflect the rapid growth of population in the Angkor
area and the resulting tensions in property relations as powerful
families at the court competed for economic re-
sources—especially land and labor—turmoil that ultimately ben-
efited the kings. 58
In the reign of Sūryavarman I, who is viewed in Khmer
history as a usurper, a process can be observed by which royal
favor enabled some elite families to prosper at the expense of
others. 59 Those families who especially prospered were those
who had willingly subordinated their own interests to the king’s
and were incorporated into the royal “bureaucratic” order. At
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least sixteen major inscriptions recording the histories of “bu-
reaucratic” families were issued between 1002, the beginning
of Sūryavarman’s reign, and 1080. In two inscriptions from
Sdok Kak Thom, for example, Sūryavarman I is assigning land
to officials of high rank for the purpose of increasing production
that could be shared by the officials and the state. 60 Royal in-
spectors were sent to the site of the land to be transferred to
validate the transaction, especially to determine if the land for
development was “unowned.” This did not mean that the land
was unoccupied but that another aristocratic family did not hold
rights over the land. Indeed one of the inscriptions notes that
villagers were already occupying the land and that the king
turned over rights to the production and labor of these well-es-
tablished agriculturalists to the family receiving official recog-
nition. One noticeable feature of this transaction was the role
of the local temple in the proposed development scheme, for
the villagers came under the administration (cāt camn āt) of a
family temple.
From this evidence we can see that Khmer monarchs in
the pre-Angkor era were clearly incapable of projecting this
degree of royal interest. Pre-Angkor monarchs could only rec-
ognize the possession of land rights, rather than having wide
powers of land assignment. In tenth-century Cambodian epig-
raphy, on the other hand, although the extent of the king’s au-
thority over religious establishments (temples) is unclear, the
king became more actively involved when the resources of two
or more temples were merged. The religious network forged
by Angkor’s kings insured that the landholding rights of Khmer
elites would remain fragmented; only those in royal favor could
consolidate or extend their property rights. This was done by
forbidding miśrabhoga, the joining of the rights to lands of
more than one local estate’s temple, without the approval of
the king himself. 61 As noted earlier, miśrabhoga consolidations,
initiated by regional elites, were common in pre-Angkorian so-
ciety as a means by which a regional elite established its power
base. Seemingly in the Angkor era miśrabhoga consolidations
were closely supervised in order to limit the growth of a re-
gional elite’s resources. Land-right transfers to temples not
involving the king still took place, but Angkor-era monarchs
were as a matter of course asked to sanction the transactions.
The Khmer monarch became the spiritual overlord of private
property rights, acting as a judge in disputes, but in most in-
stances only interfering when his participation (or that of his of-
ficials) was first solicited.
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The apparent key to the Khmer capital’s control over man-
power was its ability to form “lord-subordinate” alliances with
local leaders. Kings, acting from a center of authority, frag-
mented the power of potential enemies by formulating agree-
ments in which these prospective opponents became subordi-
nates of the state. Eleventh-century Khmer inscriptions show
that Sūryavarman I, whose rule marked a high point in Khmer
administrative development, was particularly adept at incorpo-
rating the chiefs of peoples on the outer edges of his personal
domain. After “conquering” a territory with his armies, he re-
cruited the local chiefs (elite) of the “defeated” peoples as dis-
trict chiefs (khloñ viṣaya) and their power status changed little.
62
It was during Sūryavarman I’s reign in 1011 that the king’s
administrative corps (tamrvāc) pledged an oath of allegiance,
swearing to become the local “eyes” of the king and pledging
to feed the capital with information about local activities. 63
Tamrvāc who pledged their loyalty to Sūryavarman were most
active in the districts of those appointed khloñ viṣaya and were
likely intended to serve as a reminder of the king’s authority
in the khloñ viṣayas’ regions and as a source of information in
regard to their loyalty. However, in later inscriptions tamrvāc
are specifically listed as being among those royal officials whose
rights in a temple domain were voided. This suggests either a
royal response to local pressure to remove royal officials, or it
may also suggest that tamrvāc became too closely allied to the
local khloñ viṣaya. The elimination of the tamrvāc’s local au-
thority—which in such instances could have been utilized to re-
inforce the local elite’s authority at royal expense—would thus
have had a negative impact on the power of the khloñ viṣaya.
Early historiography on classical Southeast Asia depicted
the Khmer state as a social pyramid with the king and his elite
sitting on top and little contact between them and the people
below. 64 In Sūryavarman I’s state, however, there seems to have
been a more intense relationship between the royal capital and
the local populations. The Khmer state protected regional in-
terests by incorporating the local status quo into its formal
structure instead of replacing the local landed elites with offi-
cials sent out from the capital. It further benefited local com-
munities by making its army available to guard the entire state,
maintaining order in the regions under state control and pro-
tecting the domain from invasion. Unlike pre-Angkorian inscrip-
tions, which denote that the presence of court officials at the
local level was small, Sūryavarman’s inscriptions indicate the
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physical presence of royal officials to administer the transfer of
land and to directly collect revenues due to the king, as well as
local visits made by the royal retinue (kaṃsteṅ). The kaṃsteṅ
was a mobile body of state administrators who traveled from
place to place within the realm, acting on disputes that could
not be solved locally or on affairs that were considered to be
within the state’s area of interest. 65 The kaṃ steṅ was thus a
periodic visible symbol of the king’s administration, while the
tamrvāc represented royal interest locally in the king’s absence.
Sūryavarman’s reign thus represents a critical phase in the
development of an integrated Khmer economic and political
order, with the Khmer temple network assuming a major role
in the developmental process. The prosperity of families in the
Khmer realm—a prosperity based upon control over the pro-
duction of land and manpower—came to depend more and more
upon royal favor. Interestingly, in the period immediately prior
to Sūryavarman’s initiatives, as the Khmer realm moved into
the theoretical “era of imprecision,” the percentage of royal
inscriptions actually decreased during Rājendravarman’s and
Jayavarman V’s reigns. The most impressive new temple con-
struction of that period was being attributed to named officials
and not viewed as being due to the king’s direct initiative. Al-
though the number of royal inscriptions relative to those of
his subordinates increased during Sūryavarman’s reign, temple
construction inaugurated by families subordinate to the king
continued to greatly outnumber that of the Khmer monarch.
Only in Jayavarman VII’s reign did the old pattern of royal in-
stitution of temple construction again overshadow the efforts
of Khmer “aristocrats.” 66 This new pattern does not demon-
strate weakness at the center; instead it came about through
the intensified integration of the regional aristocracy into the
Khmer state as “bureaucrats.” They were given official bureau-
cratic titles; their authority over land and manpower was rec-
ognized; and they were charged with responsibility for the ex-
pansion of the Khmer state’s economic base. Along with this
recognition, however, went the responsibility of sharing their
land’s production with the state. Land transferred to aristo-
cratic families was assigned specifically for the benefit of family
temples, whose staffs assumed responsibility for supervising its
development. Because they were subordinated to royal temples,
these family temples had to share the local production received
with the central temples and thus with the Khmer kings who
had made the original assignment.
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What developed through this pattern of land assignment and
development was a network of private and temple landholding
rights that was subject to the supervision of the monarchy.
Angkor’s society was elite-dominated. The king held the power
to maintain elites with patronage and at the same time needed
to prevent or neutralize the emergence of rival power centers.
Elites were linked to the royal court through the Khmer temple
network, if not through the bestowal of royal favor. Angkor’s
rulers were capable of reducing local power centers to subordi-
nate provinces of their government, but in the process of
awarding territorial grants or property right transfers they
were not able to dispense landholding rights at will. The landed
elites subject to the Khmer state did have independent rights
and were not subject to the constant demands of the state.
In the Angkor era, although local autonomy was as-
saulted—sometimes with a good deal of energy—the landed
aristocracy retained power. The Khmer state system was not
highly centralized or “bureaucratic,” nor was it a “feudal” order
in which the king assigned bureaucratic duties to a landed elite
who derived their landholding rights and status as a conse-
quence of the king’s favor. Records of land assignments to fam-
ilies and their temples during the Angkor era reflect constant
friction between the center and its periphery and provide evi-
dence about the nature of the relationship between the Khmer
monarch and his regional elites. 67
“Ownership” of land in the Khmer realm, as noted above,
was embedded in a system of rights held by related people. Ex-
clusive property rights imply the exclusion of various official
claims that would otherwise have force. The king in theory held
the final authority to validate landholding rights, although this
authority was not normally exercised—Sūryavarman I’s initia-
tives were unusual; the Khmer monarch thus assumed the role
of patron placing land under the “exclusive” control of favored
families and their temples. The aristocracy, drawing their liveli-
hood from the land, theoretically owed their continued pros-
perity directly or indirectly to royal favor.
Exercising the Khmer monarch’s theoretical land rights,
Sūryavarman I thus dealt directly with the lineage of Pas
Khmau, which he viewed as being constantly violent to his in-
terest, by dictating that henceforth their land was to be con-
trolled by the Khmer kings and the lineage’s resources merged
with those of the king’s temples. 68 However, this was not a total
seizure of land as aristocratic “rights” over the land were not
reassigned to another family. In the Sdok Kak Thom inscription
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cited above, a family of officials claimed land and rights over
land that was administered by a family temple. Rights over
this land had been granted by a series of kings—new settle-
ments (sruk), provisions, and manpower had been endowed to
equip the temple and to guarantee the growth of the community
around it. In the turmoil associated with Sūryavarman I’s rise to
the throne the landholding family had apparently sided against
Sūryavarman. Sūryavarman gained authority over areas where
the family held land but did not reassign all this family’s land
rights to his direct supporters. Instead, Sūryavarman forced a
temple priest related to the family—who was responsible for the
property’s assessment—to leave the temple staff and to marry
a younger sister of Sūryavarman’s first queen. Some of the
original family’s land rights were reassigned, and the family
was provided new rights over land in an area beyond the royal
core where it would seemingly be less a threat to royal in-
terests. The temple’s livelihood and as well the family’s pros-
perity were said to have been devastated in the disturbances
of the era. Thus Udayādityavarman II renewed Sūryavarman’s
endowment, allowing the new family of officials to clear land
overgrown by forest, consecrate temple statues, and build its
economic well-being. 69
In other instances Khmer monarchs imposed their authority
locally by forbidding temple staffs to employ people living on
and cultivating assigned land to also work temple lands, with-
drawing certain rights of local officials over land assigned to
temples, or favoring families loyal to the capital by exempting
their temple lands from the demand of the king’s officials. 70 In
these inscriptions Khmer monarchs reveal two purposes in their
dealings with the land endowments of local temples: on the one
hand they intervened where possible to limit the power of po-
tential rivals, and on the other hand they desired to enhance
the economic strength of their supporters. Avoiding possible
conflict, Khmer kings rarely intervened in local temple affairs
unless there was a direct threat to royal interests but adeptly
employed their right to assign their supporters’ income rights
to unsettled lands; rights to previously settled land left vacant
could be solicited from the king by a family, the land rights of
extinct lineages could be reassigned, and landholding rights to
unpopulated and overgrown land could be assigned. 71 Families
with existing estates were sometimes encouraged to resettle in
new territories. 72
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Several Khmer monarchs expressed concern that too much
of a family’s resources was committed to the financing of temple
affairs. In such cases they intervened to maintain the family’s
economic well-being. A family in one such instance had trans-
ferred so many of their income rights to support temple activ-
ities that the king, upon finding their resources insufficient to
maintain the family’s everyday requirements, ordered a halving
of royal assessments on the unassigned land they had re-
maining. 73 In another instance the rights on land transferred
to a temple were excluded from the revenue claims of various
officials but income rights not subject to revenue claims were
explicitly distinguished from other landholding rights of the
donor’s family, which provided the family’s subsistence and al-
lowed them to carry out government requirements. 74 Yet the
substantial transfers of land rights to family temples by Khmer
aristocrats and kings continued to be made, where family mem-
bers who were members of the temple staffs were assigned the
exclusive right of administering this land for the temples’ (and
their families’) benefit. 75
If land assigned to a temple was not to be administered by
the temple staff, the heads of the family or other members of the
lineage might act as property managers on the temple’s behalf,
utilizing income from the land to erect buildings, construct hy-
draulic projects, secure additional manpower to work the land,
or in general ensure that the land’s productivity would increase.
The dominant landholding families thus also benefited from the
development of temple land and the accumulation of wealth by
the family temple. This income was tapped for redistribution
by the family to its supporters in various forms. Family-temple
relationships were rarely questioned by Khmer monarchs, who
instead attempted to obtain a share of the wealth accumulated
locally by the right their central temples had to a percentage
of the local temples’ income. However, as will be discussed
below, income from local temples covered only a small per-
centage of the royal temples’ expenses and this revenue sharing
was more symbolic than critical to the financial well-being of
the state temples. In this light the revenue demands of central
temples upon local family temples would appear to have had
more political and social than economic importance. Royal in-
terest in local temples, aside from guaranteeing the financial
well-being of allies and limiting the economic resources of po-
tential rivals, was more concerned about a local temple’s ritual
being in harmony with that of royal temples than about making
a local temple economically subordinate to a royal temple.
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The existence of a hierarchical religious network gave the
monarchy control over ritual. Moreover, the elaborate royal
cults developed by Khmer monarchs helped to integrate subor-
dinates with the center. 76 The king’s powers were generated by
ceremony. The royal court, its activities, and its style recreated
a world of the gods—in theory a heaven on earth, in which
all greatness and glory were concentrated. By successfully ful-
filling his role as the hypothetical focus of all sanctity and
power, the king maintained the orderliness of the world. Subor-
dinate centers of power in the Khmer realm sought to imitate
the ritual of the royal court. 77 This ritual unity was more im-
portant than administrative control in maintaining the state’s
dominance over areas outside its core. Territorial unification
was not sufficient to sustain the realm. This came about through
the integration of indigenous folk traditions, symbols, and reli-
gious beliefs into a cult that was visibly concentrated in the
center.
The participation in the state’s rituals by those who wor-
shiped local spirits emphasized the subordination of local
deities and their temples to those of the state, thus enhancing
the king’s image as the holder of supreme spiritual power and
divine prowess among the living. There were thus political im-
plications to the institution of a centralized Khmer religious
network system. As temple collections flowed from local to
central temples and the integration of local and central cults
became concentrated in central temples, the Khmer temple
network facilitated the Khmer monarchy’s manipulation of the
regional landed aristocracy—themselves integrated into the
royal “bureaucratic” order by having official religious and
secular titles bestowed upon them—via the subordination of
these aristocrats’ local temples and cults to the monarchy’s
temples and cults.
Endowments to temples represented the mobilization, or-
ganization, and pooling of economic resources (capital, land,
labor, and so forth) to support portions of the overall ritual
process of the temple—for example, financing a single event in
the temple’s religious calendar of ritual, the construction of a
building in the temple compound, clothing for a temple image,
or a subsidy for a temple priest. While this redistribution of
economic capital was central to a temple’s existence, the mobi-
lization of “symbolic capital” was also critical, as temple endow-
ments generated one or more ritual contexts in which honors
rather than material returns were distributed to and received
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by donors. In this way economic capital was converted to cultu-
rally symbolic capital, honors that enhanced the stature of the
donor in the minds of his kin and clients. 78
An endowment permitted the entry and incorporation of
Khmer corporate units (e.g., families and kings) into a temple
as temple servants (priests, assistants, and so on) or as donors.
The donor represented a social, economic, or political unit; the
gift was a means by which the group or its leader could for-
mally and publicly receive recognition. While an endowment
supported the deity, and often returned some material ad-
vantage to the donor, perhaps more important were the sym-
bolic returns of the “donation.” 79 Rulers—regional elites or
Khmer monarchs—were patrons and protectors of temples, en-
suring the continuance of a temple’s services, resources, and
rules. They were not “rulers” of temples, however, but were
servants of the temple’s deity, human agents of the lord of the
temple—a stone image that could not arbitrate in the real world
on its own behalf—who protected and served the deity.
In the Indian tradition a ruler’s relationship with a temple
represented a symbolic division of sovereignty, whereby the
ruler became the greatest servant of the temple’s lord, his pa-
tronage of the temple’s deity sustaining and displaying his rule
over men. 80 Yet kings and others who claimed political au-
thority were subject to challenges by those who perceived their
shares and rights—a consequence of other individual or group
endowments to a temple—to be independently derived from the
sovereign deity. An example of the competition to claim the
shared sovereignty of the secular (the ruler) and the sacred (the
temple) is provided in the Khmer realm, where local elites and
kings each patronized temple deities. The issue of who was the
ultimate servant of the temple’s lord had political significance
and explains the attempts by Angkor’s monarchs to subordinate
the deities of local temples to those of royal temples or to inte-
grate these local deities into royal cults. 81
The returns from temple donations thus had both economic
as well as political implications and explain the significant flow
of economic resources from rulers at various levels to Khmer
temples. If an identification with a deity was as essential to
legitimize rule as seems to have been the case in the Khmer
realm, then instead of material returns upon one’s investment
symbolic returns must have been equally desirable, especially
to Khmer kings who never reaped substantial material benefit
from their assignment of local income rights to local temples.
The temple’s redistributive role was thus critical to issues of
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sovereignty in both the secular and sacred Khmer world order
and raises questions of how to equate economic and symbolic
capital, if it is really possible to quantify this conversion
process, and whether there was any attempt to achieve
“equity”—topics beyond the scope of the available historical
records. 82
FAMILY AND CENTRAL TEMPLES AS ECONOMIC
CENTERS
The extension of agriculture into previously uncultivated lands
and the construction of hydraulic networks to facilitate the
production of rice surpluses were central to the development
schemes of Khmer kings and their subordinates. 83 Khmer
temples at the state and regional levels fulfilled three economic
functions in the agricultural development process. First, they
were centers of investment (“banks”), the source of investment
capital and management; donors’ gifts were redistributed to
individuals or groups of peasant and bondsman cultivators as
capital investments (e.g., seeds, livestock, and land to be culti-
vated), which stimulated the agrarian sector. Second, temples
were repositories of technological information and knowledge,
directly or indirectly supporting scholars, astrologers, and ar-
tisans whose expertise and literacy could be drawn upon by cul-
tivators. Third, Khmer temples were supervisory agencies that
involved agricultural laborers in the development process, of-
fering sufficient returns to encourage them to remain on the
land. As noted earlier, lands assigned to temples for devel-
opment were often unpopulated, requiring the assignment of a
labor force with no previous claim to the land’s production. This
work force might be acquired by moving a population, possibly
war captives, from an area peripheral to the state’s core domain
to the lands to be developed. 84 Laborers assigned to develop
new lands were incorporated into the local economic and social
system by temples. Lone peasant cultivators could not likely
have borne the economic burdens of shortfalls in production as
they brought new land into production or implemented agricul-
tural technology associated with the construction of irrigation
projects. 85 Temples, however, could mobilize their storage and
redistributive mechanisms to meet the subsistence needs of the
laborers in such an event, drawing from material resources as-
signed for this purpose by kings or regional elites. Temples
were also in charge of agricultural development, engaging
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diggers, scribes, managers, and other specialists, combining
the technical expertise and human resources necessary for the
extension of agriculture. 86 Furthermore, temples offered la-
borers emotional security; workers sought not only personal
economic profit but also worked for the spiritual gain derived
from service to a temple’s deity. 87
A twelfth-century inscription from Trapaeng Don On illus-
trates the economic function of a “personal” or family temple.
This inscription is especially valuable because it contains par-
allel Old Khmer and Sanskrit texts that are identical in context
and permit full translation of both texts. 88 The founder of this
temple was an individual claiming to be a Brahman, who had
been the head herdsman for several kings. He had saved the
treasures paid to him for his distinguished service and pur-
chased lands, adding these lands to those he had acquired in
other ways, and then had built a temple to complete the foun-
dation of his estate:
(These kings) have favored me by placing various kinds of duties
upon me. On the riches that they deigned to present to me, and
for the treasures that have been amassed by the labor of my
people, I have built a temple, I have purchased “slaves,” I have
bought lands, I have purchased pawned lands, established bound-
aries, built fences, built walls, dug ditches and reservoirs.
Certain lands from this estate were assigned to support
the temple’s activities (see fig. 5). This assigned land was di-
vided into (1) a “common field of the cult” from which the
harvest went into the common granaries of the temple, (2) “the
field of the servants of the cult,” (3) “the field of the chief
priest” (purohita), and (4) the “sustenance fields” of the temple
kñuṁ (“bondsmen”), 89 agricultural laborers bound to serve the
temple. There were nineteen adult kñuṁ, nine men and ten
women, who worked the “common field of the cult” and the
“field of sustenance”; other kñuṁ are likely to have farmed the
additional fields that provided income for individual members of
the temple’s staff. 90 The nineteen kñuṁ were divided into two
groups; each labor team worked on the “field of the cult” half
of a lunar month. This division of the lunar month was a feature
of the Indian dating system adopted into the Khmer system. 91
Inscriptions recording the assignment of kñuṁ to temples usu-
ally gave two lists, equal or approximately equal in length, for
the bright and dark fortnights respectively. Temple treasuries,
repositories for food produced by the kñuṁ on the temple’s
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Figure 5
Temple of Trapaeng Don On: Redistribution of Temple Land
Production
(X = redistributed shares of land’s production)
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behalf, were normally constructed in pairs, one for the deposit
of each fortnight’s collected production. 92 Temple kñuṁ worked
for their own subsistence or for other masters with coexisting
claims on the land (e.g., the donor’s family) during periods free
of temple duties. 93
The persons in charge of the temple were relatives of the
founder:
All these rice fields, land, means of subsistence, and the slaves of
the gods belong to that one of my relatives who is a pandit and
possesses dharma. This relative will be the purohita of these gods
and let the slaves of these gods and the others be subjected to
him.
The property, however, was not free of limitations, for the in-
scription continues: “Let him [i.e., the purohita] not sell or give
away the slaves and the lands of these slaves….” Thus the land
assigned to support the temple and its staff was at the personal
disposal of the relatives of the temple’s founder, the Khmer aris-
tocrat and “bureaucrat,” but with certain restrictions.
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Lands assigned to family temples were in some cases di-
vided among the temple personnel or in other instances were
considered together as “fields of the cult”; the temple personnel
received shares of the “sacrificial rice” from the “fields of the
cult.” The temple kñuṁ “bondsmen” who worked the land had
“fields of sustenance” apportioned to them by the temple staff
for cultivation. They were allowed to retain a portion of their
production from their assigned land or were given a share of
the harvest from the produce collections belonging to the entire
temple. Family temple lands also had specific obligations to
the state, except when there was a royal decree relieving the
temple of these responsibilities. 94 Land assigned to temples was
free of direct revenue obligations to the state; especially for-
bidden were collections by royal officials who normally derived
a portion of their income from making assessments for revenue
demands. 95
In an inscription from Sūryavarman I’s reign (1028) a mil-
itary leader bearing a royal title received the land rights and
property of a royal enemy. 96 In developing his estate this in-
dividual consecrated a Śiva-liṅga and built a temple around it.
Thereupon the king required the payment of miśrabhoga duties
to a royal temple, although the inscription does not state the
amount and type of duty that was imposed. Thus the “family”
temple of this state “bureaucrat” was linked, as a criterion of
its establishment, to a central temple. The duties paid to the
royal temples in miśrabhoga linkages of smaller local temples
to larger royal temples were relatively small and were more
symbolic than economically critical to the central temple’s ex-
istence. For instance, a typical local temple in Sūryavarman I’s
reign received an income of 25,000 kilograms of hulled rice
annually but shared only 90 kilograms of it with a designated
central temple. 97
That only limited demands were placed on local family
temples is further conveyed in the accounts of the Khmer royal
temples. The Ta Prohm temple’s rice needs during the reign
of Jayavarman VII were said to be 6,589 kilograms daily for
cooking and 2,512,406 kilograms annually. 98 This rice fed the
temple’s personnel, who included 18 high priests, 2,740 offi-
ciants, and 2,632 assistants—among whom were 615 female
dancers, 439 learned hermits who lived in the temple monastery
(aśrama), and 970 students. A total of 12,640 people lived
within the walls of the temple compound. The sum of rice con-
sumed annually was thus 2,512,406 kilograms, of which only
366,800 kilograms were delivered by villages assigned to the
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temple and 42,157 kilograms from royal storehouses, together
covering less than one-fifth of the temple’s rice consumption.
99 Villages assigned to the central temple supplied rice through
their local family temples, but in comparison to the total amount
of production annually drawn by local temples from their as-
signed lands the annual payment of roughly 90 kilograms of
rice that these family temples were obliged to pay to a central
temple was insignificant. The central temple’s primary source
of income was the temple’s own assigned lands worked by kñuṁ
“bondsmen” at the behest of Khmer monarchs and state elites.
State-level central temples thus functioned economically in a
fashion similar to the local family temples, but on a much larger
scale.
Following the twelfth-century inscription of Jayavarman VII
in his Prah Khan temple complex describing the Khmer realm
as being composed of 306,372 subjects inhabiting 13,500 vil-
lages, one historian calculated that Khmer subjects were pro-
ducing roughly 38,000,000 kilograms of hulled rice annually for
20,000 gold, silver, bronze, and stone gods. 100 Each worker sup-
plied an average of 120 kilograms of hulled rice, or 60 percent
of his productivity. 101 The potential of the flow of production to
and the concentration of economic resources in Khmer temples
is demonstrated in the Ta Prohm inscription’s enumeration of
the temple’s stores, which contained a set of golden dishes
weighing more than 500 kilograms; a silver service of equal
size; 35 diamonds; 40,620 pearls; 4,540 gems; 523 parasols;
512 sets of silk bedding; 876 Chinese veils; a huge quantity of
rice, molasses, oil, seeds, wax, sandalwood, and camphor; and
2,387 changes of clothing for the adornment of temple statues.
THE KHMER TEMPLE NETWORK IN SOUTHEAST
ASIAN PERSPECTIVE
The Burmese state of Pagan, at its height from the eleventh
to the fourteenth centuries, also drew economic support from
a temple network. The economic basis of both the Khmer and
Pagan states was irrigated rice agriculture, and the ensuing
wealth from this production was concentrated in temples. In
the Khmer state, the temples were integrated into the state
structure—temple officiants were state functionaries subordi-
nate to secular powers, and conflict between the state and re-
ligious institutions did not arise. In Pagan, however, rights to
produce from the land shifted to the Buddhist monastic order
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(saṅgha) and away from secular political authority. Socioeco-
nomic power shifted from the Pagan monarchy to a rival, hi-
erarchical order dominated by monks. With an increasingly di-
minished control over the economic resources in their domain,
Burmese kings were forced to redefine the structure of the
Pagan state; a new state system was organized around a new
Theravāda Buddhist elite. 102
In contemporary Java, there was a pattern of royal temples
and local temples—the latter built under the patronage of local
rulers—similar to that in the Khmer realm. Although hundreds
of small, local temples existed, during the eighth through the
tenth centuries only four major temples—Caṇḍi Sewu, Caṇḍi
Plaosan, Caṇḍi Loro Jonggrang, and Caṇḍi Borobudur—as well
as the burial temples of kings were built. 103 The central temples
were built under the authority of Javanese rulers claiming
mahārāja status but with the cooperation and support of their
state authorities and regional chiefs. The temples helped inte-
grate the state; three levels of state offices and corresponding
temple networks emerged at the state, regional, and village
levels.
Javanese temples operated within a royal ritual policy that
was intended to consolidate and extend the state’s political au-
thority. 104 The primary level of competition for political power,
which was based on how much economic power one or the other
could control, with economic power being linked to temples,
was at the regional and state levels. The regional elites
(rakrayān) controlled regions (watĕk) and subordinate village
clusters (wanua), while mahārājas attempted to draw the
rakrayān and wanua under royal authority. One strategy em-
ployed by the kings was to urge rakrayāns to stage great fes-
tivals. For example a ruler would encourage the establishment
of a local family temple, usually assigning the land to the temple
as sīma, land free of royal revenue demands for taxes and ser-
vices, but would require the temple’s benefactor (a rakra yān)
to stage a great public festival in honor of the temple’s founda-
tion. 105 Such ceremonies and festivals were a means of redis-
tributing wealth that might otherwise have been used in ways
disruptive to society—and to the king’s sovereignty.
In the Singhasari-Majapahit era (eleventh through fifteenth
centuries) eastern Javanese monarchs generously donated land
to religious institutions throughout the countryside, freed
temples from numerous royal taxes and dues (dĕrwaya haji),
and also prohibited royal administrators and soldiers from en-
tering religious domains to make demands on their own behalf.
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106 The latter prohibition prevented collections by royal tax col-
lectors and officials who were also working for local magnates
and village authorities. Transfer of dĕrwaya haji thus often was
of more consequence in a negative sense to local officials, espe-
cially rakrayān regional chiefs, than the king. 107 The transfer of
the rights and property of local leaders to religious institutions
subtracted a portion of the wealth directly available to a local
magnate. A temple’s establishment under royal patronage also
provided an institutional foothold from which Javanese rulers
could attempt to extend their political and economic power in
the hinterland beyond the centers of royal power.
The redistributive functions of Khmer and Javanese temples
are summarized in figure 6. In this diagram the state’s re-
sources flow as donations or dues (gold, land, livestock, food,
and manpower) from villages and local and regional temples
to the state’s central temples. Returns may have been in kind,
utilizing the temple as a “bank.” In such instances the donor
received a material (i.e., “economic capital”) return upon his
“investment,” either directly via a prescribed rate of return or
indirectly through the greater productivity achieved regionally
as a consequence of the temple’s efficient management of land.
Returns might also have been “symbolic capital,” which con-
tributed to the legitimacy of various regional and state aris-
tocrats through the performance of temple ceremonies that
emphasized the donor’s superior spiritual prowess or through
the act of recording the gift in an inscription that perpetually
honored the donor’s piety.
Thus in Java, as in the Khmer realm, temples never became
independent of those in political authority, whether at the local
or state level. Rivalries and tensions developed, rather, among
local and state authorities whose power was based on their
control over manpower, landholdings, and temple adminis-
tration. There was never a shift of socioeconomic power away
from the secular authorities to a religious order. However, both
the Javanese and Khmer monarchs were limited by the very
nature of their policy of utilizing temples and temple networks
as a means of integrating their domains economically and po-
litically. Neither developed a centralized bureaucratic order, de-
pending instead upon assignments of land rights and impressive
titles to those in royal favor to elicit the loyalty of semiau-
tonomous regionally based landed elites. Yet neither appears
to have been lacking in the ability to finance major royal pro-
jects. In both realms, in the absence of a bureaucratic system
for collecting large amounts of income for the state’s treasury,
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Figure 6
Temple Hierarchy in Angkor and Java (Classical Era)
temples were viewed as important centers of economic accumu-
lation that could be tapped to finance the king’s patronage of
religion. Most conspicuous were temple construction and elab-
orate temple ceremonies and festivals, which provided a pretext
under which the state’s economic and social resources could
be mobilized to achieve the state’s political goals. These goals
mainly focused on the construction of a state-dominated po-
litical system replacing the previous system, which had been
built on a series of personal alliances. In both systems temples
assumed major roles in the process of political integration.
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Eleventh-Century
Commercial Developments
in Angkor and Champa
Eleventh-CenturyCommercialDevelopmentsinAngkorandChampa
The foregoing discussions of early Javanese and Cambodianhistory showed that the state elites in these river plain
states shared control of land and authority with a number of
other regional elites and institutions and developed a style of
statecraft based on the interdependence of political, economic,
and religious institutions. Since income derived from the land
was the major source of a ruler’s ability to function as a sov-
ereign, providing him with economic as well as symbolic capital
with which to construct alliance networks, a successful sov-
ereign in these states had to have either immense personal
charisma or greater economic resources at his personal dis-
posal than did would-be rulers from competing elites within his
realm.
A state system depending upon income from its agrarian
sector alone was limited in its development potential, however.
In a river plain state it was only when those claiming sover-
eignty became actively involved in external economic affairs
that the supreme powers of the state vis-à-vis competing elites
and institutions became secure. Economic leadership in the
commercial sphere provided a new source of income for Ja-
vanese and Khmer monarchs in the tenth and eleventh cen-
turies and enhanced each state’s political accomplishments.
However, during this same era the Angkor-based realm’s
neighbor, the Cham state on the lower Vietnamese coast, expe-
rienced the negative aspects of state participation in the inter-
national trade and the dangers posed when a state elite could
not control their coastal commercial centers. This chapter com-
pares the commercial activities of the Khmer and Cham states
to discern the impact of international trade upon each state’s
rulers and systems of statecraft.
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SŪRYAVARMAN I AND KHMER COMMERCIAL
EXPANSION
As noted in chapter 6, the water supply in the area surrounding
Angkor was irregular, such that natural conditions did not allow
for the expansion of its economic base and thus limited the
state’s potential for extending its political authority. An elab-
orate system of irrigation networks was constructed around the
Khmer capital at Angkor during the ninth through the eleventh
centuries. This network controlled the monsoon season flooding
of the Tonle Sap, stored monsoon rainwater for later use, and al-
lowed three and possibly even four rice harvests per year. To en-
courage the expansion of wet-rice cultivation royal assignments
(grants) of landed estates were made to favored elite families
as well as to the various temples of the realm. In some cases,
an agricultural work force was also supplied. These new estates
were then integrated both symbolically and physically into the
state’s economic system via the state’s ritual network. To ac-
quire and maintain their legitimacy, local temples, founded on
the new landed estates by elites subordinate to the state, were
required to relinquish a small percentage of their annual har-
vest to the state’s central temples. The ritual of these central
temples, so critical to the authority of monarchs, was chiefly
financed by the production of lands assigned and developed
under the supervision of the central temples’ administrators.
The Khmer state’s centralized temple complex thus related
land and population to the king’s capital. Temples controlled
land, the manpower on the land, and the land’s productive
output. Religious development was viewed as an aid to the
state’s economic development. The extension of cultivated land
in the tenth and eleventh centuries was thereby connected
to the endowment of religious establishments. Rich temples
formed economic bases that were tapped for construction pro-
jects, the development of irrigation, rice production, and so
on—projects that were healthy for the economy as a whole
and that the central government could not always cover finan-
cially. 1 The Khmer realm’s general economic prosperity is re-
flected in an urban development that took place in the tenth
and eleventh centuries. In the epigraphy of this period urban-
ization becomes noticeable in the reign of Rājendravarman II
(944–968) and continued under Jayavarman V (968–1001), but
reached its fullness under Sūryavarman I (1002–1050). For ex-
ample, the epigraphy mentions only twelve place names ending
in -pura, a Sanskrit term used to identify urban areas, during
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the reign of Jayavarman IV (928–942), twenty-four in the period
of Rājendravarman II, twenty under Jayavarman V, but forty-
seven—more than double those of his immediate precessors—in
the reign of Sūryavarman I. 2
Expansion of the state’s agricultural base allowed the dra-
matic political expansion of the Khmer state during the tenth
and eleventh centuries. By the first half of the eleventh century
Khmer monarchs had pushed their control to the west into the
Chao Phraya Valley of present-day Thailand and toward the
Isthmus of Kra of the Malay Peninsula. While tenth-century
Khmer political interests had been directed toward the eastern
portion of the realm, Sūryavarman I reversed this pattern with
his activities in the west. Sūryavarman’s extension of Khmer au-
thority into the Lopburi region had strong economic implica-
tions, for control of the lower Chao Phraya provided access to
international commerce at Tāmbraliṅga, the Chaiya-Suratthani
area of southern Thailand, giving the Khmers a more direct
contact with the international trade routes than had previously
been the case.
Merchants active in the Khmer domain shared in this pros-
perity and these accomplishments. There are over twenty spe-
cific references to merchant activity in the Khmer realm during
the period from the reign of Harṣavarman I (922) to that of
Harṣavarman III (1071). Most of these are concentrated in
Sūryavarman’s reign, as the new commercial opportunities
available from the extension of Khmer administrative control
into the region north of the Dangrek mountain range and into
the former Dvāravatī area of central Thailand in the west re-
sulted in the development of new commercial networks. Al-
though the Khmer state was an inland wet-rice state, anything
useful to the economic strength of the realm was encouraged.
3 Thus Sūryavarman himself took an active role in furthering
Khmer commercial aspirations.
Merchants are identified in Khmer epigraphy as khloñ jnvāl
and khlo ñ jnvāl vanik. Khlo ñ jnv āl vanik were itinerant, or
traveling merchants, while khloñ jnv āl were resident vendors.
4 In an inscription from Vāt Prāh Ēinkosei (968), a permanent
merchant quarter (travāṅ vanik) is even identified. 5 Most
Khmer epigraphic records provide examples of merchants who
personally served the state. For example, local merchants
(khloñ jnvāl) are shown serving in the retinue of a district
chief (khlo ñ viṣaya) during the reign of Udayādityavarman II
(1050–1066). 6 The nature of their services can be seen in an in-
scription from Bān Thāt Thong (922). When the district chief of
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
185
the area called Dharmapura was required to collect gold, silver,
and “precious objects of all sorts” to be offered to members of
the royal family, he obtained them from four or five merchants
who were residents of his district. 7 Similarly, the inscription
of Tuol Pei (992) is addressed to a noble (mrat ān) requesting
that he procure certain specified goods for the royal family
from the merchant Vāp China. 8 There are also two inscriptions
from Bantāy Prāv that refer to traveling merchants (khloñ jnv
āl vanik) who were members of the king’s retinue (kaṃsteṅ).
In the reign of Sūryavarman I (1012), a khloñ jnvāl vanik, iden-
tified as a member of the kaṃsteṅ, made a gift of a “slave” and
an “infant” to the local temple, as did other members of the
retinue. 9 In 1071, Harṣavarman III’s retinue included a vanik
of Gaāṅ Laṃpoh, who was “khloñ vanik” to the kaṃsteṅ. 10
Many royal endowments to temples were transacted using mer-
chants as intermediaries. For example, in a late tenth-century
inscription from Prāsāt Cār, several khloñ jnvāl directed the sale
of land rights for the royal retinue (kaṃ steṅ), for which the
buyer paid a quantity of money (silver and other precious ob-
jects) and clothing. 11
Although the inscriptions record surveys of commercial ac-
tivity by royal agents, there is no evidence of merchants being
heavily taxed. 12 A strong king such as Sūryavarman benefited
merchants’ activity by establishing standards of weights and
measures. 13 In return, Khmer kings expected certain services,
in reality a form of taxation, such as those performed by the
merchants who are named in the epigraphy. “Donations” to
temples by royal subordinates were encouraged by the Khmer
government. 14 Worship services at “central temples,” in which
the state took a particular interest, required that scented
woods, spices, gold and silver, and cloth goods be presented to
the deity. As indicated in the epigraphy, these were acquired
from merchants; in return the merchants were reimbursed with
land, buffaloes, rice, jewelry, and “slaves.” 15 This service rela-
tionship between merchants and kings is clarified in the late
tenth-century Prasat Cār inscription mentioned above, in which
the local population, in receiving their payment of silver, cloth
goods, and salt in exchange for land that they had been asked
to sell, declared to the royal judge who sanctioned the transac-
tions that “all these goods that we receive allow us to perform
our royal service. The rest serves for our sustenance.” 16 The
emphasis here is on service and not on pious “gift giving.”
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The Khmer state under Sūryavarman developed adminis-
trative mechanisms for the extraction of revenues. 17 The epi-
graphic evidence examined reflects the incorporation of mer-
chants into this revenue collection process. Most notably, mer-
chants became official members of the state’s administration,
which bestowed upon them official status as members of a dis-
trict chief’s retinue or that of the king himself. The inscriptions
focus upon the role of such merchants in facilitating the flow
of goods to the chief’s or king’s center of authority, or as in-
termediaries in endowments to temples and the source of items
used in the temple ceremonies so critical to royal legitimacy.
Further, merchants were essential as the suppliers of goods to
the king’s kaṃsteṅ when it made its periodic trek among the
subordinate centers of power within the Khmer domain. As in-
scriptions note, merchants were specifically designated as the
“official merchants to the kaṃsteṅ,” elevating their status and
paying them recognition for their service to their king. 18
Khmer kings utilized merchants’ special ability to mobilize
the distribution of various goods, acquired through the in-
digenous marketing networks that the merchants controlled.
The king was careful not to heavily tax merchants, although he
did conduct surveys of commercial activity within his domain.
Khmer kings thus came to recognize the benefits to be derived
from commerce—directly via the flow of goods to their court
and indirectly from the prosperity generated by the developing
marketing system that encouraged local production and in the
end, owing to the king’s right to receive set percentages of local
production, brought additional revenues to the treasury.
Sūryavarman appears to have been especially perceptive of
the contributions that commerce and the activities of merchants
made to the economic well-being of his state. The growth of
the Khmer commercial economy during Sūryavarman’s reign
can be examined by mapping the distribution of Khmer in-
scriptions that refer to marketing activity. The center of Khmer
administration during the tenth and eleventh centuries is indi-
cated by using Battambang, Sisophon, Prāḥ Vihār, Sambor, and
Kompong Cham as the points for the construction of a pentagon,
within which was the Khmer heartland. 19 Sūryavarman’s reign
brought the extension of Khmer administration west of this
“core” to the region of Lopburi, north of present-day Bangkok
in the Chao Phraya River basin, with the area between under
constant Khmer occupation. 20 Both archaeological and epi-
graphical evidence indicates that the initial western penetration
of the Khmers into the Lopburi region actually occurred in the
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reign of Rājendravarman II (944–968). 21 While information on
a continuing relationship between the Khmer core and Lopburi
is lacking, Sūryavarman I consolidated these earlier contacts
by incorporating this western territory into the administrative
structure of the Khmer empire. 22 Inscriptions from
Sūryavarman’s reign reflect the development of commercial
communication between the Khmer core and the Lopburi area
following this integration.
Mapping shows that commercial communication generally
followed the river systems of the Khmer domain (see map 6). 23
The main routes radiate out from the Khmer core around the
Tonle Sap. In the eastern part of the empire a major commercial
route followed the Sen River north to Prāḥ Vihār. 24 From this
point goods were carried across the Dangrek range to com-
mercial centers in the area of the Bān Thāt Thong inscription.
25 This zone also had contacts with the Mekong communication
network. In an inscription from Bān Thāt dating to the reign
of Jayavarman VI (1080–1107), reference is made to “barges”
that used the Mekong. 26 Vietnamese traders such as the Yvan
of Kaṃvaṅ Tadiṅ mentioned in a Phum Mīen inscription (987)
likely used a Mekong River route to enter Cambodia, coming
from Nghê-an through the Ha-trai pass and down the Mekong.
27 Nghê-an in turn had contact with commercial developments
of the Red River Delta and the Vietnamese capital at Thang-
long. An overland route then connected Bān Thāt to Prāsāt
Kantop, avoiding the Khong rapids south of Bān Thāt and al-
lowing a more direct access to the Khmer core. Sambor (Sam-
bupura), located below the Khong rapids, was connected more
to an eastern route than to a western route, serving as a center
for Khmer contact with hill peoples to the east who provided
“slaves,” deer skins, and forest products to the Khmers. 28
An east-west route north of the Dangrek mountain range
and following the Mun River system also developed in the time
of Sūryavarman. Inscriptions from the Phanom Wan and Phimai
areas that date to the last ten years of Sūryavarman’s reign
(1040–1050) indicate that “goods from China” as well as many
other commercial items were available in local markets. 29
Phimai, which ranks with Lopburi in its importance to the
Khmer, was the center for regional government in the
northwest. 30 The integration of both areas into the Khmer
empire was initiated by Sūryavarman and communication be-
tween the two western centers, made by overland transport,
was desirable for its economic as well as for its political po-
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tential. 31 The development of such communication and ex-
change networks aided Sūryavarman’s efforts to integrate these
outlying territories into his domain. 32
Epigraphy from the Battambang (Wāt Bāset) and Svay Chek
(Bantāy Pṛāv) areas shows commerce passing through this
region to Lopburi and the west. These two areas developed
into major commercial centers in the reign of Sūryavarman I,
indicating that this was the main route to the west from the
Khmer heartland. 33 Six of seven inscriptions of a commercial
nature from these two temples date to Sūryavarman’s reign.
The Wāt Bāset inscriptions record the bestowal of honors upon
the “chief of royal artisans,” who was responsible for the con-
struction of that temple under Sūryavarman. 34 At least eighteen
merchants are identified in two inscriptions dated 1042; there is
also reference to government supervision of weights and mea-
sures and recognition of royal agents who were surveying local
commercial activity. 35 Cloth goods, including silk, and spices
were among the goods being traded there. An inscription from
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Bantāy Pṛāv indicates the presence of a vanik from Wāt Bāset
(Gaāṅ Lampoh), reflecting regular commercial intercourse be-
tween these two centers. 36 Khloñ jnvāl vanik (“itinerant mer-
chants”) are very evident in Bantāy Pṛāv inscriptions, as op-
posed to khloñ jnvāl, indicating that Svay Chek was most im-
portant in these times as a center of communication and ex-
change between the Khmer core and its western provinces. 37
In the Wāt Bāset inscriptions khloñ jnv āl (“local merchants”)
dominate, reflecting Battambang’s importance as a local eco-
nomic center in an emerging hierarchical marketing network
(discussed below).
Such epigraphic evidence implies that during the reign of
Sūryavarman I western trade routes developed and assumed
an important economic position in the Khmer state. Although
inscriptions report the incorporation of Lopburi into the ad-
ministrative structure of the state during Sūryavarman’s reign,
they provide little information on the economic interchange
between Lopburi and the Khmer core. 38 However, control of
Lopburi gave the Khmers direct access to the trade routes of the
Isthmus of Kra. The Chaiya-Suratthani area, which was known
as “Tāmbraliṅga” (Tan-liu-mei) to the Chinese, 39 was an im-
portant commercial center. Mahāyāna Buddhist votive tablets
of similar style and dating to the tenth and eleventh centuries
have been found between Chaiya and Lopburi, indicating if not
a cultural contact between the two areas, then at least commu-
nication. 40
Archaeological remains from the area between the Isthmus
of Kra and Lopburi do not give much information on a com-
mercial relationship either. A Sūrya image found at Chaiya has
been associated with the eleventh-century style of the south
Indian Cōla̤ dynasty. 41 Other Cōla̤-style remains from the Wiang
Sa area on the isthmus date to the same tenth-and eleventh-
century period, and denote a transpeninsular route between
the west coast Malay Peninsula port of Takuapa and the Bay
of Bandon. 42 Archaeological research on the Malay Peninsula
demonstrates that Takuapa was the terminus of the Arab-
Persian trade until the mid-eleventh century, when it was
shifted to the Kedah coast. 43 “Kalāh,” as Middle Eastern
seamen called the Isthmus of Kra region of the western Malay
Peninsula coast, was the center of this Arab-Persian trade, while
Śrīvijaya-Palembang was the center of China trade. Kalāh’s
ability to handle the trade of two worlds was the source of
its importance. The Arabs knew it as a place where a large
amount of profit could be made, a fact reflected in the quantity
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and quality of artifacts found there. A Khmer presence in the
Suratthani area would have thus given the mainland com-
mercial networks further access to the international China mar-
ket as well as this Western market of Persian and Indian goods.
The presence of “goods from China” at Phanom Wan west of
Phimai in the Mun River system during Sūryavarman’s reign in-
dicates the commercial importance of these new “western con-
tacts.” 44 As the epigraphy shows, tenth-century “goods from
China” had entered the Khmer core from the eastern part of the
domain. In the Tuol Pei inscription, the royal family requested
that the district chief of an eastern commercial center acquire
goods from a China trader. 45 The activities of Vietnamese and
Cham merchants in the Khmer core are recorded in the eastern
Phum Mīen inscription of 987. 46 Other tenth-century inscrip-
tions of a commercial nature are concentrated in this eastern
direction, but those of Sūryavarman’s reign reverse this with
a western concentration. While this proliferation is a reflection
of Sūryavarman’s interest in extending Khmer administration
into the western provinces, there are strong commercial im-
plications as well. With Khmer control over Lopburi, “goods
from China” could now reach Phanom Wan via Tāmbraliṅga and
Lopburi using the Chao Phraya River system, rather than from
the east. Such a direct interaction with the international routes
no doubt was viewed as an asset to the internal development of
the Khmer economy in Sūryavarman’s time.
Thus Sūryavarman attempted to establish regular com-
mercial intercourse with the south Indian Cōla̤ state and the
Lý state that was based in the Red River Delta of Vietnam.
47 Sūryavarman appears to have been especially intent upon
establishing a flow of trade from south Indian ports to the
Southeast Asian mainland via the Isthmus of Kra and Suratthani
area. Goods could then have been transported north from the
isthmus to Lopburi, where they would have followed the two ex-
change networks that evolved in Sūryavarman’s reign. The first
entered the royal heartland in the Sisophon area; the second
encompassed the region north of the Dangrek mountain range,
with a link to the core at Prāḥ Vihār and a possible connection to
the Mekong River in the east (see map 7). Under Sūryavarman’s
rule the commercial economy of the Khmer state achieved such
importance that the upper Malay Peninsula receded from the
patterns of power and trade in the island world and was drawn
into those of the mainland. The contacts of this area came to
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lie not with the international trade route but with a more local
route that went across the Bay of Bengal to south India and Sri
Lanka. 48
While the Khmers initially took an interest in extending
their commercial influence into the Malay Peninsula during
Sūryavarman’s reign, by the end of the eleventh century Khmer
rulers were occupied with internal political strife as well as
external pressures on their eastern borders. Around 1050,
Angkor’s relationship with the Isthmus of Kra was challenged
by the Burmese as they expanded into the Malay Peninsula;
the Khmer state offered little resistance. 49 About this same
year Cham raids sacked Sambupura on the Mekong and
Sūryavarman died. Shortly thereafter the center of political
authority shifted north into the Mun River Valley beyond the
Dangrek mountain range. Little interest in further commercial
developments is reflected in Khmer epigraphy from then until
the late twelfth century.
Although the evidence discussed above indicates more than
casual involvement, the Khmer state’s participation in the inter-
national commercial routes must be regarded as a secondary
concern of Sūryavarman and other monarchs. Khmer rulers
were committed to developing their agrarian base around
Angkor as well as to overcoming Cambodia’s peripheral po-
sition, geographically speaking, to the major East-West mar-
itime routes. Thus Sūryavarman expanded his economic base by
encouraging his subordinates to bring unused land under culti-
vation, extending his political hegemony from his core domain,
and then making diplomatic overtures to the Cōla̤s and the
Lý state in Vietnam. With Sūryavarman’s death his successors
chose to internalize the Khmer polity rather than to promote
a stronger interaction in the supraregional trade routes.
However, the Khmer state’s neighbor to the southeast, the
Cham state that controlled the southern portion of present-day
Vietnam, had a more compelling desire to penetrate these inter-
national commercial channels.
CHAMPA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE:
EIGHTH-CENTURY CONTACTS
The earliest Chinese references to the Cham state of Lin-yi
date to A.D. 190–193. 50 Caught between the domain of Funan
to the south and the Chinese province on the northern Viet-
namese coast, the Cham realm’s early history was characterized
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by shifting alliances among regional centers that were concen-
trated at the river mouths of the Cham coast, not unlike that
of the Śrīvijaya realm that was examined in chapter 4. 51 Dur-
ing the early third century the great Funan ruler Fan Shih-man
brought the Chams under Funan’s authority; the earliest San-
skrit inscription attributed to the Funan state was discovered
in Cham territories and records that Lin-yi was a vassal ter-
ritory under Funan hegemony. 52 The Chinese envoys K’ang T’ai
and Chu Ying, who visited Funan in the 240s, reported that
Funan’s ruler at that time, whom they call Fan Hsun, had es-
tablished an alliance with the Chams around 220, and that to-
gether the Chams and Funanese were making naval raids and
land attacks against the Red River Delta region. 53 During the
mid-fourth century the semiautonomous Cham ruler known to
the Chinese as Fan Fo, taking the Sanskrit title Bhadravarman,
began to develop a Sanskritic administrative core, erecting the
first temples in the Cham holy city of Mi-so’n on the fictitious
Mount Vugvan, the Cham equivalent of Mount Meru, the abode
of the ancestors, and consecrated the Śiva-liṅga Bhadreśvara,
beginning the Cham tradition of assigning to the state’s central
deity the reigning king’s Sanskrit name. 54
In the fifth century Lin-yi emerged from under Funan’s
suzerainty, responding in part to the new circumstances af-
forded when Chin dynasty rulers began to encourage the ex-
pansion of maritime trade in the Southern Seas. Cham ports
became intermediate stops for merchant ships navigating the
South China Sea; ships put into Cham ports prior to their entry
into Chinese harbors. 55 During the mid-fifth century a dynastic
crisis in Funan resulted in the flight of a Funan prince to Lin-
yi, where he is said to have become king of the Chams. 56 This
king, Fan Tang, was officially recognized by the Chinese throne
in 491 when he was granted the title of “General Pacifier of
the South, Commander-in-Chief of the Military Affairs of the
Seashore, and King of Lin-yi.” 57 Chapter 3 related this recog-
nition to China’s perception of Funan’s demise as the dominant
commercial center in the Southeast Asian realm and the Lin-yi
coast’s ascendency as the major commercial and political power
on the lower Vietnam coast by the end of the fifth century.
In 605, however, a Chinese general undertook the task of
forcibly opening the region for trade. 58 The Cham state of
Champa (from which is derived the name of the Chams) as it
was then known in its epigraphy, its capital at Tra-kieu near
present-day Ða Nang, reacted favorably and soon became a
secondary entrepôt on the main international route, servicing
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shipping and sailors traveling between the Malay world and
Canton. By 758 the Chinese reported that the Cham state had
developed commercial centers at Kauṭhāra (present-day Nha-
trang) and Pāṇḍuranga (present-day Phan-rang) and began to
call the state Huan-wang. 59
In general, early Cham epigraphy reflects an internally ori-
ented wet-rice state. 60 The Cham state had a system of classical
Southeast Asian statecraft, drawing its legitimacy from a Hindu-
Buddhist cult that emphasized the Cham king’s association with
Śiva and his consort Bhādradhpatīśvara. By the seventh and
eighth centuries the Cham state had evolved a loose balance be-
tween its wet-rice economy and its participation in the external
realm of international trade. An important factor necessitating
this balance was the fact that the Cham coast was strategically
located on the principal maritime route between the Śrīvijaya
empire and China, a position that allowed the Chams the op-
portunity to take advantage of the economic benefits offered by
participation in the trade along this route. 61
Contrary to their usual lack of information on commerce,
merchants, and the sea trade in general, Cham inscriptions
dating to the eighth century report two sea raids that
threatened the state’s very existence. A Sanskrit inscription
from Nha-trang informs us that in 774 “ferocious, pitiless, dark-
skinned men born in other countries, whose food was more hor-
rible than corpses, and who were vicious and furious, came in
ships … took away the [temple liṅga], and set fire to the temple
…,” thus desecrating the Po Nagar temple near Nha-trang. 62
This was followed by a second raid by a similar group in 787,
when a Pāṇḍuranga temple was burned. 63 Historians have tra-
ditionally identified these dark-skinned and demonic seafarers
with Javanese or Malay sailors—a group similar to the Malay
sea nomads who were the strength behind the Malay state of
Śrīvijaya’s hegemony (see chap. 4)—seamen who could be used
to control shipping, but who in times of political turmoil might
turn to piracy as the source of their livelihood. 64
To understand these eighth-century inscriptions, the Cham
state’s relationship to the trade routes in that period must be
examined. Since both raids were directed not at the Cham
capital near Ða Nang, but at the two port areas recognized by
the Chinese as being of commercial importance, the Malay raids
reflect two possible conditions. If the Śrīvijaya state were still
the dominant power in the strait region, then the rise to promi-
nence of the Cham ports located in the southern areas of the
Cham coast might well have posed a threat to Śrīvijaya’s eco-
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nomic hegemony over the southern maritime route. 65 In this
instance the raids are explained as having been initiated by
Śrīvijaya to prevent the rival development of the Cham ports. 66
Alternatively, if Śrīvijaya were no longer a viable political force
during the eighth century, as some historians have proposed,
then the raids on the Cham ports were undertaken by sea pi-
rates—groups who had formerly supported Śrīvijaya’s control
over the Southern Seas, but who in the eighth century had
become pirates. 67 Cham ports, recognized in that period as
prosperous centers of commerce, no doubt presented attractive
sources of plunder.
Chinese records help to explain the circumstances sur-
rounding these events. The eighth century was a period of po-
litical turmoil in southern China following the rebellion of An
Lu Shan in 756. When Canton, the major Chinese port of that
period, was sacked by a rebel Chinese army in 758, Canton’s
foreign merchant community, especially the Persians, Arabs,
and other merchants who participated in the southern mar-
itime route, began to shift their commercial operations to the
Vietnam coast. Chinese sources lamented that thereafter “only
four or five vessels of the barbarians of the south and west (or
southwest) come each year.” 68
The Hanoi area of the Cham’s Vietnamese rivals benefited
most from this relocation of the foreign merchant community’s
base of operations. A late eighth-century (792) Chinese account
reported an appeal to the Chinese emperor:
Lately, the precious and strange (goods) brought by ocean-junks
have mostly been taken to An-nan (the port of Hanoi) [probably
Long-bien, north of present-day Hanoi] to be traded there. I wish
to send an officer to go to An-nan and close the market, and re-
quest that your imperial majesty send one central (government)
official to accompany him. 69
Cham ports prospered from this shifting trade focus as well.
As a result, Cham rulers were forced to come to terms with
the new commercial presence. Immediately prior to the Canton
turmoil of the late 750s, the Chams initiated a diplomatic re-
lationship with China. The Cham ruler’s increasing interest in
trade is revealed by the official Cham mission sent to China in
749, which presented the Chinese emperor with one hundred
strings of pearls, gharuwood, cotton, and twenty tame ele-
phants, all goods that T’ang dynasty sources considered to be
specialties of the Cham ports. 70 These ports, the Chinese
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records note, became transitory points between the Malay
world and An-nan and Canton; normally Cham traders used An-
nan to acquire fine commodities such as Chinese silks and man-
ufactured items.
After these eighth-century records, there is little evidence of
the realm’s commercial stance until the eleventh century, when
several inscriptions, as well as external information from China,
allow further speculation on Cham attitudes toward commerce.
CHAMPA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE IN
THE TENTH AND ELEVENTH CENTURIES
Tenth-and eleventh-century Cham history reflects an ongoing
hostility between the Chams and the Vietnamese Lý state to the
north, which had newly won its independence from Chinese au-
thority (see map 7). An increasingly important element of these
hostilities was the use of naval warfare. Two major Cham naval
campaigns, one in 979 and the second in 1042, had a significant
impact upon the integrity of Cham hegemony.
In 979, a naval expedition attributed to the Chams was
launched against the Vietnamese capital of Hoa-lu’ in the Red
River Delta. 71 In reply, the Vietnamese destroyed the Cham
capital of Indrapura in 982, eventually forcing the Chams to
move their capital farther south to Vijaya (Binh-đinh). Cham
raids against the northern Vietnam coast in 1042 again brought
retaliatory action. In 1044, Lý Thái-tông led a seaborne expe-
dition that was said to have routed the Chams and killed their
king Jaya Siṃhavarman II. 72 Shortly thereafter, in 1050, a Cham
inscription recorded a royal expedition against the Cham port of
Pāṇḍuranga. The people of this port were described as “vicious,
threatening, and always in revolt against their sovereign,” and
they refused to recognize the Cham ruler’s authority. 73 The
available records of this period indicate that this final event was
related to the two previous naval expeditions and was the cul-
mination of a commercial problem that the Cham rulers were
facing during this time.
Two Arabic script (Kufic) inscriptions, dating between 1029
and 1035, from Pāṇḍuranga (Phan-rang) evince the existence
of a sizable commercial group (possibly some three hundred
strong) resident in Pāṇḍuranga and indicate that Pāṇḍuranga
was a major port on the Cham coast in the mid-tenth century.
74 One inscription records the selection by this community of
one of its members—a Muslim—as “agent of the bazaar,” whose
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duty it was to represent local merchants and to protect their in-
terests when dealing with Cham authorities. That earlier com-
mercial groups had a regular interaction with the Cham
monarchy is evident from a tenth-century Chinese reference
to a 958 visit to China. On this visit the ambassador of the
Cham king Indravarman III presented the Chinese emperor rose
water, flasks of “Greek fire,” and precious stones. 75 Signifi-
cantly, this official envoy of the Cham king was a Muslim named
Abū Hasan (P’u Ho-san). In 961, Abū Hasan returned to China
bearing a letter from the new Cham king Jaya Indravarman
I and presented fragrant wood, ivory, camphor, peacocks, and
twenty Arab vases—all supposedly commercial products
available in Cham ports—to the Chinese monarch. 76
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Thus we see that Cham monarchs were responsive enough
to commercial activities during the mid-tenth century to be able
to and willing to take advantage of the opportunities afforded
when Canton was fully reopened to foreign commerce under the
later Chou (951–959) and then the Sung (960–1279) dynasties.
They utilized a member of Pāṇḍuranga’s merchant community,
Abū Hasan, to further the commercial relationships between
this major Cham port (its merchant community dominated by
Muslims) and the reopened Chinese harbors.
The reason for such a positive response by the Cham ruler is
reflected in Chinese references from the Sung era to Champa’s
harbors, where ship cargoes were inspected by a king’s agent
upon a ship’s arrival in port. After registering all commodities
carried by a ship and noting how many goods were unloaded,
the king’s agents collected one-fifth of each kind of commodity
in the name of their monarch before authorizing the sale of
the rest. Concealed freight was seized. 77 This income financed
various royal activities, not the least of which were Cham am-
bitions for military conquest—especially against the north. Not
only was the emerging Lý state a political threat, but, from an
economic perspective, the Lý ports were the Cham state’s chief
commercial rivals. The harbors of the Vietnam coastal region, as
noted above, served as major centers for the China trade, while
those of the Cham domain were of only secondary importance.
In this light it is possible to see the Cham-Vietnamese hostilities
of the tenth and eleventh centuries not only as attempts at po-
litical expansion but as having commercial implications as well.
78
There are two likely points of competition during these
times: the port of Vằn-đô’n in the northeast corner of the Red
River Delta at the Bạchđằng River mouth was emerging as a
prominent port and an interior trade route connecting Vietnam
and Angkor was also becoming important. This latter diversion
was a serious threat to Cham trading, especially with Angkor.
An eleventh-century overland trade route from the Vietnamese
port of Nghệ-an west through the Ha-trai pass and turning
south along the Mekong River into the Khmer heartland was
noted earlier. 79 Traders using this route are specifically men-
tioned as being of Vietnamese origin in Khmer inscriptions as
for example in a 987 inscription from Phum Mīen on the lower
Mekong. 80 The presence of a Vietnamese trader in this lower
Mekong area allows speculation on Pāṇḍuranga’s strategic po-
sition vis-à-vis the Angkor domain. Pāṇḍuranga was located just
north of the Mekong Delta, where it likely controlled much of
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the commercial traffic moving into the interior. The Vietnamese
trader would have normally traveled to Phum Mīen after first
stopping at Pāṇḍuranga. The development of an alternative
northern route overland from Vietnam would have significantly
diverted trade from Cham ports and threatened their prosperity.
It was therefore in the interest of the Cham commercial com-
munity to cooperate with the Cham rulers in their expeditions
against the Vietnamese.
It is significant that the Cham coast had been consistently
regarded as a center of piracy in earlier centuries. 81 The source
of tenth- and eleventh-century Cham maritime strength came
from peoples similar to those who in the eighth century had pil-
laged the Cham coast; that is, the “Malay” seafarers. A ninth-
century Khmer inscription is of interest because it refers to a
victory over “thousands of barks with white sails,” which his-
torians attribute to the Chams. 82 A Cham-Malay relationship
can also be seen in the Javanese influence upon Cham culture.
This influence is most visible in Cham temple architecture of the
ninth century, notably at Mi-so’n, the leading temple complex
and religious center of the Cham monarchs. 83 A two-part Cham
inscription dated 908–911 from Nhan-biêu reports two official
diplomatic missions to Java (Yāvadvīpa) by a favorite of the
Cham monarch Jaya Siṃhavarman. 84 A Javanese inscription
from this period makes specific reference to the activities of
both Khmer and Cham merchants in Java. 85 This Javanese
contact no doubt equally attracted Malay traders and seafarers
to Cham ports, particularly Pāṇḍuranga. Cham monarchs di-
rected the piratical energies of these seafarers against the pros-
perous Vietnamese domain in 979 in an expedition that not only
benefited the Cham state but improved the economic status of
the Cham commercial community as well.
Continuing hostilities between the Chams and the Viet-
namese during the remainder of the century diminished the
powers of the Cham monarchy, however. 86 The Cham capital at
Indrapura was destroyed in the 982 raid and political control
was fragmented. Between 982 and 1050, as a result, the
southern Cham domain, including the port of Pāṇḍuranga and
its seafaring groups, became virtually autonomous. The two
Arabic script inscriptions dating to this period, for instance,
show the considerable autonomy of Pāṇḍuranga’s merchant
community.
It is likely that the final Cham naval expedition against the
Vietnamese in 1042 utilized seafarers from Pāṇḍuranga. In fact,
based upon Chinese records that clearly regard the Cham coast
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as a pirate lair in the eleventh century, it is quite possible that
a number of the naval raids attributed to the Chams during this
period were actually initiated by semiautonomous sea nomads
who used Cham ports as their base of operation. 87 Finally, in
1044 the Lý seem to have had enough of this harassment and
vented their wrath upon the Chams, killing the king. The new
Cham monarch appears to have himself had enough of Pāṇḍu-
ranga’s autonomy and in 1050, as part of his recentralizing ac-
tivities, he restored Cham royal authority over the port by force
of arms. 88
Another Po Nagar inscription, which records the Cham
king’s expedition against Pāṇḍuranga, noted that the king sym-
bolized the restoration of his authority over this southern port
by rebuilding the Po Nagar temple complex and assigning
“slaves”—Khmers, Chinese, men of Pukam (Pagan), and Thais
(Syam)—to the temple. 89 These “slaves” were most probably
war captives who had formerly been residents of Pāṇḍu-
ranga—former seafarers who had been captured by the Cham
monarch in his expedition against their “pirate lair.” It was
normal Southeast Asian practice to make dependents of one’s
enemies. For example, after the Lý raid upon the Cham capital
cited above, five thousand war captives were transported back
to the Lý capital and resettled. In the classical era war captives
were placed on the conquering state’s lands as laborers. Gener-
ally, they became the bondsmen of the state’s monarch, al-
though their services might be reassigned to a temple or to a
royal favorite. This resettlement pattern was consistent with the
agricultural focus of classical Southeast Asian wet-rice states.
The resettlement of war captives was of great importance to the
expansion of the Khmer state’s agricultural base in the tenth
and eleventh centuries, for example. Since Champa’s ports
were recognized internationally as slave trade centers, it is
likely that such war captives would normally have been mar-
keted in Cham coast ports and these “slaves” were present in
Pāṇḍuranga’s maritime community. 90
The Cham monarch sent three embassies to China between
1050 and 1056 and five to the Lý capital between 1047 and
1060. 91 This sudden flurry of diplomacy is best characterized as
the Cham ruler’s assurance to the Chinese and the Vietnamese
that he now had his domain, including Pāṇḍuranga and its ma-
rauding seafarers, firmly under control.
It is of interest in this perspective that the Chams launched
a land attack against the Lý in 1068, and when Vietnam re-
sponded with a naval attack against Vijaya the Vietnamese
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found it remarkable that they met resistance only from a Cham
army and not from a Cham fleet. 92 The reason for the absence of
naval resistance, based on the above historical reconstruction,
was that the Cham king had temporarily diffused the old source
of Cham naval support by his conquest of Pāṇḍuranga in 1050
and could not or would not draw upon this community for his
country’s naval defense at that time.
KHMER AND CHAM COMMERCIAL CONTACTS IN
PERSPECTIVE
The central political authorities in both the Khmer and Cham
states during the tenth and eleventh centuries desired external
commercial involvement. Khmer and Cham rulers hoped to ac-
quire a share of the profits to be derived from commerce and
attempted to expand their commercial contacts through diplo-
matic means. They sent official embassies and gifts to the mon-
archs of the Cōla̤, Chinese, and Vietnamese states, all partici-
pants in international trade. But while in the tenth and eleventh
centuries the Khmer kings of Angkor benefited from their pos-
itive economic stance, the interaction of the Cham domain with
the commercial channels proved disastrous.
The different experiences of the two states were related to
each state’s internal strength. During the tenth century and the
first half of the eleventh century the Khmer state was success-
fully expanding both politically and economically. Increasing ur-
banization, the extension of the Khmer irrigation network and
the corresponding extension of agriculture, widespread temple
construction, as well as the ability of the Angkor-based state
to make even the most remote areas of its domain subject
to Khmer administration, show the state’s significant capabili-
ties. Champa’s tenth-and eleventh-century history, on the other
hand, is marked by critical fluctuations. Its geographic position
on the coast, as opposed to Angkor’s more protected position in
the interior, contributed to Champa’s vulnerability. Cham rulers
not only solicited the aid of foreign merchants and seafarers to
expand their economic opportunities but also utilized the mer-
chants’ navies for their coastal defenses and expeditions of con-
quest. This relationship demanded strong leadership to keep
these potentially disruptive forces in check. On the positive
side, the relationship helped to generate the expansion of Cham
trade with China, bringing commercial prosperity. The threat
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that these merchant groups and seafarers posed to the integrity
of the state when they established their autonomy from central
Cham authority was a decidedly negative aspect, however.
The Cham relationship with the sea became a problem as
early as the eighth century when the Cham coast was subjected
to at least two naval attacks. The geographic position of Pāṇḍu-
ranga in the south, far removed from the center of Cham po-
litical authority in Indrapura and later Vijaya, was no doubt
ideal from the Cham monarch’s point of view. In the south, po-
tentially dangerous commercial groups and foreigners could be
kept isolated, away from the Cham state’s capital in the north.
There the foreigners were less likely to harm either the Cham
treasury or the state’s central cult of legitimacy.
A generally negative attitude toward merchants is well con-
veyed in Cham epigraphy by its general failure to mention
them. There is but one direct reference in Cham inscriptions
to a merchant. In this inscription, dated 875, merchants were
among those enumerated in a list—which included kings, war-
riors, priests, and state ministers—who were likely to abscond
with a temple’s wealth. 93 People who came from the sea, who
would have included merchants, are described in Cham epig-
raphy as “dark-skinned,” “demonic,” “vicious,” and “stupid” and
were considered a threat to Cham civilization. The Chams were
overly conscious of status distinctions. The Cham social hier-
archy was clearly defined: aristocrats were Hindu, commoners
became Mahāyāna Buddhists, and merchants were Muslims. 94
It is thus to be expected that merchants, being both Muslim and
bad, would have received no positive mention in the temples of
the Cham aristocrats. 95 In the Khmer domain, likewise, there
were few references to merchants except during Sūryavarman
I’s reign, a period when the Khmer state was interested in en-
couraging commercial relationships.
These attitudes are consistent with the center-oriented
forms of Southeast Asian statecraft seen in wet-rice states, par-
ticularly Java. Because the Khmer realm of Angkor was among
the foremost wet-rice economies of classical Southeast Asia, it
would seem appropriate that the hierarchical, integrated ex-
change network model outlined in chapter 1 would apply. Unfor-
tunately, the Khmer epigraphy discussed above does not provide
sufficient documentation for a definitive view of a hierarchical
Khmer marketing network. Yet there are clues. There is, for in-
stance, a distinction drawn between itinerant merchants (khloñ
jnvāl vanik) and resident vendors ( khloñ jnvāl ) who are shown
inhabiting permanent merchant quarters in Khmer urban
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Pagan remains, Burma.
Cham temple relief, Saigon National Museum. Photo courtesy Truong
Buu Lam.
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Cham temple architecture in Mi-so’n region of Vietnam.
Photo by Stella Snead.
centers. 96 While there is no further elaboration of those en-
gaged in commercial activities such as one finds in the extensive
lists of merchants in Javanese epigraphy, the simple distinction
between itinerant and locally based merchants in Khmer epig-
raphy, as well as inscriptions that imply the important com-
mercial role of major urban centers in the expanding tenth-and
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eleventh-century Khmer economy, when related to the other
parallels between Javanese and Cambodian statecraft indicate
that such a marketing network may have also existed in the
Khmer state. 97 Such similarities suggest that the proposed
model of an integrated, hierarchical exchange network in a clas-
sical Southeast Asian wet-rice civilization based on patterns of
exchange in early Java well applies to the Angkor-era state and
provides further insight into the nature of economic, social, and
political interdependency within the Khmer realm. 98
On the other hand, evidence of commercial activity within
the Cham realm does not show a similar level of integration.
The Cham state has often been considered a wet-rice civilization
that favorably compares to that of the Angkor-based Khmer
state. 99 Champa’s use of the Indic vocabulary and religious
style associated with the wet-rice state tradition begun by
Funan has contributed to this image. Champa had an impressive
central temple complex at Mi-so’n, and Cham inscriptions speak
of Cham administrative capacity in a vocabulary similar to that
of the Khmer. Although it speaks of a centralized administration
and presents the image of an integrated wet-rice socioeconomy,
however, Cham epigraphy as well as external sources reflect an
incomplete synthesis of the classical wet-rice state traditions on
the part of Champa. Cham political and economic networks are
more appropriately understood in relation to the riverine net-
works common to the island world of Southeast Asia and may
be discussed using the model of riverine system exchange intro-
duced in chapter 1 (see fig. 1). 100
Because of the geography of the southern Vietnam region
with its narrow coastal plain, highland interior, and multiple
river systems flowing from the highlands to the coast, Cham
political authority was concentrated in coastal and riverine
centers near the coast. The Cham royal center (“capital”) was
shifted among several of these river-mouth urban centers over
time, which has been explained by historians as representing
corresponding shifts from one dynasty’s rule to that of another.
101 In reality they reflect the transfer of authority from the elite
of one Cham riverine system to that of another, comparable to
the establishment of the supremacy of a point A in the riverine
system model over various A 1s and their subordinate riverine
networks. Despite the transitions from “dynasty” to “dynasty”
and various transfers of the Cham “capital” from river-mouth
urban center to river-mouth urban center, the Cham sacred
center of Mi-so’n, located on the edge of the highlands and
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upriver from the urban center of Tra-kieu on the coast, con-
tinued to serve as the locus for Cham royal ceremony and to
provide unity to the Cham realm. 102 Similar to other island
world riverine political systems, the Cham realm did not have
the extensive hinterland agrarian development that is found
in the wet-rice states of Southeast Asia’s classical age—Java,
Pagan, the Khmer state to the west, and the Vietnamese state
to the north. 103 Indeed, in the region north of the Mekong
Delta where Cham authority was concentrated there was no ex-
pansive plain that could have served as an economic core for
Champa’s monarchs. 104 As a consequence, there was a good
deal of Cham interest in the sea, which was seen as an alter-
native source of income. 105
We have seen that a successful Southeast Asian ruler was
one who emerged from a group of competing chiefs or land-
based elites, each with their own network of allies. He rose
above his competitors through his ability to guarantee pros-
perity for his followers, whether through the redistribution of
the spoils of war, by developing the agrarian base of his realm,
by simply bringing peace to a domain previously torn by
competition for power among various factions, or by negotiating
and facilitating external trade contacts between his realm’s
ports and foreign merchants.
A chief thus emerged as a monarch because of his personal
prowess and especially as a consequence of his initiative in gen-
erating income for his subjects. The opportunity to share in this
prosperity encouraged other chiefs and their allies to honor the
monarch’s sovereignty, although they retained a considerable
degree of autonomy within their regions beyond the royal core.
There the monarch’s authority depended on his manipulation
of symbols, magical spells, and oaths of allegiance rather than
physical might. Once a ruler was no longer able to guarantee
his followers’ economic prosperity or to redistribute income to
regionally based subordinates, these allies had no reason to par-
ticipate in the monarch’s system apart from the symbolic status
bestowed on them through the ruler’s religious cults. With the
loss of economic prosperity, however, serious questions were
soon raised regarding the magical qualities of these cults, and
the autonomy of the regional units began to reemerge. 106 In
each of the classical Southeast Asian states there is ample evi-
dence of this periodic regional autonomy and resistance to the
centralizing ambitions of monarchs, even in the great Khmer
wet-rice state that was centered at Angkor. Khmer monarchs
as well as other classical rulers depended upon their own eco-
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nomic resource base—the production of laborers on royal lands
in the wet-rice states or in the case of Śrīvijaya, the revenues
derived from trade—as the main source of their income. Clas-
sical rulers could not rely upon the regular flow of revenues
from regional subordinates to finance the state, nor were they
able to completely transcend the local socioeconomic hold of re-
gionally based landed elites to create an interdependent state
system.
Unfortunately for Cham monarchs the revenues collected in
the Cham coast ports subject to royal authority were insufficient
to maintain the alliance networks. As a secondary rather than
primary center of international commercial exchange Cham
ports had a limited trade volume to tax—especially during eras
when the international maritime route was in a state of flux due
to disorders on either of its ends. In such times Cham rulers
would have had difficulty making redistributions sufficient to
maintain the loyalty of the state’s maritime allies, whereupon
these seamen became pirates. The Chinese tried in vain to make
Cham rulers responsible for the behavior of their coastal popu-
lations; in fact the Cham rulers were often unable to control the
actions of this maritime population. Cham coast piracy, which
was well known among the international maritime community,
further weakened the appeal of Champa’s ports to international
traders and increased the likelihood of Cham political insta-
bility.
Unable to amply tap the surplus production from their land
base and incapable of securing sufficient return from port
cesses to maintain the loyalty of the seamen based in their
ports, Cham monarchs were forced to seek alternative sources
of income to maintain the alliance networks critical to their sov-
ereignty. Thus the state’s rulers found it necessary to direct
their supporters to venture outside the Cham realm on a regular
basis for plundering expeditions against Champa’s neighbors,
the Vietnamese to the north and the Khmer to the west. This
plunder dynamic explains why Cham history is dominated by
one military expedition after another. Cham expeditions were
undertaken to acquire both material wealth and manpower—in
the form of slaves. Champa was known widely as a major source
of slaves (e.g., war captives) who were traded at Cham ports to
various buyers from the Asian world. 107 This wealth was then
redistributed among the participants of the expedition, the war-
riors and seamen who in return acknowledged the Cham rulers’
sovereignty. Successful plundering expeditions were thereby a
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means of reinforcing the Cham monarch’s image as the source
of his allies’ prosperity in the absence of a sufficient internal re-
source base. 108
The Cham state has been characterized in this chapter as
a loose and marginally interdependent alliance network among
a series of river-mouth urban centers and their upriver hin-
terlands on the southern Vietnam coast. The redistribution of
plunder directly or indirectly—as for instances in local temple
endowments—from successful military expeditions was the
means by which the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Cham
riverine networks was maintained. An incomplete synthesis of
the Funan wet-rice state tradition, the Cham state may thus be
viewed best as a Southeast Asian riverine state of the Śrīvijaya
sort that depended on an alliance network among the leaders of
coastal and upriver population centers for its existence, and by
its very nature was politically and economically unstable.
The limited Cham epigraphic references to commerce,
unlike those of Cambodia and Java that are distributed beyond
the coastal ports in the Khmer and Javanese hinterland, are con-
centrated in the river-mouth centers on the Cham coast and
report the activities of itinerant, maritime-oriented, and exter-
nally focused commercial communities. There is no indication
of a hierarcy of locally based and itinerant merchants compa-
rable to those documented in Cambodia and Java’s epigraphy.
Unlike Śrīvijaya’s rulers, who derived their initial success from
the redistribution of wealth accumulated from the state’s role
as a major facilitator of East-West trade, and Khmer rulers, who
received income from the wet-rice core surrounding Angkor,
Champa’s rulers were forced to maintain the loyalty of their
subordinates, including Malay seamen, by keeping these sup-
porters “in the field,” active on various expeditions against their
neighbors. The inherent institutional weakness in the Cham
state ultimately sealed its fate. Vietnamese retaliatory expedi-
tions finally drained the Cham realm of its manpower during the
fifteenth century. 109
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Through the ninth and tenth centuries, when the T’ang statewas slowly collapsing and China was splintering into nu-
merous regional political entities, the international trade did
not fall off to any great degree because of the efforts of the
Southern Han and Min regimes based respectively at Canton
and Fu-chou. 1 Yet new pressures were building up along the sea
routes in South and Southeast Asia. Where previously the po-
litical development of these regions was such that there had
been little conflict among major regional powers, the tenth
century saw the beginnings of such conflict, particularly with
the rise of maritime power in eastern Java and on the Tamil
section of the east coast of India. Added to this interregional
competition was the major upsurge in trade that followed the
reunification of China under the Sung dynasty (960–1279) and
its efforts to reopen the communications of the Southern Seas
(Nanyang) over the final third of the tenth century.
The hundred years following the upsurge along the trade
route saw a serious weakening of the position of Śrīvijaya as the
dominant entrepôt in the Strait of Malacca region, as political
and economic strains proved too great for it. The Śrīvijayan
rulers first sought to consolidate their position with diplomatic
maneuvers in the direction of India and Sri Lanka and then fol-
lowed with a war against Java. 2 The Javanese counterattacked
in 992 but in 1016 suffered a devastating raid from their ene-
mies, allowing the Śrīvijayan ruler to refer to himself as “king
of the ocean lands” when he sent a richly laden mission to
China the following year. 3 Yet, within a decade, the Cōla̤ navy
of India’s Coromandel Coast had sacked the legendary riches of
the Śrīvijayan capital and for the next fifty years was to play a
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role in the politics of the strait area. 4 The attack of 1025 dis-
rupted the concentration of the international route through the
Śrīvijayan ports along the strait, and by the last quarter of the
eleventh century the trading pattern had become more diffuse.
No longer was the chief focus of the route on the southeastern
Sumatra coast and its control of the Strait of Malacca. In 1178,
Chinese sources stated:
Of all the wealthy foreign lands which have great store of pre-
cious and varied goods, none surpasses the realm of Ta-shih (the
Arabs). Next to them comes the She-p’o (Java), while San-fo-chi
(Srivijaya) is third; many others come in the next rank. 5
Indeed the main thrust of international commerce moved
toward the produce of Sumatra and the riches of the developing
ports of east Java and the imported spices they offered. The
1025 Cōla̤ expedition was critical to the Southeast Asian
mainland as well. By removing Śrīvijaya’s presence from the
ports of the upper Malay Peninsula, the Cōla̤s cleared the way
for the expanding mainland states to fill the resulting power
vacuum. 6
The location and type of commodities involved in the Sung
maritime trade demonstrate what areas the Chinese were fa-
miliar with as well as those they did not know. 7 Chao Ju-kua,
superintendent of maritime trade at the China coast port of
Ch’uan-chou, reconstructed the world he knew in a 1225 work
on maritime trading patterns that derived much of its infor-
mation directly from the seamen and traders themselves. 8 He
divided Southeast Asia into an Upper Shore (Shang An), in-
cluding the mainland and the Malay Peninsula, a region with
which the Chinese had had contact in prior centuries, and a
Lower Shore (Hsia An), covering Sumatra and the Java Sea,
whose trading network had been in former times controlled by
the Śrīvijaya state. On the former were Champa, the Khmer
state, and the east coast of the peninsula; the latter included
the old favored coast of southern Sumatra, the ports of Java,
and the south coast of Borneo. Two areas are conspicuously
missing from this Chinese view in any geographical detail—the
hinterland of the isthmus and the eastern islands beyond the
Java Sea. Yet where the latter, merely referred to en masse as
the Ocean Islands (Hai Tao), were concerned, the Chinese still
had an idea of the types of goods that the area produced and
that it took in exchange. 9
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With the weakening of the old international trade system
greater numbers and different types of foreign traders pursued
Southeast Asian goods more directly into Southeast Asia itself.
With the rise of new ports on the southeastern coast of China,
Fu-chou and Ch’uan-chou supplementing the older port of
Canton, and increasing commercial strength in southern India,
the foreign traders not only continued to transport the goods of
East and West but wished to acquire Southeast Asian commodi-
ties more directly themselves. 10 While they initiated trade on
the coasts of the Philippines, northern Borneo, and north and
west Sumatra, they dealt still with intermediaries, notably the
Javanese, in obtaining the increased flow of spices from the
eastern archipelago. These traders also began to penetrate core
areas of the lowland empires on the mainland, though they
appear to have gone no farther inland.
Because of their more technologically sophisticated ships
and organization, Arab traders in the early tenth century were
gaining prominence in Southeast Asia. Arab seamen supple-
mented Malay sailors as carriers of international cargoes be-
tween India and China; the greater trade volume of that age (as
opposed to the limited volume of the earlier luxury trade) went
beyond the ability of the Malay sailors to provide transport.
But between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Arab role
in Southeast Asian trade diminished. 11 This decreasing Arab
role in Southeast Asian trade was in part due to the entry of
Chinese traders into Southeast Asian markets during this era,
as well as to the continuing instability of the Persian Gulf po-
litical realm after the demise of the ‘Abbāsid dynasty in the mid-
tenth century. While Middle Eastern trade continued, especially
following the rise of Fatimid rulers in Egypt in the late tenth
century, the Red Sea became the western terminus for the Asian
maritime route. Red Sea ports focused their commercial con-
tacts upon the Indian and Sri Lankan coasts, as Red Sea-based
merchants rarely ventured beyond South Asia into Southeast
Asian waters. 12 Instead Western traders depended upon con-
tacts with a multiethnic group of traders who worked the India-
to-Southeast Asia leg of the international maritime route to
acquire Southeast Asian and Chinese merchandise.
During Sung times southern Chinese interest was once
again exclusively directed to the sea after the fall of K’ai-feng
in 1127 and the subsequent closing of the overland caravan
routes across the Central Asian steppes. All tribute with trade
that came to the Chinese capital at Hangchou after that date
came by sea, while before that date approximately 35 percent of
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the tribute missions were coming by land. 13 The Sung govern-
ment looked to the sea not only as a valued source of revenue
but also for the first time began to integrate the sea into China’s
defense strategy. A Chinese navy was built that became the
foundation for later Mongol and Ming naval expeditions. Al-
though the entry of Chinese private merchants into Southeast
Asia had begun before this time—during the ninth and early
tenth centuries—in the Sung era such contacts expanded over-
seas. Chinese merchants boarded Malay ships and traded in the
Southern Seas before the appearance of Chinese junks in the
Nan-yang. Initially working out of the North China Sea, junks
from the Chinese commercial fleet were seasoning as far to the
west as Lamuri on the northern coast of Sumatra before the
end of the twelfth century, and by the mid-thirteenth century
Chinese junks and traders were active in the Indian Ocean. 14
The Arab traveler Ibn Battuta described with amazement the
size of Chinese junks he found in India during the early four-
teenth century; he boarded one of them and voyaged to the
northern Sumatra coast and said of the Sea of China (which
probably meant the Indian Ocean eastward from India to the
Chinese coast) that “travelling is done in Chinese ships only.” 15
By the thirteenth century this commercial pattern had set
the framework for the trade developments of the following
years. From the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries, though
political upheavals led to a different configuration of states,
Java with its control of the spice trade was the dominant com-
mercial power, and its dominance influenced much that was
going on around it. Javanese power continued over southern
Sumatra and surrounding island ports in the Strait of Malacca
through the fourteenth century, resisting even the intrusions
of the newly formed Ming dynasty (1368–1644) in China. The
predominance of Chinese shipping in the western Indian Ocean
disappeared in the early fifteenth century, giving way to ex-
panding shipping based out of Indian ports, largely due to a
changing stance vis-à-vis commerce by Ming rulers and the
substantial growth in Western demand for Asian goods that
resulted in more Western ships covering this portion of the
route. No longer was it necessary for Chinese ships to provide
transport in this commercial sector. Chinese junks withdrew to
the South China Sea and concentrated their activities in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries on ports in the Gulf of Thailand
and Java. They also lost in competition with the Javanese in the
Moluccas in the fourteenth century and finally were satisfied to
buy spices secondhand from Javanese ports. 16
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THE ELEVENTH-CENTURY STRUGGLE FOR THE
MALAY ISTHMUS
By the first half of the eleventh century, the Khmers of Cam-
bodia had pushed their control to the west into the Chao Phraya
Valley of present-day Thailand and toward the Isthmus of Kra.
Where tenth-century Cambodia’s commercial interest had been
directed toward the eastern portions of its land, Sūryavarman
I (1002–1050) reversed this pattern with his activities in the
west (see chap. 7). Sūryavarman’s extension of Khmer admin-
istration into the Lopburi region had strong economic implica-
tions. Control of the lower Chao Phraya River provided access
to international commerce at Tāmbraliṅga on the Chaiya-
Suratthani coast of southern Thailand, giving the Khmers a
more direct contact with the international trade routes than
had previously been the case (see map 8). After the Cōla̤s elim-
inated Śrīvijaya’s power over the isthmus, the Khmers estab-
lished their own influence over Tāmbraliṅga. 17
Stronger Khmer commercial relationships with the Isthmus
of Kra are indicated by Sūryavarman’s diplomatic initiatives
with south India. In 1020, before Rājēndra Cōla̤’s Southeast
Asian raid, Sūryavarman sent presents to the Cōla̤ king; in
chapter 7 it is argued that this act was the culmination of
eleventh-century Khmer commercial expansion. A Sūrya image
found at Chaiya has been traced to the eleventh-century style
of the Cōla̤ dynasty. 18 Other Cōla̤-style remains from the Wiang
Sa area on the isthmus date to the same tenth-and eleventh-
century period, indicating the existence of a transpeninsular
route between the west coast port of Takuapa, the terminus of
the Persian-Arab trade until the mid-eleventh century, and the
Bay of Bandon. 19
As the Khmers were developing commercial contacts with
the West, the Burmese were pushing south into the delta of
the Irrawaddy and were also moving toward the Isthmus of
Kra. After establishing a base at Pagan in the tenth century,
the Burmese in an eleventh-century expansion annexed the Mon
kingdoms of Pegu and Thaton in lower Burma. Here the
Burmese established control over the Mon commercial centers,
one of which was “Papphala,” the Burma coast port the Cōla̤s
claim they sacked in 1024–1025. Around 1050 the Burmese
were expanding into the Malay Peninsula, where they encoun-
tered little resistance from the Khmers. 20 It would appear that
after 1050 internal disorder prevented a Khmer presence in
the Malay Peninsula, leaving the isthmus to the Burmese. The
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Chams were applying pressure on the eastern Khmer border,
Sūryavarman died, and the center of Khmer political power tem-
porarily shifted north into the Mun River Valley beyond the
Dangrek mountain range. 21 Cambodian epigraphy reflects a
corresponding lack of interest in commercial affairs until the
late twelfth century.
Tenth-century disorder in the region the Chinese knew as
the Nan-chao region north of the Burmese and Khmer realms
appears to have blocked the overland commercial networks con-
necting the Irrawaddy plains and China and thus generated
Burmese interest in opening commercial channels to the south.
22 Prior to the closing of the northern route Burma had served as
a center of exchange between northern India and China; over-
land trade to Bengal via Arakan had been of major economic im-
portance to the Burmese heartland. Commercial centers on the
Malay Peninsula provided an alternative source of foreign com-
modities for this India trade after the route to China had been
closed. The isthmus port of Takuapa was located well within
the range of Mon coastal shipping. The Mon port identified
as Papphala in the Tañjāvūr inscription, located somewhere on
the Pegu coast of lower Burma, could thus have connected the
overland route to northwest India with this maritime route. Pap-
phala’s channel of communication with the isthmus was dis-
rupted by the Cōla̤ raid.
Under Anirruddha (1044–1077), there was new interest in
restoring commercial intercourse with the isthmus. Around
1057, Anirruddha followed his conquest of Thaton by moving his
armies south to Mergui. From Mergui, one historian believed,
the Burmese forces crossed the isthmus. 23 Burmese military
success in this direction is reflected in a request by King Vi-
jayabāhu I (1055–1110) of Sri Lanka for aid against the Cōla̤s,
to which the Burmese king (“the king of Rāmañña”) respond-
ed with “peninsular products,” which were used to pay Vi-
jayabāhu’s soldiers. 24 The Cōla̤s did not look favorably upon this
show of support. In 1067, they launched an expedition against
“Kaḍāram” (Takuapa), in “aid of its ruler,” who had been forced
to flee his country and had sought Cōla̤ assistance: “Having
conquered (the country of) Kaḍāram, (he) was pleased to give
it (back) to (its) king who worshipped (his) feet (which bore)
ankle rings.” 25 Cōla̤ administrative problems in Sri Lanka made
this intervention short, however; by 1069–1070, south Indian
control over Sri Lanka had been eliminated. The Cūlavaṃsa, the
Sri Lankan Buddhist chronicle, records that in 1070, after Vi-
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jayabāhu I gained control, many costly treasures were sent to
the Pagan king; then in 1075, Buddhist priests from Burma were
invited to Sri Lanka to purify the order. 26
Takuapa’s position as the dominant port on the peninsula
was dealt a death blow by this second Cōla̤ raid; the archae-
ological evidence from the Takuapa area terminates in the
second half of the eleventh century, the period corresponding to
the raid. 27 It is significant that the Cōla̤ inscription recording
the 1067 raid states that “Kaḍāram” was the object of this
attack. South Indian inscriptions from the early eleventh
century were consistent in their reference to the king of
Śrīvijaya as the ruler of Kaḍāram, calling him the Kiḍārat-
taraiyan̤. 28 Thus in one historian’s interpretation the eleventh-
century south Indian Perumbur inscription has a reference to
a revolt by Kaḍāram against Śrīvijaya’s control in which the
Cōla̤ ruler was called upon to put down this revolt and restore
Śrīvijaya’s sovereignty. 29 However, such an interpretation ig-
nores the possibility of a Burmese presence on the Isthmus of
Kra.
As noted above, the 1025 Cōla̤ raid resulted in a loosening
of commerce in the strait region, with new ports developing
as alternative entrepôts to Śrīvijaya-Palembang. By the late
eleventh century the northern Sumatra coast was becoming an
important commercial center. The Kedah coast was more strate-
gically located to be a part of this new pattern of Malacca
Strait commerce; there are even architectural similarities be-
tween Kedah and northern Sumatra temples constructed in this
period, reflecting direct contact between the two coasts. 30 A
Burmese military presence at Takuapa, followed by the second
Cōla̤ raid, sealed Takuapa’s fate and reinforced Kedah’s attrac-
tiveness—Takuapa was no longer a port that could offer se-
curity to foreign merchants. Archaeological remains at Takuapa
and Kedah suggest that such a shift occurred, with evidence
at Takuapa ceasing and that of Kedah showing a dramatic in-
crease during the second half of the eleventh century. As a
consequence of early eleventh-century disorders the port elites
of Takuapa transferred their operations to the new “preferred
port” at Kedah, which explains the Arab geographers’ continued
use of “Kalāh” to identify their preferred Malay coastal en-
trepôt—that is, the Arabs used Kalāh to identify their preferred
port wherever it was in the Isthmus of Kra region on the
western Malay Peninsula coast. Similarly, even after Palembang
had been replaced by Jambi as the capital of the Śrīvijaya mar-
itime state, the name “Śrīvijaya” still identified the ports of the
Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia
215
southeastern Sumatra coast. 31 It is significant that in 1070 the
eastern Isthmus of Kra port of Tāmbraliṅga presented its first
tribute to the Chinese court since 1016. 32 This mission may be
seen as a response to the events of 1067: while the Cōla̤ raid
against Takuapa and the shift of Kalāh to the Kedah coast estab-
lished a new pattern on the west coast, Tāmbraliṅga’s mission
was sent to reassure the Chinese that its east coast status was
unchanged. 33
After the 1067 Cōla̤ raid the Burmese moved to ensure their
external trade connections. The importance of communication
networks linking Burma with northern India was recognized
by Kyanzittha (1077–1112) in his restoration of the Bodhgāyā
shrine in Bengal. 34 An inscription from Bodhgāyā (1105–1106)
recorded that ships laden with large quantities of jewels had
been sent by the Burmese ruler to finance the restoration and
the endowment of the Buddhist monument. 35 The fact that this
mission was sent by sea is indicative of Pagan’s new status as
a participant in the regional trade of the Bay of Bengal. An in-
scription from Pagan records another mission that Kyanzittha
sent to either south India or Sri Lanka:
Then the king wrote of the grace of the Buddharatna, Dham-
maratna, and Sangharatna (upon a leaf of gold with vermilion
ink). The king sent it to the Chōli prince. The Chōli prince with
all his array, hearing of the grace of the Buddha, the Law and
the Church, from King Srī Tribhuwanādityadhammarāja’s mission
… he cast off his adherence to fake doctrines, and he adhered
straight away to the true doctrine…. 36
Although stated in religious terms, there are strong eco-
nomic implications in this account. Campaigns that were clearly
military in character, and probably economic in purpose, were
recorded as religious missions; military campaigns became
“quests for relics.” By triumphantly bringing back relics and
sacred treasures the king could justify the expenses of cam-
paigns whose “benefits might remain obscure to the people of
the kingdom.” 37
A network of Buddhist religious diplomacy had actually pre-
ceded Kyanzittha’s efforts. Śrīvijaya’s rulers had endowed
temples (vihāras) at Nālandā in Bengal during the tenth century
and at Nāgapaṭṭinam on the Coromandel Coast in the early
eleventh century. 38 In 1090, the Cōla̤ king Kulōttuṅga I
(1070–1122) renewed an endowment of village revenues to the
Nāgapaṭṭinam vihāra. 39 According to the inscription recording
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this action certain people who were occupying the previously
granted lands were evicted, indicating that the earlier grant
(1006) had been ignored for some time. It is apparent that in
1090, Kulōttuṅga saw some benefit in restoring the original
grant. By the early twelfth century the Nāgapaṭṭinam vihāra had
come under the control of the Theravāda school of Buddhism,
which was soon to become dominant in Burma. 40 Since Kyanzit-
tha’s inscription indicates that Pagan was actively seeking a
trade alliance with either south India or Sri Lanka in this same
period, it is conceivable that the “Chōli prince” who received
his mission was Kulōttuṅga himself. In this case the restoration
of the earlier grant, the conversion of the vih āra to Theravāda
Buddhism, and Kyanzittha’s claim to have converted the Chōli
prince all were connected.
The last line of the Shwesandaw inscription quoted above
includes the statement that the Chōli prince showed his grat-
itude by presenting to Kyanzittha “a virgin daughter of his, full
of beauty,” together with other presents. 41 Kulōttuṅga’s pattern
of beneficent diplomacy is also recorded in Chinese sources.
A stone tablet inscription dated 1079, which was discovered
in a Taoist monastery temple in Canton, states that the Cōla̤
king (“Ti Hua Ka Lo”), also known as the “lord of the land of
San Fo Tsi” (i.e., Śrīvijaya), was the temple’s benefactor. Kulōt-
tuṅga’s gift totaled 600,000 gold cash (a standard of measure
used by the Chinese)—a sizeable sum—which drew the praise
of the Chinese court and bestowal of the title “Great General
Who Supports Obedience and Cherishes Renovations.” 42 It is
difficult to resist the conclusion that the diplomatic efforts of
both Kulōttuṅga Cōla̤ and Kyanzittha were economic in motive,
even though they were clothed in religious garb. Closer eco-
nomic ties by sea to south India and Sri Lanka would have pro-
vided new economic potential for Pagan, and, as Kyanzittha’s
inscription indicates, royal patronage was granted to efforts to
open these new channels of communication.
Evidence of such commercial contact is provided in a
thirteenth-century Pagan inscription noting that a native of
India’s Malabar Coast made a donation to a nān ādēśī temple at
Pagan. 43 The n ān ādēśī was one among several organizations
of south Indian itinerant merchants in existence during the Cōla̤
period whose activities also took them to the northern Sumatra
coast in the late eleventh century. 44 A similar group is asso-
ciated with the Takuapa Viṣṇu temple, which has been dated to
the ninth century. 45 The thirteenth-century Pagan inscription in-
dicates that the merchants’ temple had been present there for
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some time; the recorded gift provided for the construction of
a new shrine (maṇḍapa) for the temple compound, which was
also dedicated to Viṣṇu. Further evidence of a continuing eco-
nomic relationship between Pagan and south India is reflected
in an 1178 Chinese note on the Cōla̤s: “Some say that one can
go there by way of the kingdom of P’u-kan [Pagan].” 46
By using these records to reconstruct the history of the
late eleventh century, it appears that as Burma came to dom-
inate the Takuapa region and as “Kalāh” shifted to the Kedah
coast, the Burmese empire became a focal point of regional
commerce. South Indian merchants who were formerly active at
Takuapa moved their activities either south to Kedah or north
to the regional commercial centers of the Burma coast. In the
process the old dominance over international trade enjoyed by
Śrīvijaya along the Strait of Malacca was shattered even more.
Java and the northern Sumatra ports drew the major interna-
tional route south and west, the Burmese drew the regional
route of the Bay of Bengal north, and the Isthmus of Kra came
to exist essentially as a transition area to the mainland states.
THE UPPER MALAY PENINSULA IN THE TWELFTH
CENTURY
In the following decades, the upper Malay Peninsula became
the center of a multipartite interaction among the Singhalese of
Sri Lanka, the Burmese, and the Khmers as the regional trade
route developed. Based on his study of Buddhist votive tablets
and other evidence, historian G. H. Luce believed that Pagan
controlled the isthmus from 1060 until roughly 1200. 47 Exam-
ining the chronicles of Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat together with
additional evidence, David Wyatt has revised Luce’s dating, sug-
gesting that from 1130 to 1176 Tāmbraliṅga was under Sing-
halese hegemony. 48 To support his position, Wyatt cites Pali
literature from Sri Lanka that regarded Tāmbraliṅga (“Tama-
lingāmu”) as an important twelfth-century center of Buddhist
scholarship. Indeed, a Polonnaruva inscription from the reign
of the Singhalese king Vikkamabāhu I (1111–1132) may even
record the “conversion” of Tāmbraliṅga to the Mahāvihāra
Theravāda school. 49 This inscription honors a great scholar
(thera) of the Sri Lanka saṅgha named Ānanda who was instru-
mental in purifying the order in that land. 50 In the chronicle
the prince and princess of Tāmbraliṅga fled to Sri Lanka after
an invasion of their land. After a period of exile the king of Sri
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Lanka assisted them in their return home—an event that Wyatt
believes took place around 1130—imposing his sovereignty on
the new rulers in the process. About 1176, King Narapati (Nara-
patisithu of Pagan, 1174–1211) of Pegu (Hansavati) made an ex-
pedition into the isthmus and established Pagan’s control over
the Tāmbraliṅga area “with the permission of the King of Sri
Lanka.” 51
Although the farthest extent of archaeological evidence doc-
umenting Pagan’s control over the peninsula has been found
only at Mergui, the Pagan king Cañsū II (Narapatisithu) claimed
control over peninsula ports at Tavoy (a town near Mergui),
Tenasserim, Takuapa, and Phuket—all on the west coast. 52
Burma’s twelfth-century influence on the upper peninsula is
substantiated by the Cūlavaṃsa. 53 When in the 1160s the
Burmese refused (or monopolized) the trade in elephants and
blocked the way across the peninsula to Angkor, the Singhalese
responded with a retaliatory raid. In this account five ships
from Sri Lanka arrived at the port of “Kusumīya” (Bassein)
in Rāmañña (lower Burma) led by a certain Kitti Nagaragiri.
Furthermore, a ship commanded by a government treasurer
reached Papphala, the Mon port mentioned in the Tañjāvūr in-
scription, where Singhalese troops fought their way into the
country’s interior to the city of Ukkama and killed the monarch
of Rāmañña. This brought the kingdom under Sri Lanka’s in-
fluence. The people of Rāmañña granted concessions to the
Singhalese and envoys were sent to the community of monks on
the island with the result that the Theravāda monks interceded
with the Sri Lankan king on behalf of the Burmese. 54
Since only six ships reached Burma, this could not have
been the record of a large-scale war but rather of a successful
naval raid against lower Burma. Such a plunder expedition
was similar to those undertaken by the Cōla̤s in the eleventh
century, with additional emphasis given to gaining trade con-
cessions. It is unlikely that the raid penetrated to Pagan and
killed the Burmese king. There has been an attempt by histo-
rians to show that the death of King Alaungsitthu (1113–1165?)
coincided with this raid and that the 1160s was a period of
general disorder in Burmese history. However, translations of
inscriptions that have been made in the 1970s indicate that
Alaungsitthu ruled until 1169, four years after the date of the
Singhalese raid. 55 Rather than a period of disorder, this was a
time of great prosperity according to Pagan epigraphy of the
1160s, with normal state affairs continuing vigorously. Burmese
chronicles, however, record that during Alaungsitthu’s reign the
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lower Burma provinces were in a state of “anarchy” and “re-
bellion,” suggesting that a local governor had become quite
powerful and attempted to assert his independence from Pagan.
“Ukkama,” the residence of the “king” killed by the Singhalese
has been identified as a commercial and administrative center
of lower Burma—possibly Martaban, a later capital of the
area—where a local governor could well have been put to death
by the raiders. 56 Governors in lower Burma derived consid-
erable income from trade revenues generated by the regional
commercial networks. Such an obstruction of commerce may
actually have represented an attempt to establish independent
control over this lucrative trade. It is notable that one of the
attack ships was led by a Singhalese treasurer, an individual
who would have had a great interest in increasing trade rev-
enues. Herein the raid of the Singhalese on lower Burma can
be seen as the high point of the twelfth-century competition for
control of the isthmus and is best explained in terms of an in-
terruption and difficulties concerning the patterns of trade and
communication in this area.
Epigraphic evidence from Sri Lanka supports such an eco-
nomic interpretation of the raid. An inscription from the twelfth
year of the Singhalese king Parākramabāhu I (1165) records
a land grant to a certain Kit Nuvaragal (Kitti Nagaragiri) as
a reward for carrying out a successful expedition against
“Aramaṇa” (Rāmañña). 57 The expedition had been sent against
“Kusumīya” (Bassein), which had been sacked. When the people
of Aramaṇa sent envoys to conclude a treaty, Parākramabāhu
granted favors to Kitti Nagaragiri—for forcing envoys to be
sent and not for a great military achievement. At the death of
Parākramabāhu in 1186, his successor Vijayabāhu II concluded
a final treaty of peace with Burma, and through the remainder
of the twelfth century the way to Cambodia remained open. 58
While the twelfth-century relationship of Sri Lanka and
Burma is relatively clear, that between Sri Lanka and the Khmer
state is not. As indicated in the Cūlavaṃsa, the major reason
for the 1160s conflict between Sri Lanka and Burma was Sri
Lanka’s concern that Burma was preventing free access to the
communication channels between Sri Lanka and Angkor. This
explanation is indicative of the peninsula’s relationship to the
Khmer core domain as well. The upper peninsula was signif-
icant as the intermediary between Sri Lanka and Angkor, so
that it was more important as a source of economic and cultural
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contact than as an area to be dominated politically. As a result
Sri Lanka was willing to risk a war with Burma to preserve the
peninsula’s neutrality.
Further evidence of contact between Sri Lanka and Angkor
is provided in two twelfth-century inscriptions from Sri Lanka.
One from late in the century specifically states that friendly
relations with Cambodia were maintained. 59 In the second in-
scription, one of the city gates at Polonnaruva was called “Kam-
bojavāsala,” reflecting a possible Cambodian settlement in the
city. 60 Of particular interest is the Cūlavaṃsa’s reference to the
interception by the Burmese of a betrothed Singhalese prin-
cess en route to “Kamboja,” a story that is presented as one
of the events leading to the 1160s war. 61 A marriage alliance
between the Singhalese and the Khmers suggests that such
alliances were a common tool of the Singhalese royal house.
The cross-cousin marriage patterns of the Singhalese royalty
favored continuing relationships, and to form such an alliance
with Cambodia would have provided long-range benefits. 62
Thus, as in the eleventh century, the northern Malay
Peninsula played an important role in communication between
Cambodia and the West. From the other direction, Chinese
authors of the Sung period saw the upper east coast of the
peninsula as being within the Cambodian sphere of influence,
and one of them believed that its markets produced some of the
best incense available:
Beyond the seas the Teng-liu-mei gharuwood ranks next to that
of Hainan [where the price of incense had become too high]. It is
first rate. Its trees are a thousand years old…. It is something be-
longing to the immortals. Light one stick and the whole house is
filled with a fragrant mist which is still there after three days. It is
priceless and rarely to be seen in this world. Many of the families
of the officials in Kuangtung and Kuangsi and families of the great
ones use it. 63
Cambodian interaction with the peninsula is evinced in the
relationship between the Khmer realm and Tāmbraliṅga on the
east coast of the Isthmus of Kra. The last recorded embassy of
the latter to the Chinese court was that of 1070, while Cam-
bodia sent embassies in 1116, 1120, 1128–1129, and 1131. 64
Either of two conclusions can be drawn: (a) that the Khmers
came to dominate the upper coast between 1070 and 1130, such
that they sent embassies and Tāmbraliṅga did not; or (b) that
with Cambodia’s internal political problems in the late eleventh
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and early twelfth centuries Tāmbraliṅga became a neutral port.
In the twelfth century Chinese merchants were dealing directly
with the sources of supply on the peninsula, Sumatra, and
Java, eliminating their eariier need for a dominant port of the
Śrīvijaya type. Tāmbraliṅga, as a recognized source of forest
products, would not have needed to advertise these products by
sending embassies to the Chinese court. This differed from the
case of the western Chen-la (used consistently by the Chinese
to designate the Khmer realm) state of Lo-hu (Lavo), which sent
a present of elephants to the Chinese court in 1155 in search
of recognition. 65 This mission indicates that the Chao Phraya
Valley (Lo-hu) was then free from Khmer control. If, as noted
previously, Southeast Asian states sent embassies to China pri-
marily in times of stress, then the Khmer, who were more con-
cerned with pressuring Vietnam and Champa in the east during
the first half of the twelfth century, needed to undertake mis-
sions to reassure the Chinese that the disorders—and the con-
sequent expressions of political independence by population
centers like Lo-hu that had formerly been subject to Khmer au-
thority in Chen-la’s western territories—would not interrupt the
flow of southern commerce.
The independence of the formerly subordinate western re-
gions of the Khmer realm corresponds in time to the increasing
number of military expeditions that the Khmer monarchs waged
against their eastern Vietnamese and Cham neighbors. These
expeditions assume an important role in Khmer history from
the late eleventh century on, and Khmer inscriptions imply that
Khmer monarchs, like their Cham neighbors, began to depend
more and more on war booty to finance the activities of their
court. Khmer inscriptions eulogize successful expeditions of
royal “conquest” and consequent redistributions of booty to
Khmer temples. The increasing importance of these plunder
expeditions as a source of state revenue demonstrates the in-
ability and/or unwillingness of or lack of necessity for Khmer
monarchs to increase the state’s direct revenue collections from
its agrarian base.
As explained in chapter 6, the Khmer state’s “ritual sover-
eignty” statecraft depended on endowing temple networks with
revenue assignments rather than on creating an elaborate bu-
reaucracy that could tap its realm’s agricultural production. The
success of this system is reflected in Khmer inscriptions that
report the widespread prosperity, general stability, and con-
tinuous expansion of the state’s agrarian base despite periodic
wars of succession and invasions by the Vietnamese and Chams,
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which also dominate Khmer history from the eleventh century
on and must have placed additional financial burdens on the
state. In contrast, chapter 7 noted that the Cham realm had
inadequate revenue potential of its own to fund the affairs of
the Cham state, and Cham rulers therefore pursued the wealth
of their neighbors to finance their statecraft instead. It is puz-
zling, then, that although the Khmers developed a wet-rice
agrarian system that was more than capable of supplying the
state’s needs (see chap. 6), Khmer monarchs pursued plunder
anyway. Their obsession with war may have been a necessary
response to the periodic Cham incursions; that is, the best de-
fense was a good offense. A second possibility is that these wars
represented a quest for the prowess and personal honor that
were bestowed upon a Khmer king who led a successful ex-
pedition against the Vietnamese and Chams, and thereby ful-
filled the Khmer subjects’ expectations of their monarchs. If
this were the case, the Khmer military, which appears to have
been perpetually active, could have lived off its plunder. It is
also conceivable, thirdly, that, like the Burmese state of Pagan,
Khmer monarchs had so lavishly endowed state temples to
promote ritual sovereignty that they had to explore alternative
sources of income to provide for their personal activities—for
example, to initiate new temple construction and ritual and to
pay the various troops that participated in Khmer military cam-
paigns—instead of increasing the assessments of their agricul-
tural producers. A fourth possibility is that, even more than
revenue, the Khmer monarchs needed manpower to staff the
state’s ever-active military and administration and as well to
meet the labor needs of the expanding agrarian system and
their ambitious construction projects. As noted in chapter 7,
Sūryavarman I, facing such ballooning expenses, encouraged
the development of urban and international commerce, which
he tapped through the formalization of service relationships
with merchants. But his economic initiatives were not ade-
quately carried through by his successors, who lost control over
the commercially important western sector of Sūryavarman’s
realm and seem to have depended more on war booty as a prime
source of additional state funding and manpower.
Both Khmers and Chinese participated in a twelfth-century
China/Cambodia exchange network. Sūryavarman II
(1113–1150) was personally involved in trade relations with
China and possessed his own fleet. 66 During his reign Chinese
trading vessels visited Cambodia with cargoes of silk goods
and porcelain. 67 In 1147, “specific favors” were conferred upon
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the Khmer state by the Chinese. 68 Sung porcelain has been
excavated at Angkor, but there is a noticeable gap in the epi-
graphic evidence of any commercial relationship until the reign
of Jayavarman VII (1181–1218) when the inscriptions of Ta
Prohm (1186) and Prāḥ Khan (1191) make reference to Chinese
articles. 69 In addition, an inscription from the Phimānākas
palace temple at Angkor Thom mentions a flag made of col-
ored Chinese silk. 70 The Prah Khan inscription also includes
a reference to localities in the northern access zone to the
peninsula, including Ratburi and Petburi, but there is no record
of any specific relationship between Angkor and the Isthmus of
Kra. 71 A Cham inscription makes reference to a campaign by
Jayavarman VII on the peninsula in 1195, which would indicate
an attempt to restore a formal relationship. 72
On the other hand, archaeological remains reflect a cultural
and economic tie between the isthmus and Cambodia rather
than direct Khmer political presence. Earlier historians used the
Khmer inscription of the Grahi Buddha near Chaiya, which they
dated to 1185, as proof of Khmer administrative control over
the upper peninsula, but when the inscription was revealed to
be a product of the last decades of the thirteenth century, many
dropped this conclusion. However, the eleventh-century inscrip-
tion from Phimai (1041) discussed in chapter 7, recorded the
local use of an animal dating cycle typical of later Thai rather
than Khmer practice. 73 This inscription provides early evidence
of Thai-speaking peoples who were administratively incorpo-
rated into the Khmer government of Sūryavarman I. 74 Signif-
icantly, this same animal cycle was used in the Grahi Buddha
inscription. Historians have argued that this reference to the
Thai animal cycle necessitates the assignment of a date to the
Grahi Buddha later than 1185. However, based on the Phimai
inscription’s earlier use of this animal cycle and on evidence
of a communication network connecting Phimai and Lopburi in
the eleventh century, it is indeed possible that Thai-speaking
peoples had reached the lower Chao Phraya Valley and the
peninsula by the late twelfth century and had taken their place
within the mixed cultural configuration of that area with its
international commercial routes and communications. 75 This
would reestablish a late twelfth-century date for this inscription
and show a definite Khmer cultural presence in this key area at
that time.
Clay Buddhist votive tablets scattered between the Bay of
Bandon and Nakhο̨n Si Thammarat provide further evidence of
communication between the isthmus and Angkor. These twelfth-
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century tablets have been linked to the multiple figures of
Angkor Thom, and represent a departure from earlier
Mahāyāna style tablets of the eleventh century; they have more
affinity to Theravāda Buddhism. 76 Thus, a common Theravāda
Buddhist religious interest, as with Mahāyāna in the earlier cen-
turies, encouraged regular communication among Pagan, Sri
Lanka, and Cambodia. The Cūlavaṃsa records twelfth-century
religious interaction between Pagan and Sri Lanka. By the mid-
twelfth century, Tāmbraliṅga had also become a center of the
Theravāda Buddhist school. Legend records that Pagan was
converted to the Singhalese Theravāda school at the end of the
twelfth century when five monks returned to Burma from a pil-
grimage to Sri Lanka and built the Chapata temple under the
patronage of King Narapatisithu. One of these monks was said
to have been the son of a Khmer king, probably Jayavarman VII.
77 Indeed, art historians believe that the Preah Palilay temple at
the Angkor Thom Bayon, constructed during Jayavarman VII’s
reign, exhibits a Theravāda Buddhist style that was introduced
from Burma via the Chao Phraya Valley. 78
As noted, Burma and the upper Malay Peninsula lay on a
regional route of communication across the Bay of Bengal that
connected Sri Lanka to Pagan and Angkor. While historians
have in the past postulated that the Isthmus of Kra was polit-
ically dominated by one or another of these powers at various
times in the century, the evidence cited above indicates that
Burma, Cambodia, and Sri Lanka each had a real interest in
the peninsula but that this interest was more of a commercial
nature, making attempts to dominate the peninsula politically
both unnecessary and perhaps undesirable. That explains why
the raid of the Singhalese on lower Burma in the 1160s can best
be understood in terms of an interruption and difficulties con-
cerning the pattern of trade and communication in the area. The
Burmese had come to dominate this trade and had blocked the
way across the peninsula to Angkor, thereby bringing the re-
taliatory raid from Sri Lanka. Through the end of the twelfth
century the way was reopened and rapidly became a path for
the spread of Theravāda Buddhism to the western and central
sections of the Southeast Asian mainland, establishing a cul-
tural relationship of great significance for later centuries.
Thus, the upper Malay Peninsula receded from the patterns
of power and trade in the island world and was drawn into those
of the mainland. In addition, where previously it had been the
locus for outside contact with the islands and the international
routes for the Mons of Rāmañña-desa and Dvāravatī in Burma
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and Thailand, now the isthmus provided a more regional contact
for the wet-rice states of Pagan and Angkor and through them
to the northern mountain areas where the stirrings of the Thai-
speaking peoples were becoming ever more important.
THE DECAY OF SOUTHEASTERN SUMATRA
ENTREPÔTS
In the twelfth century Southeast Asia’s spices were becoming
popular in Europe; the cure for all sorts of ailments was sought
in mixtures of pepper, ginger, cinnamon, sugar, cloves, and
especially nutmeg. Furthermore, Southeast Asian spices were
useful as flavoring for meats that were increasingly a part of the
European diet. 79 By the thirteenth century this Western demand
had greatly enhanced the commercial importance of Southeast
Asia as a source of trade goods in Western eyes and as the
source of valuable spices in particular. The name Java became
synonymous in the West with spices; to Javanese ports came
Western traders whose bases were spread throughout southern
India, Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia. 80
During this time merchants based on the Java coast carried
on two kinds of external trade, a trade with East and West (pri-
marily with India and China) in spices and other luxury goods,
and an export-import trade in rice to the Moluccas and to other
parts of the eastern and western archipelago in exchange for
spices and cloth. 81 The spices were marketed to Eastern and
Western merchants in Java’s coastal ports. 82 Java’s success as
the intermediary of the international spice trade was based on
a mutual dependency that came to exist between Java and the
islands of the eastern archipelago. The great demand for their
spices in international markets made it more economically expe-
dient for the eastern archipelago’s populations to concentrate
their energies on spice production rather than on subsistence
agriculture. Java on the other hand had the ability to produce a
surplus of rice and enjoyed a strategic position geographically
adjacent to the international maritime route. The goods Marco
Polo observed in Java on his return to Europe by sea from China
at the end of the thirteenth century were goods the Javanese re-
ceived in exchange for their own products on the intrainsular
trade route. His list of Java’s trade goods included sapanwood
(used in making red dye) and diamonds from western Borneo,
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white sandalwood incense from Timor, nutmeg from Banda and
the Moluccas, and pepper from north and east coast Sumatra
ports. He reported that
Java … is of surpassing wealth, producing … all … kinds of
spices,… frequented by a vast amount of shipping, and by mer-
chants who buy and sell costly goods from which they reap great
profit. Indeed, the treasure of this island is so great as to be past
telling. 83
The Chinese were already importing Southeast Asian spices
in quantity from Java by the twelfth century. Pepper produced
in northern Sumatra was also in demand, and Chinese con-
sumption of Javanese-supplied pepper was quite substantial. 84
Southeast Asian pepper was regarded as of lower grade than
that produced along India’s Malabar Coast, but it was cheaper
and more directly available to the Chinese. Eastern Javanese
monarchs, who controlled the redistribution of spices from the
eastern archipelago, fostered this trade. 85
In the face of growing Javanese commercial stature ports in
the Malacca Strait region diminished in importance as centers
of international trade. The unsettled nature of the strait realm
in the thirteenth century is demonstrated in local chronicles
that report Thai incursions into the region during the latter part
of the century. In the late thirteenth century a Thai political
system was evolving in the lower Chao Phraya rice plain in the
region between the declining Angkor realm to the east and the
Burmese domain of Pagan to the west. While this emerging Thai
state depended on the fertile wet-rice lands of central Thailand
as its economic base, the records of this civilization indicate
that Thai monarchs depended on their control over the trading
of rice as a principal source of income rather than upon rev-
enues directly assessed on landholders. 86 The Thai state’s eco-
nomic interests are demonstrated by the late thirteenth-century
efforts of a Thai monarch to develop a commercial link with
the main international maritime route via direct confrontations
along the Malay and Sumatra coasts.
Ramkamhaeng, who reigned over the Sukhothai state until
1317, informs us that his power extended to the sea in the
south. 87 This claim is validated in a Chinese source relating that
around 1295 the Thais were ordered by the Chinese not to again
wage war with Malāyu/Jambi on the southeastern Sumatra
coast. 88 Did the Thais indeed undertake a naval expedition
against the southeastern Sumatra coast? Early nineteenth-
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century ethnographers recording local oral tradition in the
Jambi region found several legends of wars with the Thais; one
legend holds that Jambi was devastated by a Thai army led by
a Jambi prince. 89 While Jambi legend admits the inability of
Jambi to defend itself from the Thais, the Hikayat Raja Pasai, the
court chronicle of the northern Sumatra Samudra-Pasai pepper
entrepôt, proudly reports that ports along Sumatra’s northern
coast were able to repulse Thai attacks, adding credence to the
theory that there was a Thai attempt to impose their interests in
the strait region during the late thirteenth or early fourteenth
century. 90
Whether their motives were political or economic, the Thai
incursion was a singular effort. The Chinese record a tribute
mission from an independent Malāyu/Jambi in 1301, shortly
after the Yuan court’s warning to the Thais to refrain from
future raids upon the Sumatra coast. 91 On the other hand,
Chinese sources report that Singapore Island (Tumasek) in the
strait region was subject to the Thais in the early fourteenth
century, before this area came under Malacca’s authority. 92
Arab navigational treatises, drawing information from twelfth-
through fourteenth-century sources, also describe Singapore
Island as the last point on the “Coast of Siam.” 93
One wonders who supported the Thais on this maritime ex-
pedition, since there is little historical record of a Thai “navy.”
Likely supporters were the independent communities of Malay
seamen of the post-Śrīvijaya age, groups with no clear commit-
ments to any major political authorities who had become pirates
to support themselves. With memories of their past glory, such
groups might have willingly thrown in their lot with the Thais
in return for promises of booty from this expedition, although
potentially more important was the possibility of regularizing
their future income if the Thais could reestablish political order
in the strait. These seamen, as in earlier days, had a double po-
tential; they could further the political ambitions of the Thais by
serving as the Thais’ naval force, or, if political disorder in the
region continued, they could go on preying upon the shipping
channels and obstructing Thai commercial interests they might
at one time have assisted. 94
Any thoughts of restoring the Śrīvijayan maritime state the
Thais may have had were, however, frustrated. The system
of economics upon which the Śrīvijayan state was based had
passed. In earlier centuries the southeastern Sumatra coast
had become commercially prominent due to its strategic po-
sition relative to the Strait of Malacca and the Java Sea. At
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the edge of both, the Śrīvijayan realm had monopolized the
flow of Southeast Asian commodities into the channels of in-
ternational trade that were concentrated in Śrīvijaya’s ports.
By the thirteenth century the southeastern Sumatra coast was
no longer the point of primary access to the goods from the
Java Sea, having been replaced by Java ports. While the Ja-
vanese ports became primary in the thirteenth century, Sumatra
coast centers assumed a secondary commercial role, and did
not regain commercial stature again until demand for Sumatran
pepper elevated commercial centers of the Sumatra northern
coast to first-order status in the late fourteenth century. 95
Java extended its authority over southeastern Sumatra’s
ports during the thirteenth-century reign of Kěrtanagara
(1268–1292), which was critical to Java’s commercial ex-
pansion. The last mission from Palembang to China is reported
in 1277, and by 1286 Javanese power had reached Jambi. 96
An inscription with this date is found on a Buddha recovered
from the Batang Hari River near Palembang; the inscription
proclaims the installation of the Buddha by four Javanese offi-
cials under the authority of Kěrtanagara “for the joy of all the
subjects of the country of Malāyu.” 97 How far north the power
of Kěrtanagara extended is unknown. The Javanese were inter-
ested in neither reestablishing Śrīvijaya’s old empire nor able
to. Rather, they were intent upon destroying potential rivals in
the lucrative trade and in serving notice to the strait region,
which had by that time lapsed into a state of general disorder
whereby widespread piracy was endangering shipping passing
through the strait, that they would intervene, if necessary, to fa-
cilitate the passage of trade ships through to Java’s ports. 98
However, in imposing their authority over the strait the
Javanese found that their interests ran counter to those of
the Chinese, who were themselves assuming a new role in
Southeast Asian commerce. The old T’ang and Sung tributary
system had passed; both the Yuan and Ming were concerned
with Southeast Asian affairs and were willing to take direct
action in Southeast Asia if it was necessary to guarantee the
flow of goods to Chinese ports. 99 This interest is reflected in
Yuan warnings in the late thirteenth century that future Thai
incursions into the strait would not be tolerated. When the Ja-
vanese challenged what the Yuan conceived to be China’s au-
thority to supervise commerce in the strait, the Yuan chose to
mount a naval raid in 1292 against the Javanese, ostensibly to
establish who was dominant over Southeast Asia’s sea channels.
Piracy in the strait was a major issue in bringing on this con-
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frontation. Thus when the Yuan court called for tributary mis-
sions from the strait it was in essence an attempt to draw from
would-be strait entrepôts guarantees of security for the mar-
itime trade route, while also limiting Java’s role in the region. In
return for tributary exchanges of trade goods with the Chinese
court, China was now willing to guarantee the independence of
China’s allies from Javanese or Thai control or to restore order
in states beset with internal strife through direct intervention.
By the late thirteenth century it is doubtful whether the
Jambi region held any commercial prominence. The memory
of Śrīvijaya may have induced the Thai attack against the old
Śrīvijaya heartland as well as the Chinese attempts to resurrect
the old tributary order of Sung times; the Chinese still looked
to Malāyu/Jambi as their designated authority over the strait
commercial realm. 100 Yuan dynastic records report a tributary
mission led by two Muslims from Malāyu/Jambi in 1281, a
mission that was undertaken by the remnants of a maritime
community resident in Jambi at that time. In 1293, the leader
of the Yuan expedition against Java notified the Yuan court that
Malāyu/Jambi had been issued imperial orders to show their
submission to the throne by sending sons or brothers of the
rulers to the Chinese capital. This was done in 1294. 101
Chinese records of Palembang illustrate the transition
taking place on the southeastern Sumatra coast. Palembang did
not respond to late thirteenth-century Yuan initiatives to once
again solicit tributary missions from Southeast Asia, which sup-
ports the conclusion that in that age Palembang was subject
to Jambi’s authority. 102 Not until the early Ming period in the
fourteenth century did Palembang seem to regain some degree
of independence. Ming histories viewed Palembang as a minor
commercial center, attributing its poverty to Javanese conquest
and the fact that thereafter “few trading vessels [went] there,”
and made reference to Palembang as the “Old Harbor.” 103
The commercial role of the southeastern Sumatra coast by
the fourteenth century had become insignificant; its leadership
over Sumatra’s commerce was being assumed by developing
pepper centers clustered along Sumatra’s northern coast,
beyond the Javanese commercial sphere. 104 There were only
two ports on the northern Sumatra coast invited by the Yuan
to send tribute missions to China in the late thirteenth century.
One was La-mu-li (Lamuri/Ramni), a port on the northern tip of
the island frequented by Arab traders since at least the tenth
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century A.D. 105 The second was Su-mu-tu-la (Samudra), which
during the thirteenth through the fifteenth centuries came to
dominate north coast trade.
SAMUDRA-PASAI AS A RIVERINE SYSTEM
CENTER OF TRADE
The name Samudra first appears in Yuan records when a
Chinese mission returning from the Coromandel Coast of India
in 1282 stopped at Su-mu-tu-la. The ruler of Su-mu-tu-la sent
two ministers, both Muslims, to accompany the Yuan envoys on
their return voyage. 106 Marco Polo claimed to have visited Su-
mu-tu-la on his return voyage from China shortly thereafter in
1292 but had little to say about the port except that its pop-
ulation had not yet converted to Islam and that it was settled
by primitive fishermen and farmers. 107 The conversion to Islam
took place soon after, sometime around 1296, the date on a
gravestone attributed to a local chief who is named in local
literary records as the state’s founder and first sultan. This
conversion must in some way have related to Samudra’s par-
ticipation in the international trade that was dominated in that
period by Muslim seamen. By the thirteenth century Samudra
was a regular stop for voyages between India and China. While
it would appear that Samudra was initially less significant to the
Indian Ocean traders than was Ramni to the north, by the four-
teenth century Samudra had emerged as the preeminent port
on the northern Sumatra coast. 108
Early references to Samudra as an entrepôt among external
sources place it on the Pasangan River, the longest river in
that area of the Sumatran coast. However, all the gravestones
of Samudra’s rulers have been found in a small village called
Pasai, located upriver on the more southern Pasai River. It ap-
pears that the center of royal authority was shifted there in a
later period, possibly for protection against piracy and other
raids from the sea. 109 Ibn Battuta’s mid-fourteenth century ac-
count of his visit to the urban center of Samudra noted that
it was located a little inland from the coast. He traveled four
miles by land from a coastal port he called Sarha to the city of
Samudra, which he reported was “large and beautiful.” 110 The
Samudra ruler, according to Ibn Battuta, assigned an “admiral”
(laksamana) who supervised the affairs of the Sarha port as the
Samudra ruler’s agent. 111 Local tradition holds that Pasai was
established as the seat of power for a son of the first Samudra
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ruler—Pasai was founded by the sultan on a spot where his
hunting dog was attacked by a mousedeer “full of fight,” which
was considered auspicious—but two or three generations later
Pasai subjugated Samudra. The transfer of royal power to Pasai
is explained as the consequence of a war between the two urban
centers that was blamed on the sultan of Samudra, who brought
on the war when he eloped with one of Pasai’s women against
the advice of a wise old court official. The first reference to
Pasai in the Yuan court histories dates to 1309, when three
embassies from Southeast Asian states are recorded: one from
Champa, another from Palembang, and the third from Pah-sih
(Pasai). 112
The legend of the founding of Pasai is one among many
preserved in the Hikayat Raja Pasai. This court chronicle is a
semihistorical romance in which the events described were, to
those who compiled the text, subjectively rather than objec-
tively true. 113 The Hikayat was the first among the histories
(sejarah) composed by archipelago Muslim states; its earliest
sections (those considered to have the most historical accuracy)
must have been composed by the late fifteenth century. 114 While
in later archipelago chronicles indigenous traditions dominate,
the Hikayat Raja Pasai more consciously adapted Indian folk-
tales to the local Malay folk tradition; the use of Indian, Islamic,
and local symbols are all important to the Hikayat’s narration.
The image of the Samudra-Pasai court projected by the Hikayat
is that of a cosmopolitan urban center on the edge of jungle.
The cosmopolitan atmosphere of the royal palace, the pageantry
and colorful activities of its court, and its lavish display of
wealth, which was continually shared with the subjects of the
Samudra-Pasai rulers, were all necessary to “awe” the upriver
populations. These hinterland people, who largely turned their
backs to the Islamic civilization of the coast and retreated up-
river, might otherwise have had little desire to participate in the
state’s activities. In gaining the participation of their hinterland
populations, Samudra-Pasai rulers instituted tributary or recip-
rocal gift-giving exchanges that provisioned the coast with the
forest products (especially pepper) that were necessary for the
coastal population’s international trade.
It is tempting to cite the conversion to Islam by Samudra’s
late thirteenth-century elite as an explanation for this port’s
fourteenth-century success. The Hikayat Raja Pasai as well as
the various chronicles of later Malay states preserve the legend
that the first conversion of a state within the entire island realm
took place in Samudra-Pasai and view the subsequent pros-
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perity of Samudra-Pasai, Malacca, and other Muslim states of
the archipelago as a direct consequence of this event. 115 Ac-
cording to the Hikayat Raja Pasai, Samudra was founded one
generation before its ruler converted. The Hikayat relates a
symbolic tale of the migration of the founder of the Samudra-
Pasai state from a place in the north—possibly Ramni—to
Samudra, and shortly thereafter Samudra became prominent as
a commercial center. The story stresses an alliance between this
adventurer and the native population of the hinterland as the
source of his future success. 116
Early Ming histories note that “merchants from all sides
collect at this place (Samudra-Pasai), and as the country is
distant and the prices high, the Chinese who go there make
more profit than elsewhere.” 117 But in the early fifteenth
century a report of internal strife in Samudra-Pasai was given
by the Chinese Muslim scribe and translator Ma Huan, who had
accompanied one of the voyages of the Muslim eunuch Cheng
Ho. 118 Cheng Ho made a series of early fifteenth-century ex-
peditions into the south, one of the reasons being to put down
piracy in the area and to thus stimulate the flow of commerce
to south China. Such internal strife is a common feature of the
Hikayat story, especially after the shift of the center of royal
power to Pasai.
The history of the Samudra-Pasai realm as it is projected
in the Hikayat Raja Pasai and in Chinese and Western sources
can be understood in terms of the diagram of decentralized
Southeast Asian riverine political systems that was introduced
in chapter 1. Samudra and its successor Pasai were both strate-
gically located downriver urban centers in adjacent river
systems that flowed from the Sumatra interior, which allowed
the Samudra-Pasai rulers to dominate commerce flowing up-
river to the interior and downriver to the coast from their center
of royal power. In Ibn Battuta’s account the coastal port he
calls Sarha was equivalent to a point A in the riverine system
model. Located some four miles inland was the urban center
of Samudra, the locus of royal power, which may be seen as
functioning as a point B. Consistent with the riverine system
model, Samudra-Pasai’s growth depended on its elite’s success
in forging political and economic links with its upriver hin-
terland. This hinterland was the critical source of commodities
that provisioned the international traders who began to utilize
the local port.
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That an exchange relationship was achieved is documented
in external accounts that describe the diverse commodities
available to international traders at Samudra-Pasai. These ac-
counts indicate that Samudra-Pasai’s initial fourteenth-century
emergence as a commercial power was related to its provision
of goods to Indian and other Western markets. Unfortunately
there are only two surviving reports on this early trade, one be-
longing to Friar Odoric, a Western cleric who never traveled to
Southeast Asia himself but acquired a knowledge of Southeast
Asia in India during the early fourteenth century, and the other
to Ibn Battuta, who provides occasional descriptions of Indian
Ocean trade in his account of his travels in the mid-fourteenth
century.
Odoric indicates that Samudra’s reputation as a prosperous
port of trade was high in India and reports that the entrepôt
had a “great abundance of produce,” naming among the food-
stuffs available there pigs, fowls, butter, and rice, and also
noting the local availability of gold and tin. 119 His emphasis
on foodstuffs shows that there was a local trade in bulk com-
modities for immediate consumption rather than a trade in the
luxury goods that are normally stressed in Western and Chinese
accounts of Southeast Asia’s early maritime trade. It would
seem that the view of Samudra in early fourteenth-century
Indian ports, as reported by Odoric, was that Samudra was a
source of provisions for travelers passing through the Strait of
Malacca region rather than a source of trade goods—the spices
and Chinese goods most desired by India-based traders who
traveled to Southeast Asia in that era. Odoric refers to a trade
in metals—he noted that gold and tin were utilized as local
mediums of exchange—indicating that exchanges in precious
metals as well as exchanges in kind were a part of the normal
course of this port’s trade. Since there is no report by Odoric of
the export of bulk commodities of food from Samudra to India
it would appear that Samudra was developing two levels of ex-
change, one a local network that dealt in consumable foods, the
other an international trade that depended on the exchange of
precious metals for local products.
Ibn Battuta acknowledged Samudra’s emergence as a major
international commercial center in his account. Exports from
Samudra listed in his journal include coco-palms, areca-palms,
aloes, various varieties of fruit, camphor, bamboo, tree incense,
cloves, nutmeg, and mace. 120 Since most of these were not local
products, Samudra must have had considerable contact with
other commerical centers not only along the Sumatra coast but
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also, and especially, with Java. Camphor, for instance, is known
as the major export of the western Sumatra coast prior to the fif-
teenth century, notably from the Barus region. Cloves, nutmeg,
and mace were all products of the eastern Indonesian archi-
pelago that would have reached Samudra-Pasai via Java’s ports.
It would seem that the availability of these spices was critical to
the initial emergence of Samudra-Pasai as a major international
entrepôt. The marketing of Javanese spices attracted Western
merchants to Samudra-Pasai by eliminating the necessity of
their traveling to Java. But what was unique about Samudra-
Pasai among Sumatra coast ports that drew both Western and
Javanese traders?
Exploring the second part of this question in turn answers
the first. Java’s developing commercial contact with China in
the fourteenth century made the northern Sumatra coast im-
portant to Javanese commercial interests. Northern Sumatra
was the source of pepper that was much in demand among
Chinese merchants. The Chinese, as previously noted, desired
Sumatran pepper, which was less expensive than that of India’s
Malabar Coast though inferior in quality. 121 Nicolo Conti, an
adventurer who traveled to Southeast Asia in 1435, describes
Samudra-Pasai as “a very noble emporium of the island [i.e.,
Sumatra],” and his is the first Western account to stress
Samudra-Pasai’s role as a point of collection for pepper. 122 Ma
Huan’s account of Cheng Ho’s early fifteenth-century expedi-
tions also reports that Samudra-Pasai was the northern Sumatra
collection center for pepper. He describes Samudra-Pasai as a
commercial center where “there are foreign ships going and
coming in large numbers, hence all kinds of foreign goods are
sold in great quantities in this country.” 123 Ma Huan knew
Samudra-Pasai during the time when Chinese influence in the
Strait of Malacca area was at its height, yet remarkably he ac-
knowledged no Chinese trade at Samudra-Pasai, as opposed to
other “foreign” trade. Implicit in Ma Huan’s omission of ref-
erence to Chinese merchants in the northern Sumatra com-
mercial realm is the fact that an active maritime trade existed
between the northern Sumatra coast and Java in the late four-
teenth and early fifteenth centuries such that Java’s ports sup-
plied China markets with Sumatran pepper. 124
Thus the key to Samudra-Pasai’s commercial success was
the Samudra-Pasai coastal elite’s ability to concentrate the mar-
keting of northern Sumatran pepper production at their en-
trepôt by mobilizing the flow of pepper and other goods from
their upriver and subordinate river system hinterlands to their
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port. Ma Huan’s report on Samudra-Pasai describes the “people
who reside over against the mountains” as the source of
Samudra-Pasai’s pepper. 125 Indeed, as already noted, the
legend of Samudra-Pasai’s founding attributes the state’s
success to an alliance between the coastal and upriver pop-
ulations. A “prince” from another northern Sumatra riverine
system sought a new home after his exile by the rulers of his
old homeland. Arriving on the Samudra-Pasai coast, this prince
traveled upriver to the hinterland where he negotiated an al-
liance with the chiefs of the interior populations. He is said to
have been recognized as being royal and rich (the two essen-
tials for legitimate and successful rule in the eyes of the local
population) and as a source of future prosperity. 126 Having se-
cured the backing of the interior leadership, the prince then
led a force that was composed of these chiefs and their war-
riors back downriver, where they assisted him in establishing
hegemony over the coastal realm. Thereafter the hinterland
chiefs retreated to their upriver homeland leaving the coastal
domain for the prince, who thence became the first ruler of
Samudra-Pasai.
Applying the riverine system model to this legend and the
other accounts of the Samudra-Pasai entrepôt (see fig. 1), the
new ruler may be seen establishing his authority over a point A
or B (Samudra and its port of Sarha in Ibn Battuta’s account),
but depending on alliances with chiefs at upriver points C and
D in the interior. Although these chiefs had contributed to the
ruler’s rise to power, they had withdrawn to the hinterland
where they continued to maintain their old patterns of chieftain-
ship. Ibn Battuta distinguishes between the coastal population
and that of the interior as being a Muslim coast and a “heathen”
hinterland, a view confirmed by Odoric. 127 Ibn Battuta com-
ments that the relationship between the two was not peaceful,
as there was constant warfare that he views as resulting from
the attempts of the Muslim coast to convert the heathens of
the interior. But Ibn Battuta also states that Samudra-Pasai de-
pended on the export of “aromatic plants” (pepper?) that were
to be found “in districts occupied by the infidels; in the Muslim
districts they are less plentiful.” 128 It would seem that the wars
with the interior that were considered by Ibn Battuta to have
been due to the religious fervor of the coastal regime were in
reality economic in motive, as the coastal rulers attempted to
secure the “aromatic plants” from the hinterland’s population to
market in their port. Ibn Battuta adds credence to such a con-
clusion by his statement that the “infidels pay the Muslim lords
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a poll-tax to secure peace.” 129 This reflects a “tributary” rela-
tionship whereby the residents of the interior were expected
to provide commodities that the residents of the coast could
export; if deliveries were not made it would seem that the
population of the interior was subject to a military expedition
by the coast’s rulers to extract these commodities by force.
Ibn Battuta’s reference to frequent raids against the “heathen
of the hinterland” indicates that Samudra’s rulers faced con-
tinual difficulty drawing goods from their upriver realm. That
this relationship was a perpetual problem in the history of
the Samudra-Pasai state is reflected in the Hikayat Raja Pasai,
which interprets the numerous hostilities between the coast and
its interior as political rather than economic conflict.
Samudra-Pasai’s subordinate commercial realm must have
included much of the northern Sumatra coast, including Barus
on the west coast as well as Ramni on the northern tip of the
island. Ibn Battuta sailed along the eastern coast of Sumatra
for twenty-one days on his way to China from Samudra in the
mid-fourteenth century and regarded all the countries along the
coast as being part of the sultan of Samudra’s domain. 130 A
Pasai inscription dated 1389 claims Pasai’s authority over the
ruling family of the Malay Peninsula’s Kedah coast, although
there is no known evidence on the Malay Peninsula to substan-
tiate this claim. 131 Ma Huan’s account of the expeditions of
Cheng Ho reports chasing a usurper into the northern Ramni
(La-mu-li) realm in 1412, implying that Samudra-Pasai and
Ramni were related; thereafter Ramni began to send envoys to
China, whereas previously only Samudra-Pasai had been send-
ing “diplomatic” missions. 132 Implicit in Ma Huan’s account is
the belief that Samudra-Pasai’s dominance over other coastal
commercial centers such as Ramni was economic rather than
political in nature, since the Chinese in their written records
were always extremely sensitive to issues of political su-
premacy. Ramni’s response to Chinese initiatives, that is, the
sending of envoys to the Chinese court, indicates its political
autonomy. Ma Huan reports other conflict between Samudra
and its neighboring riverine systems. There was an attempt by
a “tattooed-faced king of Nagur,” a rival northern Sumatra port
later known as a pepper center, to usurp the Samudra-Pasai
throne; 133 Ma Huan also notes friction between Samudra-Pasai
and the Menangkabau realm to the south. 134
Consistent with this evidence, in the riverine system model
Samudra-Pasai’s riverine network (A) can be seen establishing
its commercial dominance at the expense of other Sumatra
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coast entrepôts and their river systems (rival A 1s) in its
dealings with foreign markets (Xs). Was this due to conquest
over rival A 1s, or is it possible, since the available records
do not reflect Samudra-Pasai’s political supremacy over rival
entrepôts, to view Samudra-Pasai’s emergence as a dominant
commercial entrepôt as being due to the importance of Pasai’s
pepper exports? In the latter instance the riverine system model
would have had to be modified to accommodate a port system
that attracted foreign traders because it controlled a single
commodity or because of its superior marketing of a commodity
that was the most important regional product sought by foreign
merchants. Such a port would not only have attracted interna-
tional traders who sought the primary commodity, but it would
also have drawn local traders who transported the products of
other areas to this first-order commercial center in the hope of
marketing their secondary goods to the international traders. In
this way the preferred port became a collection center; rather
than traveling to numerous ports to acquire goods it was far
more expedient for international traders to frequent one strate-
gically located port. Thus Southeast Asia based traders initially
carried Java’s spices and China’s goods to Samudra-Pasai not
only to acquire northern Sumatran pepper but also to make
contact with Western traders who because of the presence of Ja-
vanese and Chinese goods at Samudra-Pasai did not have to sail
farther into the archipelago. 135
The nature of trade at Samudra-Pasai, although insuffi-
ciently documented in the Hikayat Raja Pasai, is described by
others. An international community of merchants was in resi-
dence there. 136 Ibn Battuta notes the role of the Samudra-Pasai
ruler’s representative as the supervisor of port trade and its
various participants. It would appear that while the ruler or
his representatives were directly involved in trade through the
collection of port cesses paid in kind, the ruler did not hold a
monopoly over the exchange of local pepper and other goods,
although he derived an important portion of his state’s revenues
from trade that was conducted at his port. A colleague of Ma
Huan reports that such duties in this and other Sumatra ports
were not normally collected in gold but were paid with pepper.
137 This collection in kind is significant when one considers
the possibilities of such an arrangement. The export duties
collected in kind would have allowed the ruler to participate
(through his representatives) in the marketplace as a seller of
pepper. A prosperous pepper trade would thus have doubly ben-
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efited Samudra-Pasai rulers: a high rate of exports increased
the amount of export duty collected—paid in pepper—which
pepper was then marketed by the rulers’ representatives. A
substantial demand for pepper thus brought prosperity and in-
creased profits not only to Samudra-Pasai’s traders but also to
its rulers. 138
An anchorage fee was also levied by Samudra-Pasai’s rulers
on all ships entering the harbor—the rate was determined ac-
cording to the size of the ship. Imports were subject to a
standard duty of 6 percent, except for foodstuffs that were
exempted. 139 It is likely that these import duties were also
levied in kind. Goods in demand at Samudra-Pasai, as noted
in a 1436 Chinese report—Chinese celadon and colored silks,
Java-cloth (batik?), copper and iron, and numerous consumable
goods—would have been appropriate for royal consumption as
well as for redistribution to supporters of the Samudra-Pasai
royal lineage. Although there is no definite evidence docu-
menting the extent to which the ruler directly participated in
trade, he must have at least made symbolic profit from the re-
distribution of foreign goods to points upriver from the coast.
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It is also significant that in almost all records of Samudra-
Pasai’s imports and exports there is reference to
metals—notably gold, tin, and silver—as important commodities
of exchange. Friar Odoric’s early fourteenth-century account
is the first, listing gold and tin as commodities available at
Samudra-Pasai. 141 Ibn Battuta’s mid-fourteenth century record
states that the inhabitants of Samudra-Pasai conducted their
trade using “pieces of tin and native Chinese gold, unsmelted.”
142 What was the source of these metals? Did the tin come
from Sumatran or Malay Peninsula mines—thus providing an
early record of trade in Malay tin—and the gold from China or
from local mines, or does reference to the exchange of metals
at Samudra-Pasai indicate that its inhabitants conducted their
trade not in kind, as is widely believed to have been the norm
in pre-European Southeast Asia, but in some instances utilized
precious metals as a medium of exchange? 143 Is it possible that
the exchange of metals took place only in Samudra-Pasai’s in-
ternational commercial community in the acquisition of goods
for export, while market exchanges for local consumption, such
as foodstuffs, were transacted in kind? The latter theory is sup-
ported by records that Samudra-Pasai officials valued exported
goods (notably pepper) in gold, suggesting that metallic values
were commonly used in pricing goods for export. But the fact
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that cesses were collected in kind, while there is nothing to
indicate that anchorage fees and import duties were collected
after first establishing metallic values, leads to the conclusion
that there were two types of exchanges taking place within the
Samudra-Pasai port. 144
The nature of Samudra-Pasai’s continuing evolution as a
center of trade is evinced in fifteenth-century reports that Pasai
had to import food to feed its commercial community, evidence
that is quite contrary to the early fourteenth-century view of
Friar Odoric that Samudra-Pasai had an abundance of locally
produced consumable food. That Pasai was importing food in
the late fifteenth century is indicated by the Portuguese scribe,
Tomé Pires, writing in the early sixteenth century. He specifies
that Pasai exempted all foodstuffs from import duties—other im-
ported goods being subject to a 6 percent duty—and that an-
nually sixteen junks loaded with rice from Pegu in lower Burma
and thirty from Ayudhya in Thailand supplied Malacca and Pasai
before 1511. 145 The first plausible implication of this report
is that Samudra-Pasai’s interior population was becoming spe-
cialized such that their production of pepper and other com-
modities for the international trade did not allow them time
to tend to the production of foodstuffs or did not necessitate
their cultivation of food for their own consumption. If this was
the case the interior population would have exchanged their
“cash crops” for imported food, an exchange facilitated and en-
couraged by the omission of import duties. A second possibility
is that the volatile relationship between Samudra-Pasai’s coast
and interior populations noted above prevented the flow of bulk
consumables from the hinterland to the coast and thus necessi-
tated the import of food—encouraged by the omission of import
duties on foods—to feed Samudra-Pasai’s commercial popula-
tion. 146 While increased commercial specialization among the
hinterland population may be plausible in explaining Samudra-
Pasai’s import of foodstuffs, the hostilities between the coast
and hinterland must also have been a significant factor. Pires’
early sixteenth-century report of the late fifteenth century sup-
ports this view, noting that Samudra-Pasai was a significant port
despite frequent hostilities between the port administrators of
the coast and the inland populations. 147
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MARITIME TRADE AND STATE DEVELOPMENT
CIRCA A.D. 1300
The establishment in 1250 of the Mameluke dynasty in Egypt
brought stability to the Red Sea passage from the Indian Ocean
to the Mediterranean, and in 1368 the founders of the Ming dy-
nasty overthrew the Mongolian Yuan dynasty and established
their capital at Nanking, a city on the Yangtze River in China’s
commercial heartland. With the collapse of the overland
caravan route across the central Asian steppes that the Yuan
had organized, the maritime route between East and West that
passed through Southeast Asia once again boomed. On the
western end the Mameluke dynasty contracted with Venetian
merchants to facilitate the flow of Asian goods into the growing
European markets of the postcrusade era; on the eastern end
the Ming began to solicit trade by sending maritime expeditions
into Southeast Asia. Southeast Asians responded by expanding
their marketing of pepper, tin, and spices, and new entrepôts
emerged as well. The archipelago’s trade was no longer dom-
inated by entrepôts on the southeastern Sumatra and Java
coasts; now regions on the northern end of Sumatra and in
the Spice Islands of the eastern Indonesian archipelago that
were the sources of these commodities became more direct
participants in the trade route. During the fourteenth century,
Southeast Asian states dependent on commercial revenues rose
in the island realm at Samudra-Pasai, Malacca, Brunei, and
Makassar and on the mainland at the Thai center of Ayudhya
(1351) up the Chao Phraya River from the coast, at Pegu, the
Mon center in lower Burma, and at a new Khmer center at the
intersection of the Bassac and Tonle Sap rivers near present-
day Phnom Penh—a location with more direct access via the
Mekong River to the sea, which replaced Angkor in the early fif-
teenth century.
During the fourteenth to early sixteenth centuries a new
pattern of world trade emerged linking the continents of Asia
and Europe in an even more direct exchange of goods; the
Southeast Asian trade regions described below were integrated
into this world trade network. The new pattern left no single
part of the world as the dominant “center” of the trading
network. Each zone, along with the interconnected sea route
from China to western Europe, was important to the whole
system. Long voyages transporting goods intended for faraway
markets were largely abandoned. The full participation in
shipping of Chinese, Javanese, Indian, Burmese-Peguan,
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Persian-Arab, Italian, and Jewish traders from the Middle East
and India broke down the long voyage into several consecutive
small voyages. The exchange of goods in regional ports was in-
tensive; each region in turn overlapped another. There were in
fact many zones of trade dominated by a few seafaring people
who sought profit from the transport of goods in each zone.
The dominant ports in each trade zone became the chief distrib-
utors of foreign goods in their region as well as the source of
local products for traders from another zone. The people of the
Southeast Asian hinterlands were brought into contact with the
outside world via such dominant ports, and they entered into
the mainstream of regional history in this period after being left
on the periphery through most of the premodern age.
There were at least six zones of trade through which goods
from China had to pass before they reached northeastern
Europe during this time. The first zone had its center in
southern China, where traders carried goods in junks from one
port to another. This zone included ports along the Vietnam
coast, the Gulf of Thailand down the east coast of the Malay
Peninsula, the Philippines, and made contact with another zone
in the ports of Tuban, Gresik, Japara, and Demak in Java. The
second zone was controlled largely by commercial groups based
in Java and extended eastward to the Spice Islands and the
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southwestern ports of Sulawesi, northward along the coast of
Borneo to the island of Mindanao, and westward to the ports
of the east coast of Sumatra, merging with another zone at
Malacca and the northeastern ports of Sumatra.
The third zone encompassed ports along the two coasts
of India, especially in southern India and Sri Lanka, Gujarat,
and Bengal. It connected with the second zone in the western
Indonesian archipelago in the east, and the Red Sea in the
west. The fourth zone focused upon Alexandria and included
other ports of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern
realm. Italian merchants dominated the fifth zone, and distribut-
ed Asian goods to the sixth zone, which extended from the
Iberian Peninsula at the western end of the Mediterranean,
where goods were redistributed to northwestern Europe and
from there to the Hanseatic traders of the northern seas. The
Hanse commercial network carried goods further to the east
and northeast. 148
By the beginning of the fourteenth century five commercial
zones of maritime trade had emerged in Southeast Asia. Each
of the five was a prosperous and independent regional picture
of prosperity. Going from west to east, the first zone was com-
prised of a Bay of Bengal regional trade network that began
on the Coromandel Coast of southern India and Sri Lanka and
included Burma, the upper Malay Peninsula, and the northern
end and western coast of Sumatra. The northern and western
coasts of Sumatra became important in the post-1300 era due
to increasing world demand for pepper. In particular, the
Samudra-Pasai entrepôt became the principal supplier of
pepper to Western and Eastern traders, supplementing the
pepper exports of India’s southwestern Malabar Coast that had
met the more limited demand of earlier times. On the mainland
Pegu in the Irrawaddy River Delta of lower Burma began to take
part in the commerce involving northern Sumatra, the Strait of
Malacca, and the Bay of Bengal, especially as a supplier of rice
to provision the commercial populations from the East and the
West who were frequenting the Malacca Strait’s new pepper
ports. 149
The second commercial zone was the Strait of Malacca. This
region, which would become the most important of the com-
mercial zones by the fifteenth century—immediately prior to
the European incursion—was in the fourteenth century still in
a state of transition and was still a bone of contention between
the Thais and the Javanese. Founded by a prince who claimed
royal status as the successor to the rulers of the Śrīvijayan mar-
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itime empire of earlier times, Malacca’s rise was due to the ini-
tiatives by the Ming dynasty at the end of the fourteenth century
to fill what they perceived to be a political void in the area
and to contain piracy, which was jeopardizing the steady flow of
commerce into south China’s ports. 150 By the 1430s, however,
Malacca’s prosperity would depend less on Chinese support and
more on interaction with Javanese and other Southeast Asian
merchants and networks. The Javanese continually dominated
the flow of spices from the eastern Indonesian archipelago to
Malacca, which was used as a trade intermediary through which
to market Javanese rice and Java Sea spices as well.
The third trade zone included the upper Malay Peninsula’s
eastern coast, Thailand, and the lower coast of Vietnam, the re-
gions bordering the Gulf of Thailand. The Thai state of Ayudhya
developed in the first half of the fourteenth century in the lower
Chao Phraya Valley and thrived as a result of new foreign con-
tacts. Initially hostile to the rise of Malacca in the south, which
was viewed as an intruder into the Thai political and economic
sphere, Ayudhya began to export rice to Malacca in the fifteenth
century and was as well a commercial center for trade with
the Philippines and China. 151 Thai participation in this trade
zone is well documented by deposits of their porcelains at the
sites of numerous Southeast Asian ports active during the post-
thirteenth-century era. 152 Meanwhile, following the demise of
Angkor in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the remnants
of the Khmer civilization of Cambodia established a new base at
the edge of the Mekong Delta, which provided them with a com-
mercial link to the Malay populations on the northern fringe of
the South China Sea. 153
The Sulu Sea region comprised the fourth commercial zone
and included the western coasts of Luzon, Mindoro, Cebu, and
Mindanao in the Philippines, and the Brunei region of Borneo’s
north coast. All served to varying degrees as facilitators of trade
between China and the Spice Islands to the southeast. These
Spice Islands were the source of nutmeg, mace, cloves, san-
dalwood, and other more exotic commodities such as parrots
and birds of paradise, all of which flowed through the Sulu
Sea to China and Thailand in the north, as well as to Java
and Malacca in the west. The Chinese presence was not
new—Chinese traders had established these bases in the Philip-
pines during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 154 By the four-
teenth century an intensive and extensive network of native
trade had evolved to distribute imports and to gather the forest
products desired by Chinese traders. This trade in both its in-
Transitions in the Southeast Asian Commercial and Political Realms...
244
ternal and external dimensions stimulated major changes in
Philippine society. It called for formal regulation of commercial
contact between indigenous populations and the foreign traders
and encouraged the formation of village clusters (barangay)
that were controlled and protected by local chiefs (dātu). 155
Archaeological research has revealed urban settlements of over
five hundred households in the Manila area dating to the pre-
Spanish period, as well as other urban sites on the Mindoro,
Mindanao, and Cebu coasts. Each of these communities’ trade
links with China are demonstrated by their association with sig-
nificant deposits of Sung and Ming porcelain dating to the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries. The archaeological remains of
early Laguna, Mindoro, and Cebu society especially document
the rapid growth of trade centers as people from the interior
and other islands congregated around ports fortified with brass
artillery—to protect against the piracy rampant in this region’s
sea channels—in response to the opportunities and demands
afforded by foreign trade. 156 The Brunei coast of Borneo was
important to the Chinese in its own right, for it was Borneo’s
jungles that provided camphor and other gums and resins used
in China for pharmacological purposes. 157
The Java Sea network was the fifth Southeast Asian trade
zone, and included the Lesser Sunda Islands, the Moluccas,
Banda, Timor, the western coast of Borneo, Java, and the
southern coast of Sumatra. Eastern Java had emerged as the
strongest among the archipelago’s political systems by the thir-
teenth century and came to facilitate the Java Sea spice trade.
158 The new east Java-based state of Majapahit that came into
existence at the end of the thirteenth century established a
loose hegemony over the eastern and western archipelago. Be-
cause Java had limited control over the strait maritime realm
there was a rise of piracy in the Strait of Malacca and along
the southern Borneo coast in the fourteenth century. It was due
to this piracy or the weakness of Java that Malay sea popula-
tions with Chinese support established Malacca at the end of
the fourteenth century. Chinese traders then could avoid the
Borneo coast route to Java and the Spice Islands and acquire
the spices from the Javanese at Malacca or from Sulu Sea en-
trepôts.
Thus the foundation of Malacca at the beginning of the fif-
teenth century corresponded with these new commercial op-
portunities and undercut Samudra-Pasai’s position as the most
prosperous among western archipelago commercial centers.
Malacca emerged as China’s preferred trade intermediary
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shortly after its founding in 1402 by Prince Parameśvara, a
fugutive prince-consort who was driven out of southeastern
Sumatra or the Singapore Island region by Majapahit’s forces
in the previous century. 159 The state he founded became heir to
the maritime influence and political and economic power that
was previously enjoyed by the Śrīvijaya state. Initially Malacca
specialized in facilitating Western trade with China, but with
China’s withdrawal from active participation in Southeast Asian
affairs by the second quarter of the fifteenth century Malacca
was able to forge a new economic relationship with the Java-
nese, whereby Javanese traders began to shift their spice trade
from Samudra-Pasai to Malacca. Samudra-Pasai consequently
lost its reputation as a source of Javanese spices, and Indian
Ocean merchants began to converge on Malacca to acquire
them. A corresponding increase in demand for Sumatran
pepper in Western markets softened the impact of this shift of
the Javanese spice trade away from Samudra-Pasai, but by the
early sixteenth century greater Western activity in the maritime
routes and the enhanced economic opportunity in Malacca drew
even Samudra-Pasai-based traders with their pepper to this new
hub of Southeast Asian commerce. 160
These new patterns of trade brought about a different type
of state in maritime Southeast Asia. The increasing importance
of local products, spices, pepper, and various forest products in
the international trade, the intensity of Javanese-, Chinese-, and
India-based shipping in the area that resulted in more compe-
tition among Southeast Asia’s ports, encouraged a policy of ter-
ritorial expansion that was actively pursued by important states
in the Strait of Malacca region. The extension of control over
territory that produced marketable products was essential to
these states in order to prevent the flow of products to rival
ports. Loose federations of port towns characteristic of earlier
times disappeared as in the new states only one dominant port,
usually also the seat of government, was tolerated. Power was
extended from this port center over nearby ports as well as their
upriver hinterlands. Samudra-Pasai, Malacca, and Pedir, the
dominant ports of the Strait of Malacca region during the late
fifteenth century, had varying control over their interiors and
competed for commercial and political dominance over ports on
the two coasts of the strait. 161 The extension of power by these
maritime states was different in nature from that of the earlier
Śrīvijaya age. A state’s authority over another river system pen-
etrated deeper into the hinterland. Śrīvijaya, as we have seen
in chapter 4, was most interested in providing entrepôt facil-
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ities for foreign traders, utilizing alliances with its supporters to
assure the security of its ports. 162 Śrīvijaya rulers were less in-
terested in mobilizing the flow of local products from their hin-
terland to their coastal ports, being content to provide a neutral
commercial facility for the exchange of Western, Chinese, and
Southeast Asian products. Port fees and foreign products ac-
quired by the Śrīvijaya ruler in his ports were redistributed to
the ruler’s two groups of supporters, the leaders of the Malay
seamen who facilitated the flow of trade through the Strait of
Malacca to Śrīvijaya’s ports and the chiefs of the upriver hin-
terland populations.
These redistributions reinforced the magical relationship
between the ports’ ruler and his allies, whereby the Śrīvijaya
ruler shared his spiritual prowess with his loyal followers.
Śrīvijaya was not engaged in administratively annexing the
lands and people of the Sumatra hinterland and was concerned
only with recognition of its authority by other ports. As de-
scribed by O. W. Wolters, “the [Śrīvijaya] ruler was much more
than a hoarder of material wealth … his influence promoted sen-
sations of psychological well-being among his followers, for his
person was the effective ceremonial centre.” 163 New interest in
more directly controlling the people, their production, and their
access to foreign trade changed the administrative structure of
early Southeast Asian riverine system states from one that was
based on religio-mystical loyalty of the subordinate regions to
the center to one that was characterized by military-adminis-
trative control by the center over smaller communities in its hin-
terland. 164
Samudra-Pasai is best thought of as a transitional state, par-
ticipating in the new patterns of trade but being incapable of
subordinating the riverine systems of the Sumatra coast to the
degree that Malacca and its successor Johor did on the Malay
Peninsula, nor was it able to institute a monopoly on the export
of pepper comparable to that accomplished by Aceh, which suc-
ceeded Samudra-Pasai as the dominant northern Sumatra po-
litical system in the early sixteenth century. 165 Samudra-Pasai’s
authority was confined to the Sumatra coast in a way similar
to the pattern of Śrīvijaya’s statecraft of the previous age. Al-
though Samudra-Pasai’s dominance over rival ports appears to
have been more economic than political in nature, analysis of
the state’s history shows a higher degree of structured inte-
gration between the coast and its upriver hinterland than seems
to have been the case in Śrīvijaya. 166 It is this movement toward
a more integrated state system, explained in the Hikayat Raja
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Pasai and other sources as involving the subordination of the
hinterland to the coastal populations, that is characteristic of
the new Southeast Asian states that emerged at the dawn of the
European maritime incursions. The history of Samudra-Pasai
well illustrates the consequent frictions of this transition, as
Samudra-Pasai’s history is that of continuous hostility on the
part of the hinterland populations to demands by the coast for
their production.
Samudra-Pasai has been characterized here as illustrating
a riverine state system that existed on the periphery of a hin-
terland civilization yet was dependent upon traditional relation-
ships with its interior to mobilize the flow of hinterland products
to its coast. As chapter 4 argues for Śrīvijaya, so too Samudra-
Pasai’s dominance over other ports and their Muslim elites had
something to do with the redistribution of the spiritual prowess
of the Samudra-Pasai ruler. This is best shown in the records of
Samudra-Pasai’s successors.
While Malacca assumed the leading position among com-
mercial centers in the western Indonesian archipelago in the fif-
teenth century, Samudra-Pasai still retained importance as the
source of Malacca’s legitimacy. The Malacca court chronicle,
the Se jar ah Melayu, modeled the conversion of its ruler to
Islam on that of the Samudra-Pasai monarch and cited these
conversions as marking the turning point in Malacca’s early his-
tory. 167 The Sejarah Melayu text, which was composed in the
early sixteenth century, summarized the first half of the Hikayat
Raja Pasai and noted that Malacca’s sultans continued to draw
upon Pasai-based Islamic scholars to legitimize this transfer of
Malay commercial and political leadership from Samudra-Pasai
to Malacca. In a later episode a Malacca sultan sent an envoy
to Pasai to ask whether heaven and hell remain there forever.
The envoy took with him seven tahils of gold dust and two con-
cubines to present to the Pasai theologians who were solicited
to answer the question. The first answer given was based on the
Koran: they remain there forever. But one of the Pasai scholars
had second thoughts, realizing that the ruler of Malacca would
not have sent so far afield for so obvious an answer. Thus an
esoteric answer was given in private to the Malacca envoy to
the latter’s satisfaction, and the gold and concubines changed
hands. 168 The light-hearted treatment of the “answer of Pasai”
episode by the chronicler suggests that his audience was more
interested in how the gold and concubines were to be won by
the correct answer to the riddle than in Islamic theology. But
it is important that Samudra-Pasai was regarded as the appro-
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priate place to solicit such an opinion on Islamic theology. The
records of the Aceh state, too, reflect the reverence held by
the Acehnese toward Samudra-Pasai as the “cradle of Islam”
and the source of legitimacy for Aceh’s rulers. Pasai’s Islamic
scholars were patronized by Aceh’s elite, and Aceh’s sultans
made regular pilgrimages to Pasai to renew their prowess. 169
The Samudra-Pasai rulers’ repeated difficulty with their hin-
terland populations must have related to the fact that the non-
Muslim populations of this hinterland did not view the ruler
as holding unusual spiritual prowess. Numerous sources honor
Samudra-Pasai’s ruler for his Islamic piety but record that de-
spite the ruler’s zealous patronage of Islam his hinterland pop-
ulations had chosen not to convert. In this light the conversion
of the Sumatra hinterland to Islam during the era of Aceh’s
hegemony must have been critical in better linking the interior
populations to the Acehnese royal house, employing the “ritual
sovereignty” characteristic of the classical age. 170
The development of these more integrated state systems
was encouraged by the fact that access to Chinese and Western
markets could no longer be dominated by a single entrepôt. Fur-
thermore, new marketing options were open to Southeast Asian
traders within Southeast Asia itself. Southeast Asia’s trade had
become more than a “peddling trade” in luxury items. Beyond
self-sufficiency, the commercially oriented states of Aceh,
Malacca, and Johor among others depended upon rice and other
food imports to feed their cosmopolitan populations. A bulk
trade in rice, salt, dried fish, and pepper was thus established
to provision these developing urban centers. 171 Revenue from
trade and not agricultural tribute became the most vital source
of a state’s income, even in the case of the land-based rice
states of Ayudhya and Java. 172 The old delivery mechanisms
of the earlier age, often dependent upon personal alliances
and oaths of allegiance between coastal rulers and hinterland
chiefs, or relying totally on the natural flow of products from
the interior to the coast, were insufficient to meet the demand
for Southeast Asian products in the new commercial age. To in-
crease the flow of hinterland products to the coast a greater
degree of coast-hinterland economic and political unity was nec-
essary.
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Maritime Trade and State
Development in
Fourteenth-Century Java
MaritimeTradeandStateDevelopmentinFourteenth-CenturyJava
The emergence in the thirteenth century of the Javanesecourt at Majapahit in eastern Java marked the beginning of
new levels of both internal and external political and economic
integration in Southeast Asia generally. Although central and
eastern Java had been united by Airlangga after A.D. 1025, the
division of the kingdom between his two sons in 1044 recreated
two independent and often unfriendly rival states. The process
of unification had to begin anew some two centuries later, when
Rājasa (who was also known as Ken Angrok) founded the
Singasari-based dynasty. By 1294, when Rājasa’s descendent
Kĕrtarājasa (1294–1309) came to the throne at Majapahit,
rulers reigned over a far-flung maritime empire that included
ports on Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, Borneo, and the spice-
producing islands of the eastern portion of the Indonesian archi-
pelago. 1 This maritime empire was patrolled by a Javanese
“navy” made up of a seafaring people resident in north Java
coast ports whose loyalty to the empire was directly propor-
tional to the Majapahit monarch’s ability to deliver to them a
substantial cut from the profits of the region’s spice trade. No
doubt, their economic domination of these overseas ports was
more real than any true political control, but there is no
question about Majapahit’s economic and political control over
eastern and central Java.
Throughout the fourteenth century the power of the Ma-
japahit center continued to develop and ultimately led to a most
significant transition, a change in the political structure that
was to be a hallmark for the future of the entire region, for the
developments that were clearly discernible in Majapahit Java
from 1294 on would subsequently appear as features generally
characteristic of Southeast Asian statecraft in the fourteenth
through sixteenth centuries. Java was one of the first states
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to make the transition from the classical pattern of statecraft
in which the wealth of the realm gravitated toward the center
through a network of ceremonially defined tributary relation-
ships to a state in which the royal house came to rely not so
much on ceremonial relationships as on direct central collection
of local specialties and local surpluses (which were sometimes
initially justified as direct contributions to exclusively royal cer-
emonies). But it is not simply because Java was first that it can
stand as a paradigm for an age. Equally important is the avail-
ability of material on the characteristics of pre-1300 Southeast
Asian classical states and highly revealing sources that illu-
minate important features of the fourteenth-century change. As
this chapter will demonstrate, external demand for Southeast
Asian products, domestic integration in both the political and
economic arenas, and regional control of the spice trade were
all a part or a complex dynamic in which all three elements both
acted upon and responded to the others.
JAVA IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
As noted in chapter 5, Java first began to blossom as a com-
mercial power and center of international trade in the eleventh
century. Increasing commercial interaction between the popula-
tions of the Javanese hinterland and port areas on Java’s north
coast was reflected in the inscriptions of eastern Java-based
monarchs; indeed, the largest percentage of royal charters
(metal plate inscriptions that record the monarch’s official in-
teraction with local communities and were intended to serve
as legal records to document local rights or royal expectations
of the community) issued during the tenth through the twelfth
centuries concerned port or coastal settlements in the Brantas
Delta region of eastern Java. 2 Both taxation and price-fixing
were part of royal strategies intended to produce revenue for
the royal treasury from the trade, but they also were utilized
to control the trade and traders by mediating the foreigners’
contact with the Javanese rice-producing hinterland and en-
couraging the development of commercial contacts beyond
Java. Although inscriptions from this period provide the first ref-
erences to foreigners attached to the royal court—and overseas
trade was of increasing importance to the Javanese ruler as a
source of revenue—this international linkage seems to have had
little direct impact on village-level market trade.
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Although a number of inland sites have produced a consid-
erable quantity of tenth-and eleventh-century Chinese ceramic
sherds and contemporary Chinese references to the volume of
trade with this area imply a reasonable level of consumption
of Chinese trade items outside Javanese court circles, there
is no mention of imported luxury goods or of the presence of
foreign merchants in local inscriptions. 3 Foreigners and for-
eign goods could well have been absent from the local market,
for trade was not the only mechanism by which goods found
their way into the countryside. Rather, it is believed that Ja-
vanese kings acquired prestigious foreign goods from overseas
traders in Java’s coastal ports and then redistributed these
luxury items throughout the realm, including the hinterland,
through alliance-making or the presentation of gifts. Such redis-
tribution played a major role in shoring up the Javanese ruler’s
hegemony in this period, since such luxury goods were shared
with those loyal to the monarch. On the other hand, nonprestige
goods of foreign origin, specifically metals and dyes, do appear
in local market lists and undoubtedly reached these markets
via indigenous exchange networks. Such imported goods were
funneled through eastern Java ports by Javanese traders who
then took them into the hinterland, where they were traded
for local products, especially rice. These traders could then
market the rice in the coastal ports. 4 Once in the ports, this
rice was exported to the eastern archipelago islands where it
was exchanged for spices. These spices brought to Java on the
return voyage were exchanged for foreign products brought
by Eastern and Western merchants and the triangular trade
pattern was completed.
Within Java, due to the demand for rice for export, mar-
keting networks continued to evolve that united interior
markets with Java’s coastal ports. By the Majapahit era local
produce moved via important hinterland market centers to
north coast ports along a realmwide road system that served
as a horizontal supplement to the vertical pattern of Java’s
river systems. In the fourteenth century all roads led to the
Majapahit court and connected important regions that lacked a
river route with the capital. 5 In the Nagarakĕrtagama, the Ma-
japahit court’s epic poem that was composed in the mid-four-
teenth century, the crossroads near the royal court were cited
as being: “south of the market place, that is the crossroads,
sacred, imposing.” 6 The road system and its intersection near
the court were sanctified in the poem, reflecting the network’s
great importance to the livelihood of the Majapahit realm as a
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whole in the eyes of its monarchs. The ruler and his retinue
periodically traveled along this road network, making what the
Nagarakĕrtagama described as “royal progressions” to receive
the personal homage of the various royal subordinates and to
confirm royal authority over areas distant from the court that
the king did not directly administer. 7
In addition to their political importance, the roads were also
a means for transporting rice and other trade goods. The Na-
garakĕrtagama speaks of “caravans of carts” along Java’s roads
and of crowded royal highways. 8 Special reference is made to
tradesmen who accompanied the royal progressions and who
camped in open fields near the court’s lodging at the con-
clusion of each day’s journey. 9 These carts and tradesmen are
well represented in the Majapahit era’s temple reliefs. But use
of the road network was seasonal because of the monsoons.
Movement on the road network was concentrated in the dry
season from March to September. The Nagarakĕrtagama de-
scribes road travel in the wet season:
The road … over the whole length then was difficult, narrow.
There followed rains. The incline being altogether slippery
several carts were damaged there, colliding one with another. 10
Because of the difficulty of transporting commodities along
these roads, the bulk of Javanese rice was conveyed by river
from the hinterland to the coast, and foreign goods moved up-
river in return.
The “Canggu Ferry Charter of 1358” sheds some light on the
movement of cartloads of goods and traders (akalang) to and
from the royal court. 11 The context of the charter’s comments
indicates that traders traveled with cartloads of goods over Ma-
japahit’s roads and that ferryboats at critical river crossings
in the road network were at least large enough to carry the
traders’ carts. Some seventy-nine ferry crossing “districts” are
enumerated in the charter. 12
Canggu was a commercial center on the Brantas River, and
its importance in the Majapahit realm is reflected in the account
of Ma Huan, writing about the early fifteenth-century maritime
expeditions of Cheng Ho. Ma Huan wrote that one could reach
the marketplace of “Chang-ku” by sailing 70–80 li (twenty-five
miles) upriver on the Brantas from Surabaya on the coast, and
from there one could reach the Majapahit capital by walking for
half a day. 13 The Pararaton, a Javanese account of the Majapahit
era composed in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century,
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confirms Ma Huan’s report, describing Canggu as the point of
collection for goods passing between the coast and the capital.
14
The records of the Majapahit state provide a view of the
interrelationship of trade and statecraft in the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries. Four Majapahit inscriptions dating to the
second half of the fourteenth century are especially valuable
since they register modifications in the way that the state col-
lected taxes from three eastern Java commercial communities.
In documenting these policy transitions, each inscription re-
ported the traditional method of revenue collection that dated
from the pre-1300 era, and in doing so demonstrated changes
taking place in the Javanese socioeconomy that parallel devel-
opments in other Southeast Asian regions in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries.
JAVANESE TRADE AND STATECRAFT IN THE
EARLY MAJAPAHIT ERA
The Ferry Charter of 1358 recorded a change in the status
of ferrymen based in Canggu and Terung, located on opposite
banks of the Brantas River. As noted above, the Canggu
crossing was on a major road network that connected assorted
hinterland population centers to the Majapahit court. Canggu
was also an important trade center for Brantas River traffic;
goods transported to the court from the coast passed through
Canggu. The inscription’s principal concern is the replacement
of old state tax collections known as dĕrwaya haji with a new
payment called pamuja. Dĕrwaya haji was collected by “tax
farmers” known as maṅgi lala dĕrwaya haji in inscriptions
dating to the tenth century, when east Java-based monarchs had
first begun to implement this revenue assessment process in
their eastern and central Java realm. In these older inscriptions
assorted individuals, among them merchants and other “for-
eigners” who seemingly had no local loyalties, were assigned
the right to collect local revenues (dĕrwaya haji) on the state’s
behalf on their guarantee that the state would receive a share
of the collection. The role of merchants and tradesmen as col-
lectors may be seen, for instance, in the Pālebuhan (Gorang
Gareng) eastern Java inscription dating 927, when the col-
lectors of dĕrwaya haji included Singhalese, south Indians
(Paụḍi kiras), Burmese (Ramanyadesis), and port-based mer-
chants (bāny aga bantal). 15 Although the specific dĕrwaya haji
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formerly collected at Canggu and Terung are not described in
detail in the Ferry Charter, the inscription’s proclamation of the
new tax collection arrangement does provide clues about the
nature of eastern Java’s statecraft in the post-tenth-century era.
First, the charter freed the local ferrymen from their former
responsibility to make payments of dĕrwaya haji to the local
landed elite. Second, the inscription provided that the ferrymen
could thereafter assume an independent status socially and po-
litically from the local agricultural community and could, as a
consequence, begin to interact directly with the royal court;
they were no longer obliged to deal through the landed elite.
Third, as a further symbol of their new social and political status
the ferrymen were granted a place in the king’s religious cer-
emonial. Their new status allowed them to participate as in-
dividuals or as a group in a new local festival honoring the
Majapahit monarch. In support of this festival and as repayment
for their recognition by the king, the ferrymen would provide
specified amounts of flowers and cash as the new pamuja tax.
Fourth, the ferrymen would be allowed to participate in the
Caitra festival marking the renewal of the agricultural cycle
that took place annually at the royal capital and in other loca-
tions near the capital. 16 At this festival the remainder of the
ferrymen’s yearly pamuja tax payments were due; among the
pamuja payments due to the king at this festival were unspec-
ified textiles.
The new social, political, and religious status of the fer-
rymen as revealed in this charter is of particular importance be-
cause it documents the emergence of a supralocal nonagrarian
commercial community within the Java hinterland population.
Moreover, the charter’s emphasis on payment of taxes due to
the state by direct assignment of these revenues to underwrite
local and court ceremonies demonstrated consistency with the
patterns of classical Southeast Asian statecraft whereby the
ruler depended on sacred ceremonies and other religious dona-
tions to legitimize his rule. The conversion of revenue payments
into the “symbolic capital” of the ceremonies bestowed merit
on the ruler as a patron of religion, and his ritual emphasized
the ruler’s role as the source of his subjects’ prosperity—as,
for instance, in the Caitra festival. 17 Because of their contri-
bution to local as well as state-level ceremonies that honored
their monarch, the ferrymen—who previously had been grouped
with the local agrarian population as commoners subject to the
authority of the landed elite—were allowed the opportunity to
assume a more direct relationship with the royal court. This re-
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vised the old pattern of polity whereby their contact with the
state had been, at best, indirect and completely dependent upon
the local agrarian community and its elite, who had represented
them.
The fact that the ferry crossing between Canggu and Terung
was critical in facilitating the flow to the court of hinterland
goods as well as goods of foreign origin may partially explain
the desire of the Majapahit monarch to establish a more direct
relationship with this particular community. The new rela-
tionship no doubt allowed the ferrymen greater freedom to
pursue their commercial affairs but also represented an attempt
by the state to undercut the authority of the local landed
aristocracy. Plates 9 and 10 of the Ferry Charter list among the
privileges granted to the ferrymen exemption from legal rules
that might have interfered with the efficient performance of
their work. They were also allowed to organize cockfights and
other gambling activities—activities that the Nagarakĕrtagama
deemed appropriate to commercial centers—and to have the
music of gong orchestras played at their worship services, as
appropriate to their new religious status. 18
One reason for the new royal relationship with people from
this area may well have related to events of the previous year,
when a naval expedition led by a west Java-based commercial
rival of Majapahit had penetrated up the Brantas River to the
Canggu area, demonstrating Canggu’s strategic position on the
riverine commercial route from the Majapahit court to the
coast. 19 Of further interest in this regard is the ferrymen’s
partial payment of the pamuja tax in cash, flowers, and textiles.
On the one hand, the cash payment documents the growing
monetarization of the Javanese economy as a byproduct of
Java’s emergence as a major center of international trade, while
the cess in textiles was consistent with earlier patterns of Ja-
vanese statecraft whereby Javanese monarchs exercised control
over goods acquired from and dispensed to the international
trade route. Java’s monarchs traditionally shared luxury goods
of foreign origin with those in royal favor in ceremonies of re-
distribution, thus reinforcing alliance relationships that were
critical to the monarch’s sovereignty. 20 Canggu’s importance as
a source of foreign or domestic textiles for redistribution is im-
plied in the Ferry Charter’s stipulation that the ferrymen supply
textiles to the court as part of their pamuja tax payment, as well
as the inscription’s allusion to the maritime raid of the previous
year.
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The nature of the old dĕrwaya haji collections dating to pre-
Majapahit times is further revealed in three letters addressed
by the Majapahit court to the occupants of Biluluk and Tanggu-
lunan, two neighboring communities located northwest of Ma-
japahit and inland from the coast. These three letters were
inscribed on metal plates that comprise the “Biluluk Charters.”
21 The letters depict a prosperous area that depended on nona-
grarian production for its income. Among the residents of the
local community were:
1. salt dealers
2. palm-sugar dealers
3. butchers (meat packers of salt-cured and spiced meats;
dendeng, salted water buffalo meat was a particular
luxury in that era)
4. bleachers of textile
5. indigo dyers
6. millers of oil (jarak, a ricinus oil)
7. makers of vermicelli (laksa, a luxury), and
8. lime burners (lime was burned in the making of cloth)
The first letter, dated 1366, was addressed to the aristo-
cratic families of the area and reminded them of the privileges
held by visitors attending an annual festival staged locally.
These visitors were exempt from the dues normally collected
by members of the local elite from those who purchased or
gathered salt in the saltlands; instead these visitors were to
pay pamuja—the same royal festival tax imposed on the Canggu
area in the Ferry Charter—as well as a second cess on salt col-
lections (paga- garem) that was payable directly to the state
rather than to the local elite (as had been the case previously).
The noble families of Biluluk and Tanggulunan held income
rights to a saline spring where people from other areas came to
buy salt or to make salt themselves. Those who came to make
salt in 1366 were first required to make a payment of 300 cash
as pamuja, as well as a monthly salt duty (pagagarem) of 7 ku
(one kupang was equal to 1/100 cash). At the time of the annual
festival salt-makers and outsiders were allowed for a period of
five days to scoop salt water from the spring without paying
these duties. Those who still collected salt duties (“who acted
as if they still held rights”) at such times were compared to a
person who took rice from a field not his own and according to
the inscription would be fined accordingly. 22
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Subsequent letters dated 1393 and 1395 were addressed di-
rectly to local artisans (parawangsa) instead of the elite. Unlike
the Ferry Charter’s total withdrawal of the collection privileges
held by the local elite over commercial affairs at Canggu, the
Biluluk letters confirmed the revenue collection privileges of
the elites of Biluluk and Tanggulunan. But these local elites,
the 1393 letter noted, were the “chiefs of trade,” who were
entitled to titiban (“what drops in the lap”), compulsory pay-
ments and purchases by the local merchants and artisans who
participated in the eight commercial trades. Like other mer-
chants in commercial centers near the royal capital, local mer-
chants and artisans were required to buy lots (tiban) at fixed
prices set by the chiefs of trade. 23 Tradesmen in the Biluluk
area were formerly obligated to buy four kinds of spices (these
were likely used in the preparation of meats), ironware, earth-
enware dishes (Chinese ceramics), rattan, and cotton cloth—all
trade goods acquired from other places in exchange for local
products. Titiban was also a compulsory relinquishing to the
chiefs of trade of part of their stocks by artisans who resided
in or near the royal capital. The 1393 letter revealed that mes-
sengers from the royal court normally “came down” to collect
for it a share of local titiban lots from the chiefs of trade, and
these revenue collectors were paid for their efforts an additional
fee (tahil padugi) that was collected from local tradesmen by the
chiefs of trade. 24
Finally, the 1393 letter stipulated that a new tax called
pamihos, a fixed tax, was to replace former dues known as
arik purih that were payable by local merchants and artisans
to the chiefs of trade on thirteen different occasions. Five re-
ferred to family events, such as birth, marriage, and death, that
were marked by special ceremonies; seven concerned house-
hold rights and duties, including the obligation of the house-
holds to entertain the elite’s guests; the remaining one required
that certain costs of travel and transport incurred by the chiefs
of trade be assumed by the merchant and artisan community.
The 1393 letter stipulated that these service dues payable to the
chiefs of trade were no longer valid. The pamihos cess replacing
the arik purih collections was a head tax that was to be shared
by the chiefs of trade and the state.
The new arrangement, like the Ferry Charter, demonstrated
a more direct royal authority locally. Both the Ferry Charter
and the Biluluk Charters recognized the right of a local elite
to rule the local population in pre-Majapahit times, although in
the Biluluk Charters this was a commercial elite rather than
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a landed aristocracy. The implication of both records is that
a closer relationship between the royal court and its non-elite
subjects was developing. The court began to collect its revenue
cesses more directly from its subjects—although the court still
depended on the skills of the aristocracy in Canggu and the
chiefs of trade in Biluluk to make these collections rather than
receiving individual payments from each subject. The earlier
practice of sending officials out from the court to receive royal
shares of local revenue collections was also eliminated in the
Biluluk Charters, with the local commercial elite now taking
personal responsibility for these revenue transfers to the court.
The use of commercial specialists to collect revenues was not
new. As noted above, numerous records document the use of
merchants and other non-agrarian “foreigners” to collect
dĕrwaya haj i revenues in earlier times.
Alliances with commercial elites were no doubt also in-
tended to reduce the autonomy of the landed aristocracy, who
had traditionally been well entrenched within their watĕk re-
gions. 25 When the royal court shifted to eastern Java the
monarch’s ability to govern the Javanese hinterland was en-
hanced. This was because the monarch assumed the role as
director of the development of the irrigation networks of the
Brantas River basin. He also increased his income by facilitating
international trade, as east Java ports emerged as major trade
centers on the international maritime route.
In 1395 another letter from the Majapahit court was sent
to the sugar-palm tappers of Biluluk, confirming the right of
the holders of property rights (the “chiefs of trade”) over local
sugar-palm trees to receive one-half of the sugar collected by
the tapper (apparently the tapper was allowed to retain the re-
maining half share). From this one-half share the chiefs of trade
were required to make specified payments to the state. While
this letter provides another example of greater state interaction
locally, it also confirmed that the commercial elite of Biluluk was
still permitted a share of the state’s local tax collections. The
unwillingness of the state to totally eliminate the revenue rights
of this local elite—as opposed to the exclusion of the landed elite
from a share in the pamuja cess that replaced earlier tax collec-
tions in Canggu—may reflect the state’s desire to give the local
elite a greater incentive to increase production. The 1366 letter
to the Biluluk chiefs of trade also provides information about the
state’s relationship with the commercial populations of its hin-
terland, as this letter noted that the chiefs of trade were allied
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by marriage to the royal court, denoting a special relationship
between the Majapahit sovereign and the leaders of this pros-
perous community of merchants and artisans.
Another record of the imposition of the pamuja tax on a
commercial community is reported in the Charter of Karang
Bogĕm dated 1384. Karang Bogĕm was on the north Java coast
in the western part of the Majapahit state’s territories. This
inscription concerns a royal debt-bondsman (kawula). 26 The
bondsman had been a fisherman active in a nearby coastal
center, but a royal court judge had fined him 120,000 cash as
punishment for an alleged crime. Unable to pay the debt, he
was made a debt-bondsman of the king and was assigned the
task of developing a fishery on wasteland at Karang Bogĕm. 27
The royal court received one part of the fishery’s production as
repayment of the fine and another as payment of interest on
the money invested by the court in the fishery. A further return
on this economic initiative by the Majapahit court came in the
form of a consignment of fish made to the state at the time
of the court’s Caitra festival. 28 The Charter of Karang Bogĕm
imposed the pamuja festival tax—which was likely payable at
the Caitra festival as well—on local traders, fishermen, and
sugar-palm tappers, while exempting them from old arik purih
dues that were paid to the landed elite (who held estates and
bondsmen) of that area. To appease this elite, who were con-
sidered members of the royal family because of their alliance
through marriage with the court, their pamuja tax cess was re-
duced by one-half. Herein, as in the Ferry Charter, the authority
of a local elite—members of the extended family of the monarch
no less—over commercial activity was being modified in favor
of the court and the local commercial community, and the in-
dependence of the local commercial community vis-à-vis previ-
ously dominant local political institutions was established.
All three charters thus portray a growing standardization of
the Javanese state’s revenue collections. In widespread refer-
ences the Majapahit court replaced tax assessments of earlier
times—notably dĕrwaya haji and arik purih—with new state
cesses, pamuja and pamihos respectively, that were payable
more directly to the state. The three charters show the emer-
gence of the state’s revenue collection policy in the post-tenth-
century era, wherein the state, with both an institutional in-
ability to collect local cesses and a lack of sufficient physical
prowess to impose direct authority over subject population
centers, depended on alliances with subordinate elites. The
state thus had initially turned to landed elites in agricultural
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communities (Canggu and Karang Bogĕm) and to chiefs of trade
in a well-established commercial community (Biluluk). However,
the Majapahit state’s new pamuja and pamihos cesses were to
be collected more directly than were the revenue collections
of the pre-1300 era, seemingly to assure that the state would
receive a larger share of such locally collected cesses. A new
royal relationship with these three communities is most strik-
ingly shown in the Canggu Ferry Charter’s curtailment of the
political rights of the landed elite; the emergence of Canggu
as a commercial center was reinforced by the granting of inde-
pendent political and social status to the ferrymen, who became
the commerical elite of that community. In Biluluk and Karang
Bogĕm, on the other hand, while the new revenue collection
policy diminished the political rights of the local elite vis-à-vis
the state, the state still recognized that the Biluluk chiefs of
trade and the landed elite of Karang Bogĕm held local political
authority that the state chose not to (or lacked the power to)
challenge. It may not be a coincidence that both the Biluluk
chiefs of trade and the landed elite of Karang Bogĕm had inter-
married with the royal court, while the landed elite of Canggu
had not—and were thus subject to the greatest revision of their
political rights. 29
THE JAVANESE ECONOMY UNDER THE
MAJAPAHIT STATE
Beyond the political implications of the new revenue settle-
ments, the Majapahit government’s new tax collection policies
had positive implications for the Javanese economy. Re-
placement of the dĕrwaya haji and arik purih collection systems
of the previous age with fixed yearly fees that were collected
more directly from the producer himself would have theoret-
ically allowed the producer more personal control over his
surplus production. The previous settlements appear to have
permitted those who held local revenue collection rights on the
state’s behalf (often recognizing rights that were already held
by local landed elites) to assume control over the peasants’
surplus. Guaranteeing a payment to the state, these “revenue
collectors” undoubtedly kept for themselves any amount they
could collect from peasant producers over and above the sum
officially due from them to the state. 30 In earlier as well as
Majapahit-era cesses the king’s direct control and consumption
of local revenue collections from the lands that were not con-
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sidered subject to his personal and direct landholding rights
does not seem to have been important to the state’s existence.
Rather than confront the local elites who dominated nonroyal
lands with direct demands for a share of local production, which
would have taken income away from them, the state depended
on the flow of revenues from lands directly subject to the king
to finance the court’s activities.
This does not mean, however, that the state made no at-
tempt to tap local production on nonroyal lands. Indeed, the
new revenue settlements discussed above generally required
that the royal revenues due from local producers meet the cost
of local religious ceremonies that honored the monarch. The
remainder of the revenues due to the state was assigned to
finance ritual at the capital, in which representatives of the
community were required to participate, or if the cess was col-
lected in trade goods such as textiles, these luxuries were re-
assigned to royal allies. As noted above, such redistributions of
royal revenue collections or of luxury goods of foreign origin
at the state and local level were important to the Javanese
monarch’s sovereignty. Thus revenues due from nonroyal lands
were indirectly collected in ways that allowed the local com-
munity to directly retain or to share in royal redistributions of
their production. 31
Royal policy that promoted reassignments as well as local
retention of royal revenue assessments would have given the
producer greater control of his produce, and thus would have
stimulated production. A community that was able to keep a
share of its production surplus and whose members could ac-
quire profit from the sale of this surplus would have had an
incentive to increase its rice output. The internal peace and
security provided by the Majapahit state, which fostered the
expansion of the marketing network; the development by that
time of a realmwide road network; the growing concentration of
nonagrarian populations (merchants, artisans, and government
officials) in urban centers; and a general increase in foreign
demand for eastern archipelago spices—all increased the
demand for Javanese rice. Java’s peasants accordingly in-
creased their production in response to the new levels of
demand emanating from hinterland and coastal market centers.
Improved marketing possibilities provided ample oppor-
tunity for an ambitious peasant to increase his family’s income.
The wide distribution and heavy concentration of Chinese ce-
ramics in archaeological sites that date to the Majapahit era,
literary and epigraphic references to local consumption of com-
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mercial products of nonlocal origin, and archaeological evi-
dence that substantiates written records of monetarized ex-
change at all levels of the Javanese economy, suggest that the
desire and the ability to consume imported or luxury goods
was spreading beyond the elite during this era. The availability
of these “foreign goods” would also have given peasant culti-
vators incentives to produce more rice. 32 However, given the
importance of religious ritual in early Javanese society, Javanese
peasants may not have been responding to new economic op-
portunity simply for the sake of their own personal or family
consumption. Religious ceremonies and temples, too, might
have provided incentives. New or expanded sources of income
may have made it possible for many nonelite to become
sponsors of religious ceremony for the first time. Indeed, in
the three charters discussed above the king solicits the par-
ticipation of the nonelite in state ritual. Investment of surplus
income in state temple construction or religious ritual, espe-
cially that directly associated with the king, bestowed signif-
icant merit upon the donor and would have enhanced the status
of the benefactor within the traditional system. 33
The fact that the new pamihos cess collected in Biluluk as
well as the pamuja tax due from the Canggu ferrymen were
payable in cash rather than in kind shows the growing mon-
etarization of the Javanese economy, a consequence of Java’s
commercial prosperity as a major international center of trade.
Writing in 1225, Chao Ju-kua, the commissioner of foreign trade
at the China coast port of Ch’uan-chou, was impressed by the
use of precious metals in Java. He noted the use of alloyed coins
minted with mixtures of silver, tin, lead, and copper; sixty small
metal coins with holes in their centers were strung on a string;
sixty of these were equal to one tael of gold and thirty-two
equalled a half-tael of gold. 34 He also reported that the Chinese
court prohibited trade with Java due to the flow of copper cash
out of China to purchase pepper in Java. 35 Javanese traders
circumvented this prohibition by referring to their country as
Sukadana (Su-ki-tan). The early fifteenth-century survey by Ma
Huan noted that countries located in eastern Java (Majapahit)
and southern and northern Sumatra (Palembang and Lamuri/
Ramni, respectively) used copper cash extensively. These ac-
counts demonstrate that, whether following the example of
China or utilizing the abundant supply of “copper cash” often
available from China, the Southeast Asian countries along the
main trade route in Java and the Strait of Malacca tended to
use “copper” (generally an alloy of copper with tin, lead, and/
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or zinc) as the basis for their own monetary system. 36 Monetary
flow in Java in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries involved
copper as much as it did gold and silver.
Gold and silver often assumed important roles not as cur-
rencies but as commodities and merchandise for the market;
Java received considerable amounts of copper, gold, and silver
in exchange for its pepper, cloves, and nutmeg. This exchange
was a major component in the flow of copper cash out of China
and the flow of species out of the West with the increased Eu-
ropean demand for spices in the thirteenth century. A flow of
Western gold and silver currency moved through the Middle
East and India to Java. 37 Various travelers’ accounts, substan-
tiated by local sources, document the wealth of gold and silver
accumulated in Java. Western travelers thought of Java as the
wealthiest place on earth. Marco Polo’s comments at the end
of the thirteenth century, quoted in chapter 8, are but one ex-
ample. 38 While ninth- and tenth-century charters in Java make
reference to payments in gold and silver by weight, there is
rarely mention of gold in the thirteenth-and fourteenth-century
charters, however, not due to scarcity but to the transition to
the use of copper as the standard unit of exchange. 39
Profits made on the exchange of Javanese rice for eastern
archipelago spices and on the trade and transport of these
spices for the goods and metals of the East and West that took
place in Java’s coastal ports were subject to royal taxes. It was
from facilitating this international trade that eastern Javanese
monarchs received significant income. The monarch’s port fees
and his right to a personal share of trade goods and profits pro-
vided the additional revenue necessary to finance the expanded
domestic activities of the Majapahit court. 40 Various local and
foreign sources speak of the Java monarch’s administrative su-
premacy over north coast ports and their trade. Some of these
sources considered Java-based merchants active in the interna-
tional spice trade to be the monarch’s “trade agents.” 41
To provision the key export-import sector with local
products, especially rice, royal policy encouraged the partic-
ipation of local productive units in the higher levels of the
market economy. Recognition of the rights of Biluluk’s artisan
community vis-à-vis their chiefs of trade, for example, and of
the independence of commercial communities at Cang-gu and
Karang Bogĕm illustrate this aspect of the Majapahit state’s
economic policy. While the Majapahit state’s new revenue set-
tlements with these communities did not immediately add sub-
stantial income to the royal treasury, the new tax policies en-
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couraged the production of local surpluses and the flow of these
surpluses via the expanding marketing network to the coast,
where their exchange for foreign goods was directly taxed by
the state.
Because of the income potential of the commercial sector
of the Javanese economy, Majapahit’s monarchs did not have
to enhance their collection and consumption of land taxes from
lands subject to the authority of the state’s landed elites. To
increase its revenue demands on the agrarian sector the state
would have had to encroach further upon the political rights
and socioeconomic powers of these entrenched local elites. Ma-
japahit’s monarchs seemed reluctant to pose this challenge,
and the inherent weakness of the Javanese political system
was thereby revealed: the state depended on personal alliances
forged with its local political elite to validate royal sovereignty.
To avoid political confrontation that might immerse the state
in widespread conflict, which would have benefited no group,
the state instead encouraged the development of the Javanese
nonagricultural economy and promoted the cause of merchants
and artisans who could best assist in facilitating the flow of
goods to and from Java’s north coast ports. 42
When in the fifteenth century Majapahit’s authority was
challenged by coastal commercial elites who broke away from
the state’s authority, Majapahit’s rulers were deprived of their
control over the international trade and its revenues, and the
state ceased to exist. It was only when the emerging Mataram
monarchy secured a share of the profits derived from the in-
ternational trade that a stable state system again emerged in
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 43 In the
Nagarakĕrtagama, the following passage connects the security
and success of Majapahit with its economy:
If destroyed be the peasants’ cultivated lands (as a matter of
course) will accompany them that (area) which has a shortage of
means of subsistence; now that is the town [i.e., if rice wasn’t
produced, then towns, which consumed and marketed rice, would
also suffer]. If there is not retinue [i.e., the king’s retinue, his ad-
ministrative corps and especially his military] in evidence there
are the foreign islands coming to attack. Therefore equally they
must be taken care of: stable will be both. That is the fruit of the
speaking. 44
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The state thus provided the physical protection necessary to
promote the realm’s economic prosperity and to protect the
realm from outsiders-note that the principal threat to Java’s
economy was seen as coming by sea from “foreign islands.”
With protection provided by the state military, the peasants
could produce rice that the towns would in turn market, and the
entire realm would prosper. 45
The Nagarakĕrtagama, which speaks of the royal court in
the time of Hayam Wuruk (Rājasanagara, 1350–1389), further
illustrates the importance of trade to the early fourteenth-
century Javanese socioeconomy. Although it is principally con-
cerned with the idealized affairs of the court and its sanctified
ritual activities, the Nagarakĕrtagama also indicates the impor-
tance of Bubat, a substantial commercial center located on the
Brantas River in the hinterland. The poem makes it clear that
Bubat was both frequented by foreign traders and the site of
royal symbolism. Bubat was surrounded on three sides by large
buildings (bha wanas), and its population resided in quarters
(mapanta)—Indian and Chinese quarters receive special
mention. 46 Here traders from India, Cambodia, China, Vietnam,
Thailand, and other places gathered to pay homage to and to
provision the Majapahit monarch. 47 Demonstrating the rela-
tionship between this trade and the state’s authority, Bubat as-
sumed special prominence in the Nagarakĕrtagama as the first
center for the celebration of the Caitra festival. The Caitra fes-
tival celebrated both the Majapahit monarch’s “divinity” and
the beginning of a new year in the agricultural cycle. During
the first seven days of the festival the Majapahit court “came
down” to Bubat to participate in public amusements in a fair
atmosphere. 48 Here games and gambling were permitted in a
place more appropriate for such actions than in the sanctified
court’s urban capital. It was here in Bubat that the king re-
ceived various collections in kind due to him from assorted
commercial communities, for example the pamuja payments de-
scribed in the charters mentioned above. Here, too, on the
banks of the Brantas River the king celebrated the “passing
over ceremony” that marked the coming of the new year. This
act emphasized the life-bringing powers of the Brantas, which
was the source of the eastern Java-based state’s prosperity.
The Brantas supplied the water necessary for eastern Java’s
wet-rice agriculture and also provided contact with the outside
world from whence came luxury goods and revenues.
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While the Nagarakĕrtagama refers to the state’s commercial
activities only occasionally and in the context of state cere-
monies, the Pararaton offers much more. This court chronicle,
composed in the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century,
records the affairs of the Majapahit dynasty during the four-
teenth century. 49 It provides a much longer list of centers of
trade and commercial affairs than the Nagarakĕrtagama. 50 In
one episode the Pararaton reports a maritime expedition that
had been launched against Majapahit by the ruler of the Sunda
Strait region in 1357 (one year previous to the Ferry Charter of
Canggu). Even though the expedition sailed up the Brantas by
way of Canggu to Bubat, it was defeated by the Majapahit ruler.
According to the Pararaton, the Sundanese king had escorted
his daughter to Majapahit with a large retinue of ships, in order
to present her in marriage and thereby seal a formal alliance
with the Majapahit king. When the Majapahit court refused to
recognize her as a suitable queen of equal rank to the king, a
battle resulted between Majapahit and Sunda forces in Bubat,
a battle that the Sundanese lost. 51 This raid by the Sunda ruler
is consistent with the patterns of riverine system competition
common to the island realm in early Southeast Asian history.
52 In this instance the Sunda Strait ruler—who appears to have
been in control of the riverine systems on both sides of the
strait and who from this strategic location could have been a se-
rious rival to Majapahit’s commercial interests in the western
Indonesian archipelago—sent a naval expedition up the Brantas
River intent upon eliminating a rival and enhancing his com-
mercial interests.
With Majapahit’s victory, the Sunda Strait ruler’s subor-
dinates, the riverine systems of western Java and southern
Sumatra, became vulnerable to the Majapahit state’s ambitions.
Although there is no evidence of an immediate Majapahit raid
into that area in response to this possibility, twenty years later,
in 1377, a punitive expedition was sent against Palembang, an-
other competitor in this Malacca and Sunda Strait region. 53
Conflict among rivals for commercial hegemony in the archi-
pelago trade network had been a common occurrence in the
pre-Majapahit era. True to this tradition, Majapahit’s rulers
repulsed an invasion attempt for commercial dominance by a
competitor, the Sunda Strait ruler, and this victory in turn con-
firmed Majapahit’s success as the archipelago’s leading mar-
itime power. Whether this rivalry actually threatened Ma-
japahit’s authority or not, the potential symbolism of this event
was not lost on the Pararaton’s author, who used it to confirm
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Majapahit’s commercial leadership. 54 This tie with the riverine
state tradition laid the foundation for Majapahit’s legitimate
succession as the facilitator of the archipelago’s successful in-
ternational trade. This story in the Pararaton thereby added to
the ruler’s legitimacy as the focus of Java’s wet-rice tradition,
the central theme of the Nagarakĕrtagama. While the Na-
garakĕrtagama, like the Ferry Charter, consciously omitted ref-
erence to or trivialized the Sundanese raid because it was re-
lated to Majapahit’s maritime affairs (the raid may well have
been seen as reflecting the problems that Majapahit’s partici-
pation in the international commercial sector posed to its wet-
rice civilization), the Pararaton as well as later Javanese liter-
ature considered this event to have been of great importance.
This was due to the Pararaton’s portrayal of Majapahit as both
a wet-rice plain and maritime state; the realm’s wet-rice core
provided the essential commodity (rice) that made Java’s domi-
nance of the Southeast Asian spice trade possible. The interre-
lationship of the economic and political sectors was responsible
for the state’s success.
The evolution of royal power in Java thus culminated in
the fourteenth century with the establishment of the Majapahit
state. The time before was marked by expanding and con-
tracting royal authority over the Javanese countryside. 55
Various inscriptions from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries
reflect the initial inroads of royal administration into the state’s
regions. There was a growing political, economic, and social
integration of the realm that produced a truly Javanese cultural
form that is most conspicuous in the era’s art and architecture.
56 Economically, the rice economy of eastern Java as well as the
older region of central Java prospered.
Because of the increased external demand for Javanese rice,
there emerged a hierarchical market network that united com-
munities of local exchange with Java’s coastal ports. Yet at
the topmost levels of this marketing system there was a con-
scious separation of political and commercial function. Ports
of trade were not political centers, and the state’s political
center was not a major commercial center. Majapahit’s capital
was located well in the interior up the Brantas River from
the coast, where it was less likely to have been subject to
direct contact with outsiders. The Majapahit court consciously
located its marketplace on the periphery of the capital urban
center to make sure that the commercial activities that took
place there would not pollute the royal court. 57 According to
the Nagarakĕrtagama, the court’s major commercial affairs and
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Gaṇeśa, god of prudence and sagacity, standing on the heads of slain
enemies. Eastern Java.
contact with foreigners were transacted at Bubat, some dis-
tance downriver from the court. The commercial leadership
of the Javanese state was thus downplayed in the Na-
garakĕrtagama, and Majapahit’s rulers fulfilled the Javanese
tradition of wet-rice statecraft that traced its history to early
central Java. Thus while the Majapahit monarch ruled both a
wet-rice and maritime realm, it was his association with the Ja-
vanese wet-rice state tradition that was the most critical to his
expression of legitimacy.
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Caṇḍi Panataran, Majapahit era, eastern Java.
MAJAPAHIT’S FIFTEENTH-CENTURY “DEMISE”
A new order of Javanese statecraft evolved in the Brantas River
basin under Majapahit’s fourteenth century rulers. Majapahit
monarchs assumed greater powers of economic and political
leadership and enhanced their status as the source of cultural
identity among their subordinate populations. Like earlier Ja-
vanese political centers, Majapahit was the focus of a chain
of patron-client relationships, with the state-level center at-
tempting to maintain itself economically and politically against
the centrifugal forces of local-level alliance networks. Tradi-
tionally, when an old Javanese political center was lost regional
units competed with each other to become the new center,
building new networks of economic and political alliances and
underscoring these relationships by establishing new sources of
legitimacy.
To combat the divisive tendencies of the past, Majapahit’s
monarchs substantiated their legitimacy by fabricating links to
eras of past glory, as in the case of the Nagarakĕrtagama’s em-
phasis that Majapahit’s rulers were the legitimate successors
to a line of monarchs who had ruled Java since the origin
of a Javanese “state” in the sixth century A.D. They also pa-
tronized a tantric Śiva-Buddhist religion in which indigenous
Javanese religious values dominated. The Nagarakĕrtagama is
saturated with Buddhist and Hindu references. It begins with
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the Indian incantation “OM!” (“Prosperity!”). 58 The royal family
is described as being above mortals, and the king was an in-
nately divine incarnation of a god. 59 The king was also the
divinely ordained head of society, whose function was to give
human life its appropriate place in the cosmic order. 60 Con-
sistent with the patterns of Indianized statecraft practiced in
earlier Javanese states, the Majapahit court and its kingdom
were idealized as being created in the image of the universe
as a whole. The Majapahit monarch provided for his subjects’
well-being by maintaining order in his realm. His task was to
enlarge his miniature cosmos as he created a heaven on earth
(maṇḍala). 61
Rather than physically imposing his authority, the Majapahit
monarch generally awed his subjects into submission to his
glamorous court. The Nagarakĕrtagama’s story begins around
A.D. 1250, when Kĕrtanagara (1268–1292) became king by de-
stroying a “wicked man,” “annihilating him altogether.” 62 But
it is observed that thereafter, “All of the bad people are giving
up their evil minds, only fearing the manfulness of the honored
king.” Kĕrtanagara had been initiated in the secret tantric
knowledge necessary to secure his realm’s prosperity; it was
his foremost duty to combat the demoniac powers that were
rampant in the world. To accomplish this, Kĕrtanagara culti-
vated ecstasy through alcohol and sexual excesses, activities
that shocked the compiler of the Pararaton, who characterized
him as a drunkard who was brought to ruin by lust. In the
Nagarakĕrtagama, on the other hand, which was composed in
1365 by Prapanca, the head of the Buddhist clergy at the Ma-
japahit court, he was described as a saint and ascetic, free of all
passion.
To combat the divisive tendences that had brought despair
to his land, Kĕrtanagara erected a statue depicting himself as
Aksubhya, the meditative Buddha, on the spot where Bharada,
the ascetic who was believed to have carried out the partition of
Airlangga’s kingdom, had lived. The Nagarakĕrtagama viewed
Kĕrtanagara’s religious purification of Java as the cause of his
descendants’ glory as divine kings and reuniters of the realm.
63 Thus while Kĕrtanagara initially imposed his authority by
force, his consequent success, as well as that of later Majapahit
monarchs, was due to his innate divinity. Consistent with this
pattern, Kĕrtanagara had sent a naval expedition against south-
eastern Sumatra (Malāyu) sometime around 1275, and com-
memorated the expedition eleven years later by having a statue
of his father Viṣṇuvardhana (1248–1268), in the image of the
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Bodhisattva Amoghapāśa (the tantric “Bodhisattva of Compas-
sion”), erected in the Batang Hari River system. 64 The statue’s
inscription records its dedication to the joy of all the subjects
of the land of southeastern Sumatra and may be seen as an at-
tempt to draw the area into a tributary relationship with Kĕr-
tanagara’s court rather than to impose Javanese authority.
While the Majapahit state’s efforts to extend its authority
had varying results, the accomplishments of Majapahit’s
fourteenth-century monarchs provided a standard of
achievement for their successors not only in Java but also
among the Malay populations of the Indonesian archipelago.
65 The Nagarakĕrtagama and Majapahit’s inscriptions report a
state that impressively administered the whole “land of Java”
(Javabhumi) and held sovereignty over “other islands”
(nusāntara/dvīpāntara), and whose authority was also recog-
nized by all “other countries” (desān tara). 66 The state’s mon-
archs justly ruled and protected their subject population, were
well-informed of the affairs of their state, and stimulated their
state’s development. But while these records glorify the cen-
tralizing activities of Majapahit’s fourteenth-century monarchs,
these same records note that Majapahit’s monarchs did not
hold absolute authority over their domain. 67 Like the other
great “classical” wet-rice plain states of the Southeast Asian
mainland, Majapahit’s state system still depended on a network
of patron-client relationships that allied regionally based elites
to the Majapahit court.
Majapahit-era inscriptions openly report the semiau-
tonomous powers held by important regional elites, who were
normally linked to the reigning monarch by blood or marriage,
although these inscriptions carefully specify that the activities
of regional elites were performed in the name of their Majapahit
overlord. The Nagarakĕrtagama highlights the powers of ad-
ministration that Hayam Wuruk (the most powerful among the
poem’s monarchs) shared with his father Kĕrtawardhana, who
was known as the “Prince of Singhasari,” and the king’s uncle
Vijayarājasa, who had administrative responsibilities in the
eastern Java region and was called the “Prince of Wĕngker.”
68 Remarkably, this same uncle maintained independent diplo-
matic contact with the Chinese court. When the Ming court re-
ceived envoys in 1377 and 1379 from both the Wĕngker uncle,
whom the Ming considered the “ruler of eastern Java,” and
Hayam Wuruk’s Majapahit court, which was believed by the
Chinese to hold authority in “western Java,” the Ming court con-
cluded that the Javanese realm was politically divided. 69 The
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Ming eunuch Cheng Ho held this perception when he visited the
“eastern Java capital” with his fleet in 1405, and Chinese envoys
were present when the Majapahit monarch of “western Java”
invaded this “eastern capital” in 1406—170 Chinese residents
were reported to have been accidentally killed in the fighting as
the “eastern capital” was ravaged. 70
While Majapahit inscriptions and other indigenous sources
do not support the Ming view that the Majapahit population
divided its loyalty between two sovereigns in the fourteenth
century, they do demonstrate that there were rival branches of
the royal family that resided in several regions of eastern Java.
71 Majapahit’s monarchs tolerated the semiautonomy of their
Wĕngker kinsmen until 1406, when apparently in response to
the increasingly offensive actions of their relatives it became
necessary for the Majapahit monarchy to confirm its supremacy
over eastern Java. 72 Tolerance of regional semiautonomy was
not unusual and, as noted above, was indeed necessary because
of the Majapahit state’s inability to directly administer all over
which it claimed sovereignty. But dependence upon regional
allies created a potential for fragmentation when the center
showed signs of weakness or when regional subordinates were
able to secure outside assistance to support their efforts to
reestablish their autonomy from the center.
Modern historians have theorized about the demise of the
Majapahit state that followed the 1406 “civil war.” 73 In this age
north coast ports that were dominated by commercial popula-
tions who were converting to Islam were breaking away from
Majapahit’s political authority. This drive for independence by
the north coast commercial enclaves has been traditionally
viewed as severely weakening the Majapahit political system.
Deprived of their control over the north coast trade, Majapahit’s
monarchs could no longer depend on trade revenues to support
their statecraft and instead had to depend on revenue collec-
tions from the land. The refocusing of state revenue demands
brought a backlash from regional landed elites, who were al-
ready suspicious of the concentration of power in royal hands
that was characteristic of the fourteenth century. The various
subordinate regions of the state sought to reestablish their
semiautonomy by shifting their support among various factions
of the royal family who were competing for the Majapahit
throne on a regular basis during the fifteenth century or by al-
lying with one or another of the coastal commercial centers that
willingly supplied military assistance in return for a region’s
commitment to provision the coast.
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During this fifteenth-century era of supposed decline Ma-
japahit’s records (which are quite limited in comparison to
those of the previous century) stress the state’s cultural activ-
ities in the Javanese hinterland. They focus on the flourishing
rural economy and its Hindu-Javanese culture rather than con-
tinuing to highlight the state’s efforts to extend Majapahit’s po-
litical authority. 74 The 1406 civil war appears to have been a
watershed vis-à-vis the state’s involvement in the commercial
affairs of the coast.
The available evidence suggests that the 1406 civil war
was fought in part to bring the populations of the Wĕngker
prince’s commercial center under control. The heavy concen-
tration of Chinese residents in the “eastern capital” implies
that the Wĕngker titleholder administered a commercial center
of some importance. This view is consistent with the Wĕngker
prince’s dispatch of envoys to the Ming court in 1377 and 1379,
which presumably was done to solicit commercial exchanges
under the Chinese tributary system. 75 The Prince of Wĕngker
was also promoting trade during the 1380s and 1390s when he
issued the Biluluk Charters, which enhanced that region’s com-
merce. These records suggest that the Wĕngker prince assumed
a prominent role as a promoter of Majapahit’s commerce, a
role appropriate to his seeming regional administrative respon-
sibility for the eastern Java coast. 76 Significantly, it was after
Majapahit’s conquest of the “eastern capital,” which had been
visited the year before by Cheng Ho’s fleet, that north coast
commercial centers began to establish their political autonomy
from Majapahit’s sovereignty.
These coastal centers and their populations were the Ma-
japahit state’s former allies, who had ironically gained their
commercial stature largely due to the economic initiatives of
Majapahit in the previous century. Majapahit’s rulers had ini-
tially patronized trade and traders, encouraging the emergence
of commercial specialists who were free from subsistence agri-
culture and traditional social structures, who were preoccupied
with trade and commerce, and were members of a new, cos-
mopolitan, urban, commercial society. During the fourteenth
century Majapahit monarchs had utilized trade-derived rev-
enues to institute a new state order, but when the commercial
populations began to challenge their authority the land-based
rulers could not contain their initiatives. There seems to have
been a conscious withdrawal of Majapahit from the coast and
a refocusing of its statecraft on the ruler’s spiritual rather than
his economic and political leadership. 77 If such was the case,
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then Majapahit’s elite intentionally let the coast develop as a
separate zone of international trade beyond the Java hinterland
and its rural traditions. Thereby Majapahit’s fifteenth-century
“decline” may actually reflect two corresponding movements:
(1) the growing political autonomy of the formerly subordinate
north coast ports and (2) the Majapahit state’s conscious “inter-
nalization” of its statecraft.
Chinese sources support the contention that Majapahit was
purposely withdrawing from the coast during the early fifteenth
century. The Chinese reported that an agreement had been
reached with Majapahit at the beginning of the fifteenth
century, such that an enhanced Chinese role in the western
archipelago—particularly in the Strait of Malacca region that
Majapahit had previously claimed to be subject to its au-
thority—was accepted without challenge by the Javanese.
Cheng Ho, when he removed the pirate chief of the Palembang
coastal enclave in southeastern Sumatra in 1407 as part of an
attempt to rid the area of piracy, claimed to act in the name of
the Majapahit monarch. This and other actions by Cheng Ho in
the Strait of Malacca region until the 1430s do not seem to have
been initiated to destroy Majapahit’s authority but rather were
the consequence of Chinese understanding that Majapahit’s au-
thority in the region by that time was in name only. 78
The Pararaton also suggests that a transition had taken
place. It reflects on Majapahit’s past glory, highlighting the
state’s leadership in international commerce during the four-
teenth century, but largely ignores the events of the fifteenth
century. 79 This focus on the past suggests that the fourteenth-
century image was no longer valid and seems to have been pro-
jected in retrospect to explain why the Majapahit state was no
longer what it had been.
But while Java’s ports developed during the fifteenth
century as important commercial centers beyond the political
authority of the Majapahit state, the ports still needed the
hinterland’s produce—especially its rice—to be commercially
viable. Furthermore, the hinterland elite still required external
trade goods to reinforce their legitimacy. The fact that each
sector needed the other necessitated continued exchanges be-
tween the Javanese coast and its hinterland. The north coast
port of Tuban, for example, established its political indepen-
dence from Majapahit and its elite subsequently converted to
Islam, but it retained its close exchange relationship with the
Majapahit court. 80 Other ports cultivated economic contact
with Majapahit’s regional subordinates, who were interested
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in securing military assistance against Majapahit and pledged
their trade in return. In some instances the hinterlands were re-
luctant to make such commitments and had to be “encouraged”
to do so. Tomé Pires, writing at the beginning of the sixteenth
century, described the repeated late fifteenth-century wars be-
tween the Java coast ports and their hinterlands. 81 Since the
coastal-hinterland conflicts continued long after Java’s in-
digenous populations converted to Islam, these hostilities do not
seem to have been due to religious differences but are better
explained as being the consequence of political and economic
competition over the flow of rice and other products from the
interior to the coast. 82
Consistent with this view of the fifteenth-century transitions,
the new Mataram state that rose to power in the late sixteenth
century was dominated by landed elites based in central Java,
who initially suppressed the commercial elite of the coastal
ports in an attempt to reestablish the hinterland’s control over
coastal trade. But in the early seventeenth century the new
Mataram state allowed the Dutch to dominate the coastal ports,
while Mataram was content to rule the Javanese hinterland.
In exchange for foreign commodities supplied by the Dutch,
Mataram’s rulers guaranteed the periodic delivery of Javanese
rice and other hinterland products to the Dutch ports. 83
Mataram’s victory effectively internalized Javanese commerce
and ended the remaining control of Javanese merchants over
the Java Sea trade. Henceforth control over the international
trade was assumed by others. In the Strait of Malacca, in Aceh
on the northern tip of Sumatra, and in Johor on the southern
Malay Peninsula, there emerged successors to the Javanese;
and in the eastern archipelago Malay seamen in Brunei and the
Sulu Sea assumed control over the regional and Chinese trade
with the Spice Islands. 84
THE TRANSITION FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA’S
CLASSICAL AGE
The study of Southeast Asia’s history is problematical in that
the region’s archaeological remains demonstrate the early de-
velopment of complex and populous civilizations, but these civ-
ilizations produced few settlements that can be called urban
centers in the modern sense until the post-1400 era. Discoveries
at Ban Chiang and other northeast Thailand sites show some of
mankind’s earliest bronze metallurgy and developed rice agri-
Maritime Trade and State Development in Fourteenth-Century Java
276
culture, but the evolution of Southeast Asian state systems did
not take place until the first centuries of the Christian era. 85
Sufficient technology (e.g., the domestication of animals, rice
cultivation, metalwork, pottery manufacture, ship construction,
and long-distance navigational skills) were available for the
emergence of an Angkor or Majapahit in the second millennium
B.C., but such development did not occur. When states did begin
to come into existence between the third and sixth centuries
A.D. they were unevenly distributed, and rather than evolving
their own distinctly Southeast Asian cultural traditions, these
states were largely influenced by alien ideas and models.
The period in which these early states began to emerge
coincides chronologically with the inception of intensive mar-
itime commerce between China and India, which appears to
have set in motion the formation of these earliest state systems.
By A.D. 700 state development intensified; numerous archaeo-
logical sites on the mainland and Java produce sophisticated
Buddhist and Hindu statues and reliefs. Yet the sea empire of
Śrīvijaya, which is most conspicuous in the accounts of Indian,
Arab, and Chinese who had contact with the region during this
era, has left few written records of its own, and its archaeo-
logical remains are so few that the location of its urban center
is still being debated. Most of these early states were located in
river plains where there were extensive tracts of land suitable
for growing rice with the aid of simple techniques of water and
soil management, but again the Śrīvijaya realm was different—it
was based on the shores of the Strait of Malacca where fertility
was limited.
This book has concluded that two types of early states de-
veloped in the Southeast Asian region, one based on the ex-
traction of the surplus wet-rice production from subject popu-
lations, and the other supported by cesses that were levied on
long-distance commerce and less dependent upon the quality
of local soils and water supplies. In either state type, however,
although indigenous contributions to the emerging patterns of
regional civilization were important, and despite the region’s
critical commercial ties to China, the use of Indian ideas and
symbols was extensive and was unusual in that this conscious
emulation was not the consequence of military conquest or of a
subsequent period of imperialist rule by Indians. It appears that
these Indian ideas were necessary to motivate peoples who, de-
spite possessing a satisfactory infrastructure to support state
development, were largely uninterested in becoming an urban
dwelling, monument erecting, commercially motivated society.
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Prior to these developments Southeast Asia’s society tended
to live in herding, hunting, and village settings. Family units
usually lived together in clusters that formed the basis for
primary social, economic, and political systems. Members of
leading families became “chiefs”; some with impressive Indian
ceremonial titles were endowed with the ultimate power to al-
locate goods and privileges authoritatively, while other mem-
bers of their families discussed decisions with these leaders.
The leaders’ powers were limited; they were answerable to the
community and could not make major policy decisions without
community consent.
The autonomy of these local socioeconomic groups began to
break down when some of their leaders responded to new op-
portunities afforded by the intensification of maritime trade that
was passing through the region. Numerous regions of the South
China Sea that were adjacent to the main international sea
route developed, while those away from it—the upriver high-
lands of the island and mainland, the eastern Indonesian archi-
pelago, and the Philippines (despite having a vast wet-rice basin
in central Luzon) did not. Indian culture was localized to legit-
imize the concentration of power, the collection of grains, and
the accumulation of goods by newly emergent “kings.” These
kings and their entourages usually lived together in a separate
urban center. Despite this spacial separation from the locally
based socioeconomic systems, the monarch and his elite sup-
porters still shared the customs and traditions of their sub-
jects, and the court-based elite’s way of life and their value
system were not radically different from their rural subjects;
they ate the same food, wore the same clothing, and worshiped
the same gods. There was still frequent physical contact be-
tween the court and its subject populations, as in the absence
of an effective bureaucratic capacity these early states’ rulers
depended on a network of personal relationships to support
them. Kings fulfilled their subjects’ continuing expectations of
reciprocity via ceremonial redistributions of accumulated ma-
terial as well as symbolic capital. In exchange for their ac-
knowledgment of the court’s spiritual authority—through their
participation in and reflection of, in varying degrees, the power
of the center—the subordinate centers preserved a great deal
of their internal autonomy. Basic decisions on land distribution,
irrigation control, punishment of wrongdoers, organization of
public functions, and the regulation of family affairs was still
largely with the primary socioeconomic units.
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The broad extension of trade in the fourteenth century
changed all this. In response to the greater global demand
for Southeast Asian spices the number of people who engaged
in or derived their income from commerce greatly expanded;
the repercussions of the intensifying trade even penetrated
the local population clusters where farmers in the river-plain
states responded to the multiplying demand for their rice, which
flowed from the hinterland to provision the coastal centers of
trade. Coastal populations in turn exported this rice surplus to
new cosmopolitan centers of trade and to the spice production
centers of the Indonesian archipelago, where the rice was con-
sumed by the newly specialized populations who grew or col-
lected the spices. The rulers of new expansionist states came to
depend on the taxation of commerce rather than of their subject
villages. But commercial elites who initiated independent trade
relations with the village production centers could make the vil-
lages dependent upon them for food or goods instead of upon
their royal courts—the villagers could make profits and acquire
metals without the intervention of their king. All these develop-
ments had begun prior to the arrival of European traders in the
sixteenth century.
As in chapter 8’s examination of Samudra-Pasai, the Java
case study in this chapter has shown the transitions that
fourteenth-century Southeast Asian population centers were un-
dergoing. The Majapahit state that came into existence at the
end of the thirteenth century was different from those of the
earlier age; its authority over its subordinate regions pene-
trated deeper. The increasing importance of the Indonesian
archipelago’s spices in international trade resulted in the need
to control the flow of rice from the Javanese interior to the
coast. Control over territory that produced rice became es-
sential. Thus the loose federations among hinterland population
centers that characterized traditional Javanese politics were as-
saulted by Majapahit’s monarchs in an attempt to more effec-
tively concentrate political and economic authority in one dom-
inant center.
As a consequence of these initial transitions, during the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries new Southeast Asian urban
centers emerged and assumed an enhanced economic and po-
litical role vis-à-vis their subject hinterlands and also accepted
their traditional role as the source of cultural identity among
subordinate populations. The classical Southeast Asian centers,
although they attempted to maintain themselves economically
and politically with regard to local-level alliance networks, were
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vulnerable. The local level, reinforced by kinship and economic
ties, had permanence. Clients of local patrons or “big men”—for
example, landed elites, tribal chiefs, or in the case of Burma,
the Buddhist saṅgha—would remain loyal to their leader until
the local civilization was destroyed. 86 When the center demon-
strated the least sign of weakness, however, its clients rapidly
began to express their independence. But the loss of a center
was crucial to the local society, for the center provided unity
among the various competing local units, if not on a political
and economic level then at least in a cultural sense. When
an old cultural center was lost regional units competed with
each other to become the new center, building new networks
of economic and political alliance and underscoring these rela-
tionships by establishing new sources of legitimacy—for exam-
ple, by conversion from syncretic Hindu and Buddhist religious
systems to the Theravāda Buddhist and Islamic religious tradi-
tions or by fabricating links with eras of past glory, as in the
case of Malacca looking backward to the Śrīvijayan age and in
Ayudhya and later Thai states where Thai monarchs saw them-
selves as the legitimate successors to Angkor’s royal line. If
they failed to initiate such new linkages they languished, and
their populations became more isolated and internalized eco-
nomically, politically, and socially. 87
However, in looking at the peasant populations subordinate
to these centers it would be wrong to view the local societies as
being static. A return to the “good old days” might have been
desired but was impossible to achieve because the structure
of the societies, their economic organization, and their percep-
tions of the world had been affected by the penetration of more
elaborate civilizations during the classical age. There were ex-
pectations that had to be fulfilled, for instance the mainte-
nance of the standard of living to which the local peasantry
had become accustomed during the glory years of indigenous
participation in the supralocal patterns of trade, such as the
continued redistribution of wealth from state centers and the
provision of certain trade goods like ceramics, spices, and cloth
that had become necessities of life. The collapse of one of the
classical centers created disorder and had profound cultural
consequences as the society attempted to rationalize its dis-
order. As an aftermath the society often found it necessary to
restructure its very existence. New urban centers synthesized
the new economic and political forces with the indigenous cul-
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tural heritage; their success or failure in making this synthesis
in most instances determined their fate in the new commercial
age.
It was within these new Southeast Asian urban centers that
classical societies and foreign cultures continued to intersect,
producing tensions that often precipitated open conflict. But
it was also within such urban centers where the synthesis of
traditional and “modern,” if indeed the process of change can
be reduced to this dichotomy, took place. Among some seg-
ments of the indigenous population foreign cultures were fully
accepted, and traditional ways of doing things were rejected as
being backward and the cause of economic and political insta-
bilities. Others chose the opposite course, totally rejecting new
opportunities or cultures while reaffirming their old cultural
norms, explaining difficulties that arose as the consequence of
foreign values that had in various ways corrupted the traditional
system. 88 Defenders of the traditional society stressed the need
to return to the “pure” cultural forms of some past golden age. A
third group attempted to syncretize the other two, selecting the
best of their own society while accommodating those foreign
ways considered necessary to survival in the ever more complex
world order. In such urban centers indigenous political and eco-
nomic leaders came to terms with the past and present to artic-
ulate a future for Southeast Asia.
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1: TRADE AND STATECRAFT IN EARLY
SOUTHEAST ASIA
1. See Karl L. Hutterer, “Prehistoric Trade and the Evolution
of Philippine Society: A Reconsideration,” in Economic
Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia:
Perspectives from Prehistory, History, and Ethnography, ed.
Karl L. Hutterer, 177–196.
2. See J. G. de Casparis, “Historical Writing on Indonesia
(Early Period),” in Historians of South-East Asia, ed. D. G.
E. Hall, 126.
3. See Paul Wheatley, “Urban Genesis in Mainland South-East
Asia,” in Early South East Asia: Essays in Archaeology,
History and Historical Geography, ed. R. B. Smith and W.
Watson, 288–303.
4. George Coedès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia,
ed. Walter F. Vella, passim. See Preface, and I. W. Mabbett,
“The ‘Indianization’ of Southeast Asia: Reflections on the
Prehistoric Sources,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
(henceforth JSEAS) 8, 1 (1977): 1–14; 8, 2 (1977): 143–161.
5. This is one of the themes of O. W. Wolters in Early
Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Sri Vijaya.
6. See Kenneth R. Hall and John K. Whitmore, eds.,
Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History: The Origins
of Southeast Asian Statecraft, passim.
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7. In some cases others were granted land to develop in the
core—these might be royal service grants or religious
endowments. See chap. 6.
8. Robert Heine-Geldern, “Conceptions of State and Kingship
in Southeast Asia,” Far Eastern Quarterly 2 (November
1942): 15–30; and Paul Mus, India Seen From the East:
Indian and Indigenous Cults in Champa, trans. I. W.
Mabbett and D. P. Chandler.
9. Buchari, “A Preliminary Note on the Study of the
Old-Javanese Civil Administration,” Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu
Sastra Indonesia 1 (1963): 122–133.
10. See Keith W. Taylor, “The Rise of Đai Viet and the
Establishment of Thang-long,” in Hall and Whitmore,
Explorations in Early Southeast Asian His tory, 149–192.
11. See Clifford Geertz’s model of the “theater-state” in Islam
Observed, 36–39. A more recent application and discussion
of the Geertz model is Clifford Geertz, Negara: The
Theater-State in Nineteenth Century Bali. Geertz suggests
the centrality of ritual, ceremony, and theatrical behavior
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Basin,” also suggests that a climatic or geological transition
might have brought the demise of the Funan area, noting
the abandonment of the floodlands of the Mekong Delta by
the tenth century (p. 271).
4: TRADE AND STATECRAFT IN EARLY ŚRĪVIJAYA
An earlier version of this chapter appeared as “State and
Statecraft in Early Srivijaya,” in Explorations in Early
Southeast Asian History: The Origins of Southeast Asian
Statecraft, ed. Kenneth R. Hall and John K. Whitmore,
61–105.
1. O. W. Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History, 19–48.
2. Trade in the early centuries A.D. went across the Gulf of
Thailand to Funan ports, then proceeded across the
isthmus from the Bay of Bandon to various west coast
points of disembarkation. By the fifth century Malays had
shifted the route south to the Strait of Malacca. See O. W.
Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the
Origins of Sri Vijaya, 30–48.
3. Wolters, Fall of Srivijaya, 9. Wolters has rethought his
earlier focus on the external and coastal concentration of
Śrīvijaya’s power, however, agreeing with me (“State and
Statecraft in Early Srivijaya”) that the key to the Śrīvijaya
ruler’s authority was his ability to associate himself with
spiritual prowess and supernatural qualities in promoting
his legitimacy among both the upriver and downriver
populations of the river systems of Sumatra. See O. W.
Wolters, “Studying Srivijaya,” JMBRAS 52, 2 (1979): 1–38.
Concentrating on this internal aspect of Śrīvijaya’s
authority, Wolters argues that the Śrīvijaya ruler “promoted
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sensations of psychological well-being among his followers,
for his person was the effective ceremonial centre” (p. 24).
Wolters then uses this view of the Śrīvijaya monarch as an
indigenously defined ruler to postulate that riverine
settlements of Śrīvijaya’s upriver hinterland were more
closely linked than Bennet Bronson’s model (discussed in
chap. 1) suggests was true. Not by extracting riverine
produce (Bronson’s focus), but by redistributing treasures
derived from foreign trade to maintain his “glittering court
and honor his entourage” (p. 24), the Śrīvijaya monarch
acquired control of a network of riverine settlements whose
inhabitants participated in the ruler’s adventures and
provided him with the key members of his entourage. This
upriver hinterland, Wolters postulates, was the highland
Malāyu kingdom, the realm of the mountains attributed to
the Śrīvijaya monarch by foreign sources, which eventually
fell subject to the Javanese monarch Kĕrtanagara in the
second half of the thirteenth century. See also O. W.
Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian
Perspectives, 23.
4. Wolters, Fall of Srivijaya, 8 (quoting Chou Ch’u-fei).
5. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, The History of Srivijaya, 113 (Malay
text and English translation).
6. For a bibliography of early Dutch archaeological studies of
the southeastern Sumatra area, see Wolters, “Studying
Srivijaya,” nn. 20, 45.
7. See F. M. Schnitger, The Archaeology of Hindoo Sumatra,
and Stanley J. O’Connor, Jr., Hindu Gods of Peninsular Siam,
assorted maps and discussions. As a participant in the 1974
Palembang archaeological expedition of the Lembaga
Purbakala dan Peninggalan Nasional (The Indonesian
Archaeological Institute), I was able to form my own
impressions of the Palembang area. The terrain of this
region is essentially low and flat. There is little topsoil in
this part of Sumatra, and one quickly encounters a hard red
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clay when excavating. Despite this natural handicap, local
rice agriculture is an important source of food, utilizing
both wet-rice and dry-rice technologies. One of the major
rice-producing areas lies between the two dated
seventh-century inscriptions: Kedukan Bukit and Talang
Tua. The Kedukan Bukit inscription was found near the
Kedukan Bukit River, which leads to the foot of Bukit
Seguntang, the highest hill in the Palembang area and a
major source of remains for the early Śrīvijaya period.
Moving toward the interior (and toward Jambi), the next
high ground is Talang Tua where, as the Talang Tua
inscription states, the king of Śrīvijaya dedicated a deer
park. Unfortunately, my survey of the area between did not
produce remains dating to this early period (see map 4).
One problem in identifying the pre-tenth-century culture is
the lack of evidence—particularly of a walled city of the
Oc-èo type, which the Buddhist pilgrim I-ching indicated
Palembang to be in 671 when he reported that in “the
fortified city of Fo-shih” there resided a thousand Buddhist
priests (see J. Takakusa, trans., A Record of the Buddhist
Religion as Prac ticed in India and the Malay Archipelago).
Twelfth- and thirteenth-century Chinese accounts also
describe Palembang as a city surrounded by a brick wall.
While traders dealt inside the wall, the people lived either
scattered about outside the city or on the water on rafts of
boards covered over with reeds (F. Hirth and W. W. Rockhill,
Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in
the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu-fan chi,
60). Bukit Seguntang is the most likely place in the
Palembang area to correspond with I-ching’s description.
See Schnitger, Archaeology of Hindoo Sumatra, 1–4, for a
description of the various statues discovered at this site.
For a discussion of the dating of the Bukit Seguntang
Buddha, see Nik Hassan Shuhaimi, “The Bukit Seguntang
Buddha: A Reconsideration of its Date,” JMBRAS 52, 2
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(1979): 40–49.
We also excavated a site called Sarangwaty, which is
located southwest of Telaga Batu (now known as
Sabokingking), where a standing Bodhisattva
Avalokiteśvara (see p. 87) was recovered as well as
hundreds of small clay Buddhist stupicas. The stupicas,
which contain small clay punch-marked seals roughly the
size of a dime, were deposited in a rounded hole under the
statue site, seemingly to sanctify the ground under the
statue. This same practice of depositing stupicas under
Buddhist statues has been found at the Borobudur in
central Java. Avalokiteśvara, whose ability to help mankind
reached even to the deepest and most unpleasant of the
Buddhist purgatories, was particularly appropriate as a
symbol of the Śrīvijaya monarch and his claimed powers.
Affinity for this Bodhisattva in southeastern Sumatra was
still strong in the thirteenth century when Kĕrtanagara
consecrated a tantric Avalokiteśvara (Amoghapāśa) there
and proclaimed that it was to be worshipped as an
incarnation of his father (see chap. 9). Further excavations
in the immediate area contributed no supporting remains
from the pre-tenth-century period.
Edward McKinnon has associated Chinese porcelain he
collected in the Bukit Seguntang area with the T’ang period
and argues that these sherds may be associated with
Śrīvijaya settlement corresponding to the I-ching reference
(see McKinnon, “A Note on the Discovery of Spur-Marked
Yueh-Type Sherds at Bukit Seguntang Palembang,”
JMBRAS 52, 2 [1979]: 50–58). Chinese ceramics experts
have demonstrated that the green glazed stoneware was
manufactured in the kilns of south China’s Chekiang
province during the T’ang era (Wolters, His tory, Culture,
and Region, 22–23, n. 14). Further, unglazed stoneware of
the type I recovered at Śrīvijaya sites has been found in
quantity in the archaeological remains of Siraf on the
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Persian Gulf, the T’ang era terminus for Middle Eastern
trade with Asia (this information was shared by David
Whitehouse of The British School at Rome, Italy, who is
studying ‘Abbāsid era ceramics). Our 1974 excavations at
Palembang revealed limited data supportive of Śrīvijaya
civilization. While we were able to easily identify the
fourteenth-and sixteenth-century population centers, we
did not excavate a definitive pre-tenth-century site. The
reasons for this are varied, including the possibility that
Palembang was not the center of Śrīvijaya. For the present
I will explain our failure as being due to the dense
settlement patterns of modern Palembang and the
expectation that evidence of the old city is hidden under a
layer of asphalt. Also, it is likely that early settlement
patterns were similar to those of today, with people living in
wooden houses along the various small tributaries that flow
into the Musi River. Indeed, the Kedukan Bukit inscription
was found near one such waterway. As a result,
decomposition, fire, and yearly floods have probably taken
their toll on much of the early archaeological remains of the
Śrīvijaya state. For a summary of the 1974 expedition, see
Bennet Bronson and Jan Wisseman, “Palembang as
Srivijaya: The Lateness of Early Cities in Southern
Southeast Asia,” Asian Perspec tives 19, 2 (1978): 220–239.
8. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, 87–138.
9. From the Arab geographer Abū Zaid; see G. Ferrand,
“L’empire sumatrannais de Crivijaya,” JA 20 (1922): 57; and
G. R. Tibbetts, A Study of the Arabic Texts Containing
Material on South-East Asia, 29, 33–34.
10. Ferrand, “L’empire sumatrannais,” 57; Tibbetts, Study of
the Arabic Texts, 29, 33–34.
11. Nilakanta Sastri, History of Srivijaya, 113–115; J. G. de
Casparis, Pra sasti Indonesia II: Selected Inscriptions from
the Seventh to the Ninth Century A.D., 2–6, 10–11.
12. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 32–46; 6–15.
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13. Nilakanta Sastri, History of Srivijaya, 115–116. An
equivalent of the Kotakapur inscription has been
discovered at Palas Pasemah, near the southern coast of
Sumatra and across the Sunda Strait from Java. See map 4
for the locations of these inscriptions. Information on the
Palas Pasemah inscription was generously supplied by the
Lembaga Purbakala dan Peninggalan Nasional staff,
Jakarta.
14. The Sanskrit text and English translation of the ninth-or
tenth-century inscription from Karimum Besar is provided
in B. R. Chatterji, History of Indo nesia, 195–196. The
inscription honors a local ruler who was a patron of
Mahāyāna Buddhism, the school favored by Śrīvijaya’s
monarchs. Nilakanta Sastri, History of Srivijaya, 119–121.
15. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 15–46. One of the problems
in defining the relationship of the Telaga Batu inscription to
the Palembang area is the location where the inscription
was found. Telaga Batu, now known as Sabokingking, was
one of the residences of the post-1500 Palembang
sultanate. Also found at this site were thirty inscribed
stones (including the three seventh-century inscriptional
fragments discussed by Casparis, pp. 6–15), which appear
to have been collected elsewhere and brought to this site
where they were deposited near a sultan’s grave, possibly
because they were considered to have some desirable
magical power. This may have been the case with the
Telaga Batu stone as well, which judging from its size
would have required no small effort to move. A similar
plight could have befallen the other Palembang inscriptions
and remains. Geding Suro, a site between Sabokingking
and the river, was a major Muslim caṇḍi complex in the
sultanate period and was also the source of three
pre-tenth-century Buddhist statues that are now in the
Palembang museum. Bukit Seguntang, another major
source for the earlier period, is now the site of a Muslim
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cemetery and pilgrimage center. In the latter cases, either
the Śrīvijaya remains were moved to these spots or Muslim
religious complexes were built on land that was already
known to have magical qualities.
16. Nilakanta Sastri, History of Srivijaya, 120.
17. In local tradition nāgas were spirits superior to man that
inhabited subaquatic paradises, dwelling at the bottoms of
rivers, lakes, and seas. They were keepers of the life-energy
that is stored in these earthly waters; they had the power to
attract or control rain and were the guardians of the riches
of the oceans. Nāgas were thus widely believed to be the
source of fertility, prosperity, and earthly health. Local
belief emphasized the Śrīvijaya monarch’s special
relationship with water and thus with the nāga spirits that
symbolized water. The seven-headed nāga that
encompassed the Telaga Batu stone drew from this
tradition and localized Mahāyāna Buddhist mythology:
Now Muchalinda, a prodigious cobra, dwelt
in a hole amongst the roots. He perceived, as
soon as the Buddha had passed into the state
of bliss, that a great storm cloud had begun
to gather, out of season. Thereupon he issued
quietly from the black abode and with the
coils of his body enveloped seven times the
blessed body of the Enlightened One; with
the expanse of his giant snake-hood he
sheltered as an umbrella the blessed head.
Seven days it rained, the wind blew cold, the
Buddha remained in meditation. But on the
seventh, the unseasonable storm dispersed….
In this legend and in the images of the
Muchalinda-Buddha a perfect reconciliation
of the antagonistic principles is represented.
The serpent, symbolizing the life force that
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motivates birth and rebirth, and the savior,
conqueror of that blind will for life, severer of
the bonds of birth, pointer of the path to the
imperishable Transcendent, here together in
harmonious union open to the eye a vista
beyond all the qualities of thought…. It is
said by some that when the Buddha began
teaching his doctrine, he soon realized that
men were not prepared to accept it in its
fullness. They shrank from the extreme
implications of his vision of the universal
Void. Therefore, he committed the deeper
interpretation of reality to an audience of
nāgas, who were to hold it in trust until
mankind should be made ready to
understand…. Not until some seven centuries
had passed was the great sage Nāgārjuna,
“Arjuna of the Nāgas,” initiated by the
serpent kings into the truth that all is void.
And so it was he who brought to man the
full-fledged Buddhist teachings of the
Mahāyāna. (Heinrich Zimmer, Myths and
Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization, 67–68)
18. Another inscription found at Telaga Batu, also dating from
the late seventh century, records a lengthy prasasti that
had been issued on the occasion of a great victory by the
king leading his troops against his revolting subject
(Casparis, Pra sasti Indonesia II, 6). An insurgent had led
“an army of the king’s proper slaves” against the king. This
was stated to be “adharmeṇa” employing a common Indian
expression of being against the proper code of conduct for
a certain person’s status. As punishment for acting
adharmeṇa, the enemy troops had been annihilated. The
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fighting mentioned in this fragment is alluded to in another
fragment as well. Troops of the enemies (ripugaṇam) fled
or surrendered “at the approach of my army” (ibid., 8).
19. Lines 8, 19, 21, and 22.
20. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 25.
21. Ibid.
22. Talang Tua, line 6, in Nilakanta Sastri, History of Srivijaya,
114; Kotakapur, line 7, ibid., 115–116; Kotakapur, line 6;
Telaga Batu, line 28, in Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 36;
Kotakapur, line 7; Telaga Batu, line 26.
23. Line 25. Buddhists, like Hindus, believe that man has
multiple lifetimes in which to purify his soul so that it may
be reabsorbed into the cosmic absolute from which it
originally came (achievement of Nirvāṇa). The aim of the
Buddhist was thus to gain release from the cycle of
rebirths. The Theravāda way stressed self-discipline and
meditation—sometimes under the direction of a teacher
(thera)—that led to the ultimate loss of individuality. That of
Mahāyāna sought the same goal, but with the help of
heavenly Buddhas and Bodhisattvas—those who had
achieved enlightenment but like the Buddha had postponed
their own ultimate Nirv āṇa (pari-Nirv āṇa) to assist their
fellow man in his quest. The Vijrayāna, “The Vehicle of the
Thunderbolt,” was a third way that depended on the
supernatural—release was achieved through the acquisition
of magical powers. Vijrayāna’s sacred literature were the
Tantrās, textbooks of mystical experiences, secret
documents that were written in a mysterious language that
revealed magical formulas (mantra), symbols, rituals, and
spirits—especially goddesses (Tārās) and the spirits of the
dead—that could activate an energy force that allowed the
devotee to achieve rebirth after death into a Buddhist
heaven. A tantr ā-mala, “immaculate as a consequence of
Tantrā,” offered access to this life beyond death.
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24. Line 16, Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 5, 34. In the
Buddhist religious tradition these three vices caused
human suffering and sorrow and bound man to the cycle of
rebirths, prevented his achievement of salvation (Nirv āṇa,
his release from the cycle), and thus forced man to remain
an earth-dwelling being.
25. G. A. Wilken, Handleiding voor de Vergel ijkende
Volkenkunde van Nederlandsh-Indie, 80.
26. Line 2; Sujipto Wirjosuparto, “Shrivijaya and Majapahit,”
Hemisphere 14, 9 (1970): 29.
27. Jean Sauvaget, trans., Les marveilles de l’Inde, 302, from
the ‘Ajā’ib al- Hind (ca. 1000); Tibbetts, Study of the Arabic
Texts, 47.
28. William Marsden, The History of Sumatra, 301.
29. Ferrand, “L’empire sumatrannais,” 57; Tibbetts, Study of
the Arabic Texts, 33. See chapter 5 for a discussion of this
reference to Abū Zaid.
30. Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, 61.
31. Nilakanta Sastri, History of Srivijaya, 114. In Buddhism,
bodhi signifies enlightenment; “The Three Jewels” form the
basic profession of faith of Buddhism: “I go for refuge to
the Buddha; I go for refuge to the Doctrine (Dharma); I go
for refuge to the [monastic] Order (Saṅgha).”
32. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 10.
33. Ibid. Casparis’ translation is: “praising the absent king is
like somebody trying to glorify the sun during an eclipse.”
34. The ‘Ajā’ib al-Hind (ca. 1000), reports that the Śrīvijaya
ruler demanded a levy of twenty thousand dinars, no small
sum, as right of passage before he would allow a Jewish
merchant to continue his voyage to China (Tibbetts, Study
of the Arabic Texts, 44). Such extravagant levies not only
brought wealth to the Śrīvijaya ruler and his loyal
subordinates, but also could well have antagonized
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merchants, who may not have been displeased when the
Cōla̤s eliminated Śrīvijaya’s control over the strait region’s
trade in the next century.
35. For a discussion of the Cōla̤ raid and its meaning to
Śrīvijaya’s eleventh-century statecraft, see George W.
Spencer, The Politics of Expansion, the Chola Conquest of
Sri Lanka and Sri Vijaya, 100–150.
36. Line 9. Casparis, Prasasti Indoensia II, 33, 39.
37. Ibid., “to divide into small parts … to spend the gold and
jewels in order to destroy my keraton [kraton] …”
38. This is indicated in the Arab legend and symbolized in the
redistribution of wealth at the death of a king. Abū Zaid’s
reference states that a king was remembered for the
number of gold bricks left behind. The days of his reign,
remembered by the number of gold bricks available for
redistribution to his people, symbolized the king’s ability to
keep the system prosperous. According to Abū Zaid, it was
for leaving behind great wealth that a king was rewarded
with a place in history. Ferrand, “L’empire sumatrannais,”
57; Tibbetts, Study of the Arabic Texts, 33–34.
39. O’Connor, Hindu Gods of Peninsular Siam, 59. O’Connor
notes a “Srivijayan style” Mahāyāna Buddhist iconography
on the Malay Peninsula and suggests a connection between
the statuary and the portraits of deified individuals. He
connects this practice with the eastern Java bathing place
at Jalatunda (977). See also W. F. Stutterheim, “The
Meaning of the Hindu-Javanese caṇḍi,” Jour nal of the
American Oriental Society 51 (1931): 1–15, who proposed
that Javanese caṇḍi statuary was shaped to portray
deceased kings in the form of a deity; and Alastair Lamb, “A
Note on the Tiger Symbol in Some Southeast Asian
Representations of Avalokitesvara,” Federated Museums
Journal 6 (1961): 89–90, who describes the distribution of
Tantric Buddhist statuary that he believes symbolized
Śrīvijaya’s control over the eastern Malay coast.
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40. Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, 60.
41. The word for “oath” (sumpah) in the inscription is Malay
rather than Sanskrit, reflecting the extensive local content
in this act of oath taking. The Sumatran tradition of oath
taking is discussed in Hall, “State and Statecraft,” 90.
42. Line 21, Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 43–44; lines 25
and 26, ibid., 45–46.
43. His later account of the method of extracting camphor
from trees in Sumatra’s interior adds veracity to his
description. Ferrand, “L’empire sumatrannais,” 52–53;
Tibbetts, Study of the Arabic Texts, 28.
44. “Fragment A,” Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 2–6.
45. L. C. Damais, “Études soumatranaises III. La langue B des
inscriptions de śrī Wijaya,” BEFEO 54 (1968): 523–566.
46. O. W. Wolters, “A Few Miscellaneous Pi-chi Jottings on
Early Indonesia,” Indonesia 36 (October 1983): 54.
47. From Chao Ju-kua’s Chu- fan chih of 1225, which presents
passages from the P’ing-chou k’o-t’an, compiled by Chu Yü,
translated by Wolters, “A Few Miscellaneous Pi-chi
Jottings,” 52–53. This sūtra and the Buddhist Tantric
tradition were still important in the Śrīvijaya realm during
the late eleventh century, as reflected in the comments of
Chu Yü, whose writings in 1118–1119 on Chinese material
culture incorporated his personal experiences during the
time his father had been the chief administrator of the
Canton port from 1099 to 1102:
In Canton I [Chu Yü] once attended a public
feast. The foreigners assembled in the
[government] office. The foreign headman
introduced someone from San-fo-ch’i
[Śrīvijaya] and said that he could recite the
K’ung-ch’ueh [Peacock] ming wang sūtra. My
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view is that Buddhist works which [contain]
dharani [magical formulas] are
incomprehensible….
48. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 19, 29, and 37 n. 4.
49. The Śrīvijaya king’s perception of his new state is
represented in the Telaga Batu inscription’s multiple
references to huluntuhāṅku, “the domain of the conquered
and common people [hulun] and the ruling class [tuhāṅ]”
(Casparis, Pra sasti Indonesia II, 26). One could make a
case that the Śrīvijaya king described here was a member
of an “alien aristocracy” who was able to adjust his
ambitions to the local Sumatran environment. Even if this
were the case, the Telaga Batu inscription clearly
emphasizes that indigenous tradition was the basis for and
defined the initial development of the Śrīvijayan state.
50. See Keith W. Taylor, “Madagascar in the Ancient
Malayo-Polynesian Myths,” in Hall and Whitmore,
Explorations in Early Southeast Asian History, 25–60.
51. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 19. Casparis believes that
the rājaputra were sons of concubines of the Śrīvijaya king.
52. Ibid. See fig. 3 for a reconstruction of the early Śrīvijaya
political system.
53. Ibid. Casparis translates hāji-pratyaya “royal sheriffs,”
indicating that their responsibility was to keep peace
among the commoners (hulun).
54. Ibid., 20, 32, 37. Casparis translates mūrdhaka “somebody
at the head of some group,” and its position in the Telaga
Batu inscription suggests that the people they controlled
were commoners (hulun). This is undoubtedly an example
of assigning a respectable Sanskrit title to a previously
existing group of indigenous elites who are best described
as “chiefs.”
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55. See the discussion of bondage in early Southeast Asia in
chap. 6; and Anthony Reid, ed., Slavery, Bondage and
Dependency in South-East Asia.
56. F. D. K. Bosch, “The Problem of Hindu ‘Colonisation’ of
Indonesia,” Selected Studies in Indonesian Archaeology,
3–22. The organization of the earlier southeast Sumatra
port of Kan-t’o-li included Buddhist advisors of the
Brahman type (Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce,
221–223). In the Śrīvijaya period a similar group supported
the king of the new dominant port, but by that time their
status, as reflected in the Telaga Batu inscription, was
considered lower than that of many other administrative
and military officials.
57. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, 229–253, and
“Srivijayan Expansion in the Seventh Century,” Artibus
Asiae 24 (1961): 417–424. With the discovery of the Palas
Pasemah inscription and archaeological evidence of an
early settlement on the southeastern tip of Sumatra, the
possibility exists that the old Kan-t’o-li port was located at
Palas Pasemah, and that this area was brought under
Śrīvijaya’s authority in a way similar to Malāyu.
58. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, 229–250.
59. “Fragment A,” Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 2–6.
60. Ibid., 45 n. 73.
61. David E. Sopher, The Sea Nomads, 93.
62. Ibid., 321.
63. Wolters, Fall of Srivijaya, 15. The island in the Riau
Archipelago known as Karimum Besar, as noted above, has
an inscription dating to the Śrīvijaya period (see map 4).
See also Tibbetts, Study of the Arabic Texts, 31.
64. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 42 n. 52.
65. “Fragment A,” line 11, ibid., 5.
66. Ibid., 37.
67. “Charged by me with …” (line 15) ibid., 42.
68. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 44.
Notes
331
69. Ibid., 42. The oath administered in the Khmer empire also
required more than the testimony of loyalty to the state, as
one specifically swore to become the king’s eyes, feeding
local information back to the center. See L. P. Briggs, The A
ncient Khmer Empire, 151.
70. In Indonesian inscriptions vaṇiyāga is used to distinguish
long-distance or seafaring merchants. It may be derived
from the Sanskrit vaṇij/vaṇik, “merchant.” But niaga is a
Malay word for “trade” and with its verbal prefix ber-
becomes berniaga. Therefore, unless this is a back
formation, the derivation from vaṇij seems unlikely.
71. Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 2. The Ling wai tai ta
(Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, 60) regarded Malays
living on rafts of boards as Śrīvijaya’s principal inhabitants,
a people “scattered about” the local river. Such inhabitants
could well have been alluded to by the hinterland
populations as “migratory men.”
72. The ‘Ajā’ib al-Hind (ca. 1000) notes the confinement of
merchants to the Śrīvijaya capital, which was readily
accepted because of fear of wild animals (e.g., crocodiles)
that were said to attack those who attempted to penetrate
the interior. This report describes the Śrīvijaya capital:
Some houses are built on the land, but most
float on the water, kept up by pieces of wood
tied together in the form of a raft and last
forever. They do this for fear of fire, for their
houses, constructed of wood, are very
inflammable, and when one catches fire all
are burnt down. Placed on the water, the
houses are well protected, and if fire is
detected each owner cuts the cables, floats
away and then ties up elsewhere far from the
conflagration. Whenever they do not like a
particular quarter they can always move. The
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houses in the bay are arranged in streets,
and the water between the houses is very
deep. It is fresh water which arrives from the
high country, enters the estuary and flows on
to the sea, as does that of the Tigris.
(Tibbetts, Study of the Arabic Texts, 47)
73. Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, 68.
74. See Karl Polanyi et al., Trade and Market in Early Empires.
75. Tibbetts, Study of the Arabic Texts, 53.
76. Anker Rentse, “Gantang of Kelantan,” JMBRAS 11 (1933):
242–244.
77. From the P’ing-chou k’o-t’an of Chu Yü, chap. 2, as
translated by Wolters, “A Few Miscellaneous Pi-chi
Jottings,” 55. High-quality frankincense was a product of
“the West” (the Middle East or India) although Indonesian
substitutes were also categorized as frankincense by the
Chinese. See Wolters, Early Indone sian Commerce, passim.
78. For a discussion of the geography of the Musi River Delta
and the implications of this geography to Śrīvijaya’s history,
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80. Bronson, in Bronson and Wisseman, “Palembang as
Srivijaya: The Lateness of Early Cities in Southern
Southeast Asia,” argues that the Śrīvijaya realm did not
have a continuous history as a consequence of these
economic fluctuations and instead should be better
understood as periodically coming into existence when the
international trade route offered sufficient opportunities to
acquire trade-derived revenues to facilitate the alliance
networks necessary for Śrīvijaya’s existence. Bronson
further argues that Śrīvijaya’s center, as a consequence,
likely shifted among several rivermouth entrepôts in the
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swatantra and dharma lepas). See Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, Java
in the Fourteenth Century, passim.
58. See Clifford Geertz’s model of the “theater-state” in
Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed, 36–39. A glimpse of early
Javanese court ritual is provided in the epigraphic
proclamations of the foundations of temples and sīma
grants, which report the participation of all important state
elites, who are carefully recorded as being in attendance.
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Inscriptions of Java, 1:278–287, 217–226, 266–275. Van
Naerssen argues that there was unrest after this reign, a
response to Kayuwangi’s drain of his realm’s economic
productivity to build temples (i.e., converting economic
capital into symbolic capital). But Boechari, questioning
such a conclusion, says that there was no significant temple
construction during this era. Casparis records that Pikatan
assumed the regnal title Kumbhayoni in the mid-ninth
century, an interpretation that van Naerssen does not share
(see Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II, 290; van Naerssen and
de Iongh, Early Indonesia, 29–50). Casparis’ view is that
following conflict with Bālaputra of the Śailendra line, first
Pikatan, who assumed the regnal title Kumbhayoni, and
then Kayuwangi restored Śaivite kingship; van Naerssen’s
is that Kumbhayoni, Rakrayān of Walaing and
great-grandchild of the Ratu of Halu, did not define his
legitimacy from Sañjaya, but that Śrī Mahārāja Rakrayān
Kayuwangi, who reigned from roughly 863 to 882, did.
Further, van Naerssen finds Kayuwangi recognizing a
“Rakrayān of Halu” in an inscription dated 882 (Damais,
“Études d’epigraphie Indonésienne, III,” 34–43; Sarkar,
1:278–287), as well as his other subordinate rakrayān of
Hino, Wka, Sirikan, Tiruan, and Halaran (van Naerssen and
de Iongh, 29–50). Van Naerssen argues that the
incorporation of this former ratu as a subordinate rakrayān
is characteristic of Kayuwangi’s reign and its policy of
unification and gradual concentration of kra ton
administration. In his view, all previous monarchs reigned
over regional units and may not be regarded as sovereigns
ruling a territory as vast as central Java. In either instance,
Kayuwangi’s reign demonstrates a concern for economic
development that may well relate to the immediate
economic pressures of the post-Śailendra age. New temples
on the Ratubaka Plateau and at Prambanan as well as
regional temples in the image of the central temples were
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built under royal guidance. They became the focus of royal
claims to legitimacy whether as a response to the disorders
of the previous age and the replacement of the former
Śailendra monarchs by a new royal line or because of the
centralizing ambitions of Kayuwangi. Kayuwangi’s efforts to
elevate the status of his kraton vis-à-vis other rakrayān’s
kraton may well have provoked a reaction by the other
rakrayān following his reign; in essence such continuing
competition effectively neutralized the evolution of a
centralized polity in central Java.
91. Kamalagyan inscription (A.D. 1037), Brandes and Krom,
“Oud-Javaansche Oorkonden,” as discussed in F. H. van
Naerssen, “De Brantas en haar waterwerken in den
Hindu-Javaanschen tijd,” De Ingenieur 53 (1938): A65–A66.
92. Airlangga’s two dams, one at Waringin Sapta and another
at Kĕlagyan in the Brantas Delta, were constructed to
reestablish the old course of the river in the Brantas Delta
and to protect local farmlands after a major flood that
inundated the area in 1033 (at modern Mojokerto the
Brantas curves sharply south and there uncontrolled
floodwaters could have easily broken through; see N. C. van
Setten van der Meer, Sawah Cultivation in Ancient Java:
Aspects of Devel opment during the Indo- Javanese Period,
5th to 15th Century, 18). Local villagers of Kamalagyan
were required by Airlangga to settle by the dam at
Waringin Sapta in order to guard against its damage or
destruction (lines 15–16, Kamalagyan inscription, as
translated by van der Meer, 80).
93. Coedès, Indianized States, 144–147. As noted, the earliest
written inscriptions of Java were recorded in Sanskrit
(Sañjaya’s 732 Caṅggal inscription is the first dated
epigraph), but while inscriptions in central Java continued
to be written in Sanskrit, east Java epigraphy was the first
to use Old Javanese (Kawi) script (Plumpangan Stone
Inscription of 752) and by the ninth century was recorded
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in Old Javanese language and script (see Casparis,
Indonesian Palaeog raphy). O. W. Wolters, History, Culture,
and Region in Southeast Asian Per spectives, 53, argues for
the use of the term “localization” to describe the process of
transition from “pure” Indian forms to forms in which the
local tradition predominated (see chap. 3). Javanese
literature provides a useful documentation of the process of
“localization.” By 856, landscape poetry was introduced
into central Java epigraphy, written in Sanskrit verse, in
which the beauty of nature was celebrated in a manner that
goes beyond the poetry of India (P. J. Zoetmulder,
Kalangwan: A Survey of Old Javanese Literature, 230;
Casparis, Prasasti Indo nesia II, 285). This poetic style was
enhanced in later literature written in Old Javanese.
94. The remaining records of central Java wet-rice agriculture
generally make reference to officials who were responsible
for the administration of irrigation systems (e.g., the Caṇḍi
Pĕrot inscription dated 850, Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia II,
211–243) or the conversion of lands to wet-rice cultivation
(e.g., Sarkar, Cor pus of the Inscriptions of Java,
1:278–287).
95. At Bakalan, for example, a 934 inscription issued by a
rakrayān who was subject to the authority of Pu Siṇḍok
records the initiation of wet-rice cultivation after the
construction of three dams and a local irrigation canal
network “for the benefit of the rakrayān’s people.” Local
village elders were instructed by the rakray ān to see that
farmers were fully aware of the significance of regulations
affecting the use of this new irrigation system and that they
were especially to abide by established rules applying to
water distribution (Kromodjojo Adi Negoro, Oud Javaansche
Oorkonden op steem uit het afdeeling Mod joker to, I, as
summarized and discussed in van der Meer, Sawah
Cultivation in Ancient Java, 51–52). Van der Meer argues
that water distribution was difficult for a local community
Notes
359
to administer, providing opportunities for outside political
authorities to step in to punish those who took too much
water). The Dinaya Stone Inscription of 760 (Sarkar,
Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java, 25–33) provides the
earliest evidence of political developments in this region
where three major rivers flow to the Brantas from the
Anjasmoro mountain range (see map 5). By the tenth
century this well-established wet-rice producing center was
under the authority of rakray ān claiming mah ār āja rights
over both central and eastern Java (e.g., Pu Siṇḍok’s
Sarangan Charter [929] and the Bakalan inscription of
Rakrayān Mangibil [934], as discussed in van der Meer, 9).
As a likely consequence of the periodic flooding of the
lower Brantas and/or the threat of raids from the sea,
eastern Java’s population, like that of central Java that was
more isolated from the coast, was so oriented toward the
interior that post-tenth-century monarchs based in east
Java had to undertake major recruitment campaigns to
encourage hinterland peoples to populate the Java coast.
See Wisseman, “Markets and Trade in Pre-Majapahit Java,”
206.
96. Hariñjing “B” inscription (921), P. V. van Stein Callenfels,
“De inscriptie van Sukabumi,” Mededeelingen van de
Koninklijk Akademie van Wetenschap pen, Afdeeling
Letterkunde (hereafter MKAWAL) 78 (1934): 116–122, as
discussed in van der Meer, Sawah Cultivation in Ancient
Java. The Hariñjing “B” inscription also appears in Sarkar,
Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java, 2:196–197. Tuloḍong’s
orders were received by the rakrayān Mapatih Hino, who
communicated the mahārāja’s determination to several
named rakrayān that the area’s water system should
remain a freehold (sīma) of the area’s landed elite (i.e., the
named rakrayān were denied access to the area’s land
rights).
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97. P. V. van Stein Callenfels, “De inscriptie van Kandangan,”
TBG 58 (1919): 359, as discussed in van der Meer, Sawah
Cultivation in Ancient Java, 20. Van der Meer argues that
the nearby Kelud volcano periodically erupted, creating the
perpetual danger of consequent floods, and believes that
the 1350 project was necessary because the 804 dam could
not adequately handle the periodic floods.
98. Hariñjing “B” inscription (921), as discussed in van der
Meer, Sawah Cul tivation in Ancient Java, 116. The costs of
this ritual were borne by the nearby village of Wulak. See
chap. 9 for a discussion of the Caitra festival.
99. Ibid., 132.
100. F. D. K. Bosch, “The Old Javanese Bathing-place
Jalatunda,” Selected Studies in Indonesian Archaeology,
49–107, which describes a tenth-century eastern Java
“bathing place” in the Brantas River system. A 943
inscription of Pu Siṇḍok speaks of sacred water that flowed
past or through a temple (Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia I,
149), which the rakrayān Pikatan diverted: “After the Śiva
sanctuary had been completed in its divine splendor, the
(course of the) river was changed so that it rippled along
the grounds … [of the sanctuary]” (Casparis, Prasasti
Indonesia II, 328). The role of the bathing places can be
compared to that of mountain temples and their irrigation
network rituals in Bali, as discussed in Geertz, Negara, and
therein it may be possible to assume that irrigation ritual
networks also played important roles as sources of regional
integration in Java (see n. 102, below).
101. The sanctity of the Brantas River was widely recognized in
literary and epigraphic references to the river as the “Lord
of Waters” (bangawan); such records especially note a
ceremonial relationship between eastern Java monarchs
and the river. Eastern Java court ritual promoted the ruler’s
symbolic communication with his realm’s river systems,
which was portrayed as being important to the general
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prosperity of the state’s economy (see chap. 9). In the
fifteenth century this title was transferred to the Solo
River—which in earlier inscriptions was also considered
sacred—seemingly because of a shift in the course of the
Brantas River in that time. See van der Meer, Sawah
Cultivation in Ancient Java, 17; J. Noorduyn, “Further
Topographical Notes on the Ferry Charter of 1358,” BKI
124 (1968): 460–481.
102. Casparis, “New Evidence on Cultural Relations,” argues
that the Ratubaka Plateau inscription of 792 demonstrates
that Śailendra homage was expressed not to the Lord
Buddha, the Triratna, or Avalokiteśvara but to the “Cosmic
Mountain of the Perfect Buddhas” (samvuddha-sumeru),
that is, to the Borobudur itself:
I pay homage to the Sumeru of the Buddhas,
of lofty qualities and endowed with the
awe-inspiring power of wisdom—whose
profound caves are knowledge, whose rock is
excellent tradition, whose brilliance is owing
to its relic: the Good Word, whose streams
are love, whose forests are
concentration—truly the Mount of Few
Desires, which is not shaken by the right
horrible winds….
Casparis, “The Dual Nature of Barabudur,” 74. Broad
Javanese cultural influence on all of Southeast Asia is
stressed in Wolters, History, Culture, and Region, 16–33.
103. The Javanese state system described in this chapter differs
significantly from that of its Balinese neighbor. In Bali, as
noted in Geertz, Negara, local irrigation and religious
networks confined to riverine drainage systems were the
basis of regional interdependence, but there was minimal
integration among regional irrigation and religious
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networks beyond their drainage systems. As each drainage
system formed a self-contained exchange network, linkage
normally took place via exchanges among the downriver
ports at the edge of each system. As in other riverine
economic systems in the island world, strong regional
economic interdependency evolved in Bali, but integration
of exchange networks into a hierarchical and
interdependent economic system as a whole was weak.
Because of this regional economic isolation, Bali did not
develop a highly integrated polity; symbolic linkages
connected drainage systems but religious ties were weakly
institutionalized. Temple networks retained their autonomy
vis-à-vis the political center and there was minimal
economic and political integration that resulted from
supraregional symbolic ties.
104. See, for instance, L. C. Damais, “Études
Sino-Indonésiennes, I and II,” BEFEO 50 (1960): 25–29,
where a sea captain and overseas trader of importance,
Ḍang Pu Hawang Gĕlis, and his wife in 827 donated several
domestic utensils to a Ḍihyang temple patronized by the
Gĕlis Patapān, the father of Pikatan who successfully
challenged Śailendra sovereignty (in Casparis’
reconstruction) shortly thereafter (text in Sarkar, Corpus of
the Inscriptions of Java, 1:75, i–ii). Since this Diëng Plateau
complex established by Sañjaya as the basis of Śaivite
legitimacy was drawn upon by Patapān’s line as the source
of their legitimacy, providing contact with earlier cults of
legitimacy, the sea captain’s gifts to the royal temple
complex may have been intended to solicit the favor of the
Patapān line and gain their support for the trader’s
commercial ambitions in the Javanese heartland.
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6: TEMPLES AS ECONOMIC CENTERS IN EARLY
CAMBODIA
1. Paul Wheatley, “Satyānṛta in Suvarṇadvīpa: From
Reciprocity to Redistribution in Ancient Southeast Asia,” in
Ancient Civilization and Trade, ed. Jeremy A. Sabloff and C.
C. Lamberg-Karlovsky, 227–283. Wheatley draws especially
from the work of Marshall Sahlins (e.g., Stone Age
Economics) and Talcott Parsons (Talcott Parsons and Neil J.
Smelser, Economy and Society: A Study in the Integration
of Economic and Social Theory).
2. Ibid., 252.
3. I. W. Mabbett, “Kingship in Angkor,” Journal of the Siam
Society (hereafter JSS) 66, 2 (1978): 1–58, is a useful
summary of past historiography on Khmer statecraft.
4. Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 172.
Bourdieu argues that via the transformation of economic
capital into “symbolic capital,” the economy is not grasped
as an economy, that is, as a system governed by the laws of
“interested calculation, competition, and exploitation.”
“Symbolic capital” is a disguised form of physical
“economic capital” and “originates in ‘material’ forms of
capital which are, in the last analysis, the source of its
effects” (p. 183). “Symbolic capital is always credit … i.e., a
sort of advance which the group alone can grant those who
give it the best material and symbolic guarantees….
Exhibition of symbolic capital is always very expensive in
economic terms” (p. 181). He notes that as the “good-faith”
(i.e., reciprocity) economy breaks up, the economic concept
of “undisguised self-interest” takes hold, yet in this
transition the society refuses to acknowledge this
self-interest, devoting “as much time concealing the reality
of economic acts as it expends in carrying them out.” This
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movement away from the “good-faith” economy may be
compared to Sahlins’ (and Wheatley’s) notion of a
redistributive or mobilizative socioeconomy.
5. O. W. Wolters, “Jayavarman II’s Military Power: The
Territorial Foundations of the Angkor Empire,” Journal of
the Royal Asiatic Society (hereafter JRAS) (1973): 29–30.
6. The Buddhist concept was somewhat different: Mount
Meru was the center of seven seas and seven mountain
ranges, with four continents situated in an ocean beyond
these seven mountain ranges—Jambudvīpa was the
southernmost of these.
7. See Hermann Kulke, The Devarāja Cult.
8. Wolters, “Jayavarman II’s Military Power.”
9. Claude Jacques has retraced the early history of Angkor;
see Claude Jacques, “Auteur de quelques toponymes de
l’inscription du Prasat Tapan Run K. 598: la capitale
Angkorienne, de Yaśovarman Ier a Sūryavarman Ier,”
BEFEO 65 (1978): 281–321.
10. L. P. Briggs, The Ancient Khmer Empire, passim.
11. O. W. Wolters, “Khmer ‘Hinduism’ in the Seventh Century,”
in Early South East Asia: Essays in Archaeology, History
and Historical Geography, ed. R. B. Smith and W. Watson,
427–441.
12. See George Coedès, Inscriptions du Cambodge (hereafter
IC) 2:151; 3:163; 1:15; 4:32; 6:8. Through the worship of
the dead, ancestors who had attained eminence in life were
accorded recognition; personal achievements in an
individual’s lifetime earned him ancestor status. Those who
became prosperous thereby demonstrated that their
contact with the ancestors was greater than that of others
of their generation. Achievements and meritorious deeds
were normally associated with superior spiritual prowess.
Those with prowess were able to influence their fellow
man’s stature in this life as well as their hopes for
recognition after death. Gifts to Hindu gods and local
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deities, as well as subordination to individuals who had by
their personal achievements demonstrated superior
prowess influenced one’s prospects of achieving ancestor
status. See chap. 3.
13. For example, Coedès, IC, 5:29.
14. In 685, for instance, a temple ceremony was performed by
a local chief before no less than twenty-two witnesses, all
political subordinates of their chief (Coedès, IC, 2:124);
another seventh-century inscription recorded the gifts of
twenty-five persons to the local cult temple as a display of
homage to a chief (5:37–38). In yet another inscription a
liṅga was set up in the name of a dominant local family by a
brother-in-law; this gift denoted the subordination of his
family to the religious prowess of his new in-laws, who thus
became dominant over his family’s lineage network
(2:27–28).
15. The nature of Jayavarman’s integration of the local and
Hindu religious traditions is revealed in a seventh-century
inscription in which Jayavarman ordered bondsmen to be
conducted to a prominent chief and then allocated among
the monarch’s sanctuaries in a certain area (Coedès, IC,
2:117, as discussed by Nidhi Aeusrivongse, “Devarāja Cult
and Khmer Kingship at Angkor,” in Explorations in Early
Southeast Asian History: The Origins of Southeast Asian
Statecraft, ed. Kenneth R. Hall and John K. Whitmore, 115).
In this inscription “Hindu” gods shared the “domain” of a
tree spirit also named in a 611 inscription that recorded the
merging of arrangements for maintaining a “Hindu” god’s
cult with those in honor of a sacred tree (IC, 2:21–23, as
discussed in Aeusrivongse; the 611 inscription seems to
distinguish the involvement of a political overlord). In these
two instances, the local tree spirit acquired a direct
relationship with a political overlord (Jayavarman) as well
as with “Hindu” gods. This local spirit was thereby
provided a place in the “Hindu” pantheon and also in the
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network of social and political relationships that defined
seventh-century Khmer society in that early period of
overlordship. The familiar local spirit became identified
with the more abstract and universal Indian deities and was
thus as well upgraded to an entity with greater distinction
than was previously the case. Throughout Khmer history no
single Khmer chief or “monarch” monopolized the “Hindu”
materials. Khmer elites/chiefs as a whole were involved as
early religious and political relationships overlapped.
Seventh-century Khmer chiefs did, however, refer to
themselves as “worshippers” (bhakta) of their overlords
(see Wolters, “Khmer ‘Hinduism’”). They explained this
homage as being due to their overlord’s special spiritual
relationship with Śiva, which brought rewards to those who
served him. Subordinate chiefs, with their own devotional
cults, offered Śiva gifts as tokens of their devotion to
powerful political overlords such as Jayavarman. The
“Hindu” cults in honor of Śiva heightened the political
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tenth century. The Sdok Kak Thom inscription of 1052, for
instance, perpetuated the devar āja rites, proclaiming that
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Coedès and P. Dupont, “Les stèles de Sdok Kak Thom,
Phnom Sandak et Prah Vihar,” BEFEO 43 [1943–1946]:
56–154). Kulke, Devar āja Cult, distinguishes the devar āja
cult from the personal cults of later Khmer monarchs.
17. I wish to thank Claude Jacques for pointing out the
importance of the “protectors” of Angkor-era monarchs.
18. A. Barth and A. Bergaigne, Inscriptions Sanskrites du
Cambodge et Campa (hereafter ISCC), 370.
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The last raid was joined by the Chams. See the Ðại Việt
sũ-ký toàn thu’, as reported in O. W. Wolters, History,
Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, 61 n.
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24. Briggs, Ancient Khmer Empire; and Bernard P. Groslier,
The Art of Indo china.
25. Chou Ta-kuan, Notes on the Customs of Cambodia
translated from the Shuo-fu, trans. Paul Pelliot (trans. from
French into English by J. G. d’Avery Paul), 31.
26. Barth and Bergaigne, ISCC, 407.
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28. Ibid., 502; see also Wolters, History, Culture, and Region,
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29. W. J. van Liere, “Traditional Water Management in the
Lower Mekong Basin,” World Archaeology 11, 3 (1980):
274.
30. The waterworks around the Khmer capital at Angkor were
dominated by two artificial lakes—the east and west baray,
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elite. A Phimai inscription (1041) names a khloñ viṣaya for
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consequence of a Cham invasion. Jacques believes, based
on his study of Khmer and Cham epigraphy, that the future
Jayavarman VII was visiting in Champa when a major revolt
broke out in the Khmer realm. With Cham assistance
Jayavarman put down this civil strife and then assumed the
Khmer throne. Jacques notes in personal communication
that the twelfth-century prominence of Viṣṇu worship
among Khmer monarchs (e.g., Sūryavarman II’s dedication
of Angkor Wat to Viṣṇu) was in some way related to a
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Viṣṇu, not Śiva, was the traditional protector of Cham
monarchs. When Jayavarman reestablished order in the
Khmer realm he began to patronize Buddhism as a new
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Supporting this proposal are the significant number of
references to non-Khmer “bureaucrats” serving in
Jayavarman VII’s royal administration, a pattern that is
unusual in earlier epigraphy. I wish to thank Professor
Jacques for discussing his research on Jayavarman’s reign
with me.
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79. Donors normally assigned a portion of the income from a
parcel of land to a temple and often responsibility for the
development and management of the land as well. Efficient
land management supplied the temple with the revenues
necessary to support the temple’s various activities, usually
a designated share of the land’s production. But if the total
productivity was increased by the temple’s management
then the donor’s take from the land, the consequence of
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similar patterns of integration at Iśanapura, where regional
and provincial gods were subordinated to central deities,
but were integrated into royal cults in an important urban
center within the Khmer heartland (pp. 436–439).
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82. Bourdieu stresses the theoretical importance of
establishing a comprehensive balance sheet differentiating
between symbolic profits and material (economic) profits,
where honor has greater value than the material and
acquisition of “cultural capital” is preferred (Bourdieu,
Outline of a Theory of Practice, 181–183). On the
implications of such “gift” relationships, see Marcel Mauss,
The Gift; Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its
Nature and Function; Sahlins, Stone Age Economics; and
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 159–197. Another
aspect of the utilization of gift exchanges as the source of
political integration was the marriage alliances forged by
Khmer monarchs as discussed above and in Kirsch,
“Kinship, Genealogical Claims, and Societal Integration.”
83. Rather than a “hydraulic agricultural” network that
demanded a centrality of control by a state (Karl Wittfogel,
Oriental Despotism), the Angkor state developed regionally
based hydroagricultural networks that facilitated the
extension of wet-rice cultivation. Supervision of the
construction and operation of these regional irrigational
networks was vested with regional temples. See for
example Coedès and Dupont, “Les stèles de Sdok Kak
Thom,” where the heads of a family and its branches
acted—through their family temple—as managers of land,
clearing forests, erecting dwellings for new inhabitants,
building dikes and reservoirs, and setting “slaves” to work
on land assigned for development.
84. Ricklefs, “Land and the Law,” passim.
85. Recently enslaved laborers were unlikely to understand
the technical requirements of the new irrigation system and
had to learn when and how to execute, considering the
fluctuating environmental conditions, the variety of tasks
necessary in a wet-rice system. Carol Appadurai
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Breckenridge, “Land as Gift in the Vijayanagara Period,” is
useful for comparative purposes. Breckenridge views south
Indian temples as centers of a “storage economy.”
86. Breckenridge argues that in an era of change and
uncertainty temples provided not only authority over the
development of the agricultural sector, but also were
cultural mediators providing psychological continuity to a
potentially insecure and unstable social order facing an
influx of new manpower, new agricultural technology, and
new political alliances (ibid.).
87. Indeed, Khmer inscriptions describe agricultural
productivity as “spiritual gain” and record the rights of
monarchs and temples to a share of this “spiritual gain.”
See Sachchidanand Sahai, “Fiscal Administration in
Ancient Cambodia,” The South East Asian Review 1, 2
(1977): 123–138, especially 130. See also Bourdieu, Outline
of a Theory of Practice, 171–183. Man’s relationship with
the land in traditional societies, Bourdieu argues, was a
holy/sacred relationship. Land was never treated as a raw
material to be exploited but was an object of respect mixed
with fear; bad treatment of the natural realm brought
revenge (p. 175).
88. Coedès, I C, 3:180–192.
89. In the literature about Angkor, kñuṁ and most other
references to Khmer agricultural laborers are translated
“slaves” but this is misleading. In some instances “slaves”
were given permanent lots of land and had rights over this
land, in others they tilled fields that did not belong to them
but received certain rights of security in exchange for their
labor. See Mabbett, “Kingship in Angkor,” 42ff.; also J. M.
Jacob, “Pre-Angkor Cambodia: Evidence from the
Inscriptions in Khmer concerning the Common People and
their Environment,” in Smith and Watson, Early South East
Asia, 423–426, for differing views on the debate over the
appropriateness of the translation of kñuṁ as “slave.” In
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Khmer epigraphy, kñuṁ grind, spin, groom elephants, mold
statues, sing, play musical instruments, sew leaves into
mats, and assist in temple ceremonies, as well as till the
soil (Mabbett, 409).
90. Other inscriptions demonstrate that land assigned to
individual priests could be reassigned or the land and its
kñuṁ sold. See, for example, Coedès, IC, 4:106–107.
91. This dating system was preserved in Thailand into the
nineteenth century.
92. Coedès, I C, 3:3–24.
93. Sedov, “On the Problem of the Economic System in
Angkor,” calculates that the nineteen kñuṁ produced 5,715
kg. of rice annually, that is, 300 kg. per person, of which
85.6 kg. remained for personal consumption, the temple
receiving 71.5 percent of the labor forces’ productivity. In
comparison the field assigned for the production of rice for
the chief priest’s personal consumption provided 553.4 kg.
of hulled rice per year, or 1.5 kg. per day. Aside from the
production of the land directly assigned to support the chief
priest, Sedov argues that the chief priest undoubtedly
received a share of the temple’s “sacrificial rice.” The
implication is that these priests could use this additional
daily rice allotment to secure other goods for their personal
consumption. While there is little information on the
functioning of Khmer marketplaces or of the specific role of
temples or even the Khmer government as market
supervisors or participants, temple priests could have had
an impact upon market prices by withholding their
allotments of surplus foodstuffs from the market or by
exchanging this surplus within the marketplace, depending
upon when in the agricultural calendar this was done.
94. See Coedès, IC, 4:107, where a certain amount of rice
designated to support temple sacrifice was paid to the
state.
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95. The state may or may not have exercised its revenue rights
over land, and often didn’t. Its revenue demands were
based on the land’s capacity for production. As inscriptions
recording land transfers normally note the land’s
productivity, it would seem that land surveys were
conducted and that the state’s revenue expectations were
set accordingly. This does not mean that estimates of
productivity were necessarily set by royal officials; they
could equally have been established by the local elite, or
derived through negotiation between the local elite and
royal officials. Royal revenue officials received payments in
kind or labor services, keeping a portion of their collections
for their own benefit and passing a portion on to the king’s
treasury. The royal family thus derived income from such
collections as well as from their own estates. See Sahai,
“Fiscal Administration in Ancient Cambodia,” 123–138.
Sahai believes that a Khmer monarch could rightfully claim
between one-sixth to one-fourth of the “spiritual gain (i.e.,
the production) of his subjects” (p. 130). The phrasing of
such royal claims, that is, taking a share in his subjects’
“spiritual gains,” well illustrates the mobilization of
production under a religious pretext.
96. Coedès, IC, 5:229–234.
97. Ibid., 6:228–233. In addition, 6 kg. of vegetable oil, 25 kg.
of sesame seeds, 25 kg. of chick peas, 2 banners, and 2
measures of cloth were annually provided by the local
temple to the central temple.
98. George Coedès, “La stèle de Ta-prohm,” BEFEO 6 (1906):
44–81.
99. Sedov, “On the Problem of the Economic System in
Angkor,” estimates that 366.8 tons of rice were supplied by
roughly 66,625 villagers, each of the 3,140 villages
providing roughly 117 kg. per year to the central temple.
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100. Coedès, “La stèle de Prah Khan d’Angkor,” BEFEO 41
(1941): 255–301. Despite this regional separation, there
was a sense of belonging to a Khmer “state.” O. W. Wolters
argues that the Khmer sense of territorial identity was
unlike that among other populations in early Southeast
Asia. This sense is conveyed, for example, in an 868
inscription from the Korat Plateau that describes that area
as being “outside Kambudesa” (Coedès, IC, 6:85; noted in
Wolters, History, Culture, and Region, 31). Wolters believes
that this attitude was confirmed by almost five hundred
years of territorial integrity. Yet Khmer royal authority was
often seen as limitless, as for instance in Yaśovarman I’s
(889–910) claim to have ruled from the Bay of Bengal to
China, and Jayavarman VII’s late twelfth-century records
that he had received the homage of Vietnam and Java. See
chap. 8.
101. By contrast, Cambodia’s 3 million people during the early
1960s prewar era produced 1.2 million tons of rice
annually, 400 kg. per person. Since the figure of 200 kg. of
hulled rice is roughly equivalent to 400 kg. of paddy rice,
Sedov, “On the Problem of the Economic System in
Angkor,” estimates the productivity of twelfth-century and
twentieth-century Cambodian peasants to be equal. When
one considers that Khmer monarchs could also claim
one-sixth to one-fourth of a peasant’s production, the
degree of exploitation of Khmer workers is even more
pronounced. In the Trapaeng Don An inscription noted
above, by comparison, Sedov estimates that the local
temple kñuṁ were allotted 86 kg. of their annual
production of 300 kg. of rice, or about 30 percent of their
total production, a figure consistent with those of the royal
temple of Prah Khan.
102. See Michael Aung-Thwin, “Kingship, the Saṅgha, and
Society in Pagan,” in Hall and Whitmore, Explorations in
Early Southeast Asian History, 205–256.
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103. Boechari, “Some Considerations on the Problem of the
Shift of Mataram’s Centre of Government from Central to
East Java in the 10th Century,” in Smith and Watson, Early
South East Asia, 473–491.
104. Hermann Kulke, “Early State Formation and Ritual Policy
in Eastern Java,” in Proceedings, Eighth International
Association of Historians of Asia Conference, offers a
similar thesis.
105. Buchari, “A Preliminary Note on the Study of the
Old-Javanese Civil Administration,” Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu
Sastra Indonesia 1 (1963): 122–133, and Boechari,
“Epigraphy and Indonesian Historiography,” in An
Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko
et al., 50–60. Sīma grants were intended to develop
economically peripheral lands, reward loyal followers, and
extend the control of the throne.
106. Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century: A
Study in Cul tural History, 4:490.
107. See J. G. de Casparis, Prasasti Indonesia I: Inscripties uit
de Çailendra- Tijd, 24ff., 73, 79; and Kulke, “Early State
Formation.”
7: ELEVENTH-CENTURY COMMERCIAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGKOR AND CHAMPA
This chapter expands upon two earlier studies by Kenneth
R. Hall: “Khmer Commercial Developments and Foreign
Contacts under Sūryavarman I,” Jour nal of the Economic
and Social History of the Orient (hereafter JESHO) 18, 3
(1975): 318–336; and “Eleventh-Century Commercial
Developments in Angkor and Champa,” JSEAS 10, 2 (1979):
420–434.
1. H. de Mestier du Bourg, “La première moitié du XIe siècle
au Cambodge: Suryavarman Ier, sa vie et quelques aspects
des institutions à son époque,” JA 258, 3–4 (1970):
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281–314; and Michael Vickery, “The Reign of Sūryavarman
I and the Dynamics of Angkorean Development,”
Proceedings, Eighth Interna tional Association of Historians
of Asia Conference. Du Bourg notes in particular the
intense religious and economic development of the Prāḥ
Vihār region in the time of Sūryavarman I (p. 291), and also
believes that the Angkor complex was constructed utilizing
resources derived from lands assigned to and developed by
temples (pp. 306–307).
2. Du Bourg, “La première moitié,” 308.
3. The Mon region of Dvāravatī was absorbed by the Khmer
in the mid-tenth century but reemerged as a recognizable
cultural entity in the fourteenth century. See H. L. Shorto,
“A Mon Genealogy of Kings: Observations on The Nidāna
Ārambhakanthā,” in Historians of South-East Asia, ed. D. G.
E. Hall, 163–172.
4. These are compounds of the Khmer words khloñ
(“worker”) and jnvāl (“Khmer”), resulting in the meaning
“one who works for money” (George Coedès, IC, 3:14 n. 1),
and the Sanskrit word vāṇija (“merchant”). Resident
vendors had local roots that often included landholding
rights. See for example IC, 3:11–16.
5. Ibid., 4:108–139. Here gold, precious stones, pearls, cloth
goods, and “goods from China” were traded. Other Khmer
inscriptions refer to silk, cotton, and other cloth goods;
spices; animals such as cows, buffaloes, elephants, horses,
and pigs; sandalwood; slaves; ceramics; precious stones;
rice; and gold and silver as being among the commodities
one could acquire from a merchant. The participation of
itinerant merchants from foreign lands in the activities of
Khmer commercial centers can be identified. A Cham
merchant (Vāp Chāmpa) and a Vietnamese merchant (a
Yvan of Kaṃvaṅ Tadiṅ) sold goods along with local
merchants (khloñ jnvāl) in the eastern area of Phum Mīen
in 984 (ibid., 6:183–186). A little farther west, at Tuol Pei
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(992), a China trader (Vāp China) was dealing in slaves,
gold, silver, and other goods (E. T. Aymonier, Le Cambodge,
1:443).
6. Coedès, IC, 5:270–271.
7. Ibid., 7:94–98.
8. Aymonier, Le Cambodge, 1:443.
9. Coedès, IC, 6:225–227.
10. Ibid., 3:57–61.
11. Ibid., 4:140–150.
12. Ibid., 3:16–24.
13. Ibid., 3:16–24; 5:133–142.
14. See Du Bourg, “La première moitié,” 307.
15. Coedès, I C, 5:133–142.
16. Ibid., 4:149–150.
17. Du Bourg, “La première moitié,” passim.
18. Merchants may thus be seen as intervening on the Khmer
elites’ behalf, circumventing local autonomy relative to the
centralizing ambitions of regional (khloñ viṣaya) and royal
authorities. Merchants named in the inscriptions appear to
have derived stature—which likely contributed to their
commercial success—via the patronage of the Khmer elites
whom they served. Similar use of merchants to extend royal
authority is documented in Javanese epigraphy, as
discussed in chapters 1 and 9.
19. Du Bourg, “La première moitié‚” 297.
20. Ibid., 298.
21. In the Beṅ Vien inscription of 946, it was noted that
Rājendravarman was “victorious in combat against the
powerful and wicked Rāmaṇya and Champa” (Coedès, IC,
5:97–104). Based on Burmese records that name the old
Mon area at Pegu Rāmaññadesa, the Rāmaṇya in the
Khmer inscription is identified as that of the Mons of
eastern Dvāravatī. Two inscriptions from Thailand’s
Prachinburi province record activity in this area by
Rājendravarman II. One was exhibited at the National
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Museum, Bangkok, in 1971; the other, from Aranna Pradesa
district, was published in the Thai journal Sinlapakon 16, 1
(1972): 61–65. This information was generously supplied by
Hiram W. Woodward of the University of Vermont, who has
discussed the tenth-century evidence with me.
22. George Coedès, Recueil des inscriptions du Siam, 13–15.
23. Map 6 was constructed by plotting the locations of
inscriptions that show clear evidence of commercial
activity. Locations are based on E. Lunet de Lajonquière,
“Carte archéologique de l’ancien Cambodge,” Publications
de l’École Française d’Extrême Orient 9 (1911): insert.
24. As previously noted, Prāḥ Vihār was the scene of intense
religious and economic development in the reign of
Sūryavarman (Du Bourg, “La première moitié,” 291). For an
idea of the geography of this area, see L. P. Briggs, The
Ancient Khmer Empire, 111, fig. 19.
25. Coedès, I C, 7:94–98.
26. Louis Finot, “L’inscription de Ban That,” BEFEO 12 (1912):
2.
27. Coedès, IC, 6:183–186. Evidence that this would be the
case can be surmised from the 1128 attacks on Vietnam
that followed this route. One of these attacks is even noted
as having involved over seven hundred boats, an indication
of the extent of travel in the upstream area on the
Vietnamese side; see the Vietnamese chronicle Ðại Việt
sũ-ký toàn thu’, 1: 263, 347. (Gratitude is extended to John
K. Whitmore for an English translation of the appropriate
sections of the chronicle.) See also Henri Maspero, “La
frontière de l’Annam et du Cambodge,” BEFEO 18, 3
(1918): 29–36.
28. See Milton Osborne, “Notes on Early Cambodian Provincial
History: Isanapura and Sambhupura,” France-Asie /Asia 20,
4 (1966): 447.
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29. Coedès, IC, 7:63–70. L. P. Briggs, Ancient Khmer Empire,
178–182, credits Sūryavarman with bringing the upper
Mun Valley into the Khmer administrative structure, dating
the foundation of three temples in this region—at Phimai,
Phanom Wan, and Phanom Rung—to his reign.
30. A Phimai inscription (1041) makes reference to the
syncretic Śaivite cult with which Sūryavarman was
associated (Coedès, IC, 7:124–126; see Du Bourg’s
discussion of Sūryavarman’s relationship with this cult in
“La première moitié”), a cult that was also known to have
been established at Lopburi (Coedès, Recueil des
inscriptions du Siam, 10–12).
31. The Phimai (1041) inscription uses the twelve-year animal
cycle associated with Thai rather than Khmer dating
practice. The later development of a cultural center of the
Thai-speaking peoples in the Lopburi region reflects the
importance of these early communications between Phimai
and Lopburi. An early nineteenth-century Thai map shows a
well-developed road network connecting Phimai and
Lopburi; see Victor Kennedy, “An Indigenous Early
Nineteenth Century Map of Central and Northeast
Thailand,” in In Memorian Phya Anuman Rajadhon, ed. Tej
Bunag and M. Smithies, 315–348.
32. By the late eleventh century Khmer kings were coming
from this northern region. Jayavarman VI (1081–1107) first
appears in a Phanom Wan inscription (1082), directing
many high civil and religious officials to supervise the local
monastery (Briggs, Ancient Khmer Empire, 178–179). The
inscriptions of Jayavarman and his immediate successors
are concentrated in the northern areas of Phimai, Prāḥ
Vihār, and Bān Thāt, making a strong case for the
development of consistent communication via the Mun
River during the reign of Sūryavarman I.
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33. It is no coincidence that modern roads from the Tonle Sap
region follow this same route via Battambang and Sisophon
to Thailand. The distribution of Khmer temple inscriptions
indicates that an overland route from the Sisophon-Svay
Chek region also connected the Phimai-Phanom Wan area
to the Khmer “core.”
34. Coedès, IC, 3:3–11. Briggs, Ancient Khmer Empire, 160,
dates the construction of the temple to 1036, the date of
this inscription.
35. Coedès, IC, 3:11–24.
36. Ibid., 3:13, 60.
37. The epigraphy from Bantāy Pṛāv records visits by the royal
retinues (kaṃ steṅ) of Sūryavarman I and Harṣavarman III
(1071). In the latter inscription, among those present was a
man “of the caste from the West” (varṇa anak pūrva), who
may be considered representative of the western contacts
of this Khmer commercial center (ibid., 3:57–64).
38. Coedès, Recueil des inscriptions du Siam, 10–15.
39. As identified by O. W. Wolters, “Tāmbraliṅga,” BSOAS 21
(1958): 587–607.
40. Alastair Lamb, “Kedah and Takuapa: Some Tentative
Historical Conclusions,” Federated Museums Journal 6
(1961): 76. Past literature has presented Tāmbraliṅga as
the scene of eleventh-century conflict between the Śrīvijaya
maritime empire and the expanding mainland power of the
Khmers, as discussed in chapter 8. A political connection
between the Khmers and Tāmbraliṅga has yet to be
conclusively proved, although Chinese accounts from the
Sung period considered Tāmbraliṅga to be within their
pattern of geographical knowledge about Cambodia. The
Chinese believed that mainland markets supplied
Tāmbraliṅga with some of the best incense available. See
Wolters, “Tāmbraliṅga,” 593–594, 600; and F. Hirth and W.
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W. Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and
Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,
Entitled Chu-fan-chi, 31–33.
41. Stanley J. O’Connor, Hindu Gods of Peninsular Siam,
60–62, and fig. 34.
42. David Wyatt of Cornell University has provided information
on a Phatthalung chronicle reference to a Tamil inscription
from Songkhla dated 983. In this account, a monk states
that he is copying this inscription, which records an
overland route to the west coast.
43. Alastair Lamb, “Takuapa: The Probable Site of a
Pre-Malaccan Entrepot in the Malay Peninsula,” in Malayan
and Indonesian Studies, ed. John Bastin and R. Roolvink,
76–86.
44. Coedès, IC, 7:63–70.
45. Aymonier, Le Cambodge, 443.
46. Coedès, I C, 183–186.
47. Hall, “Khmer Commercial Development and Foreign
Contacts under Sūryavarman I,” 318–336.
48. See chapter 8.
49. G. H. Luce, Old Burma, Early Pagan, 1:21–23, 26, as
discussed in chapter 8.
50. George Coedès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia,
ed. Walter F. Vella, 17.
51. Rolph Stein, “Le Lin-yi,” Han-Hiue 2 (1947).
52. Coedès, Indianized States, 40.
53. Georges Maspero, Le Royaume de Champa, 54–55.
54. Ibid., 53.
55. As evinced by the travel itinerary of the fifth-century
voyage of the Indian prince Guṇavarman, who was to have
sailed from the Javanese coast to a Cham port on his way to
China. See O. W. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce: A
Study of the Origins of Sri Vijaya, 35, and chap. 3.
56. George Coedès, “Deux inscriptions Sanskrites du Fou-nan,”
BEFEO 31 (1931): 1–12.
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57. Maspero, Le Royaume de Champa, 77–78.
58. George Coedès, The Making of Southeast Asia, 77. Earlier
references to widespread piracy along the Cham coast—for
example, the story of Nāgasena, an Indian monk who was
shipwrecked on the Cham coast in the late fifth century and
robbed of his possessions (see chap. 3)—suggests that this
naval expedition was undertaken to deter piracy along the
Cham coast, thus making the coast fit for trade. Fan Tang’s
title as “Pacifier of the South and Commander-in-Chief of
the Military Affairs of the Seashore,” reflected the Chinese
court’s view that he was responsible for maintaining
control over Cham coast piracy. Fan Tang successfully
engaged the loyalty of the Cham coast seamen. The
necessity of a Chinese naval expedition to police the coast
in the early seventh century suggests that in that era there
was either an unstable relationship between the Cham
state and its coastal inhabitants or that Cham monarchs
actually encouraged raids as a means of providing their
maritime allies with income when the international trade
route was in a state of flux and even derived a share of the
loot.
59. Wang Gungwu, “The Nanhai Trade: A Study of the Early
History of the Chinese Trade in the South China Sea,”
JMBRAS 21, 2 (1958): 90–91. In 875 a new Cham dynasty
came to power at Indrapura (Quang-nam), and reference in
Chinese sources is henceforth made to Chan-ch’eng, “the
Cham city,” or Champapura (Maspero, Le Royaume de
Champa, 6). That the Chinese thought of the Cham domain
as principally a maritime state is reflected in Annam
Chí-lúo’c, written in China in the early fourteenth century
by a Vietnamese, Lê Tắc, which gives the following brief
note on Champa (Chan-ch’eng-kuo): “(They) established
(their) state on the shore of the sea. Chinese merchant
ships cross the sea. The outer barbarians who come and go
all congregate here to take on fuel and water” (Lê Ta̐c,
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Annam Chí-lúo’c, 31). John K. Whitmore of the University of
Michigan’s Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies
provided this translation.
60. See Maspero, Le Royaume de Champa, passim. Champa,
like the Angkor state, patterned much of its statecraft on
Funan, drawing upon its legacy as a former “vassal
territory” of the Funan empire. See chap. 3. Early Cham
epigraphy reflects the river valley focus of Cham
agriculture. In these inscriptions Cham monarchs never
assume a role as direct supervisors of agricultural activity,
although their meritorious acts are considered responsible
for the prosperity of their subject populations. The
monarch’s place was in the battlefield, where he protected
the agrarian communities under his rule and thereby
legitimized his ruling status. In return the Cham monarch
was entitled to receive one-sixth of local agricultural
production (also the official state share due to Khmer
monarchs). But transfers of state income rights to property
consistently emphasize that the state normally expected to
collect only one-tenth of the income, which was assigned to
temples, and report that because of the ruler’s
“benevolence” the state collected only one-tenth instead of
its rightful one-sixth share. It is likely that the Cham
monarch was largely incapable of collecting local land
revenues and was thus assigning a token one-tenth in the
hope that the temples might have better luck than he
making collections. Instead of provoking hostility by
collecting his share of local production, the monarch
instead drew the symbolic merit that his “donation”
bestowed. The growing importance of temples as economic
centers—and as well as institutions of political
consolidation—is shown in the numerous inscriptions that
record the assignment to temples of management rights to
public granaries by Cham monarchs and their direct
political subordinates. Communal granaries played an
Notes
392
important role as a source of unity among agricultural
communities. Temples were also often responsible for
bringing the lands of the Cham political elites under
cultivation.
61. Champa was in a position to inherit the entrepôt position
filled in earlier centuries by Funan to the south (Paul
Pelliot, “Le Fou-nan,” BEFEO 3 [1903]: 248–303). It was
Śrīvijaya, however, that assumed Funan’s former position
as the chief entrepôt on the maritime route in the seventh
century and maintained this position until the eleventh
century. Champa’s position, recognized by the Chinese, was
that of a secondary port.
62. A. Barth and A. Bergaigne, ISCC, 253.
63. Aymonier, Le Cambodge, 1:191, and Barth and Bergaigne,
ISCC, 217.
64. Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce, and The Fall of
Srivijaya in Malay History.
65. The Nakhǫn Si Thammarat inscription from the eastern
Malay coast dated 775 suggests that the Śrīvijaya monarch
held political authority over the Southern Seas during the
eighth century (K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, The History of
Srivijaya, 120, provides the text and an English translation
of the dated inscription). There is some debate, however,
whether Śrīvijaya’s authority during that period was being
exercised from Sumatra or from Java (J. G. de Casparis,
Prasasti Indone sia II: Selected Inscriptions from the
Seventh to the Ninth Century A.D., 15–46, 258–261,
288–300, as discussed in chapter 5). Thai historians,
however, propose a southern Thailand base, possibly
Nakhǫn Si Thammarat (M. C. Chand Chirayu Rajani,
“Background to the Srivijaya Story,” JSS 62, 1 [1974]:
174–211; 62, 2 [1974]: 285–324). The Chinese recognized
Śrīvijaya’s dominance over the Southern Seas until at least
the twelfth century (Wolters, Fall of Srivijaya, 38), although
Bennet Bronson has proposed that Śrīvijaya’s hegemony
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authority probably shifted several times during the period
when the Chinese were recognizing its dominance (Bennet
Bronson and Jan Wisseman, “Palembang as Srivijaya: The
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Perspectives 19, 2 [1976]: 220–239).
66. The Cham temples were said to have been desecrated in
these raids, representing the destruction of the Cham
king’s legitimacy. As noted in the Po Nagar temple
inscription recording these events, the temple’s liṅga was
carried off by the raiders but the Cham king followed with
his navy. He was unable to recover the original liṅga, which
was said to have been lost at sea in a battle between the
Cham monarch and the raiders. The Cham king not only
installed a replacement liṅga, the symbol of his legitimacy,
but he also used the loot he acquired while defeating the
marauders to reconstruct the damaged temple (Barth and
Bergaigne, ISCC, 252).
67. See Bronson and Wisseman, “Palembang as Srivijaya.”
68. Quoted in Wang Gungwu, “The Nanhai Trade,” 81. In
addition, the foreign merchant community themselves
compounded the situation by sacking Canton in 763.
69. Quoted in ibid., 82. The Vietnamese ports were also
subjected to similar raids during the 760s; this indicates
their commercial importance in that age. See Coedès,
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structures, who were preoccupied with trade and
commerce and were part of a new, cosmopolitan, urban,
commercial society. See Reid, “Trade and State Power.”
172. Kasetsiri, Rise of Ayudhya, passim, and Moertono, State
and Statecraft in Old Java, 136.
9: MARITIME TRADE AND STATE DEVELOPMENT
IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY JAVA
1. George Coedès, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia,
ed. Walter F. Vella, 185–188, 198–201, 232–234, 239–242.
2. Jan Wisseman, “Markets and Trade in Pre-Majapahit Java,”
in Economic Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast
Asia: Perspectives from Prehistory, History, and
Ethnography, ed. Karl L. Hutterer, 197–212.
3. Paul Wheatley, “Geographical Notes on Some Commodities
Involved in Sung Maritime Trade,” JMBRAS 32, 2 (1959):
passim.
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4. Wisseman, “Markets and Trade in Pre-Majapahit Java,”
205.
5. A reconstruction of the traditional Javanese road network
in the seventeenth century, with speculation about its
character in Majapahit times, is supplied by B. Schrieke,
Indonesian Sociological Studies: Ruler and Realm in Early
Java, 103ff.
6. Canto 8, stanza 2 of the Nagarakĕrtagama, in Th. G. Th.
Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century: A Study in
Cultural History, 3:9.
7. Canto 23, stanza 3, ibid., 3:24; 4:55.
8. Canto 18, stanza 1, ibid., 3:23; 4:497.
9. Ibid., 3:25.
10. Canto 23, stanza 3, ibid., 3:24.
11. Ibid., 1:108–112; 3:156-162; 4:399–411 (Javanese text,
English translation, and commentary).
12. This may be compared to a tenth-century reference to
ferrymen of various central Java river-crossing districts in
the Panambangan Ferry Charter of A.D. 903–904, which was
discovered in the upper course of the Bengawan River (the
eastern bend of the Solo River). This inscription provides
for the institution and upkeep of a boatshed, houses for
ferrymen, and boats, and for the free passage of all subjects
of King Balitung without toll. Leading members of the local
trade community (goldsmiths, ironsmiths, coppersmiths,
and brass-smiths) received remitted royal taxes on deposit
and were to pay for the above provisions out of the interest
on these deposits. The inscription also discusses royal taxes
imposed on members of the commercial community. The
community’s commercial leaders were granted freedom
from tax on transactions up to specified levels, whereupon
surplus sales above the designated level were subject to
royal taxes. The inscription also lists the transactions of
dealers in cloth, rice, sesame oil, salt, and other trades
subject to royal taxes. The text and translation appear in H.
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B. Sarkar, Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java (up to 928 A.D.
), 2:43–50. For comparison see the Palĕbuhan Copper-Plate
inscription (ca. A.D. 927) that was discovered near Madiun
and the Mananjung inscription (A.D. 928) that was issued
near Malang, which record very similar tax arrangements
with commercial communities that were subject to Siṇḍok
(929–947). See ibid., 2:215–219, 227–247.
13. J. V. G. Mills, trans., Ying-yai Sheng-lan of Ma Huan (1433),
91.
14. Hardjowardojo, trans., Pararaton, 43, 58.
15. Sarkar, Corpus of the Inscriptions of Java, 215–219. For a
discussion of the pre-Majapahit era dĕrwaya haji cesses,
see Wisseman, “Markets and Trade in Pre-Majapahit Java.”
As noted above, the use of foreigners to collect dĕrwaya
haji reflects several possibilities. It may simply have
facilitated the movement of goods from the hinterland to
the coast, or it may also be viewed as an attempt by
Javanese monarchs to penetrate local political autonomy.
Javanese monarchs, who had difficulty dealing with local
powers, could have placed their trust in outsiders with no
local connections. Such foreigners with few ties to the local
political or social system could have enhanced their
political, social, or economic status as a consequence of
their royal service.
16. The concept of “symbolic capital” is drawn from Pierre
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 172ff., as
discussed in chapter 6.
17. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 3:160–162; 4:109.
18. Ibid., 4:400.
19. The Nagarakĕrtagama reports one such royal
redistribution of textiles (along with bamboo and food) to
workers who were responsible for the construction of
viewing stands for those watching the games that took
place at the Caitra festival (canto 87, stanza 3).
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20. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 1:115–117;
3:166–168. Pigeaud’s assignment of a 1391 date to the
second letter was revised to 1393 by L. C. Damais, “Études
d’epigraphie Indonésienne, III. Liste des principales
inscriptions datées de l’Indonésie,” BEFEO 46 (1952–1954):
105, and “Études d’epigraphie Indonésienne, IV. Discussion
de la date des inscriptions,” BEFEO 47 (1955): 238.
21. It is not clear what a unit of “cash” was equivalent to,
although Chinese accounts suggest that they were units of
copper currency.
22. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 3:166. The area
in question was subject to the authority of the king’s uncle
(the Prince of Wĕngker, who plays a prominent role in the
Nagarakĕrtagama) who independently issued a charter
around 1380 that was confirmed in the 1393 letter from the
king to the local elite (ibid., 4:416).
23. Ibid., 4:426.
24. The court’s right to a share of the titiban collections
guaranteed the flow of locally produced trade commodities
(salt, sugar, salted meats, cloth, oil, and a share of goods
acquired in exchange for these products) to the court. The
political implications of royal redistributions of these trade
goods are discussed in Hiram W. Woodward, Jr., “A Chinese
Silk Depicted at Candi Sewu,” in Eco nomic Exchange and
Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspectives from Pre
history, History and Ethnography, ed. Karl L. Hutterer,
233–244.
25. See F. H. van Naerssen and R. C. de Iongh, The Economic
and Adminis trative History of Early Indonesia, 1–84.
26. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 3:173; 4:449ff.
While the Naga rakĕrtagama makes no mention of
debt-bondsmen, the Pararaton lists many. A discussion of
debt-bondsmen in early Southeast Asia is provided by
Anthony Reid, ed., Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in
South-East Asia.
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27. He was assigned seven acres (one jung) of land that could
be terraced (pasawahan) and one kikil (half ajung) of
clearings. This territory was subject to the authority of the
king’s daughter’s husband.
28. This consignment of fish (acan) was consumed in the great
community meal that culminated the Caitra festival.
29. The importance of such marriage alliances is demonstrated
in the case where the rejection of a marriage tie to the
ruler of the Sunda Strait region led to armed conflict
between the ruler’s forces and those of the Majapahit state.
30. In the Angkor realm, peasants often retained only about 30
percent of what they produced on their lands, the
remainder being due to elites or institutions (temples) that
held rights to income from property (see chap. 6). Loss of
control over surplus did not mean poverty for the peasant,
however. With the percentage of local production due to
those who held income rights to land fixed, increased
productivity that generated additional surplus would have
benefited the producer as well as those holding income
rights to the peasant’s land. Revenue was collected by the
Majapahit state in three forms: cash, produce, and labor,
with the latter two the most common. Rice was the
principal means of payment in the fourteenth century
(although cash settlements were becoming more common,
especially among the nonagrarian population). Payments of
rice due to the Majapahit government were collected by
state ministers (patih) and were often stored until needed
by the state (Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century,
4:386; see also Soemarsaid Moertono, State and Statecraft
in Old Java: A Study of the Later Mataram Period, 16th to
19th Century, 85). “The Charter of Katiden” (1395)
mentions a rice tax of takerturun (“a bundle of rice in the
blade for every compound gate”) (Pigeaud, 3:174; 4:456).
The rice was collected from the fields at harvest time—the
Nagarakĕrtagama mentions prabherti, the “first fruits of
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the harvest” that were payable to the government for use in
the Caitra festival (canto 83, stanza 5). Writing in 1225,
Chao Ju-kua, the commissioner of foreign trade at the
China coast port of Ch’uan-chou, noted that the Javanese
paid a “tithe-rent” rice tax; Javanese government officials
received rice from this payment as their salary—these
officials supervised cities, the state’s treasury, and the
state’s granaries. See F. Hirth and W. W Rockhill, Chau
Ju-kua: His Work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the
Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, Entitled Chu-fan-chi,
76–77, 83.
31. These ceremonies converted the material capital derived
from royal cesses into “symbolic capital.” During the
pre-Majapahit era Java’s population was linked in a social
and cultural order that focused on the court. In the
Majapahit era new state ritual, such as that described in
the Nagarakĕrtagama and in the three charters discussed
above, broadened participation to include those who were
of nonelite (“common”) status. Majapahit rulers promoted
the state’s authority vis-à-vis local authority and
encouraged ritual at the local level that “copied” that of the
royal court. Various groups, not just landed elites as in
former times, participated in local ceremonies and
representatives of these groups attended ceremonies at the
court. An extended discussion of ritual integration in early
Javanese history is provided in Hermann Kulke, “Early
State Formation and Ritual Policy in Eastern Java,” in
Proceedings, Eighth International Associ ation of Historians
of Asia Conference.
32. It is here implied that the Javanese peasant would have
responded to such an opportunity to improve his income.
This assumption is somewhat controversial, as scholars also
argue that the typical Southeast Asian peasant had other
priorities than economic goals in his life. See William C.
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Scott, The Moral Econ omy of the Peasant, and Samuel L.
Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of
Rural Society in Vietnam.
33. See Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java, 14–26.
During the Majapahit era there was a shift of emphasis
from the construction of colossal temples to more elaborate
court ceremony. The Majapahit state built an impressive
royal kraton and several strategic temples (e.g.,
Panataran); however, the Nagarakĕrta gama’s focus on the
massive Caitra ceremonies indicates that lavish public
festivals were considered more critical to the strengthening
of ties between the state center and its outer regions.
34. Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, 78, 82–83.
35. Ibid., 78, 81–82 n. 16. Java also imported gold and silver
vessels, silk, chemicals, lacquerware, and porcelain from
China in Chao Ju-kua’s time.
36. See John K. Whitmore, “Vietnam and the Monetary Flow of
Eastern Asia, Thirteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” in
Precious Metal Flows in the Later Medie val and Early
Modern Worlds, ed. J. F. Richards, 363–393.
37. Mills, Ma Huan, 45–47, 88, 96, 97, 102, 107, 129–130, 136,
141, 151, 153, 156, 161, 167, 172.
38. Henry Yule, trans., The Book of Ser Marco Polo, 2:272–274.
39. Brian E. Colless, “Majapahit Revisited: External Evidence
on the Geography and Ethnology of East Java in the
Majapahit Period,” JMBRAS 48, 2 (1975): 124–161.
40. The commander-in-chief of Majapahit’s forces was said to
have received 8,000 cash per diem from markets. Market
merchants active near the court were obliged to relinquish
part of their stocks to the “chiefs of trade,” who shared this
collection (titiban) with the court (Pigeaud, Java in the
Fourteenth Century, 4:426). Chao Ju-kua reports that high
government officials periodically received a supply of native
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produce to supplement their monthly salaries; soldiers and
troop commanders received their salaries in gold (Hirth
and Rockhill, Chau Ju- kua, 76).
41. The Nagarakĕrtagama (canto 16) implies that specific
traders were under royal patent.
42. Chao Ju-kua reports that “traders going there (eastern Java
ports) are put up in visitors’ lodges, where food and drink
… (are supplied to them)” (Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua,
77); traders were generously treated and were not charged
for harborage or board—although the Java monarch
received a return on foreign traders’ exchange of gold and
silver and other metals and produce for Java’s spices (ibid.,
83). The following quotation from Clifford Geertz’s study of
early Balinese civilization could well be describing the
dilemma faced by Java’s monarchs as they came to terms
with their state’s commercial interests:
commerce in classical Bali, though definitely
in [the state’s realm of interest], was not
altogether of it. Not only was the bulk of it in
foreign hands (Chinese, Javanese, Buginese,
on occasion European), but also it was
connected to political life
eccentrically—through a set of extremely
specialized institutions designed at once to
contain its dynamic and to capture its
returns. The lords were not unmindful either
that, in reaching for them, they risked the
very foundations of their power. Grasping by
habit, they were autarchic by instinct, and
the result was a certain baroqueness of
economic arrangement. (Geertz, Negara: The
Theater-State in Nineteenth Century Bali, 87)
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Geertz’s study of nineteenth-century Bali holds that
Balinese civilization generally looked away from the
international trade centers (“politically insulated ‘ports of
trade’”); the state’s elite mediated contacts with outsiders
to the advantage of all (ibid.). In contrast, this study of Java
shows less internal focus and greater interaction between
the Javanese economy and the trade centers on Java’s north
coast, especially after the eleventh century.
43. Anthony Reid, “Trade and State Power in 16th and 17th
Century Southeast Asia,” in Proceedings, Seventh
International Association of Historians of Asia Conference,
391–419; and Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java.
44. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 3:105.
45. The state was also responsible for keeping public utilities
in good repair (directly or indirectly through pressure on
the local elite); they were specifically noted as being under
government protection (ibid., 4:93–94). The royal
government undertook such public works projects as the
construction of dams, roads, bridges, fountains, and
marketplaces, as well as the planting of trees (ibid., 4:103,
257).
46. Canto 83, stanza 4; canto 86, stanza 1–canto 87, stanza 3;
Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4:291.
47. Tradesmen and merchants brought tribute to the king at
the annual Caitra festival ceremonies, the culmination of
the Majapahit state’s economic and social life. Here, too,
representatives from China, India, Cambodia, Vietnam,
Champa, and Thailand paid their respects to the king. They
came to Java on merchant ships (it is unclear whose),
arriving by the western monsoon before the beginning of
the festival (February or March), and returned to the Asian
mainland on the eastern monsoon. The same eastern
monsoon brought traders from the eastern archipelago with
spices (canto 83). Foreign Buddhist monks and Brahmans
also participated in the Caitra festival (93.1). The view of
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Majapahit that these foreigners provided to their
homelands is reflected in the following passage from the
Hikayat Raja Pasai:
The Emperor was famous for his love of
justice. The empire grew prosperous. People
in vast numbers thronged the city. At this
time every kind of food was in great
abundance. There was a ceaseless coming
and going of people from the territories
overseas which had submitted to the king, to
say nothing of places inside Java itself. Of the
districts on the coast, from the west came the
whole of the west, from the east came the
whole of the east. From places inland right
down to the shores of the Southern Ocean
the people all came for an audience with the
Emperor, bringing tribute and offerings….
The land of Majapahit was supporting a large
population. Everywhere one went there were
gongs and drums being beaten, people
dancing to the strains of all kinds of loud
music, entertainments of many kinds like the
living theatre, the shadow play,
masked-plays, step-dancing and musical
dramas. These were the commonest sights
and went on day and night in the land of
Majapahit. (A. H. Hill, “Hikayat Raja-Raja
Pasai,” JMBRAS 33, 2 [1960]: 161)
48. The Phalguna-Caitra ceremonies began with the Bubat
festival (Nagara kĕrtagama, cantos 86–87), continued with
speeches on statecraft at gatherings of the royal family and
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its allies (88–89.5), and culminated with a community meal
and dancing and singing performances in the royal
compound (89.4–91.9).
49. The poem especially tells of the coming to power of the
founder of the Singasari line, Ken Angrok (Rājasa).
50. In the Pararaton Tuban was identified as the Majapahit
realm’s most prosperous coastal port. Although it benefited
from royal favor, it held no royal trade monopoly, and there
was ample trade at other north coast ports.
51. The Pararaton tells most of this story; it was also made into
a romantic poem entitled “Kidung Sunda,” and the
preamble to the Canggu Ferry Charter, as noted above,
alludes to these events. The Nagarakĕrtagama omits
reference to this event entirely, seemingly because it was
considered a blight on the state’s record that the rulers
would rather forget.
52. Chao Ju-kua’s 1225 report noted that the Sunda Strait
region grew a superior variety of pepper but that “the
people of the area are given to brigandage, on which
account foreign traders rarely go there” (Hirth and
Rockhill, Chau Ju- kua, 70).
53. According to the Sejarah Melayu, the Malacca court
chronicle, after this raid the Palembang monarch, who was
idealized as the legitimate heir to the Śrīvijayan rulers,
moved away from Palembang. Malay authority over the
strait was eventually reestablished at Malacca. See O. W.
Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History, 113–114.
Edward McKinnon believes that he has found
archaeological evidence of a Majapahit sack of Muara
Jambi in 1377. See O. W. Wolters, “A Few Miscellaneous
Pi-chi Jottings on Early Indonesia,” Indonesia 36 (October
1983): 60 n. 54.
54. This episode may well illustrate a manipulation of
historical events in early Javanese literature to demonstrate
the legitimacy of the state. In this light it is interesting that
Notes
435
the Pararaton recorded the event while the
Nagarakĕrtagama omitted reference to it. It would seem
that the Parara ton’s emphasis on the trade sector,
including extensive reference to ports that were totally
ignored in the Nagarakĕrtagama, reflects a different
concern from the magico-religious focus of the earlier
work. While the Nagarakĕrtagama projects the image of a
sanctified court that fulfilled earlier concerns for the state’s
“ritual sovereignty,” the Pararaton recognized the
importance of the nonreligious political and economic
affairs of the Majapahit state. On the use of early Javanese
literary sources for historical writing, see C. C. Berg, “The
Javanese Picture of the Past,” in An Introduction to
Indonesian Historiography, ed. Soedjatmoko et al., 87–118.
55. The most recent English language summary of early
Javanese history is D. G. E. Hall (with M. C. Ricklefs), A
History of South East Asia, 4th ed., 74–104.
56. A. J. Bernet Kempers, Ancient Indonesian Art, passim.
Claire Holt, Art in Indonesia: Continuity and Change,
depicts the Majapahit era as the peak of the cultural
synthesis of Śiva worship and Buddhist tantrism, an era of
the “Indonesianization” of classical forms in art, literature,
and music (p. 72ff.). The Javanese wayang (puppet theater)
and gamelan (orchestra) developed in the Majapahit court
and was imitated throughout the realm.
57. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 5, “The Centre of
the Majapahit Complex in the Fourteenth Century
According to Nagara-Kertagama Information,” Outline Plan
1, insert.
58. Ibid., 3:3.
59. Ibid., 3:4; 4:468; and Anthony Johns, “The Role of
Structural Organization and Myth in Javanese
Historiography,” JAS 24, 1 (1964): 93.
60. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4:528.
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61. Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java, 1, speaks of
the magico-religious principle that was the basis of
Javanese kingship; Robert Heine-Geldern, “Conceptions of
State and Kingship in Southeast Asia,” Far Eastern
Quarterly 2 (November 1942): 15–30, describes the
cosmo-magic principle. See Stanley J. Tambiah, World
Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and
Polity in Thailand against a Historical Background, for a
more recent discussion, and also chap. 1.
62. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 3:4.
63. Cantos 42–43.
64. On the controversial reconstruction of the events of
Kĕrtanagara’s reign, see C. C. Berg, “Kertanagara, de
Miskende Empire-builder,” Orientalie 34 (July 1950): 3–32;
and J. G. de Casparis, “Historical Writing on Indonesia
(Early Period),” in Historians of South-East Asia, ed. D. G.
E. Hall, 160–161. A more recent essay on the legacy of
Majapahit in Javanese and Southeast Asian literature and
the authenticity of Majapahit era literary sources, is S.
Supomo, “The Image of Majapahit in Later Javanese and
Indonesian History,” in Perceptions of the Past in Southeast
Asia, ed. Anthony Reid and David Marr, 171–185.
Kĕrtanagara had previously divided the ashes of his father
between two shrines; at one he was worshipped as an
incarnation of Śiva, at the second as the Bodhisattva
Amoghapāśa.
65. Supomo, “The Image of Majapahit.”
66. Canto 4. 2. 4.
67. A useful discussion of Majapahit’s state structure is
Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies: Ruler and Realm
in Early Java, 25–70.
68. Cantos 79.2.2, 88.4; Kĕrtawardana was the husband of
Hayam Wuruk’s mother, who had reigned as queen of
Majapahit prior to her son’s ascension to the throne.
Cantos 79.2.1, 88.2.4; the Wĕngker region was near
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Madiun—west of Kaḍiri on the upper eastern branch of the
Solo River. Vijayarājasa’s title associated him with the
previous rulers of Kaḍiri (he was married to the Princess of
Kaḍiri), while Hayam Wuruk’s father’s Singasari title
associated him with the previous rulers of Singasari. The
Majapahit monarch’s sovereignty over these two princes
symbolized the reigning dynasty’s ties to the past.
Vijayarājasa’s administrative duties included responsibility
for eastern Java and Bali, which was conquered by
Majapahit in 1343 (see J. Noorduyn, “The Eastern Kings in
Majapahit,” BKI 131, 4 [1975]: 479–487). The
Nagarakĕrtagama depicts the holder of the Wĕngker title
as being well-informed of peasant holdings; organizing the
compilation of descriptions of the districts that were under
royal authority; and stimulating the upkeep of roads, public
buildings, and temples—the activities that were also
associated with the king’s father Kĕrtawardana (see
Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4:540–546).
69. From the Ming-shih (“History of the Ming”), as discussed
in Noorduyn, “Eastern Kings in Majapahit,” 481–482.
70. See Brian E. Colless, “A Note on the Names of the Kings of
Java in the Ming History,” BKI 131, 4 (1975): 487–489. The
location of this “eastern capital” is unknown. Majapahit’s
apology for these deaths was accepted by the Ming court.
71. Pigeaud, Java in the Fourteenth Century, 4:537–546.
72. Ibid., see also Colless, “A Note on the Names.”
73. Coedès, Indianized States, 239–242, following the lead of
N. J. Krom, Hindoe-Javaansche Geschiendenis, 427–432.
74. J. Noorduyn, “Majapahit in the 15th Century,” BKI 134, 2–3
(1978): 207–274.
75. See Wolters, Fall of Srivijaya, passim.
76. Noorduyn, “The Eastern Kings in Majapahit.”
77. The Majapahit monarch could no longer guarantee that he
could maintain the order necessary for his subjects’
well-being—the most critical requirement of traditional
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Javanese monarchs—except in Java’s hinterland; thus was
statecraft legitimately refocused on the miniature cosmos
that the monarch continued to rule in Java’s interior.
78. See Mills, Ma Huan, passim.
79. Hardjowardojo, Pararaton.
80. Tuban and Gresik were the most important among the
fifteenth-century ports on Java’s north coast, largely
because of their trade alliances with the Javanese interior
(where they secured rice), the eastern archipelago (where
they exchanged Java’s rice for spices), and Malacca (where
they provisioned the port population with Javanese rice and
the eastern archipelago’s spices). See M. A. P.
Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in
the Indone sian A rch ipelago bet ween 1500 and 1630,
103–115.
81. Armando Cortesão, trans, and ed., The Suma Oriental of
Tomé Pires, 180–223.
82. Numerous fourteenth-through sixteenth-century Muslim
gravestones discovered near the the Majapahit capital (the
earliest dated 1368–1369), which appear to mark the
graves of well-to-do Javanese not foreign Muslims,
demonstrate that Islam did not initially represent a
religious and political force that opposed Majapahit. See L.
C. Damais, “L’epigraphie Musulmane dans le Sud-Est
Asiatique,” BEFEO 54, 2 (1968): 353–415. Tomé Pires noted
that Muslim elites among the Java coast ports, especially
those dominated by Southeast Asian populations, admired
the Majapahit court and tried to emulate its manners and
customs—and thus reflected the style of the Majapahit
state to which they had previously been subject. This port
elite (orang kaya) dominated trade by levying tolls,
monopolizing the trade in specific staple products, and took
an active part in maritime activities such as shipowning,
piracy, and carrying on a personal trade.
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83. See D. H. Burger, Structural Changes in Javanese Society:
The Supra- Vil lage Sphere, trans. L. Palmier; van Naerssen
and de Iongh, Economic and Administrative History,
102–104; and Moertono, State and Statecraft in Old Java.
84. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influences.
85. Chester Gorman et al., “Ban Chiang,” Expedition 18, 4
(1976): 11–47.
86. Marshall Sahlins, “Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief:
Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia,” Comparative
Studies in Society and History 5 (1963): 235–303.
87. Wolters, Fall of Srivijaya; O. W. Wolters, “The Khmer King
at Basan (1371–1373) and the Restoration of the
Cambodian Chronology during the 14th and 15th
Centuries,” Asia Major 12, 1 (1966): 44–64; Charnvit
Kasetsiri, The Rise of Ayudhya; and Tambiah, World
Conqueror and World Renouncer. For elaboration of this
theme, see Geertz, Negara.
88. See, for instance, discussion of the hinterland population
of Samudra-Pasai as reflected in the Hikayat Raja Pasai in
chapter 8. This hinterland population assisted in the
establishment of the Samudra-Pasai entrepôt but chose to
retreat to their upriver homeland rather than convert to
Islam and to become full participants in the new lifestyle of
the entrepôt. Similar patterns were found in Malaysia by
Diane Lewis, where upriver populations rejected the
“civilization” of their fellow Malays who lived in downriver
lowlands yet looked upon these downriver populations for
political and economic mediation with the outside world.
See Lewis, “Inas, A Study of Local History,” JMBRAS 33
(1960): 65–94; and Kenneth R. Hall, “The Coming of Islam
to the Archipelago: A Reassessment,” in Economic
Exchange and Social Interaction in Southeast Asia: Perspec
tives from Prehistory, History and Ethnography, ed. Karl L.
Hutterer, 223–227.
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